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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines works of Philip Sidney (1554-1586), Robert Hooke (1635-
1703), John Milton (1608-1674), Margaret Cavendish (1623-1673), and Anne Finch (1661-1720) 
through the lens of two competing world views that were well-known to all of the subjects of my 
study. The dissertation will begin with a discussion of these two different ways of perceiving and 
representing truth—one informed by the poetic imagination and the other influenced by the 
emerging new science of the seventeenth century. In his The Defence of Poesy, Sir Philip Sidney 
advocates a poetic vision that possesses a unique spiritual and creative power to produce truths, 
making the material world subordinate to the spiritual vision of the poet. In contrast, Robert 
Hooke’s Micrographia (1665) insists upon the value of actual physical seeing, through the 
microscope, and constructing models of the world based upon accumulated details of the tiniest 
observable physical minutia. Though he wasn’t directly responding to Sidney’s works, Hooke’s 
microscopic seeing disputes the autonomy of Sidney’s “inward light each mind hath in itself,” a 
source of poetic sight that Sidney considered sacred to the poetic imagination. Because my chief 
interest involves the topos of light and the representation of “inward light” articulated by Sidney 
in The Defence of Poesy, Sidney’s metaphysics and conception of the poetic imagination remain 
a constant, semi-theoretical foundation throughout my work as I examine the poetic works of 
Cavendish, Milton, and Finch. Although Cavendish, Milton, and Finch had different poetic goals 
among them, they are united in my study by their insistence that accumulating larger piles of 
minute sensory data does not get one closer to “truth.” Because of the modern reader’s location 
in history—given the grand success of the scientific narrative—such a position appears to border 
on irrationality, but much is to be gained by reading these poets’ works through the less familiar 
framework Sidney’s poetics provides.   
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The only way which now remains for us to recover some degree of those former perfections, 
seems to be, by rectifying the operations of the Sense, the Memory, and Reason, since upon the 
evidence, the Strength, the integrity, and the right correspondence of all these, all the light, by 
which our actions are to be guided, is to be renewed, and all our command over things is to be 
establisht.1 
 
Nay, truly, learned men have learnedly thought that where once reason hath so much over-
mastered passion as that the mind hath a free desire to do well, the inward light each mind hath 
in itself is as good as a philosopher’s book.2 
 
So much the rather thou celestial light 
Shine inward, and the mind through all her powers 
Irradiate, there plant eyes, all mist from thence 
Purge and disperse, that I may see and tell 
Of things invisible to mortal sight.3   
 
 
 
The use of the topos of light in these epigraphs suggests the pervasiveness of physical 
light in discussions of both human sensory perception and the intellectual processing of those 
sensory perceptions. In this dissertation I am going to discuss the works of John Milton (1608-
1674), Margaret Cavendish (1623-1673), and Anne Finch (1661-1720) through the lens of two 
competing ways of supplying meaning to the diverse array of physical experiences and 
impressions each human encounters on a daily basis, two competing world views, furthermore, 
that were widely discussed and well-known to all of the subjects of my study. The dissertation 
will begin with a discussion of these two different ways of perceiving and representing truth—
one informed by the poetic imagination and the other influenced by the emerging new science of 
                                                 
1 Robert Hooke, The Preface, Micrographia or Some Physiological Descriptions of Minute Bodies Made by 
Magnifying Glasses with Observations and Inquiries thereupon, sig. A1r. This edition is a facsimile reproduction of 
the first edition published by the Royal Society in 1665.   
2 Sir Philip Sidney, The Defence of Poesie, printed for William Ponsonby, 1595, sig. E4r. For this 
dissertation I am going to refer to the electronic version available online and regularizing to the modern spelling of 
“Poesy.” 
3 John Milton, Book III, Paradise Lost, lines 51-55. 
2 
the time. I have chosen two figures upon which to base my analysis of these two opposing modes 
of seeing, and although not strictly contemporaneous, both were public figures whose works 
were widely discussed and who perfectly represent the contrasting poles of my study. Especially 
with his sophisticated metaphysics in his The Defence of Poesy, Sir Philip Sidney (1554-1586) 
advocated a role for a poetic vision that possessed a unique spiritual and creative power to 
produce truths, making the mere material world subordinate to the spiritual vision of the poet.  
Robert Hooke (1635-1703), on the other hand, wrote beautifully about the value of actual 
physical seeing, through the microscope, and constructing models of the world based upon the 
tiniest observable physical minutia and building up. Thus, though he wasn’t directly responding 
to Sidney’s works, Hooke’s microscopic seeing seeks to undermine the autonomy of Sidney’s 
“inward light each mind hath in itself,” which Sidney—and, as I will show, the other authors in 
my study—considered sacred to the poetic imagination.4 Because my chief interest involves the 
representation of “inward light” in the poetic works of three poets, Cavendish, Milton, and Finch, 
Sidney’s metaphysics and conception of the poetic imagination will remain as a sort of 
foundation throughout my work. Although Cavendish, Milton, and Finch certainly had different 
poetic goals among them, they are clearly united in my study by their dogged insistence that 
accumulating larger and larger piles of minute sensory data does not get one closer to “truth.” 
Because of the modern reader’s location in history—given the grand success of the scientific 
narrative—such a position appears to more than border on irrationality, but I hope to show that 
much is to be gained by reading these poets’ works through the less familiar framework Sidney’s 
poetics provides.   
                                                 
4 Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig. E4r.  
3 
The chapters will proceed in roughly chronological order. Sidney, as I describe above 
central to my study, will occupy chapter one, and it was my fascination with his belief in an 
“inward light” that inspired my examination of this idea in the poets in the next few generations 
that followed him. My second chapter, on Cavendish, will present an especially pivotal aspect of 
my analysis, for Cavendish was a natural philosopher who avidly read and responded to Hooke’s 
works. Therefore, she represents an important figure who fought against the materialist impetus 
of the new scientific method. The contrast between Cavendish and Hooke, as I will show, pits 
two ways of seeing and knowing the world against one another—one that believed the 
contemplative mind could uncover legitimate and large truths from very limited or even singular 
sensory impressions, and the other that sought truth through careful observation, hypotheses, and 
testing. Chapters three and four will examine Milton’s great works, which, I hope the reader will 
agree, proved particularly fertile ground for an examination of inward vision and spiritual sight. 
Finally, I will examine the works of Anne Finch, in which darkness—forcing the observer to rely 
on inward vision and intuition—plays a special role, thus making her a fitting subject for the 
conclusion of my project. 
Since Aristotle’s conviction that the celestial region was more perfect than the terrestrial 
region, including any living things in it, the material distance between such conceptualized 
values as low and high or small and great represented both material and immaterial distance and 
hierarchy. The physical nearness to the greatness signified not only metaphorical relationship but 
also the metonymical relationship of significance and size.5 This hierarchy between the small and 
                                                 
5 In the ancient poetic tradition the size and greatness are proportional, and this tradition remains true and 
influential; Aeneas, a legendary hero, appears in an epic--the bigger than life, longer poem containing poetic verse—
written by the poet whose name embodies the metonymy of poetic genius. In contrast to epic poems, eclogues are 
indeed shorter and contain dialogues. Despite their depiction of pastoral idleness typical of bucolic lifestyle, 
especially to an urban audience, eclogues subtly assume greater complexity and philosophical insight prefiguring the 
bard’s—and the poet himself--potential to rise up the scale, moving away from his humble state to the lofty state of 
4 
great inevitably reinforced the inverse relationship between celestial greatness and corporeal 
proximity to it—the great must maintain its proportion of epic significance as well as the 
physical distance from the small and mundane. Yet such an inverse relationship merely reflects 
the perspective from the seat of celestial greatness.6 The descendant order from great to trivial 
must maintain the inverse relationship between the material distance and conceptual significance. 
For those living things in the terrestrial region, the hierarchy anticipated the necessity of the 
congruous relationship between proximity and greatness—the smaller the distance they have 
from the celestial world, the greater they might be. From the living things’ perspective, 
perfection diminishes as things are farther removed from God, and any significant conceptual or 
physical movement should project and aim for the greatness, should embody the ascending 
movement from the small to great. On the other hand, the farther the celestial body was distanced 
from the earth, the more perfect it was; especially under the influence of Neoplatonists, the 
degree of perfection was “directly proportional to its proximity to the first heaven.”7 
The topos of size and significance had a long tradition in poetic endeavors that sought to 
transform and elevate the material smallness of a text into literary greatness, as in the epic style 
and proportion accomplished in Virgil’s Aeneid or Milton’s Paradise Lost.8 In these amplified 
representations of greatness, Lara Dodds points out, the world other than our own becomes 
visible and magnified. Published in 1665, Robert Hooke’s Micrographia reveals “a new visible 
                                                 
epic hero. In this hierarchy of size and significance, the small and humble looks up to rise higher and become 
greater. 
6  There must be imaginable but intangible distance between the mundane, corporeal life of the everyday 
reader and the range of those great heroes and epic poets. This is indeed the anxiety of the Author speaking.  
7 Edward Grant, “Celestial Perfection from the Middle Ages to the Late Seventeenth Century,” Religion, 
Science, and Worldview: Essays in Honor of Richard S. Westfall, Ed. Margaret J. Osler and Paul Lawrence Farber, 
(New York: Cambridge UP, 1985) 137-162. On the medieval and Renaissance worldview on a hierarchical universe 
ordained by God and the Chain of Being, see also The Elizabethan World Picture by E. M. W. Tillyard. 
8 Lara Dodds, “‘Great Things to Small May Be Compared’: Rhetorical Microscopy in Paradise Lost,” 
Milton Studies 47 (2008), 96-117.  
5 
world discovered to the understanding” and magnifies the world previously too small to be 
visible to our natural eyes.9 Though these poetic and scientific endeavors both aim to signify 
greatness, the subject matter of Hooke’s Micrographia is mostly smaller than the printed letters 
in the book—the objects observed through his microscope are much smaller than the 
conventional small things of his time, and what the microscopic view revealed was invisible to 
the naked eye. Hooke’s magnification of minute, trifling things such as a mite or linen cloth 
signifies an “apparent reversal of [epic] topos,” argues Dodds; in Hooke’s text, small things are 
magnified to show God’s great design, and “this recalibration of the reader’s perception of size 
and significance” shows “the aim of directing attention from the artificial to the natural.”10 By 
zooming in onto the minute things of the terrestrial world, Hooke tries to remove our fixation on 
the sizeable world and direct our focus back to the “natural,” restoring “the material basis of a 
reformed natural philosophy.”11 Visual images play a natural role in organizing and creating 
knowledge about the natural world, but the images anticipate the content and scope that need to 
be interpreted and defined according to the existing scale of size and significance.  The “reversal 
of topos” might change the position or place of the values, but it doesn’t change the common 
values. 
In addition, the reversal of the hierarchical values and “recalibration of the reader’s 
perception of size and significance” cannot occur without “a remarkable and unprecedented 
combination of text and illustration” in Hooke’s experiment. In fact, the combination of “the 
natural” and “the artificial”—the image of the thing from nature and the interpretation of the 
                                                 
9 Hooke, The Preface, Micrographia, sig. A2v. 
10 Dodds, “Great Things to Small May Be Compared,” 106.  
11 Dodds 106. The author references Catherine Wilson’s influential study on how the invention of 
microscope changed the philosophical and scientific understanding of the world. For more, see The Invisible World: 
Early Modern Philosophy and the Invention of the Microscope by Catherine Wilson. 
6 
image using the language of comparison—makes such reversal in his observation sensible to the 
readers. Simile is used as a rhetorical device to compare the size and define the significance; 
Milton tries to reconstruct the lost world of Paradise through the topos of greatness, comparing 
Paradise to things of celestial magnitude, while Hooke presents the hidden, invisible world inside 
the visible world through the mechanical device that accomplishes rhetorical magnification 
through visual magnification. Yet once discovered and seen, the small things also needed proper 
names, or even more specifically, names that magnified their constituent function and 
importance in the already conceptualized and materialized “shape” and size of our worldly 
realm.  
 The science of perspective and dimension had been established in both verbal and visual 
representation of the world; even the celestial world was somehow imagined and measured by 
the unit of small to great. As Wilson points out, “estimating size was still a problem, for the 
power of a lens could only be deduced from its magnification and could not be known 
independently.”12 The microscopic discovery of a new, unseen world poses a linguistic urgency 
over describing what seems to be completely all shape but no size. Natural philosophy aimed to 
show how nature embodies its symbolic significance in God’s grand design by simply pointing 
back at nature and the picture of nature’s material exterior; Hooke attempts to magnify the 
complexity of small things by not only making them visible but also illuminating them with 
magnifying—epic—similes. In a less fragmented world, what nature shows is supposed to 
directly embody its significance. Nature’s symbolic interiority is obscured in a fragmented world, 
and it is materialized and articulated through the literary commonplace of size and significance. 
The microscope magnifies the material exterior of nature that is too small to see through natural 
                                                 
12 Catherine Wilson, The Invisible World, 90-91. 
7 
eyes, but nature’s revealed interiority will remain all shape but no significance, if without a 
commonplace in the hierarchy of small and great. Without the symbolic interpretation, the image 
only does the appearing while it remains illegible and unintelligible. In other words, Hooke’s 
images had to be made into a text to be understood as the smallness that becomes the greatness. 
The dissonance between the visually magnified shape and the physically—and conceptually—
insignificant size of a mite further affirmed the spatial and perceptual detachment of the 
microscopic view from the source of its new and exciting view of the new world. Hooke’s 
attempt to reverse the traditional ladder of size and greatness is compelling, but men now see the 
things that they cannot touch or feel. The advance in optical science undoubtedly induced the 
estrangement between the haptic and visual world.  
Materializing the world of the minute reversed the traditional way of understanding the 
visible world. Often, the minute or invisible world too small to be perceived by human sight was 
articulated as felt—sensed or experienced, mostly through haptic sense—darkness or 
shapelessness. Yet with the microscope, what used to be unseen now becomes seen but 
untouchable. The microscopic world alienates the world of sight from touch as it disables one 
world by enabling the other. The enhanced sight became a prosthetic for the dissuaded touch. 
Microscopic observation yielded a spatial identity to the invisible world, yet this spatial 
understanding of the microscopic world began to subvert and complicate the conceptual 
understanding of the macroscopic world with new artificial measurements and units. Where or 
what is a context when the content is replaced by a shape or a form and becomes incoherent and 
alien to the observer? Fundamentally, units of measure have always been image-based as in 
hands, feet, and leagues—the discovery of the new visible world through microscope signified 
not only a readjustment of the set values of small and great from the images of the physical, 
8 
visible world, but it also challenged those whose definition of size and shape derived from the 
platonic idea of immaterial significance; spiritual significance is both real and abstract, 
influencing both the spatial and conceptual scale of comparison. The microscopic world 
challenges the source of knowledge and complicates the Great Chain of Being. What becomes 
macroscopic after the discovery of microscopic world? How would a religiously garrisoned and 
upheld hierarchical structure like the Great chain of being adapt to or even calibrate the 
microscopically small into its scale of being? One might argue that the microscope widened the 
realm of human perception and inspired the far-reaching excavation into the borders of 
subvisibilia; perhaps the discovery of more empirical derivations promised the prospect of 
revealing empirical origins and visualizing the mechanics of physical world. One might also 
argue that images of the microscopic world give beauty and significance to the world that used to 
be understood as insignificant. However, it is the linguistic comparisons of the microscopic 
image to the conceptual space that raises Hooke’s small things to the realm of the great. Without 
the intensified state of human perception and spiritually inspired mental faculty participating, the 
microscopic view of a mite is merely a shape or a form without content through a lens. If the 
microscope evades the authenticity of a spiritually fortified mental perspicacity and the subtleties 
observed and reproduced through such intensified faculties of human perception, the microscopic 
world loses its coherence in the world outside of it, the world constructed and sustained by 
human perception.  
When the idea of seeing became instrumentalized and materialized by the introduction of 
microscopic seeing, the new way of seeing began to polarize the theory of poetic space as both 
abstract and material, reflecting nature but also mimicking and improving nature; microscopic 
seeing antagonized the idea of immaterial space—nothing is too small or immaterial to see—and 
9 
eviscerated the purposeful abstraction and delay of turning observation into description. Poetic 
seeing, unlike microscopic seeing, doesn’t need artificial enhancement or manipulation of 
sensory perception to pair the material image with the immaterial meaning. Despite its consistent 
and material—linguistic—exterior, poetic representation changes its interior shape as it seeks the 
movement toward the realm of less corporeality, the realm of celestial perfection. Because it is 
not chained to one material shape, poetic imagination can imitate and enhance the original and 
do more than mere representation.13 Both poetry and science seek to represent the worldly to 
reveal the greater truth, yet the concept of “perfection” in poetry is fundamentally different from 
the one in the sciences; the concept of imitation in poetry collides with the concept of 
representation in sciences, the kind of representation that Hooke employs. The two 
representations are judged differently even though they equally anticipate similar 
epistemological and pedagogical goals of illuminating the truth. Representation in Hooke’s 
experiment reveals the particulars on sight that could either obfuscate the potential truth by 
focusing too much on the obvious matter revealed on sight or accurately reveal a physical 
articulation of truth that could lead the observer to a better understanding of the truth. The 
temporality of Hooke’s discovery matters so much to the scientific representation of truth that 
Hooke’s visual renderings of his objects show the exact stillness of the moment of observation 
that seems to be unaware of time. Poetic representation, as Sidney illuminates, promises nothing 
will remain the same and that there is no guarantee that imitation will generate mutation--in fact, 
he promises mutation more than anything else out of poetic imitation. Poetry is not about 
reproducing exact truth, but producing more truth by keeping its imagination alive—by keeping 
                                                 
13 Sidney writes in The Defence of Poesy: “So then the best of the Historian, is subject to the Poet; for 
whatsoever action, or faction, whatsoever counsel, policy, or warre stratagem, the Historian is bound to recite, that 
may the Poet (if he lift) with his imitation make his own” (sig. E2v). 
10 
apart and far away from the domain of one, single Truth. Poetic imagination anticipates in 
heralding the distant truth put in abeyance; poetic imagination magnifies the oddities and 
disparities between the small and great, worldly and spiritual, or lowly to perfection, while 
scientific observation strives to reduce such distance. Through his microscopic view Hooke 
might seek to congeal the image of the minute and invisible world as a kind of topological 
evidence for and epistemological progression towards unreachable and immanent truth; 
meanwhile, poetic imagination always motions at the spiritual realm and moves further into the 
intangible and abstract by solidifying nothing—certainly, poetry promises uncertainty and 
change.  
Imitation leads to magnification or reduction, and undoubtedly, mutation. The poet 
imitates both the experience being described but also a poetic genre that already exists.  The 
properties of poetic imagination such as imitation, improvement, or mutation are both abstract 
and material, but its abstract quality always moves in ascending motion, affirming poetry’s 
affinity to spiritual significance and celestial perfection; poetic imagination is kinetic as it is able 
to develop and transform its worldly representation into spiritual significance. Magnification is 
impossible without mutating the worldly appearance of that specific magnified world. The small 
doesn’t and cannot immanently and immediately insist on its prospects and represent its 
greatness without the mediating intellectual measure that recognizes its spiritual significance; Sir 
Philip Sidney understands the necessity of that mediating intellectual measure when the 
knowledge is generated from any kind of physical representation, when the sensory perception 
leads to intellectual understanding:  
The philosopher showeth you the way, he informeth you of the particularities, as 
well of the tediousness of the way, as of the pleasant lodging you shall have when 
11 
your journey is ended, as of the many by-turnings that may divert you from your 
way. But this is to no man but to him that will read him, and read him with 
attentive studious painfulness; which constant desire whosoever hath in him, hath 
already passed half the hardness of the way, and therefore is beholding to the 
philosopher but for the other half. Nay, truly, learned men have learnedly thought 
that where once reason hath so much over-mastered passion as that the mind hath 
a free desire to do well, the inward light each mind hath in itself is as good as a 
philosopher’s book.14   
Sidney’s argument for “the inward light,” which precedes before a motivation from “a 
philosopher’s book,” suggests that if one is trained in education and becomes cultured, he or she 
must be inspired by something inward, as they have shown “a free desire to do well.” No man 
but himself who would like to write poetry will be propelled to write his own book as “no man 
but to him that will read him, and read him with attentive studious painfulness”; the “constant 
desire whosoever hath in him” is indeed internal, an intimate and personal light that fuels its own 
desire and motivation to create. Magnification alone cannot ascend the small to the great. Hooke 
argues that if human sense perception cannot visualize the great extent to which divine truths are 
present in small and insignificant things, his optic device’s artificial resolution can assist our 
passive sensory vehicle and provide a more active and animate experience of accessing these 
truths that are hidden in nature. He claims that his book Micrographia records such magnificent 
work of illuminating the great and spiritual in the worldly and low. As Dodds argues, such 
ascending movement implied in Hooke’s observation makes his experiment more than a mere 
physical magnification of the small world. 
                                                 
14 Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig. E3v-E4r. 
12 
Perhaps then the ascending movement toward celestial perfection exemplifies the action 
of “learned men” who have trained themselves to look inwardly rather than outwardly to find the 
source of “inward light each mind hath in itself is as good as a philosopher’s book.”15 One must 
be “learned” to look inwardly before projecting outwardly, to be able to transform small into 
great. Look inwardly, look beyond the spatial image of heart, look microscopically—the learned 
poet is supposed to be able to magnify the immaterial, invisible seed of passion and desire inside 
the body; in Sidney’s sonnet sequence Astrophil and Stella, the “inward light” helps Astrophil to 
magnify his “heart” that Stella provokes him to “look in.”16 The “inward light” reveals the 
shapeless world magnified by Cavendish in her poem “It is hard to believe, that there are other 
worlds in this world” where “not everything can shape” (line 8).17 The poet must locate and 
conceive an image or sight—whether material or abstract—to be imitated or magnified by his 
poetic imagination; and where do these images or sights come from? As Sidney explains above, 
it is the “learned men” who are able to imitate and magnify what is outside—tradition is external, 
like Astrophil measuring himself against Virgil, but Astrophil’s desire to ascend the poetic 
tradition and be as great as Virgil is internal and thus immeasurable. The “learned men” know 
the tradition before them and use the tradition as a measuring unit to give the spatial and spiritual 
significance to their own work. In his discussion of a Restoration physiology of reading, Adrian 
Jones points out the “fear of [reading’s] irreversible effects” in Restoration England (140).18 
Jones explores the experience of reading and the emergence of an intimate involvement of reader 
with text and provides the writings of seventeenth-century scientists, philosophers, and moralists 
                                                 
15 Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig. E4r. 
16 Sidney writes in Sonnet 1 of Astrophil and Stella: “‘Fool,’ said my muse to me, ‘look in thy heart and 
write’” (line 14).   
17 Margaret Cavendish, “It is hard to believe, that there are other Worlds in this World,” Poems, and 
fancies, sig. G2r-G2v.  
18 Adrian Jones, “The Physiology of Reading in Restoration England,” The Practice and Representation of 
Reading in England, 138-161. 
13 
who predict the potential dangers of that intimate involvement. As with the increasing 
development of natural philosophy and material science in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, 
more things became microscopically and macroscopically visible; more things became sizeable 
and comparable. More things became legible bodies. The discourse on the relationship between 
the reader and the read became highly charged in late seventeenth-century England, as did a 
variety of sciences relating to perception and the workings of mind. In this seventeenth-century 
discourse, the cautionary tales of the moment when one confronts a false or erroneous body 
warned about the “irreversible effects” of a bad impression of a bad text on human perception. 
At the same time, the influence of a “great” literary tradition upon small individuals—whether 
readers or writers—remained persistent. The learned poet knows the canonical work where he 
finds the sizes and shapes to measure and compose his work, but “look[ing] in thy heart” 
suggests an inward affair, a deliberate, intellectual movement towards a spiritual realm 
antithetical to that of the learned. Sidney’s “inward light” in The Defence of Poesy suggests the 
unmeasurable, immaterial fuel for greatness does neither exist nor come from the outside; the 
passion and intelligence necessary for greatness resides in the learned men, and in Astrophil and 
Stella Sidney urges himself--the learned man--should “look in [his] heart and write,” instead of  
“Studying inventions fine, her wits to entertain:/ Oft turning others’ leaves, to see if thence 
would flow/ Some fresh and fruitful showers upon my sun-burn’d brain.”19  
 How does a form without context possess a coherent meaning? How does something all 
shape but no size, comparison, or significance begin to convey any meaning otherwise seen and 
articulated through self-animated human perception and mental acuity—“the inward light”—that 
looks beyond the surface, as Hooke himself exhibited in his galvanizing effort to show what 
                                                 
19 Astrophil and Stella, Sonnet 1, line 14 and 6-8. 
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Micrographia can deliver beyond its pages? When Sidney suggests “look in thy heart” or argues 
for the power of “inward light,” Hooke might as well be proposing “look in thy microscope.” 
The “inward light” and the microscopic lens display a similar process of illumination; both give 
significance to the world they illuminate by making it sensible, making it available for others to 
experience, either through the lens of imagination or magnification. Yet the difference between 
Hooke’s microscopic observation and Sidney’s “inward light” lies in the origination of the light. 
Though immaterial and invisible, the inward light is the spiritual superlative that shines like the 
celestial light; there is not much shape or size similar or proximate enough to describe its 
significance. The microscope unveils the invisible world, providing more subtleties and 
complexities of our terrestrial world and even signifying the inconceivable greater design of god 
by human perception only, but the microscope still remains as an external source of illumination.  
My dissertation aims to explore this commonplace of light consistently present and 
ubiquitous in literary representations of truth. Though there are various metaphoric 
representations of both the natural and artificial world to signify the spiritual authority of truth, 
which might both challenge and complement scientific endeavors in examining the world and 
understanding truth, light as a metaphor for truth champions in showing how poetic imagination 
most eloquently expresses the pervasive authority of truth that is being “true of its own 
accord.”20 Unlike the topos of size and significance, the topos of light remains unresponsive to 
the external institutions or recalibration of artificial values. One aspect of light that I will be 
examining in my dissertation will be its persistent association with “truth,” so much so that the 
                                                 
20 Hans Blumenberg, “Light as a Metaphor for Truth: At the Preliminary Stage of Philosophical Concept 
Formation,” Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision, ed. David Michael Levin, 30-62. The article was originally 
published in 1957 in Studium General 10.7 and is a seminal read for the summary of philosophical ideas and 
discussions of representation of truth I am invested in and intend to develop further in the discussions of poetic 
representations of light as truth. 
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terms within my discussion might at times seem interchangeable. Yet I begin my observation 
exactly with that common and perhaps even banal familiarization of the ubiquitous and abstract 
authority of truth with one of the most present and insistent signs of physical life—light. The 
topos of light remains spatially and conceptually pervasive in the literary representation of truth. 
Most literary representations of light as truth materialize the spiritual authority and pervasiveness 
of truth in the form of illumination and transcendence or objects estranged and distant from the 
sun. Sidney’s remark on looking inside to find the “inward light” should also suggest that despite 
its omnipresent existence, truth requires a quality of inwardness—that truth is hard to see 
through the physical eye and too abstract to be measured in a dimension capable of enough going 
under the scrutiny of instruments like the microscope. Truth can be compared to the microscopic 
view of the world, but the microscopic view doesn’t show truth. Inward vision or “inward light,” 
then, suggests the spiritual authority preserved away from the corporeal reality, one that 
surpasses material temporality. Hooke’s goal is to turn the invisible, minute world into one 
sizeable and significant, and poetic seeing that perceives the illumination of truth as a more 
inward, personal, and spiritual process reverses the process of Hooke’s magnification. In 
Hooke’s experiment, light is the external source to reveal and magnify the small. This light, 
however, represents only the mechanical quality of human faculties. In poetry, light is the inward 
source to illuminate the small, the hidden, or the intangible. It is not the microscopic seeing that 
reveals truth but the poetic seeing that imagines and creates the shapes and dimensions of a 
world that conveys truth.  
Cavendish chooses a form of blazing light as the self-fueled and self-sufficient flame that 
emblazes and gives birth to the new world. Cavendish acutely criticizes science’s endeavor to 
observe and define an intangible or “shapeless” realm of nature, and in “It is hard to believe, that 
16 
there are other Worlds in this World,” she puns on the name Hooke and his microscopic process 
of looking into what used to be unseen, shapeless, or even dark: “For many things our sense dull 
may scape,/ For sense is grosse, not every thing can shape./ So in this World another world may 
bee,/ That we do neither touch, tast, smell, heare, see./ What Eye so cleere is, yet did ever see/ 
Those little Hookes, that in the Load-stone bee,/ Which draw hard iron? or give Reasons, why/ 
The Needles point still in the north lye” (lines 7-14).21 Hooke’s microscopic view subordinates; 
one world becomes a property or subject to the other world, so a world just can’t be a world once 
under a microscopic lens. Any world visible must be defined and measured. Cavendish knows 
her sentiment that “sense is grosse, not every thing can shape” will find very little support, and 
she satirizes how the efficacy of optic devices intends on giving a “shape” to “this World another 
word may bee,/ That we do neither touch, tast, smell, heare, see” (lines 3-4). By this kind of 
invasive looking in, she argues, the dignity of the individual and intimate world is compromised; 
she argues the magnified world is brute and exposed as it lacks poetic intimacy and philosophical 
subtlety. Milton writes consistently about seeing both physically and spiritually, but his inability 
to see physically didn’t stop him from seeing poetically. In Book III of Paradise Lost Milton 
writes: “so much the rather thou celestial light/ Shine inward, and the mind through all her 
powers/ Irradiate, there plant eyes, all mist from thence/ Purge and disperse, that I may see and 
tell/ Of things invisible to mortal sight” (III. 51-55). Poetic seeing for Milton is like the 
irradiating light; it enlightens him intellectually and spiritually while exposing him to a spiritual 
radiation that “purges and disperses” corporeal sights, but leaves him with the sight of “things 
invisible to mortal sight.” Though the poet is unable to see outward, he does not need to look 
elsewhere anymore because the “celestial light” will “shine inward,” illuminating and escalating 
                                                 
21 Margaret Cavendish, “It is hard to believe, that there are other Worlds in this World,” Poems, and 
fancies, sig. G2r-G2v.   
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his “mind through all her powers” (III. 51-52). Anne Finch sees the lack of physical light as a 
gateway to access poetic dawn—darkness was as significant as light for her poetic imagination to 
become active. Her affinity to darkness is an esoteric and singular gesture breaking away from 
the homogenous Western poetic convention and even an unintentional subversive denial of the 
verbo-ocular-ego centric values of the hegemonic social and class structures that inspired her to 
look for the less visual and obvious.  
All of these authors, then, are linked in my study not through necessary influence of one 
upon the next—though in many cases there were such direct historical connections—but because 
they all contemplated the role of human sight and imagination in exploring and constituting the 
material world surrounding them. As I will demonstrate ahead, simply overlaying a crude 
distinction between science and spirituality upon the works in question would be at least partly 
ahistorical and unwise; still, the championing of an “inner light” or “inward vision” by Sidney, 
Cavendish, Milton, and Finch definitely signals a mode of seeing and representation that does 
stand in stark contrast to the claims of objectivity forwarded by adherents to the emerging 
observational science. Sidney’s praise for the “poetic imagination” in his Defence of Poesy, I will 
argue in my initial chapter, provides a perfect foundation for examining the idea of “inner light” 
in the works of the remaining figures in my study.  
2 CHAPTER 2: How a Metaphor Can Create a Good Man: Sidney’s “Inward Light” 
and Poetic Representation 
Since our erected wit, maketh us know what perfection is, and yet our infected will, keepeth us 
from reaching unto it. 22 
                                                 
22 Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig. C2r. Sidney explains the idea of “fore-conceite” as an act of 
substitution, or, being a stand-in for the idea, not the work itself: “And that the poet hath that Idea, is manifest, by 
delivering them forth in such excellencie as hee hath imagined them.” The readers—and the poet—have their own 
“erected wit,” the spiritual sight that guides them and prevents them from “reaching” into “infected will” (sig. C2r). 
Neither the poetry nor the poet can be responsible for anyone’s “infected will,” or the lack of “erected wit.”  
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For any understanding knoweth the skill of the Artificer, standeth in that Idea or fore-conceite of 
the work, & not in the work itselfe.23 
 
Sidney would have received encouragement for his vision of the poet’s “erected wit” 
materializing particulars from a more universal “fore-conceit” from multiple sources. Given the 
amount of critical attention that I pay to the work, it seems important to note an essential element 
of my view of Sidney’s The Defence of Poesy. As Robert E. Stillman points out in Philip Sidney 
and the Poetics of Renaissance Cosmopolitanism, recent scholarship has often tended to 
emphasize an incoherence and lack of effective synthesis in the work, but I am obviously among 
those who view Sidney’s Defence, to borrow the words of A.C. Hamilton in his Sir Philip 
Sidney: A Study of His Life and Works, as “closely reasoned and logical in all its parts” (111).24 
As part of his evidence, Stillman closely examines Sidney’s incorporation of Scaliger, insisting 
that “Sidney’s critical brilliance is enabled, in no small measure, by the methodical brilliance of 
his reading skills, and there is no better example of Sidney’s skill in ‘methodizing’ the eclectic 
matter of his Defence than his treatment at the very center of his golden world poetics of Julius 
Caesar Scaliger” (105). Much of Scaliger sounds close to Sidney, especially when Scaliger 
distinguishes (in his Poetices) the poet from the philosophers and historians because the former 
“represent things just as they are” whereas “the poet depicts quite another sort of nature” (qtd. in 
Stillman 106). Scaliger even considers the poet “almost” a “second deity” (qtd. in Stillman 106), 
but as Stillman points out, Scaliger’s suggestive description stops short of its purpose, leading 
the methodical Sidney “to devour Scaliger’s text and make it wholly his own” (107). As Stillman 
                                                 
23 Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig. C2r. 
24 Additional significant works that Stillman cites as demonstrating philosophical sophistication and 
coherence in Sidney’s Defence include John C. Ulreich’s “‘The Poets Only Deliver’: Sidney’s Conception of 
Mimesis,” Studies in the Literary Imagination 15.1 (1982): 67-84 and John Hunt’s “Allusive Coherence in Sidney’s 
Apology for Poetry,” Studies in English Literature 1500-1900 27 (1987): 1-16. 
19 
shows, Sidney introduces the concept of “scope,” so that in comparison to the other arts such as 
astronomy and metaphysics that zoom in and focus on, as Sidney describes, “the works of 
Nature,” the poet, again in Sidney’s words, “lifted up with the vigor of his own invention, doth 
grow in effect into another nature” (107).  
Sidney was certainly well-read and possessed an intimate knowledge of his sources. Even 
before his Continental tour, he had, through his tutor and friend John Dee, undoubtedly come in 
contact with even extremely esoteric currents of European thought, as well as earned continual 
access to Dee’s library—by then, as Deborah Harkness explains in John Dee’s Conversations 
with Angels, “the largest private library in England” (61).25 Considering the astonishing breadth 
of his learning, Dee was certainly an effective conduit of Neoplatonism to Sidney, and to other 
intellectuals in England as well, given Dee’s prominence. After a comet appeared in 1577, 
Queen Elizabeth actually summoned Dee to explain the comet’s possible astrological 
significance to her courtiers (Harkness 68-69). Though Sidney begins the Defence on squarely 
Aristotelian territory—insisting that poetry involves “imitation”—he quickly changes the nature 
of such imitation to bring it, as Marvin Carlson insists in Theories of the Theatre, “closer to 
Neoplatonist than to Aristotelian thought” (82).26 Once the anti-Aristotelian impetus of the 
Defence is underscored, another important source for Sidney becomes clear—Peter Ramus. 
Although early scholarship tended to overstate Ramus’ influence on Sidney, many factors 
                                                 
25 Deborah E. Harkness, John Dee's Conversations with Angels: Cabala, Alchemy, and the End of Nature 
(Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1999). In addition, Peter French, in John Dee, The World of an Elizabethan Magus, 
marvels at the sophistication of Sidney’s assertion, “So of the contrary side, if we will turn Ovid’s verse, Ut lateat 
virtus proximitate male, that ‘good lie hid in nearness of the evil,’ Agrippa will be as merry in showing the vanity of 
science as Erasmus was in commending folly” (qtd. in French 144). Recognizing the obscurity of the source 
mentioned, French observes: “What a revealing comparison! Sidney makes it clear that he perceived Agrippa’s De 
incertitudine et vanitate Scientiarum declamatio invecta for what it was, a kind of satire. He had a complete 
understanding of Agrippa and his magical philosophy if he knew that this work, which was meant to fool the 
authorities, was a sham” (144). 
 
26 Marvin Carlson, Theories of the Theatre (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993). 
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suggest at least some level of influence—John Dee’s close friendship with Ramus, for example, 
and Ramus’ status as a genuine Protestant martyr after his slaughter in the St. Bartholomew’s 
Day Massacre, something that would have appealed greatly to Sidney’s own Protestant 
sensibility. Also, from the beginning of his career Ramus was staunchly anti-Aristotelian, to such 
a level that he was fired from post after post for lecturing against the canonical teachings of 
Aristotle that formed the basis for a university education in his day. To be clear, Ramistic logic 
would have seemed extremely simplistic to Dee and, in turn, Sidney, especially given the 
sophisticated turn of Dee’s alchemical and metaphysical thought. Still, it did function in a 
markedly universal-to-particular direction as it, in the words of Dewey D. Wallace from Shapers 
of English Calvinism, 1160-1714, “articulated the unity and diversity of all knowledge of things 
human and divine by breaking wholes into parts and defining parts through their bifurcation or 
by their opposites” (Wallace 16). In addition, as Richard Tuck argues in Philosophy and 
Government, 1572-1651, for Ramus “there was no real distinction between philosophical science 
and practical reasoning—and no logical distinction, moreover, between science and merely 
probable ‘opinion’” (Tuck 25). Ramus’ suggestion that the mind possesses the power to discover 
large truths first before pursuing a structure of logical proof that works toward component parts 
fits Sidney’s Neoplatonic view of the imitative power of poetry, an imitation of universals over 
particulars that captures truths exceeding those possible in the mere mechanical arrangement of 
the world. Indeed, Jon S. Lawry convincingly argues in his Sidney’s Two Arcadias that both 
Arcadias proceed by dividing the universal “truths” Sidney is trying to present to the reader into 
component taxonomic pairs in order to move the reader to recognize the validity of his original 
propositions, suggesting both a methodological and philosophical link between Sidney and 
Ramus.   
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I remind the reader of Stillman’s description of Aristotelian methodology above, that of 
discovering forms or ideas through investigations of the material realm. This is, of course, very 
familiar to modern readers, for scientific progress has largely depended upon a sort of 
methodological reductionism that examines component parts to discover larger truths and 
patterns—a movement from observed or quantified details to explanations that are tested through 
further observations. Indeed, despite the more “systems”-oriented approaches seen in 
contemporary calls for a holistic revision of scientific methodology, both ontological and 
methodological reductionism appear to be completely embedded at the heart of the scientific 
project. Against this movement—from specific observations to general conclusions—stands 
Sidney’s call for an ontological and epistemological theory of knowledge that works in the 
opposite direction, moving from universals and “fore-conceits” to specific representations that 
are, in the process, more truthful than any mere copy or mimetic representation—a scientific 
model, for example—could be. This is, I think, a significant strand of thought in Sidney’s 
Defence, and certainly one of the most important for my comparison of Sidney to Cavendish 
ahead. Stillman correctly concludes that Sidney was synthesizing Platonic elements and 
abandoning the “Aristotelian project of locating forms (or ideas) embodied in the material realm” 
(109), and the interweaving of Aristotelian and Platonic elements creates many of the most 
striking features of the Defence and will be central to my analysis ahead. 
Homer, according to Aristotle, mastered the art of figurative language by coming up with 
active and tangible metaphors and endowed life “to lifeless things in his well liked similes: 
Arched, foam-crested, some in front, but others upon others” (On Rhetoric).27 Though spoken, 
                                                 
27 Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George A. Kennedy, 248. In Book 3 Chapter 
11 of Rhetoric Aristotle explains why vividness of figurative language implies movement, which he calls 
“energeia,” an “actualization”: “For example, to say that a good man is ‘foursquare’ is a metaphor, for both are 
complete; but it does not signify activity [energeia]. But the phrase ‘having his prime of life in full bloom’ is 
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and later written, Homer’s poetic language was able to evoke senses outside the linguistic 
apparatus—“[Homer] makes everything move and live, and energeia is motion.”28 The 
ocularcentric paradigm has dominated the major aesthetic theories in Western culture since the 
ancient Greeks. With Homer’s use of poetic language, poetry becomes more than words 
reflecting reality but instead interacts with and influences reality, and Sidney professed such as 
the goal of good poetry: “Poesie therefore is an arte of imitation, for so Aristotle termeth it in this 
word Mimesis, that is to say, a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring foorth: to speake 
metaphorically a speaking picture, with this end: to teach and delight.”29 The notion that words 
can generate pictures, or that pictorial properties can be converted into poetical ones, was 
popularized by the Horatian dictum, "ut pictura poesis (as is painting, so as poetry).”30 Bruce R. 
                                                 
energeia, as is ‘you, like an apheton’ and ‘now then the Greeks darting forward on their feet.’ Darting is 
actualization and metaphor; for he means ‘quickly.’ And [energeia is,] as Homer often uses it, making the lifeless 
living through the metaphor” (On Rhetoric 248). Aristotle examines Homer’s simile that compares battle to waves 
of the sea beating on the shore to emphasize the visual in Illiad 13. 799: “Arched, foam-crested, some in front, but 
others upon others.” In addition, Aristotle opens Book 3 Chapter 11 with the following lines: “But it is necessary to 
say what we mean by bringing-before-the-eyes and what makes this occur. I call those things ‘before the eyes’ that 
signify things engaged in an activity” (On Rhetoric 248). The phrase “Bringing-Before-the-Eyes” first shows up in 
Book 3 chapter 10 where Aristotle discusses the rhetorical stylistic urbanization or what he calls “asteia,” or 
“urbanities” (244). The sense of urbanity in “asteia” signifies the activity of towns, the sense of vigilance or 
movement associated with towns, and the element of alertness or vividness is critical for the cultivation of style: 
“[urbanity is achieved] by means of bringing-before-the-eyes [pro ommatōn poiein, or visualization]; for things 
should be seen as being done rather than as in the future. [To achieve urbanity in style] one should thus aim at three 
things: metaphor, antithesis, actualization [energeia]” (245). What “visualization” does is “bringing-before-the-
eyes” for Aristotle, and the figurative language might be the only sophisticated linguistic tool that can deliver this 
“energeia.”  
 
28 By listing examples from Homer’s Odyssey and Illiad in Book 3 chapter 11 of On Rhetoric, Aristotle 
further explains the element of “visualization” in figurative language: “In all [Homer’s] work he gains his fame by 
creating activity, for example, in the following: Then to the plain rolled the ruthless stone’ and ‘the arrow flew’ and 
[also of an arrow] ‘eager to fly’ and [of spears] ‘They stood in the ground longing to take their fill of flesh,’ and 
‘The point sped eagerly through his breast.’ In all of these something seems living through being actualized, for 
being ‘ruthless’ and ‘longing’ and the other examples constitute energeia. [Homer] applied these by using metaphor 
by analogy; for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the ‘shameless’ one to the one ‘shamefully’ treated” (On Rhetoric 
249). Analogy, as we know, is a comparison between two things, typically on the basis of their structure and for the 
purpose of clarification; the distance between two comparisons in metaphors is not only inevitable but encouraged. 
29 Philip Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig. C2v. 
30 Horace introduced the phrase “ut pictura poesis” in his Ars Poetica to compare the art of painting with 
that of poetry. However, this analogy that poetry and painting are alike has been popular since ancient Greece and 
wasn’t original to Horace, as expressed by Simonides of Keos, who was first paraphrased by Plutarch in De gloria 
Atheniensium, 3.347a: “Simonides, however, calls painting inarticulate poetry and poetry articulate painting: for the 
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Smith in The Key of Green: Passion and Perception in Renaissance Culture points out that 
“Plutarch’s version of an observation originally made by Simonedes of Keos—‘poema picture 
loquens, picture poema silens’ (poetry a speaking picture, picture a silent poem)—commanded 
such a wide assent that Philip Sidney is exceptional in labeling it only a metaphor” (Smith 
125).31 Unlike Horace’s analogy that conjoins the aesthetic function of painting and poetry, 
Sidney’s analogy of painting and poetry keeps the two distant; pictures and words share a similar 
mimetic act of representation and involve the sight as the mode of reception, but reading poetry 
requires understanding of verbal signs. Poetry, simply put, teaches its audience how to become a 
better reader of the world; it can teach the reader to recognize the mimetic relationship between 
two distant things—words that describe the world in poetry or a picture that portrays the world in 
painting—and imitate such associations between the representation and the original, which 
resembles the act of metaphor: “If poetry is like painting, it is because the reader of poetry, in act 
an act of judgment, makes it so” (Smith 125-26).32 Sir Philip Sidney’s The Defence of Poesy 
argues for poetry’s capacity to mimic and “improve” nature, but such improvement also implies 
the enhancement of the readership of poetry. Sidney’s “end” goal of poetry indicates the 
transformation of the readers of poetry into the actors of metaphors, who can perceive what “a 
                                                 
actions which painters portray as taking place at the moment literature narrates and records after they have taken 
place. Even though artists with colour and design, and writers with words and phrases, represent the same subjects, 
they differ in the material and the manner of their imitation; and yet the underlying end and aim of both is one and 
the same; the most effective historian is he who, by a vivid representation of emotions and characters, makes his 
narration like a painting.” 
31 Bruce R. Smith, The Key of Green: Passion and Perception in Renaissance Culture. (Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 2009). Smith opens the chapter titled “Green Spectacles” with the following: “Ut pictura poesis: no 
Renaissance commonplace was more common than the claim that poetry is like picture”(125). In relation with the 
concept of “picture” in poetry, Smith cites Lucy Gent who points out the word “picture” in early modern England 
was “an extraordinarily capricious word” that signified many things, as broadly as paintings, sculptures, tapestry, or 
embroidery, but even “things made out of words” (125). For further readings on Renaissance understanding of the 
word “picture,” see Gent’s Picture and Poetry 1560-1620: Relation between literature and he visual arts in the 
English Renaissance (Leamington Spa: James Hall, 1981).  
32 In an end note to the text in page 125 Smith further explains: “Sidney, in The Defence of Poesy, is 
altogether typical in making Horace’s observation part of the very definition of poesy, but is quite unusual in 
realizing that the observation is, after all, a metaphor” (Smith 290). 
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speaking picture” articulates and, furthermore, “speak metaphorically a speaking picture, with 
this end: to teach and delight.”33  
When poetry generates a “speaking picture,” it encourages the reader to connect two 
distant or unfamiliar things together to make sense. The new science provided different ways of 
seeing and representing the world, but as I will show in the next chapter, scientific observation 
centered heavily on pictorial representation. Natural scientists like Robert Hooke argue that the 
microscopic observation will cancel the distance between the visible world and the invisible by 
revealing the invisible world to our natural eye through the help of his optic device, eventually 
encroaching on the terrain of poetic distance necessary for metaphors to sustain their function. If 
the pictures become too detailed and informative, they might claim to overtake the superior 
capability of words that Sidney argues as unique in poetry. In this chapter, I will examine how 
Sidney’s defense for poetic representation and reception prefigures the concerns voiced by the 
subsequent generation of poets who believed the advent of scientific observation posed a threat 
to the unique purpose of poetry. Furthermore, my examination of Sidney’s poetic theory in The 
Defence of Poesy will help establish a framework for my examination of “inward light” in the 
works of Robert Hooke, Margaret Cavendish, John Milton and Anne Finch in the following 
chapters. 
In “The Touch of the Blind Man: The Phenomenology of Vividness in Italian 
Renaissance Art,” Jodi Cranston examines how the sight receives the most attention among the 
various operations of the human senses in Italian Renaissance discourses on art. Leonard da 
Vinci, she asserts, considered the function of the eye “the primary means by which the sensus 
communis of the brain may most fully and magnificently contemplate the infinite works of 
                                                 
33 Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig. C2v. 
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nature, and the ear is the second, acquiring nobility through the recounting of things which the 
eye has seen” (Cranston 225).34 Poetry cannot provide directly tactile and ocular experience, and 
Leonardo believed sight to be the most vital sensory operation for aesthetic experience and 
judgment. Cranston writes that Leonardo believed that a blind person’s sensory and aesthetic 
experience is necessarily marred by lack of sight, and therefore a blind person cannot fully enjoy 
and judge beauty and “lives as though dead” (226). For Leonardo, a blind man’s sensory 
experience is controlled by speech, which he believes is subsidiary to sight, and the lack of sight 
“limits expression through a fixed set of words and meaning” (226). To prove his point Leonardo 
employed a specific example of how the king of Hungary, Mathias Corvinus, upon receiving 
both a poem and painting on his birthday, found the painting more engaging and moving. The 
poet, who learned that the king preferred the painting over his poetry, accused the king of 
appreciating “the inferior mode of representation” (226). The king refuted the poet’s accusation 
by insisting that the painting not only appears more accessible and alive to the viewer but also 
offers something more than mere ocular experience: “Give me something I can see and touch, 
and not only hear, and do not criticize my decision to tuck your work under my arm, while I take 
up that of the painter in both hands to place it before my eyes” (qtd. in Cranston 226). In 
Leonardo’s story, poetry is thus hidden—the aesthetic value and experience poetry can offer to 
the king is insignificant, and, most of all, invisible, as his action of tucking the poetry under his 
arm suggests. Cranston expands Leonardo’s ocularcentric aesthetic theory and suggests that the 
agent of touch—the hand—can manipulate another sensory and aesthetic operation. This kind of 
touching art, or touching of art, is also crucial for the art work’s vivid effect. Although the 
operation of sight, especially in its role in judging beauty, “receives considerable attention in 
                                                 
34 Jodi Cranston, “The Touch of the Blind Man: The Phenomenology of Vividness in Italian Renaissance 
Art,” Sensible Flesh, 224-42. 
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Renaissance discussions on the arts,” the King of Hungary’s remark on his preference of painting 
over poetry as well as the tucking of the poetry under his arm reveals the role that hands play in 
both creation and reception of art; hands possess the ability not only to “facilitate and assist 
sight,” but also “have the power to disable sight,” as the king’s arm can hide as well as reveal—
while the poetry is tucked under his arm, he extends his hands to “take up that of the painter in 
both hands to place it before [his] eyes” (227).35 Hands serve as one of the essential parts of the 
creative process and production of meaning. As a literal sign, the hand might represent an 
individual body part rather than a whole body and coherent self, but as a symbolic sign—as a 
synecdoche—the hand embodies a coherent sign that is connected to the poet and his art work, 
extended out from the creator and pressed onto the creation at work. The trope of the hand 
functions in both metaphorical and metonymical ways; its creative labor is both literal and 
symbolic.  
In poetry, holding the art work close is unnecessary because physical proximity to words 
doesn’t do anything to the abstract distance between the vehicle and the tenor. However, the 
figuration of the hand as an extension and connection between art and nature suggests the 
metaphorical association between hand and writing. Poetry, just as painting does, can “place 
[nature] before [one’s] eyes.” When reading poetry, poetry takes care of the hands’ work to 
“place it before [one’s] eyes” because poetry can push towards or pull away its subject from the 
reader through the manipulation of metaphors. Poetry can enhance and reconfigure our view of 
the world, just as paintings can, and anti-theatricalists during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century were concerned for poetry’s capability to mimic or fabricate truth. In poetry, the signs—
the words—become the substance for the images. Unlike painting, which still uses images to 
                                                 
35 Touching and holding are two vital activities to bring something “before our eyes.” As Cranston points 
out, tropes that involve touching “serve as metaphors for accessibility, clarity, and visibility” (227). 
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deliver sight, words deliver sight in poetry.36 As I will discuss further, with Sidney in this chapter 
and Cavendish later, the poets argue that poetry does not deceive because it never promises to be 
the mere deliverer of truth, but rather insists on copying and altering—enhancing—truth. If the 
figurative language can bring nature before our eyes, then poetry can facilitate the function of 
hand that extends and contracts to bring nature as well as art closer to the viewer’s eye. Sidney 
professes the purpose of reading and writing metaphors as the moral education of “learned men” 
whose “mind hath a free desire to do well.”37 A man who wants to learn how to decipher hidden 
or intricate metaphorical representations can learn to perceive the world more comprehensively, 
and it is that clarity and scope of his vision that makes “a learned man” a good reader.38 Guided 
by “the inward light,” both poet and reader of poetry can create a figure that appears closer and 
more vivid, tangible and real as “[one] can see and touch.”39 This suggestion then subverts 
Leonardo’s claim that only through the ocular experience of painting can a man experience and 
judge art. A moving—to stress the active metaphor there—work of art, whether it be painting or 
poetry, can create a tactile and visceral experience that manipulates the distance between nature 
and art, image and language, tenor and vehicle, or art and its audience.40 Even with the obvious 
association between touch and figurative language, the idea that the human body has a direct 
                                                 
36 This change from one substance to another is far more severe—exaggerated--and inherent in poetry 
because the pictorial representation is less alienated from our sensory reception of the world while the verbal 
representation indeed uses verbal sign to observe and represent the world. After all, the verbal signs are abstract, not 
pictorial. The capacity of poetic imagination to mimic and improve the original is indeed redolent of the process of 
transubstantiation, as the verbal signs transform its original form and create visual scenes in the reader’s mind. I 
include a more in-depth discussion of this transformative aspect of poetic metaphors later in this chapter. Also, for 
further contemplation of how visual sight is the antecedent of verbal representation, read The Key of Green by Bruce 
R. Smith. 
37 Defence of Poesy, sig. E4r. 
38 Sidney argues that—and encourages—the poet should exercise a wider scope and envision the world 
beyond “the narrow warrant of” what nature provides; the poet should imagine and create things that are “either 
better then Nature bringeth forth, or quite a newe forms such as never were in Nature” (sig. C1v). 
39 Poetic metaphors not only train and create a good reader, but they can also enhance and magnify the 
quality of a good reader to further suggest his moral superiority. 
40 For instance, poetry’s capacity to create a “speaking picture” enables the poets to target more abstract 
and elusive subjects, as in Finch’s “The Spleen,” which I will discuss the later chapter. 
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impact on the creation of art could raise a problem, especially among the Neo-Platonists. A part 
of the human limb, a part of the corporeal body, partakes in the creative process of recording 
poetry to be read; hand and its capacity to manipulate the reality become an integral part of 
artistic creation. Poetic representation comes from the association of hand in writing—thus 
poetry is connected to the body in a metaphoric, metonymic way.41 Poetry’s long tradition of 
representation through metaphor and simile modulates the ocularcentric representation of 
painting to allow it to explore new terrain.  
Sidney has long been thoroughly recognized as a major figure in the English 
Renaissance, and to say that much has been written about his work is an understatement. 
Because I am especially interested in the influence of philosophy and theology on his work, I 
sometimes find myself gravitating to earlier works of scholarship less likely to eliminate these 
fields of their meaning and view them, instead, as hollow expressions of power or mechanisms 
for social order. I will admit at the outset that I have struggled with a way to finesse my reading 
of Sidney into closer alignment with the more common contemporary handling of his works, one 
that tends to subordinate larger philosophical concerns to local negotiations of power through a 
New Historicist emphasis on expediency and “self-fashioning.” No doubt, such functionalist 
readings are compelling, even as they almost do away with the need to examine the 
epistemological and ontological complexities of Sidney’s poetics. Put simply, such a view sees 
Sidney’s invocation of the Horatian ideal of pleasurable and instructive poetry as a necessary and 
strategic instrument intended to bring into alignment his activist Protestant politics—more 
typically championed by middle-class intellectuals like Gosson—and his own high status at court 
                                                 
41 With more poetry being printed and read, instead of being recited and heard in front of the audience, the 
transmission of poetry and its tactile impact on the audience became more personal and individualized; if educated 
enough to read, people could hold poetry in their hands and read and enjoy it alone. 
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and great skill as a courtier. In Gosson’s judgment, poetry did indeed produce pleasure, yet 
“pleasure” was a force that quickly transformed men from warriors “wreastling at armes” to 
courtiers “wallowyng in Ladies laps.” However, seeing the need to protect the leisure and 
pleasure that were part of the social currency distinguishing between classes, Sidney attempted a 
sort of reconciliation. Thus, even as he claims in Defending Literature in Early Modern England 
to challenge earlier New Historicist assumptions about the ability of texts to be genuinely 
constitutive of actual political power, Robert Matz is typical of current attitudes towards 
Sidney’s works when he straightforwardly insists that in the Defence “Sidney attempts to defend 
the courtly pleasure of poetry by claiming that such pleasure promotes warrior service” and that 
“Poetry’s profit and pleasure thus mediates between Sidney’s ambivalent position as courtly and 
Protestant aristocrat” (Matz 22).42 
Although I have much different aims in my discussion of Sidney, recent theoretical 
positions such as Matz’s do foreground many significant details of the Defence, and it might be 
useful to summarize a few of them here. A reading searching for pragmatism as compared to 
profundity, for example, readily accounts for the ambivalence sensed as the lofty claims to heroic 
valor earlier in the work give way to Sidney’s description of the work at the end as an “ink-
wasting toy,” a conclusion, Matz insists, where writing “becomes instead excess, straying, and 
waste” (76). Likewise, a reading focusing on Sidney’s anxious desire to reconcile two competing 
value systems explains the frequent attempts on Sidney’s part to rescue poetry from Gosson’s 
characterization that it is somehow a feminizing force, turning readers away from martial valor, 
from “courage to cowardice,” and from “Dartes to Dishes” (qtd. in Matz 61). Although Sidney 
                                                 
42 Matz points out that “for both Sidney and Gosson poetry should profit as well as delight, and, in 
particular, it should profit by moving men to deeds of military courage,” and he even concludes that “Gosson’s 
dedication to Sidney seems reasonable in light of their shared Protestant activism” (62). 
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does propose a rather feminine “sweet and charming force” for poetry, he quickly changes that to 
a useful purpose in service to the state, transforming pen to weapon by contrasting the 
embroidery needle that constituted a popular pastime of females at court with the soldier’s 
sword: “Truly, a needle cannot do much hurt, and as truly (with leave of the ladies be it spoken) 
it cannot do much good. With a sword though mayst kill thy father, & with a sword though 
mayst defend thy prince and country.”43 The lack of opportunities to gain or solidify one’s status 
in the court through military achievement under Queen Elizabeth definitely necessitated the 
creation of alternate forms of status-seeking displays, and as Matz points out, the ritualized 
performances in the tiltyard had become so distant from actual battle and so close to courtly 
entertainment that they incorporated flowers and perfumed water (Matz 79); it is obvious, then, 
that Sidney would attempt to masculinize and recuperate courtly display in all its forms after 
Gosson’s attack. Because Sidney certainly was responding to local social pressures—often quite 
consciously—analysis borrowed from New Historicism appears at times in my discussion. It is 
striking, however, that in his lengthy study of Sidney, not once does Matz connect the actual 
content of Sidney’s arguments to larger philosophical concerns as they would have existed in 
Sidney’s day, and indeed as they still exist to this day. Instead, Sidney’s ideas are consistently 
reduced to mere strategic deployments intended to negotiate and protect his own social standing, 
a critical practice that misses much that interests me the most in Sidney’s great works. 
In addition to New Historicism, reader-response and reception-oriented modes of analysis 
have proven particularly fruitful in Renaissance studies, starting with the pioneering work of 
such giants as Stanley Fish and Barbara Lewalski and continuing with a host of equally 
insightful scholars. The following chapter will be very indebted to reader-response theory, and I 
                                                 
43 Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig. H2v.  
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would like to start with a general statement pointing out the affinity of Sidney’s work for studies 
that examine both the writer’s intended and the actual actions that occur in the mind of the reader 
as the text forces him or her to engage in an active transaction intended to convey truth far 
beyond the truths possible through mere imitation or verisimilitude. For a variety of reasons that 
I will discuss later, Sidney’s poetics presupposed a hermeneutic interpretive process that elevated 
poetry above all other forms of literature in conveying truth and revealing glimpses of Neo-
Platonic Ideal forms to the reader. Sidney, as author, also describes the poet’s active process of 
interpretation in his poetry. His sonnet sequence Astrophil and Stella begins by protesting that 
the poet wants to cease using obvious conceits and overused conventional sonnet form. He 
wishes to invent a new sonnet form, but the task isn’t easy. Already demonstrating how the poet 
is up against a daunting mission as Astrophil expresses his anxiety to keep up with “inventions 
fine,” the first sonnet of the sequence begins with Astrophil moaning that he can’t seem to write 
good poetry that will inspire his beloved--and move her--to love him back. As he tries to find a 
way to compose a poem that will impress his beloved, Astrophil is already composing fine 
poetry that reveals his poetic skill and understanding of poetic conventions:  
  I sought fit words to paint the blackest face of woe,  
Studying inventions fine, her wits to entertain: 
Oft turning others’ leaves, to see if thence would flow  
  Some fresh and fruitful showers upon my sun-burn’d brain.  
  But words came halting forth, wanting Invention’s stay,  
  Invention, Nature’s child, fled step-dame Study’s blows. (lines 5-10) 
The unknown reaction of his audience—the fact that how his beloved, Stella, might react to his 
words determines the success of his poetry—makes Astrophil worry and causes him to lament. 
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At this point it is important that I explain why I am painstakingly describing the seemingly 
obvious lines from the first sonnet of Astrophil and Stella. Although it seems plain that sonnet 1 
focuses on the process and hardship of poetry writing, those lines are set up to show what really 
occurs in the mind of a poet before composing his verse and to point out that the virtue of writing 
may be tested not just in the act of writing but also in the reaction of its reader. The reader’s 
reaction is not only a metaphorical deliverance and achievement of the text but also a physical 
manifestation of virtues that the text tries to evoke. A good poem, a successful one, then, will 
indeed be read as a good poem but will do its job, which is to inspire and move the reader to 
action. Hence, a successful love sonnet is supposed to actually move the beloved’s heart and 
make him or her do something. In other words, if a love poem doesn’t create love, then it can’t 
be a good poem. This is more about turning words into a reality, and for Astrophil it is more 
complicated since he wants to use a new and different set of poetic devices to accomplish this 
alchemical task.  
Here I want to describe the divine capability of a poet that Sidney argues for in The 
Defence of Poesy, for it is central to most of my discussion ahead. When, for example, Sidney 
argues that  “Only the poet, disdaining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up with the vigor 
of his own invention, doth grow, in effect, into another nature, in making things either better than 
nature bringeth forth, or, quite a newe forms such as never were in Nature,” he lauds the poet’s 
ability to expand nature’s gifts “as he goeth hand in hand with nature, not enclosed within the 
narrow warrant of her gifts, but freely ranging within the zodiac of his own wit.”44 The poet’s 
ability to make something better than nature is the invention that Astrophil desires, and this 
invention requires “study” and practice. The poets with the ability to examine the world and then 
                                                 
44 Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig. C1v. 
33 
create “things either better than nature bringeth forth, or, quite a newe formes” are not only great 
learned men who learned from inventions already existing but also accomplished makers who 
imitate and reinvent something better than the preexisting forms.45 The poet should not be 
limited to “the narrow warrant of [nature’s] gifts” but be freely creative with what nature 
provides using his or her wit; the poet shouldn’t merely copy nature but rather experiment with 
it—“lifted up with vigor”--while inventing a new form, a new nature. 
Nor, to finish up a very preliminary appraisal of Sidney’s poetics, was it just a matter of a 
poet’s accomplishing more than mere imitation, for the manner of presentation was also vitally 
important.46 Sidney begins The Defence of Poesy with an anecdote about his visit to Edward 
Wotton in Italy. At the Holy Roman Emperor’s court, Sidney and Wotton “gave [themselves] to 
learn horsemanship of John Pietro Pugliano, one that with great commendation had the place of 
an esquire in his stable.”47 Sidney’s The Defence of Poesy displays much persuasive verbal and 
rhetorical skill, accompanied by learned references to the classical literary tradition, and the 
carefully modulated humorous, self-deprecating tone becomes apparent in the introduction, 
which discusses horsemanship. Pugliano, with his eager and diligent delivery of teaching, 
                                                 
45 Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig. C1v. 
46 Sidney further explains that through imitation the poet can “make his own, beautifying it both for further 
teaching, and more delighting, as it pleaseth him” (sig. E2v). It is important to note that Sidney points out the creator 
(poet or the artist) also experiences the “end” of poetry; while making “his own” and “beautifying it,” the poet 
creates something that is not only instructive and didactic for the audience/reader, but receives joy in doing it. 
Without a doubt, the Platonic perception of poetry as the least instructive and persuasive means to teach virtue 
prevailed from ancient Greece and Rome through the sixteenth century, and in The Defence of Poesy Sidney 
confronts ancient attacks on poetry and drama that had been revived by Puritan moralists. Stephen Gosson, whose 
invective restated Plato’s criticism of poetry, argued that poetry is an art of imitation that is far removed from truth 
and thus appeals only to “the inferior part of soul,” causing moral corruption and political unrest. However, Sidney 
argues that imitation is the core of literary creation because poetic imagination doesn’t mindlessly copy but always 
reflects the individual mind who is doing the work of mimesis: “Poesy, therefore, is an art of imitation, for so 
Aristotle termeth it in this word mimesis, that is to say, a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth— to speak 
metaphorically, a speaking picture—with this end, to teach and delight” (sig. C2v).  
47 Sidney, sig. B1r. It was during the court of either Maximilian II or Rudolf II, the son of Maximilian II, 
but the date of Sidney’s visit is uncertain; and scholars have pointed various dates between 1574-75. Rudolf II took 
over his father’s reign in October of 1575.  
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appears to be an unsophisticated, one-dimensional character owing to Sidney’s subtle wit: “And 
he, according to the fertileness of the Italian wit, did not only afford us the demonstration of his 
practice but sought to enrich our minds with contemplations therein which he thought most 
precious.”48 Pugliano compares a horse to a courtier and suggests that horses are nobler than 
courtiers. Sidney recounts: “Then would he add certain praises, by telling what a peerless beast 
the horse was, the only serviceable courtier without flattery, the beast of most beauty, 
faithfulness, courage, and such more, that if I had not been a piece of a logician before I came to 
him I think he would have persuaded me to have wished myself a horse.”49 Sidney clearly thinks 
that Pugliano’s assertion is too obvious and too eager to be understood as anything but a type of 
self-love without self-control. Although Sidney says in his acerbic tone that “self-love is better 
than any gilding,” Pugliano’s hyperbolic speech on the art of horsemanship is not only 
overwrought but his “weake arguments” fail to satisfy an experienced courtier whose mastery of 
balancing “self-love” and “gilding” helped him establish the steadfastness of his political and 
social status.50  
The seeming appearance of an easy, perhaps a bit reckless, thus self-effacing, and yet 
impeccably controlled rhetorical surface in Sidney’s The Defence of Poesy reflects the most 
conspicuous Renaissance aesthetical ideal, the supreme importance placed on grace and 
sprezzatura. Furthermore, note how in the beginning of The Defence of Poesy Sidney thoroughly 
lists numerous examples of ancient philosophers who used poetry to articulate their inner 
                                                 
48 Sidney, sig. B1r. 
49 Sidney, sig. B1v. 
50 Sidney, sig. B1v. The word “gilding” could mean two things here— the typical metal gilding, but also a 
pun on “gelding,” which is the meaning I am referencing in my later point about the art of balancing self-advocacy 
(“self-love”) and self-effacement (“gelding”) to present oneself as an affable and sophisticated courtier who is also 
able to hide his political greed and ambition. 
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thoughts as they performed their profession “under the masks of poets.”51 Sidney’s description of 
poetry as a mask informs his interpretation of the function of mimesis in poetic creation: “Poesie 
therefore is an arte of imitation, for so Aristotle termeth it in this word Mimesis, that is to say, a 
representing, counterfeiting, or figuring foorth.”52  Poetry, as Sidney argues, is undeniably 
capable of not only representing but also masking, and therefore poetry is an incredibly useful 
form of communication and production of individual knowledge as well as national posterity:  
Let learned Greece in any of her manifold Science, be able to shew me one booke, 
before Musaeus, Homer, & Hesiodus, all three nothing els but Poets. Nay, let any 
historie be brought, that can say any writers were there before them, if they were 
not men of the same skill, as Orpheus, Linus, and some other are named: who 
having been the first of that Country, that made pens deliverers of their 
knowledge to their posterity, may justify challenge to bee called their Fathers in 
learning. (sig. B2r) 
Sidney defends poetry’s mimetic quality by expanding the scope of poetry’s—and the poet’s--
capability. A poet is someone who holds the veil to unveil truth, the one who performs behind a 
mask; as Sidney writes, any writers who “made pens deliverers of their knowledge to their 
posterity” learned to embody and perform metaphor—because it stands in for something else 
while “representing,” it is “counterfeiting” and “figuring foorh” simultaneously. Note how 
Sidney begins The Defense of Poesy by telling the story of Pugliano and his horse, whom Sidney 
                                                 
51 Sidney, sig. B2v. Sidney explains how the mask of poetry enabled the great thinkers to embody their 
ideas: “So as Amphion was sayde to move stones with his poetrie, to build Thebes. And Orpheus to be listened to by 
beastes, indeed, stony and beastly people. So among the Romans were Liuius, Andronicus, and Ennius. […] After 
whom, encouraged and delighted with theyr excellent fore-going, others have followed, to beautifie our mother 
tongue, as wel in the same kinde as in other Arts. This did so notably shewe it selfe, that the Phylosophers of 
Greece, durst not a long time appeare to the worlde but under the masks of poets. So Thales, Empedocles, and 
Parmenides, sange their natural Phylosophie in verses” (sig. B2v). 
52 Sig. C2v. 
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met through his friend and courtier Edward Wotton. This is a peculiar line up. Imagine--a poet, a 
courtier, a riding master, and a horse? What kind of performance is occurring around this 
significant, noble subject, a horse?53 Or, is Sidney pointing out that human beings can produce, 
perform, and embody meaning only through the unbreakable assembly of mimetic pretense? As 
David M. Posner points out in The Performance of Nobility in Early Modern European 
Literature, Count Baldassare Castiglione’s The Book of Courtier appropriates Cicero’s concept 
of “artful artlessness” in public performances when describing the effect of wonder and suspense 
in a courtier’s public performance when a courtier appears graceful in his behavior and rhetoric 
yet accomplishes the effect without appearing to try. Castiglione’s The Book of Courtier praises 
sprezzatura, compactly defined as “effortless grace,” as the most essential quality for a courtier 
to possess in order to achieve successful social and political nearness to the power.  
The ideal of sprezzatura, then, extends to the ideal courtier’s aesthetic goal when 
employed in creating art. An ideal courtier who employs his rhetoric and physical attributes to be 
politically persuasive is equivalent to an ideal poet who artfully uses his words to be inspiring 
and moving. Yet the key to diplomacy and courtly dissimulation is subtlety—Pugliano fails 
because he is too eager, too obvious. In both Sidney’s and Castiglione’s discussions of artistic 
creation, literary creation is further removed from the classical tradition and its expectation of art 
representing or imitating nature—an ideal artist and his or her ideal literary creation will achieve 
more than a mere representation of nature, and an ideal artist will deliver such an accomplished 
and sophisticated piece of art without making the process of naturalizing art obvious. For 
example, in Robert Herrick’s “Delight in Disorder” (1648), in praising “a wild civility” created 
                                                 
53 We should also remember how Sidney describes Pugliano as a gauche and loud type, who comes across 
as even less sophisticated than his own horse. Yet it is also Sidney who uses this story to allude to something else, 
hiding behind a horse (and the horseman). This should make one wonder, “who is counterfeiting or figuring forth?” 
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by feminine disarray, Herrick creates a site of sprezzatura through the poem’s metrical and 
rhyme structure, which also includes his satirical criticism of the Puritan preference for precision 
that eschewed the lush, languid, easy grace of courtly culture and its poetry.54 By idolizing the 
lack of order as the abundance of delight, Herrick transforms and expands the natural, expected, 
and common meaning of disorder into something unexpected and enhanced, so “golden” that it 
would teach us something new and delight us with enlightenment. The abundance in disorder, 
caught in “an erring lace,” “here and there,” and “ribbons to flow confusedly,” gives so much 
delight to the poet, and to reiterate Sidney’s argument that while nature’s world is “brazen,” art is 
able to “deliver a golden” world.55  
The idea of a “golden” world brings us past gesture and style to Sidney’s core claim 
about poetry, that it is able to transcend its material surroundings and participate in the ideal. 
Again, this alludes to the capability of poetry, being able to turn brazen into gold, to use—
counterfeit and figure forth--an example of a horse to teach and inspire a man. Naturally, 
contemporary discussions of Neoplatonic philosophy must be handled delicately to avoid 
historical misrepresentations. For example, in Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature, 
Elizabeth Spiller criticizes Harry Berger, the author of Second World and Green World: Studies 
in Renaissance Fiction-Making, for misreading the Platonic distinction between the physical and 
the ideal. According to Spiller, Berger identifies “model worlds” as a “historical novelty” in 
early modern thought: “The Renaissance was characterized by the rediscovery of a belief in the 
human imagination… [that] leads to the creation of a ‘second-world attitude,’ the desire to live in 
                                                 
54 Paradoxically, an ideal, successful artistic creation for the Renaissance humanists occurs when the artist 
artfully effaces his “too precise”—too obvious--representation of nature in order to create art that is more vivid to 
the audience than would otherwise be accomplished through careful, strict regularity and imitation so that it “makes 
everything live and move,” as Aristotle describes Homer’s vivid metaphors. Herrick’s “Delight in Disorder” 
contains near rhymes, accented initial syllables to break the iambic structure, and even one line a syllable short, yet 
it flows with an uncanny grace, making it the perfect illustration of sprezzatura. 
55 Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig. C1v. 
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and therefore control a world made by human invention rather than in the ‘first world’ as God, 
nature, or the gods have contrived it” (qtd. in Spiller 29).56 For Berger, then, the “physical” 
corresponds to a kind of hard truth or objectivity while the “ideal” involves the creation of 
imaginary worlds, the province of art. Spiller emphasizes that this distinction emerges from 
imposing modern categories on sixteenth-century thought. The belief that description of the 
physical world produces “truth” emerges from an acceptance of Aristotelian mimesis—and 
corresponds closely with modern scientific methodologies—but Spiller insists that Renaissance 
Neoplatonism provided an alternate model, one in which imagination produced truth by actively 
creating new worlds and knowledge. This manner of discovering truth avoided what Sidney and 
others viewed as a misleading reliance on merely copying the physical world of nature through 
scientific description and modeling (as opposed to the Ideal forms that, in Platonic thought, the 
physical world merely copies). Spiller presents Nelson Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking as 
offering a more accurate—though still flawed—account of Sidney’s theory of the imagination, 
for Goodman emphasizes the active role of “worldmaking” in the production of both scientific 
and artistic knowledge yet falls short, in Spiller’s judgment, by demoting the role of mind and 
imagination in his insistence that there is an unmistakable distinction between knowing and 
doing, or, as Goodman puts it, that “a broad mind is no substitute for hard work” (qtd. in Spiller 
31).57 
                                                 
56 Harry Berger, Second World and Green World, 9.  
57 Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978). Goodman further 
argues: “Moreover, while readiness to recognize alternative worlds may be liberating, and suggestive of new 
avenues of exploration, a willingness to welcome all worlds build none. Mere acknowledgement of the many 
available frames or reference provides us with no map of the motions of heavenly bodies; acceptance of the 
eligibility of alternative bases produces no scientific theory or philosophical system; awareness of varied ways of 
seeing paints no pictures” (21). Too much knowledge might take away from the liberty of imagination. 
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However, Sidney and Cavendish would argue that a broad mind does hard work.58 Spiller 
credits the Florentine Neoplatonist’s promotion of Plotinus as the source for Sidney’s view that 
art transcends the merely physical forms of nature. Given the astonishing breadth of Sidney’s 
reading there are additional probable sources that I will discuss later, but Spiller is correct that 
Plotinus is certainly chief among them.59 As Sidney argues in The Defence of Poesy, then, poetry 
does not misrepresent or deviate from nature, but create more nature to represent and to be 
represented. Or, as Spiller describes it, “art offers an alternative, competing image that may come 
closer to ideas themselves the further it departs from the physical reality of nature” (Spiller 32). 
To accurately recover Sidney’s mindset requires hard work to escape the modern mentality that 
equates fidelity in representation with objectivity and rationality and a lack thereof with 
subjectivity and irrationality, but doing so encourages a profound meditation on representational 
fidelity and truth as well as the active role that mind and imagination play in all human 
perception--thus tainting all claims of objectivity. For Sidney, imagination is not the source, as 
Spiller describes it, of “irrational mysticism,” but instead, again in Spiller’s words, Sidney 
believes poetry produces truth because “its primary epistemological connection is with the ideal 
world rather than with a sensible world that is imperfect and contingent” (32). I would argue that 
the creative and subjective mind is the “broad mind” that does hard work. Indeed, I am aware 
that this kind of comparative argument or debate about the quality—or the merit—of the artistic 
mind versus scientific knowledge would easily sound misleading and unjust. “Hard work,” I 
                                                 
58 The similarity between Sidney’s description of the divine power of “vates” in The Defence of Poesy and 
Cavendish’s description of augurers in The Blazing World is striking as they both represent the figure of a foreseer 
or prophet, someone who can manifest one world into the other by the power of a “broad” mind. Poets do this by 
writing while augurers do this by reading. I discuss Cavendish’s use of augurers in the next chapter. 
59 According to Spiller, Plotinus declared in the Enneads that “the arts are not to be slighted on the ground 
that they create by imitation of natural objects, for, to begin with, these natural objects are themselves imitations . . . 
but go back to the Ideas [logous] from which nature derives, and furthermore, that much of their work is all their 
own; they are moulders of beauty and where nature is lacking” (qtd. in Spiller 32). 
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should specify here, is a kind of intellectual work that involves actual creation or materialization 
of what had theretofore only existed in the abstract, as an idea—as distinguished from a more 
basic and one-for-one act of mimesis. This is a subtle point that needs more explanation: whereas 
science often only produces objective and rational knowledge through relatively static models, 
art relies on broad minds working hard to connect human reality—“the sensible world”—to “the 
ideal world” and transform one knowledge to the other, thus potentially accomplishing more 
“hard” work than the scientific mind. And to be specific, the transformation from “one 
knowledge to the other” I mentioned above takes place between the minds of artists and those of 
audience. The transformation is both epistemological and pedagogical, conceptual but practical, 
further developing a private practice of learning into a shared, social virtue. Needless to say, the 
popularization of book publishing and accessibility of literary creations bolstered the expansion 
of private artistic creativity, making the artist a social and public source of artistic creativity and 
establishing a novel dialog between the artist and the audience. The social and communicable 
aspect of poetry could not be found in the lone scientist’s lab during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries—scientific discovery and knowledge remained private and never fully 
optimized even when they were publically announced and acknowledged.  
Thus, as I will discuss in a later chapter, Robert Hooke’s Micrographia proves to be one 
of the novel scientific publications of his day, attempting to expand the private epistemological 
stage of science into a public, social place by incorporating pictorial images and poetic details 
into his study. And it is also significant to point out that both Sidney and Hooke describe the 
capability of their epistemological device—poetry and science, or more specifically, poetic verse 
and the microscopic lens—to be theology-inspired and theologically serviceable, arguing that 
their devices can be used to produce a broad and universal kind of epistemology espoused by 
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Renaissance humanists. Such wholesome and expandable knowledge is applicable to a wide 
array of social, educational, or political situations, offering a pedagogically operative 
epistemology encouraging its audience to be mobile in action as well as thoughts. Thus, the 
godly work is not just knowing what is morally good but doing what is morally good. For 
instance, if Astrophil’s love poetry in Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella is good enough to inspire 
Stella to fall in love with him, then Sidney’s poetry, by illustrating and materializing that change 
and making it available to the reader, succeeds in being mobile in both actions and thoughts. 
Sidney argues that poetry is on the side of religion, and poetic imagination offers nothing that is 
ominous towards imaginative methods of explaining theology. Hooke believes that microscopic 
details reveal a godly message of harmony and beauty in the design of organisms. Knowledge 
and learning exist emphatically to serve moral and teleological goals in Sidney’s Defence and 
even in his Sonnet sequence, for writing poetry is an epistemologically mutating and 
expanding—thus climbing and optimizing—experience. However, in Hooke’s Micrographia, as 
we shall see, the moralizing theological inspiration from microscopic details becomes the main 
act as well as the message of the scientist’s observation, leaving very little room for the readers 
to use their own imagination to expand the knowledge provided for them. In other words, the 
imagination needed to process a poetic representation as a divine representation involves much 
more intellectual expansion than the logic that defines the information provided through 
scientific discovery as a divine creation. Climbing up to “the ideal world” from “a sensible 
world” requires a broad mind and hard work, and scientific reductionism—of both an ontological 
and methodological sort— would not only object to the broadness but also suspect the distance 
between ideal and reality, viewing the former as unreal and imagined, thus irrational. 
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That a poet can get closer to the ideal world through his work also suggests Sidney is 
mindful of Plato’s hierarchically and holistically structured world. In a Platonic world, 
knowledge should serve a vehicle to carry an individual to the greater and higher end that is 
closer to the most moral and truthful. Everything physical and corporal in a Platonic world, then, 
aspires to be better and higher, closer to the idea of incorporeal, away from physical. The 
amorous love wants to be a better love, as it lacks the spiritual unity and truth that is beyond the 
physical beauty. Most Neoplatonic love sonnets in the sixteenth century thus demonstrate the 
ladder of love. With their knowledge gained from studies and practices, Sidney indicates, all the 
sciences and arts should aim for the one single end of well doing, which goes beyond knowing 
well:  
all these are but serving sciences, which, as they have each a private end in 
themselves, so yet are they all directed to the highest end of the mistress-
knowledge, by the Greeks called architectonike, which stands (as I think) in the 
knowledge of a man’s self, in the ethnic and politic consideration, with the end of 
well doing and not of well knowing only—even as the saddler’s next end is to 
make a good saddle, but his father’s end to serve a nobler faculty, which is 
horsemanship […] So that, the ending of all earthly learning being virtuous 
action, those skills, that most serve to bring forth that, have a most just title to be 
princes over all the rest.60  
Most notably, Sidney insists here that the most moralistic and truthful end for an epistemological 
journey in all the sciences and arts should be “the end of well doing and not of well knowing 
only.”61 Therefore, horsemanship, as Sidney mentions in the beginning of Defence, should be 
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more than just an end in itself, for it should provide the knowledge that improves the soldier’s 
art, which serves the statesman’s art; the end goal is to achieve the most virtuous action. In 
sonnet 5 of Astrophil and Stella, Sidney ponders the Neoplatonic doctrines opposed to romantic 
love: “True, that true beauty virtue is indeed,/ Whereof this beauty can be but a shade,/ Which 
elements with mortal mixture breed” (lines 9-11). I would argue that the action—ascension—is 
already part of the Neoplatonic course of knowing, and a great work of art conjoined with 
knowledge is supposed to help the mind to be moved and delivered upward, closer to “true 
beauty.” Astrophil does describe Stella’s physical beauty that arouses romantic love as a kind of 
particular love that is far from true beauty. Pay attention to how Sidney uses a singular 
demonstrative pronoun “this” to signify the physical proximity and particularity of what it refers 
to—“this beauty” that Astrophil is fallen in love with is the body, “a shade.” Stella’s physical 
beauty is merely a shadow—“shade”—of inner virtue that embodies a transcendent and immortal 
idea of beauty. Sensual love will only carry Astrophil near the shade of her virtue, not her inner 
virtue veiled and shaded by her physical beauty. Only through the hard labor of transcending 
physical love and reaching up to the state of spiritual love can Astrophil get closer to her inner 
virtue and true beauty. The poet writing love sonnets should convert his physical love into 
spiritual love, and this transformation should occur inside art as well as outside it as the art 
should create a better, ideal reality, rendering the poem able to transform the reader as well. 
Knowledge that doesn’t create movement has little significance in the Platonic world order 
because knowledge itself alone isn’t anywhere close to truth—however, the application of 
knowledge can create movement closer to ideal beauty and truth. One way to apply such 
knowledge and create truth that is more virtuous and ideal than reality, for Sidney, is through 
poetry. A poet’s recreation of nature surpasses its original, as it has been transformed into a 
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much more improved and specialized form of art, which “offers an alternative, competing image 
that may come closer to ideas themselves the further it departs from the physical reality of 
nature,” as Spiller describes it.62  
As I mentioned at the start of this chapter, Sidney’s persistent call that poetry should 
inspire action—specific, virtuous action—in the reader has served to make reader-response 
modes of analysis particularly valuable in discussions of his work, especially since Sidney 
differentiates poetry from history or philosophy based on this ability. In The Shape of Things 
Known: Sidney’s Apology in Its Philosophical Tradition, Forrest G. Robinson explains that “The 
assumption that knowledge should inform action gives rise to the central argument of the 
Apology—that poetry is the best teacher of that which is most important in action, namely 
virtue” (98). Robinson examines Sidney’s definition of poetry as a “speaking picture” and claims 
that poetic imitation reigns supreme precisely because of this ability to offer pictorial depictions 
of ideas to match the philosopher’s verbal definitions: “Sidney was convinced that moral 
abstractions have the greatest pedagogical efficacy when they are made visible to the mind’s eye, 
and not when set forth in verbal definitions” (98-99). Robinson’s argument is effective here, 
especially for the moral outcome of poetry that Sidney argues for in The Defence of Poesy. The 
picture and pictorial in verse, after all, strikes the mind visually—as it is visible—while the non-
poetic word strikes the mind with ideas; a poet can turn words into ideas, but these are ideas not 
“visible,” but more like abstractions, words turning into non-concrete concepts only visible to the 
mind. And that conceptualization striking the mind with the enhanced power of pictorial 
representation—or literary and figural, that is—will inspire the reader to act upon the moral and 
virtuous concepts gained from reading poetry. Sidney’s “speaking picture” signifies an artistic 
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expression accomplishing the pictorial representation of ideas, and Robinson’s model manages to 
reassert a relatively direct model role for mimesis: “poetry is a kind of representational painting 
in words, an art of language in which there is a premium on vivid descriptions of external nature” 
(99). 
It is interesting to note that Sidney’s idea that words can both create virtuous action and 
paint an image through a process of abstraction modifies the Neoplatonic dualism that separates 
and places incorporeal over corporeal reality. Though based on Neoplatonic dualistic 
psychology, the Neoplatonic values are modified to support Sidney’s definition of poetry as 
“speaking picture.” Robinson points out Sidney depends “upon the traditions of visual 
epistemology for much of the theory of the Apology,” but the work contains innovations of his 
own: “That ideas could be seen was the standard assumption during the sixteenth century, but 
that they could be seen in a poem was something new” (100). Although Sidney claims that poets 
“imitate the inconceivable excellencies of God,” Sidney also argues that there should be “a firm 
distinction between philosophy and theology” (101). The distinction Sidney draws between the 
realm of nature and divine could have been a “lip service” to the religious misomousoi—as 
Sidney terms the poetry haters—but one must still wonder how Sidney makes his argument for 
poetry’s divine capability. What makes Sidney’s argument different from the Neoplatonic 
beliefs? Robinson describes: 
This dichotomy of nature and grace, with the concomitant division between 
poetry (“popular” philosophy) and theology, stems from an epistemological 
distinction current among many Renaissance Neoplatonists. The doctrines of 
religious Hermeticism, received in Florence during the fifteenth century, had 
strong alliances with the dualistic psychology of Platonism and provided the 
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highly visualized theory of knowledge which underpins the emblem tradition. 
During the sixteenth century these doctrines were influential in a variety of 
different forms. Sidney probably encountered magical Hermeticism in John Dee, 
who considered himself a Christian magnus. […] Sidney’s translation of Mornay 
is concrete evidence that he was familiar with visual epistemology in its explicitly 
philosophical form. (101) 
Robinson sees the influence of the protestant theologian Philippe de Mornay on Sidney’s 
formation of the divine capability of poetry. Mornay’s religious tract—De la Verite—was 
saturated with the Platonic epistemology of “double vision, ” which Robinson describes as “one 
eye looking toward the phenomenal world and the other toward God’s light within the soul” 
(102). Furthermore, in Mornay’s description, God’s grace is written to be read. Since God is 
“visibly reflected in nature and . . . the divine image is engraved on the human soul,” even 
though the essence of God might be impossible for the human mind to grasp, “the eye of the 
mind has the natural power to see God indirectly reflected in the external universe and within the 
intellect itself” (Robinson 102). Convinced by Mornay’s theology, Sidney’s belief that poetry 
provides a visual epistemology similar to the natural vision ensuing from the sight of God’s 
reflection is an important point that helps us understand why the epistemological visualization is 
such a unique property of poetry. The reason that engages and inspires the human mind to see the 
ideas in poetry is something divine, Robinson suggests. Even though such a connection might 
blur the distinction between the two different realms—the realm of grace and nature—still the 
human mind uses Reason, which is the gift of God, to understand both realms. Poetry, then, 
becomes the instrument of God, beyond a pedagogical tool of epistemology but more connected 
to theology in its way of inspiring the human mind not only to see but more importantly to 
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appreciate God’s creations and their beauty. Although in my discussion of Sidney, Cavendish, 
and Finch I will consider this connection of poetic creation and spiritual seeing in more broadly 
philosophical terms, my later discussion of Milton’s “spiritual sight” will explore the connection 
in more literal terms. 
As I have intimated earlier, the idea that the object of human desire can produce 
knowledge, which further encourages the human will to love, is one of the main themes of 
Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella. And Sidney doesn’t stop there, as the sonnet sequence embodies 
the ladder of love, delivering the poet as well as the reader to the higher sense and understanding 
of love. This is the most unique and spiritual capability of poetry; poetry can deliver—as it 
“bringeth things forth”—the image of God. The subtle but crucial significance of this claim is 
that poetry can imitate the creative act associated with God. Poetry can take us to God through 
the image it creates, but it is not the image itself that makes poetry godly or close to God; rather, 
it is the transportive act that turns a verbally rendered image into a mentally apprehended—and 
theologically indicated—experience of something divine. What is more important is that poetry 
alone cannot accomplish this transport—it of course requires the participation of audience to 
fully catalyze and complete the act. The reader of poetry thus becomes a crucial part of poetry’s 
function of moral integrity and effect.  
Providing an insightful reading of Sidney’s moral argument of poetry in Sidney’s Poetics: 
Imitating Creation, Michael Mack connects the poetic re-creative force with divine creative 
force as he examines Sidney’s claim in Defence that “with the force of divine breath” a poet 
“bringeth things forth.”63 Mack explains this famous passage by arguing that Sidney “follows the 
method of his humanist predecessors and begins not with the beginning but with the end of 
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poetry” (Mack 111). Again, it is important to understand that to bring “things forth” with “the 
force of divine breath” alludes to the connection between divine creativity and poetic creativity.64 
Sidney also argues in Defence: “But they that with quiet judgments will look a little deeper into 
it, shall find the end and working of it such as, being rightly applied, deserves not to be scourged 
out of the church of God.”65 Mack takes this even further, mindful of the religiously-inspired 
moral attacks Sidney was working against, insisting that it is not just the cause of this creative 
force that makes poetry moral, but the end of poetry that justifies “the poet not by what he 
receives but by what he delivers” (111). Therefore, Sidney’s argument is not about the cause of 
poetry but instead the outcome of poetry, buttressing the moral merit of poetry by transferring 
attention from its creation to its future outcome, which can be easily outside of poetry: “the 
mystery of creativity is seen most clearly in what the poem originates in the lives of readers” 
(Mack 110). The godly work of poetry is not merely contained in the poem itself, then, but is 
more accurately measured—as it is a transportive act—in the godly turn in the reader’s mind. 
 Before addressing the more specific concern of how the diverging Biblical hermeneutics 
of Catholics and Protestants shaped Sidney’s poetics, a few more general observations are in 
order. Sidney clearly participates in the Christian effort to justify the pagan elements of poetry. 
When poetry’s pagan origins became the target of religious criticism, the supporters of poetry 
found it necessary to establish a theological merit of poetry wrung out of an essential inner and 
inherited moral goodness that was naturally of poetry. As Mack points out, the idea that the 
impact of poetry can do something good to the morals of the reader instead of doing harm was a 
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carefully constructed argument used not only in poetry’s defense but also in the defense of 
humanist theology: 
Endeavoring to justify poetry vis-à-vis theology, Boccacio and Petrarch argued  
 that neither the subject matter nor the effect of poetry was opposed to theology.  
 Accordingly, they did not emphasize the creative origin of the poem but rather  
 its not ungodly effect. Poetry’s emulation of theology, deeply embedded in the 
 humanist poetic tradition that Sidney inherited and advanced, emphasizes above 
all else the good moral effect of the poem. In arguing that poetry, just as with 
theology, can lead an audience to God, Sidney follows the method of his 
humanist predecessors and begins not with the beginning but with the end of 
poetry.66 
As Mack further points out, both Boccaccio and Petrarch believed that poetry’s pagan origin or 
its “ungodly effect” had to be eclipsed by the moral effect of the poem. Thus, Boccaccio finds 
the teleological Christian moralistic message to be “hidden in pagan mythology” while Petrarch 
“structures his oration as a sermon, while filling it with quotations not from the Bible but from 
Virgil and other classical sources” (111). Comparing “poetry to theology” is a typical method 
humanists used to “provide that neither the subject matter nor the effect of poetry was immoral” 
(111). 
To this end, Sidney relentlessly pushes the faultless moral grounding of his poem’s 
subject. Falling in love is, according to Sidney’s love sonnets and in the Neoplatonist sense, a 
property of intelligence, action propelled by a most virtuous “learned” mind that sees true beauty 
and falls in love with the most virtuous; as Sidney explains in Sonnet 16 of Astrophil and Stella:  
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  Mine eyes (shall I say curst or blest?) beheld 
  Stella; now she is nam’d, need more be said? 
  In her sight I a lesson new have spell’d, 
  I now have learn’d Love right, and learn’d even so, 
   As who by being poisoned doth poison know. (lines 10-14) 
The kind of love that a learned Astrophil says that he has found is indeed visually oriented, 
though the sight of Stella that fills him with “the restless fire” is the opposite of what Astrophil 
describes as the physical, obvious beauty that attracts the physical eye first but doesn’t fully 
satisfy his desire. Astrophil confesses that he was “apt to like” obvious “beauties” that “were of 
many carats fine” (line 1-2). A learned man not only being taught and inspired by poetry but 
most importantly also being able to create his own poetry, Astrophil realizes that the love he 
used to feel is neither real nor good—Astrophil doesn’t have “those restless flames in [him]” 
though he used to think that he “was full of thee” (5). Willing to better himself and his poetic 
invention, Astrophil desires something more virtuous than a mere physical beauty, “which others 
said did make their souls to pine” (6). To be exact, Astrophil is in the state of wanting, 
unsatisfied with the accessible and obvious beauty—“many carats fine”—and the shallow 
inspirations it incites. Learning what true love is, simply put, is a challenging lesson because 
Astrophil must contemplate and “pine” in order to attain it. It is also equally important that 
“Love right” that Astrophil espouses is a kind of love that “others” have experienced— “which 
others said” that it made “their souls pine”—but Astrophil hasn’t until he meets and falls in love 
with Stella. The poet starts his artistic invention “in her sight,” which the poet “a lesson new 
have spell’d” (12). The right kind of love Astrophil desires is life changing, as its lessons can be 
fatal: “I now have learn’d Love right, and learn’d even so,/ As who by being poisoned doth 
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poison know” (13-14). The Neoplatonic moral ground and convention of virtuous love teaches 
the poet how to be honorable and heroic through unrequited love. 
One senses in Sidney the same philosophy that led Cavendish to criticize Robert Hooke’s 
“passive” method of recording scientific truth in Micrographia, the method that ignored the role 
of human imagination and ostensibly possessed the ability to observe and record—as in his 
drawing of the eye of a fly—an accurate and directly representational “copy” of material 
phenomena. Spiller emphasizes that Sidney viewed the poet as “maker,” a term that deflects 
attention from the artifact produced—the poem—and recenters it on poetry as an act producing 
knowledge. In this definition, Sidney reverses modern views of the “sciences,” putting poetry 
above the others because it produces truth where the others merely counterfeit it; the poet “doth 
grow in effect another nature,” whereas the scientist— as Hooke demonstrates— is limited by an 
allegiance to the project of supposed representational fidelity. Spiller sums up Sidney’s position 
nicely: “poetry makes while other sciences only copy” (38).     
Although “theology” up till this point in my discussion has often been an unsatisfyingly 
undifferentiated term, in fact the specific currents of theological thought contesting for 
intellectual space in Sidney’s England—and Europe as a whole—play a fascinating role in 
Sidney’s poetics and open up very fertile comparisons with later subjects in my study. As 
Timothy Rosendale argues in the introduction to Liturgy and Literature in the Making of 
Protestant England, historiographical studies of the English Reformation have swung wildly 
between two competing poles, one which believes that “England was a fertile seedbed for 
reform, and that Protestant ideas took root quickly, deeply, and widely,” the other that “the late-
medieval Church was vitally alive, foundational to English culture, and beloved by the vast 
majority of English people, who found its ritual, doctrine, and institutional presence to be 
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profoundly satisfying.”67 Much is at stake for literary studies in reconciling the two views, the 
former elevating the “word” to almost iconic status in its emphasis on a hermeneutics of literal 
representation and the latter retaining a more richly figural conception of language in which 
words combine to form images, which in turn lead the reader from the literal to the Ideal. Partly 
because contemporary culture celebrates the literal—especially in the triumphal and de-
mystifying claims of technology and science—it is easy to mistake the path by which we got 
here as a steady progression, a view which, among other things, as Rosendale also points out, 
inscribes contemporary prejudices into literary studies and almost completely removes religion 
from the process. Also, however, such a view flattens “Protestantism” to a homogenous force 
bearing few distinguishing marks even between the Continent and England. For example, despite 
the undeniable insights Peter Harrison shares in his The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of 
Natural Science—a work that has influenced me greatly in other areas of my study—Harrison 
tends to view, as he describes it, an “innovative. . .insistence on the priority of the literal sense” 
as the earliest central and distinguishing tenet of a seemingly undifferentiated Reformed and 
Anglican Protestantism.68 Certainly, all Protestants were united against the totalizing claims of 
Rome, but even in England neither side attained permanent ascendancy:  
It is no surprise that the opposing parties in the Civil War defined themselves 
centrally in terms of textual affiliation. In fact, it might be useful to rethink the 
Civil War as less a matter of old dichotomies of Crown/ Parliament or court/ 
country and more a conflict between the competing social, religious, and political 
visions of a Bible party and a Prayerbook party.69 
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In the near-century span between the drafting of the Book of Common Prayer in 1549 and the 
start of the War, the theological debate surrounding its centralized authorizing of a more figural 
reading of scripture, as opposed to a radically individualistic and literal one, helps us understand 
a wide assortment of thinkers and writers who were not explicitly connected to religious writing. 
Chief among these is Sidney, who, in The Defence of Poesy, demonstrates a clear awareness of 
the competing hermeneutic claims established within competing methodologies of biblical 
exegesis in his day. The reader must avoid, however, a simple diagrammatic representation of 
figurality versus literality that ascribes one or the other as an emblem of a particular religious 
group and equates the increase of one as necessarily effecting the decrease of the other. In fact, 
both “Protestant” and “Catholic” theologies exhibited degrees of both, particularly in their 
conception of the Eucharist. Here, indeed, the two sides flip, which further complicates the 
conceptual model necessary to make sense of the interaction of figurality and Renaissance 
literary production. In order to insist on the doctrine of transubstantiation, where the bread and 
wine become the literal body and blood of Christ, the Catholic church forwarded a completely 
literal reading of the ceremony and the scriptural event behind it. Protestants, however, replaced 
the literal transformation with a symbolic act where the bread and wine represented the body and 
blood of Christ, either retaining a “real presence” as in Calvin or becoming entirely symbolic as 
in Zwingli. One thing that is certain is that the consistent discourse surrounding the need to 
distinguish between competing modes of representation in the Eucharist fostered valuable 
conversations about signifiers and how they signified both in the Renaissance and in 
contemporary literary study.  
To be perfectly clear about the basis for my argument, I do believe that the rise of 
Protestantism led to a changed relationship between reader and text--and observer and object—
54 
that stressed increasing levels of literalness. According to Harrison, the emerging Protestant 
hermeneutics involved a “collapse of the allegorical interpretation of texts, for a denial of the 
legitimacy of allegory is in essence a denial of the capacity of things to act as signs.”70 In one 
sense, the Book of Common Prayer (hereafter, BCP) was incredibly literal, for the “Black 
Rubric,” added to 1552 Prayer Book during printing, omitted in 1559, then restored in 1662, 
advises that despite kneeling during communion, “that is not meant thereby, that any adoration is 
done, or ought to be done, either unto the Sacramental bread or wine there bodily received, or 
unto any real or essential presence there being of Christ’s natural flesh and blood. For as 
concerning the sacramental bread and wine, they remain still in their very natural substances, and 
therefore may not be adored, for that were Idolatry to be abhorred of all faithful Christians. And 
as concerning the natural body and blood of our Saviour Christ, they are in heaven and not 
here.”71 The peculiar publication history of this passage—briefly appearing, then disappearing, 
then reappearing (with changes) 100 years later—demonstrates an important aspect of the 
Anglican communion; the lack of a really specific conception of the Eucharist, outside of the 
brief appearance of the Black Rubric, intentionally left the representational nature of the 
sacramental bread and wine open for interpretation for each participant.72 
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Just as the symbolic representation of Christ’s body and blood celebrated during each 
service accomplished a physical lifting up of the participant to heaven through the hermeneutic 
negotiation between representation and the reality of Christ’s power and presence in heaven, so 
too did poetry possess the same power to lead the reader to a greater awareness of his erected 
wit. Rosendale describes: “the English Reformation (and especially the BCP) had replaced a 
belief in the immanent sacramental presence of God himself with a newly stressed faith in the 
power of representations and their faithful interpretation to define, express, and transform our 
relation to the divine.”73 Once the special interpretive challenges of the Protestant Communion—
especially as presented in the BCP—are considered, Sidney’s poetics correctly emerge as less of 
a “middle ground” between Catholic and Protestant hermeneutics and more the result of a very 
astute awareness of the philosophical and theological ramifications of an efficacious Eucharist 
that involved, in some fashion or other, merely a representation of Christ. I argued earlier that 
Sidney found history and philosophy less useful than poetry because they are tied to “what is,” 
largely describing things as they actually are, whereas the poet has access to truths far greater 
than mere recapitulations of past events or universal principles. That is only part of the story, 
however; Sidney’s theological vision permeated all aspects of his writing, so that learning had 
but one goal: “This purifying of wit, this enriching of memory, enabling of judgment, and 
enlarging of conceit, which commonly we call learning, under what name soever it come forth or 
to what immediate end soever it be directed, the final end is to lead and draw us to as high a 
perfection as our degenerate souls, made worse by their clay lodgings, can be capable of.”74 
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Learning is a spiritual, transformative experience for both the poet and the reader, and Sidney 
believes poetry offers the most apt “learning” experience, better than history or philosophy, 
through its “purifying of wit, this enriching of memory, enabling of judgment, and enlarging of 
conceit.” 
Rosendale’s analysis leads us to a more sensitive and nuanced awareness of how words 
and representation function in Sidney’s creative process. Lamenting “O absent presence, Stella is 
not here,” the poet opens the Sonnet 106 from Astrophil and Stella. Though briefly suspended by 
the instant release of the long diphthong sound of “O,” the deliverance of Stella’s name brings 
the poem back to the pronounced “absent” subject again, thus subverting the poet’s description 
of “absent” Stella by making the description obsolete. Although the poet says she is “not here” 
and is an “absent presence” on top of his emphatic, echoing “O” that opens the line, this sonnet 
immediately brings itself to the reason why the poet must write, and most importantly, what the 
poet is writing about (Sonnet 106, line 1). As soon as the poet says that Stella is not here, Stella 
shows back up, in our—the readers’—mind as well as in the line even though the poet exclaims 
out loud that she is missing. The poet cannot seem to match what he says with what happens 
with his words—what he says about his creation doesn’t reflect what he ends up creating.  
Perhaps it is too obvious to suggest that writing poetry is what is on the poet’s mind in 
Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella, but the more significant point I am trying to make here that 
frequently gets ignored is that the poet cannot trust the means of his own art because she—the 
object of his attention—constantly flees away from him; her “figured forth” representation 
through poetry is restlessly transforming and moving, as long as she is being discussed through 
poetic language. And I might add here that if Stella were the subject of a scientist’s examination 
with a magnifying glass or microscope, she would be examined and discussed in parts, shapes, 
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functions, etc., as if she were a material. I would suggest that Sidney instructs us that that kind of 
looking in and projecting—piercing and magnifying—is indeed a limited way of representing or 
articulating any subject because all it does is make it easy for us to see additional matter, which 
will still have to be studied through the human imagination and intelligence.75 Furthermore, the 
subject of writing poetry is undoubtedly in question from the very beginning of the sonnet 
sequence, whereas the voice of a scientist describing scientific inquiry, such as examining a fruit 
fly or looking at stars, would proceed in the opposite direction, always towards certainty and 
authority. Writing—more specifically, writing good poetry—is compared to a figure of 
imperviousness, inaccessibility, and distance. She is both literally and figuratively opaque as the 
poet describes how she is often slipping away and hence absent in words and on the page. She 
appears to be associated with an abundance of ideas—but these ideas keep reminding the poet of 
her absence, further affirming her inaccessibility as the beloved. Unfortunately, for the poet, 
Stella signifies the uncertainty and inevitable hardship of writing poetry. The image of the poet’s 
struggle with writing good poetry mirrors the image of an unobtainable Stella, as she can be 
present only as a verbal referent, “O absent presence, Stella.”76 When Stella is figured forth 
through comparisons, she becomes the uttered, written, and read figure, but still not the real 
Stella. The mind begins to negotiate with her physical absence by uttering her name or writing 
her name or erasing it, as the poet does in the beginning of the sonnet sequence.  
Stella must remain absent and distant from the poet so that he can figure her absence out 
and articulate her absence forth. The presence of his words takes the place of her absence, as is 
                                                 
75 Of course, no microscope or magnifying glasses were big enough to capture her entire body or pin her 
down like an insect, which is why Margaret Cavendish ridicules the limited use of the microscope in The Blazing 
World.  
76 I deliberately cut off the last three words in the line 1 of Sonnet 106 to show the reader how the entire 
line can be read as various figurative articulations of Stella—the ever hollowing and echoing “O,” the absent 
presence, or “not here.”  
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plainly shown in Sonnet 106. To say that the distance between the signified and the signifier is 
inevitable is an understatement—this distance is paramount for the art to be kinetic and embody 
transformation. This word-to-action transformation is the inspiration for the kind of Neoplatonic 
instructive and transformative learning that Rosendale describes in his book; if teaching the 
pupils how to read the Bible will train the entire nation to become God’s chosen blessed 
kingdom, then it does prove “England’s fundamental sense of identity as a nation at worship”: 
Both the Prayerbook Eucharist and the Sidneian poetic insist on the absolutely 
critical centrality of figural understanding as a means of spanning the gap between 
real and ideal, earth and heaven. Both of these forms of truth must be accessed 
and understood in terms of signification, not absolute identity; in other words, 
both insist on a conscious engagement with systems of signs that are not (and 
cannot be) identical to their referents. And both view this mode of interpretation 
as one with profound transformative potential, which offers the possibility (in 
differing degrees, of course) of negating the nasty effects of sin itself.77 
The reformist church hoped to re-design and re-birth the nation as it trained its faithful Christians 
to plough through the veiled metaphors and symbols to find the signified, God. Sidney’s example 
suggests that the signified referent should remain veiled and distanced away from the signifying 
signs. As Rosendale asserts above, “the gap between real and ideal, earth and heaven” must 
remain and more importantly be kept far enough away for a more transformative experience of 
“spanning” to take place. This is why “absolute identity” won’t do--God’s true meanings were to 
be earned through diligent, hard work, through “a conscious engagement with systems of signs 
that are not (and cannot be) identical to their referents.” This antithetical, paradoxical distance 
                                                 
77 Rosendale 114 and 145. 
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that Rosendale calls “the gap between real and ideal, earth and heaven” is, however, paramount 
in creating the relationship between the signifier and the signified, the word and the message, 
and this construction also resonates with the antithetical relationship between the poet and his 
art.78 
Is it impossible for the poet to create poetry and make his poetry love him back 
simultaneously? This is a familiar dilemma—a familiar synopsis of those popular parables 
between the subject and the subjected, the thesis and the antithesis, the lover and the loved, the 
parent and the child, and the creators and the creatures, or finally, the God and His men. God’s 
true message has to be earned—through ploughing, working through bad seasons, sorting good 
from bad seeds, recognizing patterns and significance transcending the fidelity of accurate 
physical description or narrative: 
Much of Christ’s teaching, Sidney observes, is in the form of self-consciously 
fictional parables, which should not be mistaken for historical accounts (this 
would cripple their moral significance by limiting them to the amoral realm of 
mere events); these poetic teachings carry truth by representing and embodying 
moral ideas, which are both created and received through the “imaginative and 
judging power.” Sidney implies that Christ, in his role as teacher, deliberately 
chose the role of poet over those of historian and philosopher.79 
The “self-consciously fictional” qualities of parables resemble the often incredibly self-conscious 
and self-antagonizing characteristics portrayed in Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella. Without 
working through “other’s leaves” and studying “Inventions,” the poet will never gain Stella’s 
affection: “I sought fit words to paint the blackest face of woe,/ Studying inventions fine, her 
                                                 
78 Rosendale 145.  
79 Rosendale 139. 
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wits to entertain,/ Oft turning others’ leaves, to see if thence would flow/ Some fresh and fruitful 
showers upon my sunburned brain” (lines 5-8). Most parables and biblical allegorical narratives 
do appear constructed specifically to present layered meanings, with realism or accurate mimesis 
always a secondary concern—if at all—and present guides that must be intuitively interpreted 
and figured forth if they are to serve their intended purpose.  For example, the children in a 
narrative might despise and blame their creators for bringing them to the imperfect, sinful, or 
painful conditions they are in, feeling as if these conditions are interminable; unlike their 
creators, the children are still too mercurial and malleable to see that time is constant and fleeting 
as promised, that they are already anticipating in the course of their universe’s existing and 
changing, that this fall—both literally and figuratively of course—is necessary for their growth, 
and that at some point during this fall they are transported to a more ontologically stable ground. 
Stella then embodies the fissure in the poet’s wounded heart, or “the gap between real 
and ideal, earth and heaven.” But let us not forget, the figurative language describing her 
absence—the very sign, the very word that embodies her absence, “Stella”—is inaugurated and 
uttered out loud because of the emotional rupture induced by Stella’s inaccessibility. No “figured 
forth” or “ideal” signs of Stella exist unless the signified, the subjected, the longed after “real” 
object is “not here.” Stella, the signified, should not be here/there together with the signifiers that 
describe her—“O absent presence, Stella is not here.” Yet Rosendale argues, just as the diligent 
and faithful followers will read and study the Book of Common Prayer and search for the true 
meaning of God, a great poet will not give up his process of “figuring forth” his beloved, his 
quest to articulate truth in poetic representations that offer many more truths.    
It is “the transforming power of the figurative,” upon which Sidney anchors and builds 
his argument that poetry functions just as effectively in its instructive mission as parables, and, 
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furthermore, “Sidney adduces no less a fellow poet and moral instructor than Christ himself.”80 
Indeed, Sidney observes God’s word as the inspired word of poetry, and even more, the divine 
inspiration for building a nation’s identity in The Defence of Poesy:    
Since then poetrie is of all humane learning the most ancient, & of most fatherly 
antiquitie, as from whence other learnings have taken their beginnings, since it is 
so universal that no learned nation doth despise it, nor barbarous nation is without 
it: since both Roman and Greek gave divine names unto it: the one of 
“prophesying,” the other of “making.” And that indeede, that name of “making” is 
fit for him, considering that whereas other arts retain themselves within their 
subject, and receive as it were, their beeing from it, the poet onely brings his own 
stuffe, and doeth not learne a conceite out of a matter, but makes matter for a 
conceite.81 
If Christ has “vouchsafed to use the flowers of [poetry],” poetic language using metaphors and 
symbols may generate many more “figured forth” images that are “out of a matter,” far away 
from “uncleanness.” Sidney of course has to defend poetry’s language from the sinful, fallen 
human reality, hence the argument that poetry is “vouchsafed” by Christ—since Christ used it, 
and because the parables use poetic metaphors and symbols, poetry is expiated and excused from 
being the fruit of man’s fallen will and instinct, instead becoming one of the means for the fallen 
to find God’s truth. Furthermore, as Sidney argues for poetry’s virtuous educational merit, above 
and in contrast to history and philosophy, he points out poetry’s kinetic and malleable quality 
that makes poetry more adaptable to the change of time and space and thus able to deliver the 
                                                 
80 Rosendale 139. Also, Sidney indeed wrote in The Defence of Poesy: “since the Holy Scripture, wherein 
there is no uncleanness, has whole parts in it poetical, and that even our Savior Christ vouchsafed to use the flowers 
of it.” 
81 Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig. G1v-G2r.  
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knowledge that is more fit to teach what is more timelessly virtuous.82 Poetry is the means not 
only to teach virtuous actions but also inspire the reader to act virtuously by providing the 
physical place—or site—for the readers to plough through the veiled metaphors by persistent and 
intelligent reading.  
Poetry is begotten and constituted under a paradox demanding that, to exist, it must keep 
the distance between the Ideal and real. For a poet, “figuring forth” is an obstinately lonesome 
process, but it is this self-doubting and effacing process that enables the poet to keep striving for 
the poetic greatness that might also help him win Stella’s love. That returning love is, after all, 
the end goal for Astrophil; the creator wants his audience to appreciate his creation at the end of 
his or her generative course. That generative course cannot exist without the heartbreaking 
fissure between Astrophil and Stella, or the signifier and signified in the representation begotten 
by the figurative language. The writer always watches his creations departing, already moving 
into the distance, waving backwards. Sidney writes in Sonnet 106: “O absent presence, Stella is 
not here;/ False flattering hope, that with so fair a face/ Bare me in hand, that in this orphan 
place/ Stella, I say my Stella, should appear.”83 All the poet can do is keep calling, keep writing, 
with “False flattering Hope” that Stella will return, but this hope is already conditioned with a 
qualifier--“false”--that reminds the poet about the figurative assurance that Stella “is not here,” 
the proof of Stella’s “absent presence” on the paper, “this orphan place.”84 In other words, 
poetry, if truly good, can make Stella appear. Is Astrophil comparing poetry to alchemy? 
                                                 
82 I reserved the following lines from the block quotation above to persuade the point about the 
interchangeability and malleability of poetry’s figurative language. Sidney also writes in Defense: “since neither his 
description nor his end contains any evil, the thing described cannot be evil; since his effects be so good as to teach 
goodness, and delight the learners of it; since therein—namely in moral doctrine, the chief of all knowledges—he 
doth not only far pass the historian, but for instructing is well nigh comparable to the philosopher, and for moving 
leaves him behind him” (sig. G2r). 
83 Sidney, Astrophil and Stella, Sonnet 106, lines 1-4.  
84 Sonnet 106, lines 1-2.  
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If the absence of Stella is what the poet is constantly left with—“with so fair a face/ Bare 
me in hand, that in this orphan place”— and that “absence” embodies the proof of the poet’s 
heartbreaking experience of writing/begetting, then it is her absence that resolutely lead us to a 
poetic “figuring forth.” As Rosendale also writes: “Given poetry’s moral goals, this ‘figuring 
forth’ carries an important double (one might even say sacramental) sense in Sidney’s argument: 
morality and virtue are figured forth not only in the fictional text but in turn, in the attentive 
reader as well.”85 This is the giving, transformative power, and even more specifically, the moral 
practicality of poetry that is capable of mutability; good metaphors can make something appear 
and reappear, turn words into a moving picture as they endow life “to lifeless things in his well 
liked similes,” move someone’s mind so they will fall in love, or inspire someone to learn how to 
decipher metaphors and become better readers of the world and its representations.86 Sidney’s 
“purifying of wit, this enriching of memory, enabling of judgment, and enlarging of conceit, 
which commonly we call learning” cannot occur without the antithetical antagonizing course of 
self-reflection and effacement, which makes the poetry writing and poetry reading into a 
transformative experience, “a discourse of imagination and self-improvement, capable of 
mitigating to some degree our sinful condition and leading us on toward the good.”87 Such 
metamorphosis comes from a kind of self-reflective learning initiated by looking inwardly and 
fueled by self-purification, -annihilation, and -reformation, which, according to Sidney, cannot 
occur without “the inward light each mind hath in itself is as good as a philosopher’s book.”  
                                                 
85 Rosendale 139.  
86 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 248. Also, as I explained in the Introduction to the dissertation, metaphors begin 
with comparison and contrast of two things, and without the difference and the scale to measure these differences, 
we would have a very limited way of representing the world.  
87 Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig.C4v; Rosendale 137.  
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The reductionism at the heart of scientific observation undermines the kind of poetic 
observation that moves from universals and “fore-conceits” to specific representations wrought 
by “the inward light” and, furthermore, leads to a virtually complete dismissal of the creative and 
transformative power of metaphor and figural representation. The remainder of my study will 
examine the conflict between the two opposing modes of observation—inward versus outward 
sight—and representation—figural versus literal. As I discussed earlier, the next chapter on 
Cavendish and Hooke will deal with these contrasts explicitly within the context of an emerging 
consensus that scientific observation involved close observation and literal representation. The 
debate swirling around the new science, as I will show, ensured that the concerns voiced by 
Sidney retained their power and cultural currency long after his death.    
 
3     CHAPTER 3: Cavendish’s “Subtle Observations” and Hooke’s “Neer” Observations 
By the means of telescopes, there is nothing so far distant but maybe represented to our view; 
and by the help of Microscopes, there is nothing so small, as to escape our inquiry; hence there is 
a new visible World discovered to the understanding. By this means the Heavens are open’d, and 
a vast number of new Stars, and new Motions, and new Productions appear in them, to which all 
the antient Astromers were utterly Strangers. By this the Earth it self, which lyes so neer us, 
under our feet, shews quite a new thing to us, and in every little particle of its matter, we now 
behold almost as great a variety of Creatures, as we were able before to reckon up in the whole 
Universe it self.88 
 
And though they had no knowledge of the Load-stone, or Needle, or pendulous Watches, yet 
(which was as serviceable to them) they had subtile observations, and great practice; 89 
 
In this chapter I will examine Robert Hooke’s Micrographia and Margaret Cavendish’s 
strenuous objections to Hooke’s work as expressed in her The Description of A New World, 
Called The Blazing World and Observations upon Experimental Philosophy. I will argue that 
                                                 
88 Robert Hooke, The Preface, Micrograpia, sig. A2r. 
89 Margaret Cavendish, The Description of A New World, Called The Blazing World and Other Writings, 
ed. Kate Lilley, 128. 
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Cavendish, in a manner much like that of Sidney that I discussed in the preceding chapter, 
espouses the power of imagination as a tool for spiritual seeing. Furthermore, Cavendish 
believed the poetic imagination and faculties such as “Fancy” and “Fiction” able to negate the 
threat of modern science, with what she viewed as its false claims of accuracy and proximity to 
truth. Cavendish’s claim for “subtile observations” explicitly collides with Hooke’s praise of 
“neer” observation; in her poem “It Is Hard to Believe, that there are worlds in this world,” 
which I will examine later in this chapter, Cavendish rejects Hooke’s claim for the subtlety of the 
microscopic view. In this poem she points out that Hooke’s microscopic view hinges on the 
certainty and security of the object under the microscope, but since “Nothing [is] so hard in 
Nature,” as Cavendish argues in the poem, Hooke’s microscopic observation cannot grasp the 
mutability and uncertainty in Nature.90  
For many things our sense dull may scape, 
For sense is grosse, not every thing can shape. 
So in this World another world may bee, 
That we do neither touch, tast, smell, heare, see. 
What Eye so cleere is, yet did ever see 
Those little Hookes, that in the Load-stone bee, 
Which draw hard iron? 
As I will show later, Cavendish debunks Hooke’s claim for “subtlety” in microscopic viewing by 
arguing what a true subtle observation entails. Hooke’s advocacy for proximity in scientific 
observation merely offers, in the passage above, a magnified “shape” but fails to work with the 
                                                 
90 Cavendish, Poems, and fancies, “It is hard to believe, that there are Worlds in this World,” sig. G2r-G2v. 
In the poem, Cavendish writes: “Nothing so hard in Nature, as Faith is,/ For to believe Impossibilities” (lines 1-2). 
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observer’s senses to deliver “subtile observations” that could lead the observers to a greater truth 
and conceptual clarity.91 
Cavendish (1623-1673) lived in a time of great change, none so much as in the field of 
science. Cavendish wrote and published thirteen books during her life time, and in most of her 
works, whether fiction, plays, poetry, or prose, she continually provides her philosophical 
discourse on the advent of early modern science. New technologies were redefining the role of 
the “scientist” and would soon send the grand tradition of the “natural philosopher” to the brink 
of extinction. Cavendish’s The Description of A New World, Called The Blazing World was first 
published in 1666 and then in 1668 as a companion text to her Observations Upon Experimental 
Philosophy, and in both The Blazing World and Observations, Cavendish is not at all timid to 
express her judgment against early modern science. In Observations, she subverts the efficacy of 
magnifying glasses as articulated by Robert Hooke in Micrographia (1665). She acknowledges 
Hooke’s work as “the art of Micrography,” rather than calling it the science of micrography, to 
express her unequivocal doubt for the efficacy of micrography: “I am confident, that this same 
art, with all its instruments, is not able to discover the interior natural motions of any part or 
creature of nature.”92 Significantly, Cavendish willfully defines micrography as art. By 
identifying micrography as art, not science, she subtly draws attention to the contrasting 
definition and use of the two words. According to OED, the word “art” was then defined as more 
of a practical skill with less of the denotation of creativity that is more commonly used today: “a 
practical application of knowledge” and “something which can be achieved or understood by the 
employment of skill and knowledge” (OED, art, n., 3.a). Especially in its early use, the word 
                                                 
91 Cavendish, The Blazing World, 128. 
92 Margaret Cavendish, “Of Micrography, and of Magnifying and Multiplying Glasses,” Observations upon 
Experimental Philosophy, 50.  
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“art” also meant “a body or system of rules serving to facilitate the carrying out of certain 
principles” (art, n., 3.a). Meanwhile, “science” signifies “the state or fact of knowing; knowledge 
or cognizance of something; knowledge as a personal attribute” (science, n., 1.a). In her 
discussion of Hooke’s microscopy, Cavendish clearly points out the discrepancy between the 
skill of looking in closely—microscopically—and what can be defined as science or knowledge.  
In fact, the two terms are often juxtaposed against each other to suggest the differences 
between art as the vehicle of knowledge and science as the knowledge itself. When “science” is 
“paired and contrasted with art,” explains OED, it signifies “a discipline, field of study, or 
activity concerned with theory rather than method, or requiring the knowledge and systematic 
application of principles, rather than relying on traditional rules, acquired skill, or intuition” 
(science, n., 4.a). On the other hand, “art” signifies “a practical application of knowledge; 
(hence) something which can be achieved or understood by the employment of skill and 
knowledge” (art, n., 3.a).93 The etymological background of the two words further reveals the 
history of the contrasting definitions behind them: “ultimately, this distinction [between science 
and art] is informed by that in ancient Greek between ἐπιστήμη (episteme n.) and τέχνη (techne 
n.)” and also “reflected by a similar distinction in classical Latin between scientia and ars [art 
n.1]” (OED, science, n., etymology).  The word “episteme” comes from “the ancient Greek 
ἐπιστήμη, knowledge, understanding, skill, scientific knowledge (ἐπιστάναι to know, understand; 
probably, ἐπι- epi- prefix + ἱστάναι to stand and  -μη , suffix forming nouns)” (episteme, n., 
etymology). In addition, “techne” comes from the ancient Greek τέχνη, meaning art, thus 
referring to “an art, skill, or craft; a technique, principle, or method by which something is 
                                                 
93 The word “science” in Cavendish’s time differs from the way most people use the word now as a subject 
of study or examination—such as natural science—to mean “the intellectual and practical activity encompassing 
those branches of study that relate to the phenomena of the physical universe and their laws, sometimes with implied 
exclusion of pure mathematics” (science, n., OED 5.b). 
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achieved or created” as well as “a product of [art], a work of art” (techne, n., etymology). 
Cavendish claims that, as a science, Hooke’s microscopic experiment fails to fully reveal the 
intrinsic motions and designs of nature. Hooke identifies his experiment with microscopy as 
“philosophy” more than art, and he proudly announces the benefits of his optic device:  
And I do not only propose this kind of Experimental philosophy as a matter of 
high rapture and delight of the mind, but even as a material and sensible pleasure. 
So vast is the variety of objects which will come under their inspections, so many 
different ways there are of handling them, so great is the satisfaction of finding 
out new things, that I dare compare the contentment which they will enjoy, not 
only to that of contemplation, but even to that which most men prefer of the very 
senses themselves.94 
Hooke associates his experiment with “experimental philosophy” to present microscopy as an 
instrument of knowledge, a science.95 However, Cavendish not only believes Hooke’s 
experiment fails to provide “a matter of high rapture and delight of the mind” as Hooke claims 
above, but she also points out that Hooke’s Micrographia also misleads the public, which 
therefore makes his method not just crafty skill but “art” that is immoral: “[T]his art has 
intoxicated so many men’s brains, and wholly employed their thoughts and bodily actions about 
pheonomena, or the exterior figures of objects, as all better arts and studies are laid aside; nay, 
those are not as earnest and active in such employments as they are; by many of them, accounted 
unprofitable subjects to the commonwealth of learning.”96 It is hard to ignore the underlying 
                                                 
94 Hooke, The Preface, Micrographia, sig. D2r. 
95 By “philosophy” Hooke means the following OED definition: “knowledge, learning, scholarship; a body 
of knowledge; spec. advanced knowledge or learning, to which the study of the seven liberal arts was regarded as 
preliminary in medieval universities” (OED, philosophy, n., 1).  
96 Cavendish, “Of Micrography, and of Magnifying and Multiplying Glasses.” Observations upon 
Experimental Philosophy, 51.  
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similarity between the poetry haters’ moral attack on poetry, as described in the previous chapter, 
and Cavendish’s criticism against Hooke’s “art.” However, note that she distinguishes art as skill 
from fancy and poetic imagination. Furthermore, Cavendish targets Hooke’s claim of the 
microscope as being able to deliver truth about nature. She believes that the outcome of Hooke’s 
experiment rather obstructs obtaining truth, because Hooke fails to establish a single unitary 
view of his microscopic subject; as Cavendish asserts: “[A]rtists [she would mean Hooke here] 
do confess themselves, that flies, and the like, will appear of several figures or shapes, according 
to the several reflexions, refractions, mediums and positions of several lights.”97 Moreover, the 
extrinsic and artificial component of Hooke’s method and technology “doth more easily alter 
[nature] than inform” the observer about nature, and even misinforms or misrepresents: “that 
natural figure may be presented in as monstrous a shape, as it may appear misshapen rather than 
neutral.”98 Cavendish’s mordant criticism against Hooke’s experiment in Observations echoes 
Stephen Gosson’s accusation against poetry; Hooke’s art is nothing more than sensationalism to 
Cavendish, and she believes Hooke and his publication prove to be morally dissolute and 
academically incompetent: micrography “intoxicate[s]” its audience with “thoughts and bodily 
actions about phenomena,” but yields no tangible facts about the interior figures or functions of 
the object of observation so that it fails to profit “the commonwealth of learning.”99 Furthermore, 
we can also see how her criticism against the moral letdown of Hooke’s study aligns with 
                                                 
97 Cavendish, Observations, 51. Cavendish further comments on Hooke’s argument that microscopy can be 
useful in uncovering the world unseen and lead us to more truth about the world as she argues his claim tenuous and 
inflated. According to Cavendish, Hooke even confesses in the Preface in Micrographia that “there is much more 
difficulty to discover the true shape, than of those visible to the naked eye, the same object seeming quite differing, 
in one position to the light, from what it really is, and maybe discovered in another” (sig.F2v). 
98Cavendish, Observations, 50. Both in Observations and her poem “It is hard to believe” Cavendish makes 
an effort to repeat the word “shape” to point out that the microscopic view of nature would merely generate a 
meaningless “shape” of magnified and mutated--not “neutral”—figures from nature; alienated from the established 
values of size and scale, these figures appear mis-shaped and monstrous “shapes.” 
99 Cavendish, Observations, 51. 
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Sidney’s defense of poetry. Poetry must defend its unique purpose and advantage against the 
other ways of seeing and comprehending the world. Though she confronts modern science, as 
opposed the fervent moral and religious believer Stephen Gosson’s attack on poetry confronted 
by Sidney, both Cavendish and Sidney deal with the antithetical claims made against one of the 
oldest and most established methods of representing and understanding the world—poetry—and 
the power of poetic imagination that it entails. Most importantly, both Cavendish and Sidney 
discuss the moral benefit—or the lack thereof—and the social delight that poetic imagination 
brings into the “commonwealth of learning.”100  
In contrast, Hooke is confident that his optic device can enable the observer to get “neer” 
to the object of his or her observation, “the earth itself, which lyes so neer us.”101 Hooke claims 
that a microscopic view can provide a new, enhanced view of nature that is proximate enough to 
nature that it can even deliver greater truth than other methods of observation can accomplish, 
and he also suggests that looking at the smallest details of nature might help us grasp a vast 
insight into God’s grandeur. Hooke sees nature as a text waiting to be unveiled and read more 
closely without “all the uncertainty, and mistakes of humane actions, [that] proceed either from 
the narrowness and wandering of our senses, from the slipperiness or delusion of our memory” 
so that it can reveal more profound intentions and designs of God’s creativity.102 Yet for 
Cavendish an advanced view of nature requires more than mechanically enhanced sight. In her 
introduction to The Blazing World, she states that even philosophers “may err in searching and 
requiring after the Causes of Natural Effects, and many times embrace falsehoods for Truths,” 
                                                 
100 “Learning” is paramount in Renaissance discussion of knowledge and art. Representation of the world 
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chapter on Sidney, learning is a spiritually transformative and kinetic experience—“purifying wit, the enriching of 
memory, enabling judgment, and enlarging of conceit”--for both the poet and the reader.    
101  Hooke, The Preface, Micrographia sig. A2v. 
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and that sometimes human beings are so eager to find the truth that they may still pursue “the 
error [that] proceeds from the different motions of Reason.”103 Modern science claims that it can 
capture and control nature by “the real, the mechanical, the experimental philosophy, which has 
this advantage over the philosophy of discourse and disputation,” and Hooke defines such 
science as “the remedies” for “the dangers in the process of humane reason” in his preface to 
Micrographia.104 For Hooke, “science” involved minute scrutiny and much repetition, so that 
larger systems of knowledge were constructed from the ground up, each step based upon 
quantifiable and replicable observations. However, Hooke’s claim of modern science’s certainty, 
especially as opposed to “the philosophy of discourse and disputation,” alarms Cavendish: 
“[S]ince there is but one Truth in Nature, all those that hit not this Truth, do err, some more, 
some less; for though some may come nearer the mark then others, which makes their Opinions 
seem more probable and rational then others; yet as long as they swerve from this onely Truth, 
they are in the wrong.”105 On the other hand, “Fictions,” Cavendish explains, “are an issue of 
mans Fancy, framed in his own mind, according as he pleases, without regard, whether the thing, 
he fancies, be really existent without his mind or not.”106 In other words, since “Fictions” don’t 
claim to deliver the truth, only duplicating or manipulating the truth, the poetic devices or 
faculties such as Fancy, Fictions, or poetic imagination do not deceive. 
It might help to trace out the general outlines of both sides of the debate. Hooke was born 
at Freshwater in 1635 and was educated at Westminster School, followed by Christ Church, 
Oxford, from which he received his degree of M.A. in 1663. During his time at Oxford he 
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became involved with modern science while also making contacts with John Wilkins and Robert 
Boyle at Wadham College.107 The Royal Society decided to fill one of the positions for Curators 
of Experiments with a full-time professional scientist, and Hooke was offered the position in 
1662. The Royal Society needed sponsorship since it was, as John Enderby points out in “Hooke 
and the Royal Society,” “not a rich organization, and it was important to attract, as members, 
well-heeled financiers, landowners, merchants and the aristocracy”(68). Hooke was encouraged 
to curate his experiments to “entertain the wealthy dignitaries and so extract from them sufficient 
cash to keep the Society afloat and meet the various expenses incurred by [himself] and 
others”(68). According to Samuel Pepys (1633-1703), a Cambridge graduate who was 
steadfastly interested in new science and later became an important figure of the early days of the 
Royal Society, Hooke was a fascinating and prolific scientist. During the last days of the 
Commonwealth, Pepys was appointed as Clerk to the Exchequer; he was Clerk of the Acts to the 
Navy Board during the Restoration. Pepys’ famous diary, written during 1660 through 1669, 
provides significant insights into the Royal Society and Pepys’ fascination with Hooke’s 
experiments. Hooke designed experiments virtually every week and discussed them with 
educated—and not necessarily learned, but rich—gentlemen. However, his service to the Royal 
Society, again as Enderby asserts, “showed how science was of direct concern to government, 
commerce, defence and civic policy, and not merely a branch of the entertainment industry” 
(74). The form of observation in Micrographia contrasted starkly with the philosophical science 
practiced by many of his peers, including his most notable superior, Robert Boyle, and other 
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natural philosophers like Newton and Cavendish. A modern scientist might be inclined greatly to 
admire Hooke’s meticulous delineation of the properties of a vacuum, but in first postulating its 
possibility, Boyle got, and kept, the fame. Experiments, soon to become the general currency of 
science, still relegated the experimenter to a level of technician, something akin to the modern-
day appellation of “blue-collar.” In contrast, the older science tended to be the province of 
philosophers, those whose thought moved from limited observations—one might immediately 
think of a fortuitous apple fallen to the head—to the construction of grand systems of knowledge 
like the law of gravity.  
Given Cavendish’s social status, one could easily see a sort of classist distinction and 
prejudice in Cavendish’s privileging of intuition and dismissal of Hooke’s observational 
paradigm, as well as a self-protective gesture arising from Cavendish’s frank acknowledgement 
that she lacked access to the sorts of new machinery increasingly being used by men like 
Hooke.108 Still, as I will show below, Cavendish’s objections to Hooke’s work reveal aspects of 
her philosophy that are central to her literary output, tracing a now familiar trajectory; on one 
side was the new science, cold and calculating, and on the other—hers—was the older “science,” 
where human reason and imagination both stood as allies of truth. 
Hooke’s Micrographia opens with a trope that compares a corporeal body to a written 
text, suggesting that the constituency of small and simple parts will explain the end goal of the 
bigger and more complex system: “As in Geometry, the most natural way of beginning is from a 
Mathematical point; so is the same method in Observations and Natural history the most 
genuine, simple, and instructive. We must first endevour to make letters, and draw single strokes 
                                                 
108 Cavendish’s social status has been central to much criticism examining Cavendish’s life and works. For 
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true, before we venture to write whole sentences, or to draw large pictures” (1). To legitimize the 
moral purpose of the microscope, Hooke tries to bolster its technological advantage beyond the 
typical merit of scientific observation. He shows perception in claiming that the beginning of any 
meaningful text is simultaneously pictorial and verbal, as his book contains both texts and 
images; but the teleocentric moral emphasis on the “true” beginning of a text, the belief that a 
small component of a large sentence determines the text’s significance in the world, suggests the 
author’s overemphasis on the portent of machinery.109 The microscope can catch errors that are 
hidden to our physical eyes:  
What may not be expected from the rational or deductive Faculty that is furnish 
with such Materials, and those so readily adapted, and rang’d for use, that in a 
moment, as ‘twere, thousands of instances, serving for the illustration, 
determination, or invention, of almost any inquiry, may be represented even to the 
sight? How neer the nature of Axioms must all those proportions be which are 
examin’d before so many witnesses? And how difficult will it be for any, though 
never so subtil an error in Philosophy, to scape from being discover’d, after it has 
indur’d the touch, and so many other tryals?”110 
That the microscope can catch “never so subtil an error in philosophy” if the subject of 
examination “indur’d the touch” and “many other trials” presents the experimental scientist’s 
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compelling argument—it will catch the wrongs of philosophical observations and conclusions 
because nothing is “so subtil” under the modern science’s microscopic view.111 The staple of 
experimental science’s method is acting and doing—physically interacting with the material 
world, described as “touch” or “trials” by Hooke above. He believes the microscopic seeing is 
close to touching—it gets “neer” enough to “an error in philosophy” that the errors can’t escape 
from the microscopic “trials” and observations. Instead of merely thinking and arguing, an 
experimental scientist “touch[es]” the object of his experiment, so he is less likely to miss “so 
subtil an error,” whereas pondering philosophers are more likely to do so; here Hooke expounds 
on the experimental science’s actual practice as a concrete experience. His experiments are 
established on the tangible experience of concrete object rather than abstract thought as he 
suggests that “the philosophy of discourse and disputation” has less “regard to the first ground-
work, which ought to be well laid on the sense and memory” as opposed to experimental science 
that “chiefly aims at the subtilty of its deductions and conclusions.”112 So many errors are made 
by “the philosophy of discourse and disputation” because it forgets to pay most attention to “the 
first ground-work, which ought to be well laid on the sense and memory” while focusing on 
abstract concepts and passive disputations.113 Since the human senses are unreliable after all, 
Hooke argues: “The first thing to be undertaken in this weighty work, is a watchfulness over the 
failings and an inlargement of the dominion, of the senses.”114 For Hooke the microscope 
symbolizes “this weighty work” that accomplishes a triumphant achievement of experimental 
science that acts and does the expansion of how far our sight can reach. Therefore, he argues that 
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the philosophers who would rather think than act are unlikely to do “[the] weighty work,” to 
carefully and painstakingly look at the material existence of the world; in contrast, the 
experimental science would offer “a watchfulness over the failings and an enlargement of the 
dominion, of the senses” and try to magnify the errors as well as prevent further errors in “the 
first ground-work.”115  
 A careful reading of Hooke’s argument for his optic device will further reveal that even 
though a microscope can provide knowledge that is real and practical, the efficacy of his device 
as well as the competence of experimental science cannot be explained without some poetic 
imagination. Hooke’s instrument offers the illusion of tangible experience while revealing 
something intangible, which makes his instrument practical and relevant—one might see the eye 
of a fly through a microscope, enlarged and proximate, but in truth it is the seen light that 
touches the magnified object under the glass, not the observer’s body. As the light “touch[es]” 
the glass and the subject is lit and magnified, this “touch” begins to excavate and penetrate the 
boroughs, films, and cells inside an organism. Hooke argues that the act of looking in through 
the microscope leads the observer to a greater intellectual proximity to truth, turning a tangible 
action into an intangible knowledge. To further support his argument that microscopic looking 
can help the observer decipher the dense and obscure content and take the observer closer to 
truth, he looks at religious texts, believing that his new way of observation could be used to 
unveil the existence of the spiritual realm through deciphering the material body of a religious 
script, thus further establishing the pertinence and proficiency of his optic device. One of the first 
                                                 
115 Hooke’s skepticism towards human senses as expressed above further prompts my reading of Milton’s 
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microscopic examples Hooke chose to describe in Micrographia is none other than the printed 
letters—types—of religious texts with “lines … so small and near together,” made by a copper 
plate and roll-press:  
[H]aving view’d certain pieces of exceeding curious writing of the kind (one of 
which in the bredth of a two-pence compris’d the Lords prayer, the Apostles 
Creed, the ten commandments, and about half a dozen verses besides of the Bible, 
whose lines were so small and near together, that I was unable to number them 
with my naked eye, a very ordinary Microscope, I had then about me, inabled me 
to see that what the writer of it had asserted was true, but withal discover’d of 
what pitifull bungling scribbles and scrawls it was compos’d, Arabian and China 
characters being almost as well shap’d; […] If this manner of small writing were 
made easie and practicable (and I think I know such a one, but have never yet 
made trial of it, whereby one might be inabled to write a great deale with much 
ease, and accurately enough in a very little roome) it might be of very good use to 
convey secret Intelligence without any danger of Discovery or mistrusting.116  
It is Hooke’s intention to choose the subject that is not only sacred and secretive, but also 
obscure to read, so that by using his microscope he can find more “roome” between small types. 
He believes that material reality participates in and manipulates immaterial reality—a point 
missing to our naked eye, unfortunately, would be nothing but a point missing. And that missed 
point, whether intended by the author or not, would alter or produce resultant meaning of the 
text. Thus Hooke argues that the microscope can offer a kind of nearness that enables our naked 
eye to reach in and see the hidden context that was previously illegible and unseen. As if peeling 
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the layers of a vegetable’s skin, the looking through the microscope that Hooke describes lets 
people infiltrate the exterior layers that keep “secret intelligence” distant from the naked eye, 
which obscures the hidden meaning of the text; the naked eye, which he calls “a very ordinary 
microscope,” cannot obtain the “secret intelligence” because its vision cannot travel through the 
exterior layers. The microscope can connect the point a—let us assume this is a beginning point, 
perhaps from a person’s eye ball or some physiological point where the image of the subject at 
the end of the microscope is captured—to the end point aa, where the eye longingly looks, but 
more importantly, what Hooke wants to highlight is that the microscope can also eliminate the 
distance between a and aa.  
Yet there is something about keeping the distance, sensing the distance between two 
things, when trying to build a thought or a sentence. Hooke says “[W]e must first endevour to 
make letters, and draw single strokes true, before we venture to write whole sentences, or to 
draw large pictures” and insists his optic device will help us to see “single strokes true” so that 
we can improve each stroke, thus improve the quality—the truthfulness—of our larger picture; 
yet we can’t even tell if the picture or sentence is good—“true”—until comparing each stroke 
while seeing each of them next to each other in a larger picture or sentence, a pattern.117 We 
don’t always draw a large picture—nor, needless to say, a good one—by “draw[ing] single 
strokes true.” In fact, if we focus on the tiny details of each stroke too much, we might forget to 
think about the bigger picture entirely. Even if we know how a perfect single stroke looks and 
learn how to draw one, we can still produce a bad larger picture at the end if we ignore other 
variables that complete the bigger pattern, such as the “room” between letters in a sentence.118 
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We know something went wrong with minute details when the bigger pattern is out of balance. It 
is not just the preciseness of each stroke or letter or word that makes a good sentence, but the 
compatibility and flexibility—the room—between the words, and the sharpness of the words also 
determine the life of a good sentence.119 This also reveals why Hooke continually uses 
metaphors to explain the function and need of his device, though he criticizes the uncertainty and 
errors of human reason and senses, which are the crucial instigators of poetic imagination. 
Furthermore, the microscope doesn’t just magnify, but it makes things appear bigger than they 
really are, more alien, more other; the microscope offers minute details of already small objects 
by altering their familiar, regular appearance under the manipulated gaze of the observer. The 
altering capability of “fictions” or poetry as suggested by Cavendish helps us comprehend reality 
without completely alienating or changing the appearance of the reality. There is a hint of 
violence and willfulness as well as a looming sense of termination and eradication in Hooke’s 
dedication to “the weighty work,” what Hooke describes as “a watchfulness over the failings and 
an inlargement of the dominion, of the senses.”120 The machine will enlarge not only the image 
of the object but also the territory of our senses. The power of the microscope Hooke describes in 
Micrographia encompasses more than the expansion of sensory domain; it anticipates the 
machine’s efficacy in expanding the domain of imperialist power. Note carefully how Hooke 
chooses the secretive and obscure text to read under his microscope, and he needs to magnify “a 
very little roome” between small types so he can actually see the bigger picture and comprehend 
this sacred text. Contrary to Hooke’s claim that his device can eliminate the distance, his device 
instead magnifies the “little roome” between types not only in a metaphorical way that the 
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meaning is not readily accessible, but also in a physical way. Therefore, the distance is necessary 
for seeing and knowing to occur, but it is also necessary for meaning to exist—the distance must 
be there to produce more significance, comparison, metaphor, and finally, the need to 
communicate. The text Hooke chooses to observe under his microscope is designed to obfuscate 
easy reading—it is a sacred text after all. Perhaps even Hooke realizes that what is too obvious to 
be understood isn’t worthy of his discussion in his book.121 Without realizing, Hooke exemplifies 
the kind of invasive and ambitious scientist who usurps and alters the nature of things.  
Furthermore, the center of Hooke’s determined argument hinges more on the device’s 
virtual potential than its actual performance. Hooke establishes the impending possibility of the 
magnified image to become more than a mere physical sight: “It seems not improbable, but that 
by these helps the subtlety of the composition of Bodies, the structure of their parts, the various 
texture of their matter, the instruments and manner of their inward motions, and all the other 
possible appearances of things, may come to be more fully discovered.”122 The “more fully 
discovered” things must reveal something more than their physical state, such as their atomic 
structures or their mechanics and designs, in order for Hooke to present his microscopic 
discoveries as unveiling something “secretive” and “sacred,” like the decoding of the content of 
religious text with “little roome” between types. Yet when reading Hooke’s claim above more 
closely, one must realize his machine actually sees--at least the way he describes it--“parts,” 
“texture,” “inward motions,” or “appearances,” which, as he stresses, “may come to be more 
fully discovered.” Unless an observer with his imagination turns these material things into 
something meaningful or something that “may come to be more fully discovered,” the 
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microscope reveals to an observer what remains to be mechanical and physical--parts, texture, 
motions, or appearances, and nothing more, as Cavendish suggests. The small bodies being read 
in Micrographia are microscopic texts; after all, Hooke draws them in his book. They are being 
observed mechanically—through the microscope—but described metaphorically. The 
microscopic seeing encourages Hooke to be more poetic, although that amount of abundant 
detail could have made his writing undoubtedly dull. Seeing more—seeing what one couldn’t see 
before the microscope--doesn’t result in clarity but more opacity, which is essential to poetic 
imagination. Opacity in poetry here functions more like the distances between things that are 
necessary for the pursuit of truth, which I discuss above. Not all seeing leads to telling, needless 
to say, a story that is telling.123  
Mechanically enhanced seeing might yield abundant images, but these images would 
mean nothing more than what Cavendish calls “the picture presented in and by the glass,” and 
these “pictures” merely represent the images that “the glass only figures or patterns out.”124 It is, 
however, the mental faculty that turns the external “figures” and “patterns” into something more 
than “pictures,” a body of text that needs to be deciphered and understood. Thus for Cavendish, 
not only does the microscopic “glass” alter the information of nature by presenting pictures of 
“figure[d]” and “pattern[ed]” nature, but human senses and intelligence also need to accompany 
the observation through “the glass” to convey significance that matters in terms of human values. 
In fact, even though in his preface Hooke criticizes human sense and reason as unreliable, he 
knows an appeal to certain values is necessary for his argument. He asserts the political and 
moral timing of his work and other modern scientists’ endeavors as the establishing foundation 
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for a nascent, adventurous, and “inquisitive” nation blossoming with new methods of seeing and 
knowing:  
The good success of all these great men, and many others, and the now seemingly 
great obviousness of most of their and divers other inventions, which from the 
beginning of the world have been, as ‘twere, trod on, and yet not minded till these 
last inquisitive ages (an argument that there may be yet behind multitudes of the 
like) puts me in mind to recommend such studies, and the prosecution of them by 
such methods, to the Gentlemen of our Nation, whose leisure makes them fit to 
undertake, and the plenty of their fortunes to accomplish, extraordinary things in 
this way. And I do not only propose this kind of Experimental philosophy as a 
matter of high rapture and delight of the mind, but even as a material and sensible 
pleasure. 125   
Here Hooke identifies his experiment as a “matter of high rapture and delight of the mind” as 
well as “a material and sensible pleasure.” According to his statement above, Hooke intends his 
device to be both instructive and entertaining. Hooke’s Micrographia proves to be an 
entertaining work of literature that introduces and describes a new method of seeing rather than a 
scientific study that examines or proves a theory about microscopic seeing. In other words, 
Hooke’s book provides an exhibition, not an explanation. Gerard L’E. Turner explains in “The 
Impact of Hooke’s Micrographia and its influence on Microscopy” that even though the 
publishing of his book in 1665 gave him the title of the “father of microscopy,” Hooke was 
rather a sage than “a serious microscopist in the sense that the Dutchman, Antoni van 
Leeuwenhoek, or the Italian, Marcello Malpighi, deserve the title”—instead, Hooke was “a true 
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natural philosopher, attracted by the novelty and possibilities of an unfamiliar instrument, and 
ready to demonstrate and then to write about what it could achieve” (124).126 Micrographia was 
an instant success, and the book’s popularity, Turner asserts, helped in establishing “the 
popularity of the microscope with generations of observers, and this in turn supported the 
serious, scientific use of the instrument and ensured that it was manufactured in quantity and 
steadily improved in design” (124). 
In addition, in the block quote above, Hooke suggests that “the Gentlemen of [his] 
Nation” can use the microscope as a social as well as political instrument, appointing these 
“gentlemen” responsible for refining and enriching the political and cultural landscape of the 
English nation. What Hooke calls “the inlargement of dominion” suggests various kinds of 
expansion of how far one can see, which also translates into how far one can know and control, 
especially for the learned audience of “the Gentlemen of our Nation, whose leisure makes them 
fit to undertake, and the plenty of their fortunes to accomplish, extraordinary things in this 
way.”127 It is doubtful that Cavendish missed the patriarchal overtone of Hooke’s prophecy for 
his device—Hooke’s device is not only deceiving and immoral to Cavendish, but its dominant 
male politics usurp the possibility of non-male readership and authorship in constructing new 
methods of perceiving and building the world. Therefore, Cavendish sets out to build her own 
world, a new world, called “A Blazing World,” where the old political system and gender 
structure are absent. Despite Hooke’s claim, Cavendish insists she doesn’t need a microscope or 
a microscopic view to look at, understand, and describe her new world; her “first ground-work” 
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doesn’t have to “be well laid on the sense and memory” because she uses “sense and memory”—
and her imagination—as “the first ground work.”128 
Poetry, I argue, requires and uses an insight akin to spiritual sight so that it can compose 
the talk that is not just speaking stuff, but communicating something meaningful. And this is 
why, again, the poetic tone in Hooke’s writing is striking to the modern reader, even though 
Hooke’s work signified little more than the stock motif of modern science to Cavendish. In 
“Books Written of the Wonders of These Glasses” from Science, Reading, and Renaissance 
Literature, Elizabeth Spiller points out that the opening paragraph of Micrographia establishes 
symbolic representation of the microscope as “a tool that will make it possible to read what he 
sees as the most secret texts of the world, the true book of nature”; furthermore, the opening 
paragraph tries to prove how the new science has fashioned a new way of reading: “[I]magining 
all of creation as being engraven with its own ‘small writing,’ Hooke represents interest in 
reading out the ‘small writing,’ the periods and full stops of the world that is his text.”129 On the 
other hand, Spiller suggests that Cavendish’s writing reveals a “sense of herself primarily as a 
reader”—but, if so, it is clearly an entirely different sort of reader.130 Cavendish appears to pay 
less attention to such minute details as “the sharpness of a point the most superlatively, we say, 
as sharp as a needle.”131 As a matter of fact, observation for Cavendish is scarcely about looking 
at something from one fixed point as is paramount to observational science; imagination, she 
insisted, could fruitfully fashion multiple divergent yet equally useful perspectives. For Hooke, 
the established, stationed point at the top of a magnifying glass must serve as a beginning point 
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to an observing eye, but to Cavendish such a stationary point of view is unnatural and fixed to 
artificially alter the appearance of nature or the course of truth. While Hooke becomes more 
focused on looking and looking closely in with his experiment, Cavendish loses interest in much 
of the looking because she finds the outcome of Hooke’s observation static, expected, and not 
particularly illuminating. Rather, Cavendish has her imagination to help her illuminate and find 
the truth. Most importantly, the comparison between Hooke’s looking and Cavendish’s reading 
helps us understand the difference between Cavendish’s “subtile observations” and Hooke’s 
“neer” observations. Cavendish’s perspective as a reader provides her with an open-ended 
position to zoom in and out of the text she observes, but when Hooke’s microscope lets the 
observer “neer” the object, perhaps too near, the text becomes a static image, without 
communicative meaning, as the observer becomes static and detached from the thing he sees 
through the device.  
We must also pay attention that while experimental science preaches the practicality and 
efficacy of its method, the outcome of such practice often signifies rather abstract conclusions, 
despite its persistent lionizing of its epistemological advantage in regards to our seeing and 
understanding of the world. Once again, without the aid of imagination, or the spiritual mind, 
Hooke’s promise that his observation will result in “something more fully discovered” remains 
as a mere virtual promise and collides with the actuality of his experiment. Hooke argues that  
“by these helps the subtlety of the composition of bodies, the structure of their parts, the various 
texture of their matter, the instruments and manner of their inward motions, and all the other 
possible appearances of things, may come to be more fully discovered” (The Preface, sig. A2v), 
but without the aid of the creative and spiritual eye, the mechanical or mechanically-enhanced 
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eye might physically get “neer” enough to the object, yet not be “subtle” enough to generate 
“something more fully discovered,” despite Hooke’s belief. 
That Cavendish espouses the idea that human creativity can not only predict but even 
fashion the future through the keen intuitive grasp of inner reality is a less than subtle argument 
in The Blazing World. For Cavendish, magnifying glasses merely provide a process of crude 
atomic reduction that fails to accomplish what imagination or fantasy can—expanding time and 
space, stretching the span of present reality beyond the imagination’s bent that tests our 
perception and observation, to foresee and to prove by predicting the existence of the bigger 
system.  Hooke believes that his experiment will provide an observation that could reduce the 
distance from the truth while breaking things into constituent parts, but Cavendish points out that 
the physical nearness to something doesn’t signify the acute grasp of it. She gives a specific 
name to this intuition-and-creativity driven observation in order to identify and distinguish it 
from the mechanistic experimental science when she describes the navigating method of 
augurers as “subtile observations and great practice” in The Blazing World:  
And though they had no knowledge of the Load-stone, or Needle, or pendulous 
Watches, yet (which was as serviceable to them) they had subtile observations, 
and great practice; in so much that they could not onely tell the depth of the sea in 
every place, but where there were shelves of Sand, Rocks, and other obstructions 
to be avoided by skilfull and experienced Sea-men: Besides, they were excellent 
Augurers, which skill they counted more necessary and beneficial then the use of 
Compasses, Cards, Watches, and the like.132 
                                                 
132 Cavendish, The Blazing World, 128. 
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Here Cavendish conveys doubts about the aid of machinery and technology—compass, cards, 
watches—by emphasizing the capability of “skillful and experienced Sea-men” who are able to 
read the “depth of sea” and foresee any obstructions coming before them without any help of 
technology.  Unlike the experimental scientists with their scopes and compass, augurers, as she 
points out, have the skill to practice “subtile observations” without the help of machinery. What 
is exactly that “skill”? Is it to observe subtly, or to observe subtle things? Or both? To answer 
this question I must ask another—what is a subtle object to be observed subtly, and what 
determines something as subtle? When experimental science tries to explain things by resorting 
to increasingly greater detail, always dissecting functioning systems into smaller and smaller 
constituent parts in an effort to define and understand them, she would argue that the details 
themselves do not create any comprehensive significance. The “skill” referenced above is the 
sensibility and experience that allow someone to be able to observe and interpret a subject 
seamlessly, gracefully, without negotiating its personal space, and thus preserving boundaries 
between different worlds. Functionality and aesthetics should complement each other in 
harmony; machines, to Cavendish, are too obvious and too intentional to be subtle and effortless. 
In other words, she believes experimental science cannot accomplish the sophistication and skill 
established by countless years of ancient practice of reading and interpreting natural signs. It is 
interesting that she uses nautical navigation as an example to demonstrate that the proximity and 
accuracy of the machine do not determine the success of navigation. Minute details are indeed 
important, but patterns are paramount in accumulating meanings. More importantly, to recount 
the Empress’ criticism against the microscope in The Blazing World, proximity can actually lead 
one to inaccuracy and thus more confusion: “Whereupon they took one of their best and largest 
microscopes, and endeavoured to view a Whale thorow it: but alas! the shape of the Whale was 
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so big, that its circumference went beyond the magnifying quality of the Glass; whether the error 
proceeded from the Glass, or from a wrong position of the Whale against the reflection of light, I 
cannot certainly tell.”133 The Empress is unsatisfied when the microscope fails to magnify a 
whale, as “the shape of the Whale was so big, that its circumference went beyond the magnifying 
quality of the Glass.”134 This scene might seem too obvious or foolish to some, and they might 
even wonder why anyone would even think about putting a whale under a microscope. Yet 
Cavendish’s idiosyncratic argument against the microscope does deliver a good point; she 
chooses an object that is obviously too big to be under the point “as sharp as a needle” to reveal 
the extremely partial and small pieces of the world the microscope can magnify.135 What Hooke 
believes as sharp and subtle as “the point of a sharp small needle” indeed can only deliver 
information too small, too localized to effectively and justly represent the whole.136 
Furthermore, Cavendish even dismisses the merit of reading such observations written by 
an experimental scientist: “To relate all their optic observations through the several sorts of their 
Glasses, would be a tedious work, and tire even the most patient Reader.”137 In the historical 
context of Cavendish’s observations about experimental philosophy, her admiration of augurers 
and derogation of the use of mechanical practice indicate her distrust of Hooke’s method and 
practice. Neither his observation nor his rhetoric is able to obvert the shallow impression of 
experimental science on Cavendish. An augurer interprets what he observes after watching the 
flight patterns of the birds in the sky. One might ask how the practice of augurers differs from 
that of experimental scientists such as Hooke. The ancient practice of augury not only needs an 
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135 Hooke, Micrographia, 1. 
136 Ibid.  
137 Cavendish, The Blazing World, 145. 
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auspice with a skill to conduct careful observation and produce keen interpretation of patterns in 
nature, but it also requires a bird that manifests the signs delivering the omens. An augurer is a 
governor of metonymy; the message is the bird itself, the instrument moving and signaling the 
sign, embodying the sign. Here we discern that there is an instrument involved, after all, with the 
practice of augury, but the perception of this instrument requires insight and patience, an 
observational passivity little resembling the forceful invasion of space marking the 
technologically-enhanced gaze of the emerging science. Thus, Cavendish, unlike Hooke, who 
believes microscopic observation can provide not only acute but also prophetic experience 
revealing “secret texts,” identifies the practice of experimental science with the opposite—
confusion and crudity. Furthermore, Cavendish acknowledges that human perception and 
sensory experience can lead the human observer  to “err in searching and requiring after the 
Causes of Natural Effects, and many times embrace falsehoods for Truths” (“To the Reader,” 
The Blazing World). Unlike Cavendish, Hooke doesn’t see the chance of such “falsehoods” in his 
microscopic seeing; yet an augurer would more likely be aware of the possibility of human error 
in reading the pattern, thus focusing more on comprehensive poetic significance than minute 
material details of the patterns. 
I’d like to return and pay more attention to Hooke’s use of the word “point” to disclose 
the significance of subtlety for both Cavendish and Hooke, this is a key concept in understanding 
Cavendish’s argument against experimental science. It is not just a small point that the 
microscope magnifies; in Hooke’s imagination, a point embodies both a material and immaterial 
sense of a significant mark that could change the outcome of a sentence because even such a 
small material entity has a significance and function in a bigger text. Through the aid of a 
magnifying glass, one can see a point not only microscopically but also metaphorically—optical 
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magnification can somehow mediate a symbolic touch that connects one point to the other. This 
is indeed an extremely poetic way of looking at the world; the idea of being able to see one thing 
and delineate it in a way that it manifests and transforms into another thing evokes the capability 
of metaphor.138 Experimental scientists such as Hooke use the divinatory rhetoric of prediction to 
establish a moral merit of their scientific experiments, and they argue that through the aid of 
machines one might be able to see everything in his or her surroundings and possibly predict the 
future, which used to be poetry’s tone and its claim of purpose.139 As Elizabeth Spiller points 
out, Hooke’s text literally embodies the body to be read that contains the bodies being read 
microscopically. The bodies being read in Micrographia are being observed mechanically—
through the microscope--but described metaphorically. Therefore, a point indeed becomes a 
significant point of beginning and ending for an organism being read and observed. Spiller 
suggests that Cavendish’s own writing reveals a “sense of herself primarily as a reader”—in 
works like The Blazing World and Observations, Cavendish is not only the author but a reader of 
scientific writing. However, Cavendish appears to pay less attention to such minute details as 
“the sharpness of a point the most superlatively, we say, as sharp as a needle.”140 As I discussed 
earlier, Cavendish’s observation is scarcely about looking—looking at something from one fixed 
point is paramount to observational science. The established, unmoving point of a magnifying 
glass must serve as a beginning point to an observing eye. The human eyes are not only 
                                                 
138 This resonates with Sidney’s mimetic theory of poetry. 
139 In “Books Written of the Wonders of These Glasses” from Science, Reading, and Renaissance 
Literature, Elizabeth Spiller argues that the opening paragraph of Micrographia not only provides a symbolic 
representation of the microscope as “a tool that will make it possible to read what he sees as the most secret texts of 
the world, the true book of nature” but also shows us how the new science fashioned a new way of reading: “ 
imagining all of creation as being engraven with its own ‘small writing,’ Hooke represents interest in reading out the 
‘small writing,’ the periods and full stops of the world that is his text” (Spiller 139). 
140 Hooke, Micrographia, 1-2. Hooke writes: “Now though this point be commonly accounted the sharpest 
(whence when we experts the sharpness of a point superlatively, we say, as sharp as a needle) yet the microscope 
can afford us hundreds of instances of points many thousand times sharper.” 
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constantly moving but also controlled by human senses, and Cavendish believes that what one 
sees through the magnifying glasses does not reveal or present nature in a shape or form that is 
closer to truth. And as I also mentioned earlier, if Cavendish does believe in the specific power 
of poetry to reflect nature and present multiple differing versions of it, then magnifying glasses 
do offer something that fundamentally alters the outcome of poetic imagination and metaphorical 
formation. Hence Cavendish calls it “the art of micrographia” and expounds upon its artificiality 
that “doth more easily alter than inform.”141 If the nature a poet observes and writes about in his 
or her poetry is not observed through the naked eye but moved away from the naked eye, 
manipulating what the poet sees by observing his subject of poetry through a magnifying glass, 
then the poet begins his poetic thinking with inaccurate information and, as Cavendish puts it, 
“deformed” material upon which to build a poetic creation. The most accurate way to observe 
and understand the world is in the manner through which it appears and comes to our naked eye 
without any mechanical improvement or manipulation: “Wherefore the best optic is a perfect 
natural eye, and a regular sensitive perception; and the best judge, is reason; and the best study, 
is rational contemplation joined with the observations of regular sense, but not deluding arts.”142 
Hooke’s attempt to magnify the capability of the microscope by turning a textual mark into an 
organism to be observed and then into a symbolic point to be made should have appeared poetic 
and been effective for most readers of his time. After all, his point about the machine’s ability to 
turn a point into the point demonstrates the profit of scientific observation conducive to 
observing divine knowledge; however, this does not persuade Cavendish. She writes in 
Observations: “the several dioptrical instruments belonging thereto, by reason I have neither 
studied nor practiced that art; yet of this I am confident, that this same art, with all its 
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instruments, is not able to discover the interior natural motions of any part or creature of 
nature.”143 She is clearly doubtful of not only its informative accuracy but also its supposed 
ability to reveal messages beyond the obvious materiality of the material world. Even when our 
senses can perceive things crookedly or incorrectly, information gathered through our own naked 
eye and sensory system remains closer to God’s intention for Cavendish: “[T]here is something 
more powerful than nature, all the parts of nature (which are infinite) certainly have: And so 
God, being an infinite and eternal God, hath an infinite and eternal worship; for every part 
conceiving something about itself, and above its nature, worships that supreme, either through 
fear, or love, or both; yet knows not what the supreme being is.”144 This is clearly a radically 
different attitude in acquiring knowledge than Hooke’s argument for the spiritual merit of his 
machine; even though human perception and sensory experience might not be able to give 
precise answers to our critical inquiry about the world, nature, and the divine, Cavendish cannot 
condone any unnatural aid or thing that does not respect the way God intended us to perceive the 
world, which is through the naked eye, without any aid of machines. Looking at God’s creatures 
through the magnifying glass would only mean seeing the copy of a copy, not even a copy of the 
original: “though the perception may be true, when the object is truly presented, yet when the 
presentation is false, the information must be false also. And it is to be observed, that art, for the 
most part, makes hermaphroditical, that is, mixt figures, partly artificial, and partly natural.”145 
“Besides, there are so many alterations made by several lights, their shadows, refractions, 
reflexions,” she writes, and the mechanical presentation of this sort will also, she continues, be 
affected by “several lines, points, mediums, interposing and intermixing parts, forms and 
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positions, as the truth of an object will hardly be known.”146 Whether it is the poet looking at the 
sky to write a poem, an augurer looking at the sky and the bird to predict the weather, or any 
person looking at the sky to describe the weather, he or she must look at the presentation that 
God intended us to see, not the ones magnified—or, misrepresented—by a machine. Cavendish 
argues: 
The glass only figures or patterns out the picture presented in and by the glass, 
and there mistakes may easily be committed in taking copies from copies. Nay, 
artists do confess themselves, that flies, and the like, will appear of several figures 
or shapes, according to the several reflexions, refractions, mediums and positions 
of several light; which if so, how can they tell or judge which is the truest light, 
position, or medium, that doth present the object naturally as it is?147  
And should one not find the right light, we are misled by a wrong version, a misrepresentation of 
God’s creatures, as if the poet is holding a broken mirror or a horse master is riding on a 
deformed or sick horse that cannot perform its duty of reflecting nature as well as it can.  
Not only does Cavendish argue that mechanical and atomic representation demote the 
nature of things that God intended us to see, but she also points out the fact that if there is no 
point to anchor the subject being observed, scientific observation can never succeed. Here we 
can recount Cavendish’s description of the augurer’s “subtle observation” that does not require 
the subject to be pointed down or marked—literally—in order to be observed. Instead of looking 
in to observe smaller details, augurers look at the bigger picture or larger collection of events. 
Subtlety in this case almost functions opposite to sharpness of the microscopic view that Hooke 
praises, suggesting a broader, open-ended act of looking at the bigger patterns of nature that 
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signifies Cavendish’s vitalist materialism. The problem with microscopic looking in, for 
Cavendish, begins with a limited scopic situation that takes the subject out of its own context to 
the point where the observers cannot tell what exactly they are looking at. When looking through 
a microscope, everything else other than the very subject under the point of the glass is 
unseen.148 Even though Hooke argues that microscopic observation can magnify the mark at the 
beginning and end of a sentence, the sentence disappears while the end point of a microscopic 
view zooms in and whitens out everything around it, obliterating how the end mark of a sentence 
functions in the sentence or arrives at the end.  
 In “Of Many Worlds in This World,” it is clear that Cavendish espouses sensory 
observations over atomic observations, as she describes the multitudinous world through her 
imagination and metaphoric comparisons that abstain from scientific observation. Cavendish 
sees an open-ended and expanding world: “Just like unto a Nest of Boxes round,/ Degrees of 
sizes within each Boxe are found./ So in this World, may many Worlds more be,/ Thinner, and 
lesse, and lesse still by degree”(lines 1-4).149 However, perhaps with “subtile observation, great 
practice” we can remember how to use our senses to read ever mutating patterns and decipher 
“Thinner, and lesse” signs as augurers do. The microscope, in an attempt to show greater details, 
ends up showing less because the observer sees only what the machine reveals. Furthermore, as 
Cavendish points out, the left-out margins invisible to the microscopic view change not only the 
way one understands the subject but also the way one reads and perceives the world: 
“[M]agnifying glasses are like a high heel to a short leg, which if it be made too high, it is apt to 
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or from a wrong position of the Whale against the reflection of light, I cannot certainly tell” (144).  
149 Margaret Cavendish, “Of Many Worlds in This World,” Poems, and fancies, sig. G2v-G3v. 
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make the wearer fall, and at the best, can do no more than represent exterior figures in a bigger, 
and so in a more deformed shape and posture than naturally they are.”150 For Cavendish, the 
microscope is dangerous because it manipulates the way texts are presented to be observed and 
read, as if Hooke plays with and defiles God’s text by magnifying one textual detail or 
minimizing another. Cavendish believes such manipulation with the original text is far different 
from poetic mimesis; in fact, it is immoral to represent the text in a way that encourages a 
reading practice that forgets about the bigger picture while focusing on small details and leaving 
out bigger patterns. Mechanical misinforming and misrepresenting occur as the machines fail to 
conduct “subtle observations.”  
In various works by Cavendish, the conceptual expansion of physical space occurs 
through imagining what was unseen, instead of seeing everything. Hooke’s Micrographia 
presents an argument that the merit of the microscope, ironically, is that it signifies the presence 
of something immaterial by showing as much detail as it can. But unlike an augurer’s 
observation, microscopic observation leaves very small room for the observers to use their 
imagination to combine the missing—unmagnified—pieces.  I would suggest that any hints of 
conceptual expansion involving observing material growth and change in Micrographia should 
evoke the precedence of poetic imagination already working—Hooke’s rhetoric demonstrates the 
process of looking in through the tropes of revelation, reflection, and simulation, as if the act is 
already part of looking under and throughout, which signifies the act of “looking in” as a 
symbolic act of comprehension and prediction. Furthermore, poetry’s capability to enable a point 
mark on a page to signify an end of sentence, a point to start or stop a thought, should be unique 
and original to the world of metaphoric comprehensions and observations, not a microscopic or 
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atomic understanding of the world. What is unique to poetry’s realm should only be used to 
preserve poetry’s capability. However, Hooke’s poetic delineation of the microscopic appearance 
subverts the Empress’ amiable description of sea men’s “subtle observation” in The Blazing 
World. While Hooke claims that the microscopic looking in can enlighten us with a macroscopic 
observation and appreciation of God’s inventions that is broader than a mere material 
comprehension of the material world, Cavendish argues that it is precisely that act of looking in 
aided by a machine that depreciates and devalues the sublime beauty of God’s work. That 
successful and sufficient navigation in the sea can be made through “subtle observation” without 
an aid of machines signifies not only the Empress’ distrust of mechanical science but also 
Cavendish’s faith in ancient traditions and tools of navigation.  
I would also suggest that Cavendish may be using a nautical trope to invite us to ponder 
something more than the efficiency of ancient ways of navigation. It is not a coincidence that 
Cavendish frames her criticism on mechanical tools of navigation inside a story of the Empress’ 
sea adventure. Presenting a prose narrative for the Empress’ heroic and mysterious adventure in 
a remote, imaginary place in time with imaginary characters, The Blazing World becomes a 
fantastic romance for the poet herself, and the unpredictable adventure demands a dependable set 
of skills and inventions to help the poet navigate through the storm. What forms of poetic 
navigation can the poet rely on to navigate through the vast sea of signification other than a well-
established poetic tradition such as Petrarchan conceit? I would argue that Cavendish espouses 
the practice of augurer over the mechanical machines because the augurer’s subtle observation is 
close to the practice of poetry writing. If, as Cavendish and Sidney assert, poetry is supposed to 
deliver a variety of representations of the world through “subtle observations” and “studying 
inventions,” then poetic representation should almost desert the idea of nearness and preciseness; 
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then instead of getting rid of the distance between the word and the thing itself, collapsing the 
space between vehicle and tenor, poetic representation that comes from “subtle observation” uses 
the distance to achieve the impact of nostalgia. Thus the practice of looking in and looking 
through the layers of concealment and external appearance fundamentally breaks the system of 
poetic representation from the basis of observation. While Hooke diligently looks in and through 
the microscope to find God’s secret message, Cavendish looks out to the sky to see God’s secret 
message using her own senses. Since looking in is radically different form of observation 
compared to looking at and watching from a distance, as the latter seems to involve more 
intuition and trained human senses, it will require a different type and class of metaphors to 
describe what one observes by looking in or looking at.151  
Interestingly, when comparing Hooke’s cautious rhetorical use of nearness and subtleness 
in approaching his subjects to Cavendish’s blunt criticism about mechanical inventions in The 
Blazing World, one might hastily conclude that oddly, even though she valorizes subtlety, there 
isn’t much subtlety when it comes to Cavendish’s rhetoric, especially in her caustic complaints 
against the practicality of mechanical devices such as the microscope and telescope. When 
Cavendish uses of the term “subtile” to describe a kind of observation, as in the previous passage 
I introduced, the term is used to deliver a discerning judgment against the technology that some 
might argue advanced a close observation as well as a wide navigation of the world. As subtle as 
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it might sound, I would like to argue that for Cavendish what proximity offers to scientific 
observation represents the abomination of what nature conceives as beauty—subtlety. And here I 
am using the word to describe the beauty found in the material world, both physical or abstract, 
that is both so sharp and so distant that its metamorphosis is often unrecognized by or 
untraceable to our naked eye. The subtlety is not without its dangers. The kind of double 
meaning that the word “subtle” embodies in Cavendish I am trying to point out might be 
explained more clearly through the example of Bacon’s use of the word to explain the 
paradoxical doubled nature of mechanical inventions as he writes in The Wisedome of the 
Ancients: “mechanicall arts are of ambiguous use, serving as well for hurt as for remedy, and 
they have in a manner power both to loose and bind themselves.”152 In Humanism, Machinery, 
and Renaissance Literature, Jessica Wolfe writes in her introduction that “Bacon’s conflicted 
attitude towards mechanical subtlety emerges most clearly in his interpretation of Daedalus in his 
1609 De Sapientia Veterum”(Wolfe 12).153  Wolfe explains that Bacon sees Daedalus’ invention 
as “simultaneously obfuscatory and enlightening,” and his analysis of the “Daedalian duplicity of 
mechanics” in the De Sapientia Veterum helps to explain “his ambivalent depiction of the 
discipline in The New Atlantis, where mechanical devices alternate between elucidation and 
deception.”154 As Wolfe also points out, Bacon’s scientific method also reveals how Bacon 
“oscillates between two contradictory definitions of subtlety,” and the scientific method and the 
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153
 Jessica Wolfe, Humanism, Machinery, and Renaissance Literature, 12. Wolfe writes that Bacon 
interprets the Cretan engineer as an allegorical embodiment of mechanical artifice” in the fable entitled ‘Daedalus, 
or Mechanique’ in The Wisdome of the Ancients. Wolfe points out that Bacon’s description of Daedalus’ intricate 
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154 Wolfe 12-13.  
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machines that enabled and could “denote an empirical, highly particularized mode of scientific 
investigation” can also “signify an intellectual pitfall” and manipulate or veil truth.155  
To assert his moral conviction for his mechanical device, Hooke writes an ambiguously 
humble tract about a man-made mechanical device full of irregularities while still capable of 
magnifying the divine work of God: “[S]o unaccurate is it, in all its productions, even those 
which seem most neat, that if examin’d with an organ more acute than that by which they were 
made, the more we see of their shape, the less appearance will there be of their beauty: whereas 
in the works of nature, the deepest discoveries shew us the greatest Excellencies.”156 Even 
though Hooke seems to underscore the obvious downfalls of the man-made machine, one must 
still recognize some truth in Hooke’s claim that the microscope is a “superlative” medium, more 
acute than the human eye itself, to watch as much details of nature’s beauty as we can and 
appellate God’s omnipotence by transcribing what we see through a microscope as in the 
drawings and prints Hooke offers in Micrographia:  
An evident argument, that he that was the Author of all these things, was no other 
then omnipotent; being able to include as  great a variety of parts and contrivances 
in the yet smallest Discernable Point, as in those vaster bodies (which 
comparatively are also called Points) such as the Earth, Sun, or Planets. Nor need 
it seem strange that the Earth it self may be by an analogie call’d a Physical Point: 
For as its body, though now so near us to fill our eyes and fancies with a sense of 
the vastness of it, may by a little distance, and some convenient Diminishing 
                                                 
155 Wolfe also writes: “Directed one way subtlety reveals truth; directed another way, it obfuscates that 
truth. Bacon is ultimately unable either to oppose or wholly to embrace the use of machinery in his scientific method 
precisely because machines embody both kinds of subtlety at once” (12). For Cavendish, this polarizing quality of 
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Glasses, be made vanish into a scarce visible Speak, or Point (as I have often try’d 
on the Moon, and (when not too bright) on the sun it self.) So, could a Mechanical 
contrivance successfully answer our theory, we might see the least spot as big as 
the Earth it self; and Discover, as Des Cartes also conjectures, as great a variety of 
bodies in the Moon, or Planets, as in the Earth.157 
Nevertheless, in Micrographia visual representations take away from metaphoric representation 
by presenting both too little of bigger patterns and too much of small details. As I discussed 
earlier regarding Hooke’s magnification of a “point,” the nearness negates subtleness—the fact 
that one sharp point can get near the other sharp point eradicates the possibility of subtlety. It is 
important that Hooke associates physical sharpness with nearness, and even further, with 
subtleness. From a small, sharp point, Hooke writes, begins a world; the fact that an 
experimental scientist writes in metaphors to explain the world cannot overcome, Cavendish 
would argue, the decontextualized nature of the microscopic observations he is preceding from: 
“Truly, my reason can hardly be persuaded to believe, that this artificial informer (I mean the 
microscope) should be so true as it is generally thought; for, in my opinion it, more deludes, than 
informs. It is well known, that if a figure be longer, broader, and bigger than its nature requires, 
it is not its natural figure” (Hooke 60). Again, for Cavendish, the physical nearness rather 
deforms, not informs; there is only mental subtlety, conceptual sharpness. The distance between 
things that create proportions, patterns, and depths makes it possible for augurers to perform their 
augury and poets to create better metaphors and use poetic imaginations. Rather than using a 
mechanical or external aid that merely offers physical nearness, Cavendish advocates using our 
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own innate ability to compare and contrast to comprehend the truth more subtly, and it is the 
ability to compare and contrast that inaugurates the artfulness of poetic imagination. 
As with the term “subtile” being used in Hooke, the magnitude or extremity of material 
subtlety becomes a fascination in Hooke’s microscopic observation. Hooke is fascinated by 
sharpness and irregularity of a surface that is part of a bigger, more blunt landscape so that he 
can define how sharp one thing is to the other. He wants to replace the practice of “discourse and 
disputation” that relies on variables and comparisons with his microscopic studies; he argues that 
the “productions of ruler and compasses” fail to deliver the kind of accuracy his microscope can 
show: “The Points of Pins are yet more blunt, and the Points of the most curious Mathematical 
Instruments do very seldome arrive at so great a sharpness; how much therefore can be built 
upon demonstrations made only by the productions of the Ruler and Compasses, he will be better 
able to consider that shall but view those points and lines with a Microscope.”158 It is interesting 
that both Cavendish and Hooke use the similar analogy of comparison and contrast that only 
something equally or more sharp will get through another subtle surface, as the actual tip of the 
microscope is sharp and acute. However, while Hooke uses subtlety as a physical periphery 
between two things, Cavendish’s delineation of “subtile observation” in The Blazing World 
suggests something less material. Redolent of the sophisticated mastery of sprezzatura I 
discussed in relation to Sidney earlier, her concept of “subtile observation” is laden with 
laborious practice veiled under the “great practice” of keen intuitive knowledge, the kind of 
sharp reasoning and swift wit essential for a courtly navigation. The knowledge gained from her 
“subtile observation” seems to come from within, never quite seems to be external; it appears 
rather simple outside while intricate inside; it is neither noisy nor obvious. Scientists appear 
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clunky and loud in The Blazing World because Cavendish believes the “great work” of the 
“subtile observation” should remain so subtle that the laborious work underneath and before the 
outcome of one’s endeavor leaves enough distance for the audience to do their own “great work” 
to appreciate and learn from it. Consider the similarities between political navigating in the court 
and poetic “gilding” in artistic creation to achieve subtlety that hides “self love,” a quality that is 
essential to these poets whose political and courtly career often determined their poetic career; it 
becomes unequivocal that she uses nautical metaphors to express her concerns about the advent 
of new science.159 As her description of “subtle observation” and “great practice” highlights the 
machine’s affiliation with mechanical rudeness and lack of complexity, Cavendish believes that 
mechanical science is not the answer to finding the truth, but rather the source of confusion and 
deformation, and that such confusion and deformation of truth will result in the inevitable 
changes in social, philosophical, and political views that will threaten the subtle and great way 
people used to perceive the world to find truth.  
Cavendish is consistent in the presentation of her beliefs. In “It is hard to believe, that 
there are worlds in this world,” she argues that the microscopic world threatens the idea of a fluid 
and soft world perceived through our sensory system. The title signals the underlying 
metaphysical crisis triggered by the discovery of a microscopic world—the institutionalized 
representation and knowledge of the fluid and mutable world becomes compartmentalized and 
organized by the smaller worlds inside.  
Nothing so hard in Nature, as Faith is, 
For to believe Impossibilities: 
                                                 
159 I discussed how courtly conduct and poetic imagination go hand in hand in the previous chapter about 
Sidney. I am using the Word “Gilding” from the opening of Sidney’s The Defence of Poesy where Sidney discusses 
tactlessness of Pugliano’s hyperbole about mastery of horsemanship. The word could possess double meaning, both 
writing poetry and performing one’s political significance at the court. 
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As doth impossible to us appeare, 
Not ‘Cause ‘tis not, but to our sense not cleere; 
But that we cannot in our Reason finde, 
As being against Natures course, and kinde. 
For many things our sense dull may scape,  
For sense is grosse, not every thing can shape. 
So in this World another world may bee, 
That we do neither touch, tast, smell, heare, see. 
What Eye so cleere is, yet did ever see 
Those little Hookes, that in the Load-stone bee, 
Which draw hard iron? or give Reasons, why 
The Needles point still in the north lye. 
As for Example, Atomes in the Aire, 
We nere perceive, although the Light be faire.160 
Our sense may be “dull” and “many things” could “escape” from our senses, and the microscope 
might provide a sharper, clearer vision of things invisible to our “dull” naked eye; however, the 
poet also suggests “sense is grosse” and “not everything can shape.” The microscope aims to 
enhance the “grosse” human sense and give a shape to “this world” with the shapes of the “other 
worlds in this world.” Although the shape under the microscope is still impossible to touch, taste, 
smell, or hear, the inner “other worlds” define the outer—“this world”—as they give a “shape” 
to “this world.” The world of subvisibilia, only visible through the microscope, gives new 
additional content to the already visible and sensible world; as Christiane Frey points out, the 
                                                 
160 Cavendish, “It is hard to believe, that there are worlds in this world,” Poems, and fancies (1653), lines 1-
16. 
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microscopic worlds “become an arena for a new kind of science of the invisible just starting to 
gain contour” (377).161 By using the word “contour,” Frey alludes to the ideology of shape and 
form; without outlining one world from the other, neither world can be defined in terms of its 
size or shape.162 Microscopic observation provides a visible knowledge that outlines the world of 
the invisible, which gives significance—“contour”—to both the visible and invisible world. 
Hooke writes in Micrographia that “the science of Nature has been already too long made only a 
work of the brain and of Fancy: It is now high time that it should return to the plainness and 
soundness of Observations on material and obvious things.”163 Even though we cannot fully trust 
or rely solely on human senses, Hooke continues, accuracy is possible if we use “a sincere hand, 
and a faithful eye, to examine, and to record, the things themselves as they appear.”164 Indeed, 
these are the values of microscopic examination: remaining faithful to the pure examining 
method of natural science while suppressing and policing human imagination and sense 
perception. As Frey points out, Hooke believes that the “plainness and soundness of observation” 
alone should “supersede” and control the imagination and sensory reflection.165 Only through an 
“artificial instrument,” as Hooke describes his instrument, are we able to see the “plainness and 
soundness” of the invisible world without being misguided or misinformed by reflection or 
imagination. 
                                                 
161 Christiane Frey, “The Art of Observing the Small: On the Borders of the Subvisibilia (from Hooke to 
Brockes).” Monatshefte, vol. 105, no. 3, 2013. 376-87. 
162 I would also like to further point out that the word “contour” echoes with the idea of shade being not 
only the antithesis but also the defining element of light, the idea that I explore in the later chapters where I discuss 
the topos of light and shade in the works of John Milton and Anne Finch.  
163 Hooke, The Preface, Micrographia, sig. B1r.  
164 Hooke, sig. A2v. 
165 Frey 377. Frey also points out how Hooke inserts the rhetoric of humilitas to suggest the new empirical 
method used in his scientific observation focuses on a small, humble world that becomes visible under the 
microscope. 
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Cavendish, however, believes that the microscopic observation provides the “hard” 
definition and circumscription of “this world,” which poses a threat to an ever-changing and 
developing power of imagination and human sense perception. In addition, the idea of 
subvisibilia signifies the infinite existence of “other worlds” inside “this world.” Frey points out 
that although “both the microscope and the telescope occasion new theories and techniques of 
pure observation,” Hooke believed “microscopic observations in particular lead to far-reaching 
meditations on the nature of matter, the infinite smallness of the microcosm, and that which, in 
spite of the microscope’s powers of magnification, is not able to be observed. Hooke’s ideal of 
limiting observation entirely to what is visible is exceeded precisely with regard to the new, 
microscopically delimited world.” Borrowing Cavendish’s words, “it is hard to believe” that 
inside “this world” there are “other worlds,” which might contain more “other words” that yet 
again contain more “other worlds” inside them, so on and so forth; the microscopic view not 
only reveals what cannot be seen through the naked eye but also suggests the possibility of what 
hasn’t been seen even through the microscopic view. The poet, in “It is hard to believe,” 
carefully reiterates the signifiers that draw attention to the obvious differences between “gross” 
physical reality and the “hard” abstract realm. To believe in something, human beings always try 
to “shape” something invisible or impossible into visible or probable, thus believable. Once 
something takes on a shape and form, it becomes the “hard” certainty.166 Nature does not stay in 
a permanent “shape,” she argues, but “faith” does—“Nothing so hard in Nature, as Faith is,/ For 
to believe in Impossibilities.” Soft things are hard to shape, and the poet believes that Nature—
“this world”—should remain soft, “gross” without “shape.” Notice the juxtaposition of concepts 
such as “hard” and “believe” or “Impossibilities” and “believe”; the word “hard” in the title 
                                                 
166 Imagine the religious icons or iconic images that become more solid than the mutable, uncertain reality 
of our physical realm. 
106 
suggests difficulty while the one in the first line of the poem signifies density. Here she also 
plays with the word “believe” as in believable knowledge as well as believing in faith. Natural 
scientists would argue that things without density are more difficult to know, thus impossible to 
even believe in their existence. She would argue that things with definitive shape or density do 
not support the very principle of mutability that keeps “nothing so hard in Nature.”  
Moreover, as if to accentuate the contrasting images of “hard” things in mutable Nature, 
Cavendish includes the image of loadstone pulling hard iron: “Those little Hookes, that in the 
Load-stone bee,/ Which draw hard iron.”167 Hooke in Micrographia describes Cavendish’s “little 
Hookes” as “attractive virtue”: “Thus have I gently raised a Steel pendulum by a Loadstone to a 
great angle, till by the shaking of my hand I have chanced to make a separation between them, 
which is no sooner made, but as if the loadstone had retained no attractive virtue, the pendulum 
moves freely from it towards the other side.”168 When Hooke strives to endow the magnetism or 
the properties of a magnet with abstract values, Cavendish calls it as it would appear through the 
microscope—“those little Hookes” pulling the “hard iron.” Hooke prophesies the “plainness and 
soundness” of “the things themselves as they appear.”169 Yet Cavendish’s “those little Hookes” 
seems far more plain and descriptive than Hooke’s “attractive virtue.”170  Furthermore, here is 
Cavendish punning on the name “Hooke” to illustrate the image of a scientist laboring to “hook” 
and pull one world to the other so that they are near each other; the nearness between two things 
generate subtext for comparison, rather than objective scientific facts. The subtleness of the 
                                                 
167 Cavendish, “It is hard to believe, that there are other worlds in this world,” lines 12-13. 
168 Hooke 32.  
169 Hooke writes in The Preface: “It is high time that [the science of nature] should return to the plainness 
and soundness of Observations on material and obvious things” (sig. B1r).  
170 In her poem “It is hard to believe,” Cavendish describes how a magnet works using a plain language: 
“Those little Hookes, that in the Load-Stone bee,/ Which draw hard Iron?” (lines 12-13). On the other hand, Hooke’s 
description of a magnet in Micrographia is more conceptual and allusive: “So vast a difference is there between the 
attractive virtues of congruity upon a contiguous and disjoined body” (32). I will leave it to the readers to decide 
which description delivers a more vivid and persuasive image. 
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subject, she would argue, rather becomes more comprehensible and vivid through the power of 
imagination, rather than the aid of a microscope, which would only take us near the subject we 
observe.  
Cavendish contemplates—what should one believe, when even though the science has 
now revealed the “other worlds” smaller than “this world” or greater than “this world,” there are 
possibilities of more “other worlds” that haven’t been uncovered, which again might completely 
rearrange or subvert the accepted, “hard” knowledge of the world? How does the microscopic 
view, as it reveals such a confined, small world, avoid the partial, capricious, and artificial values 
that establish the institutional values such as sizes and shapes that are co-dependent on other 
artificial values? Is there truth that overrides these worldly conditions and holds its ubiquitous, 
permanent “shape”? The “hard” evidence that the new science offers should come from the 
“plainness and soundness” of the natural science, as Hooke argues, but even Hooke cannot avoid 
using hyperbolic poetic language to emphasize the potential connection between the plain, 
physical phenomenon and the inevitable authority of a non-physical realm, or what Cavendish 
calls “Impossibilities.” In the fourth line of the poem it becomes clear—the poet points out that 
things are invisible “not ‘cause ‘tis not, but to our sense not cleere.” The poet argues that “hard” 
evidence is man-made, as there is “nothing so hard in Nature.” Sometimes what we cannot see or 
feel embodies the aura of “Impossibilities” that engages our imagination, and without 
imagination, there is no chance for “Impossibilities”: “As for Example, Atomes in the Aire,/ We 
never perceive, although the Light be faire.” And if there are no “Impossibilities,” there is even 
less chance for faith. Seeing as a sensory perception, whether through the naked eye or enhanced 
by “the sincere hand” or optic devices, cannot completely avoid the possibility of mutability and 
uncertainty; there might be another world inside the “other words in this world.” There are still 
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things unknown and unseen, and the infinite possibility of subvisibilia makes the unseen and 
undiscovered region much more significant. What has been touched, explored, or observed, 
doesn’t leave much room for imagination and desire; knowledge and faith are two different 
things, and here in her poem Cavendish suggests that hard things might offer knowledge but they 
offer so little room for faith—hard things are perhaps too real, too “hard to believe” because they 
eradicate our need to believe something beyond or invisible to us. Though the poet in “It is hard 
to believe” acknowledges the tenuousness of sensory perception, she finds solace in innate 
knowledge and faith without seeing microscopically or completely. Hooke’s microscopic 
looking into what used to be unseen, shapeless, or unknown subordinates the world under the 
microscope as one world gets “shape[d]” by the others that become visible through the 
mechanically-aided vision. Cavendish rebukes the natural science’s endeavor to present the ever-
changing, shapeless—“grosse”—realm of nature as something “hard” with “shape.” By 
describing a magnified image as something “hard” and with “shape,” Cavendish argues the 
subtlety of microscopic view that Hooke praises fails to take us anywhere “neer” conceptual 
clarity or subtlety, but rather dissuades and leads us farther away from “subtile observations” that 
could result in a greater truth. We will see this same contrast in the next two chapters on Milton 
(and, indeed, the final chapter, on Finch). While Hooke underlines the unreliability and need for 
improvement of human senses with the external help of an optic device, Milton, aligning with 
Cavendish and Sidney, considers accurate and fruitful vision to be in a significant sense 
internally oriented. In the next chapters on Milton I will argue that Milton, in fact, believes the 
lack of physical sight doesn’t create as much harm as the deficiency of spiritual sight, as 
suggested by Milton’s delineation of Adam and Eve’s spiritual insight and faith in Paradise Lost; 
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to appreciate and understand the true beauty and significance of God’s creations, Milton’s texts 
imply, one must learn to read and decipher the material world through one’s spiritual eye.    
  
4 CHAPTER 4: Milton, St. Augustine, and Illuminated Sight in Paradise Lost 
At the very start of my project, I supplied a series of quotations that would guide my 
discussion, among them Sidney’s assertion that “the inward light each mind hath in itself is as 
good as a philosopher’s book.” I have now examined Sidney’s assertion in two general contexts: 
first, with Sidney himself, as a means of explaining the special position of the poet, who, he 
insisted, produces a special sort of truth, working from larger, universal principles and then 
assorting specific aspects of the material or physical world to match; and, second, with 
Cavendish, in the preceding chapter, I examined the implication of Sidney’s insistence on an 
“inward light” in terms of one of the most vigorous debates that would arise in the years 
following his death, the rise of experimental science and the steady adoption of an atomistic 
materialism seeking truth through minute, repeated physical observations, which the major 
authors in my study all stand in stark opposition to. In the following two chapters on Milton, I 
would like to focus more specifically on a theme that has been running barely under the surface 
of my discussion so far, the way that this “inward light” functions in terms of religion and 
spiritual sight, as well as the inference that this spiritual sight is far more complete than Hooke’s 
microscopic view. After examining Milton’s monist materialism, which collapses the 
traditionally recognized dualism between material and spiritual and thus privileges spiritual sight 
as the master of all human perception, I will introduce an additional major figure into my study, 
Saint Augustine. The link between Saint Augustine and Milton has been, as I will show, widely 
discussed by previous Milton scholars, and rightly so. As Irene Samuel writes in Plato and 
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Milton, “As a Christian, Milton rejects Plato’s explanation that we won this knowledge in a 
previous existence, that is, he rejects the doctrines of metempsychosis and recollection; but he 
finds a convenient substitute in St. Augustine’s theory that God himself imparts knowledge of 
the eternal Ideas to the human mind” (139). Indeed, Augustine describes a “mind’s eye” that 
correlates perfectly with Sidney’s “inward light,” and these terms are freighted with additional 
urgency and poignancy given Milton’s failing physical sight and eventual blindness.  After 
establishing a foundation for my use of the term “spiritual sight” that connects it squarely to my 
earlier discussions of Sidney and Cavendish, the next two chapters will proceed with a series of 
detailed readings of Paradise Lost, Samson Agonistes, and Paradise Regained to demonstrate the 
importance of recognizing a spiritual sight separate from and superior to physical sight in 
Milton’s poetry. 
4.1 Milton, Matter, and Materialism 
In Brief Notes Upon A Late Sermon Titled The Fear of God and the King by Matthew 
Griffith, D.D., Milton composed an acerbic critique against the priest who tricks his pupils into 
submitting to the sublime power of a sovereign:  
[Griffith] begins in his Epistle to the General; and moves cunningly for a licence 
to be admitted Physitian both to Church and State; then sets out his practice in 
Physical terms, an wholsom electuary to be taken every morning next our hearts: 
tells of the opposition which he met with from the College of state-Physicians, 
then laies before you his drugs and ingredients; Strong purgatives in the pulpit, 
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contemperd of the myrrhe of mortification, the aloes of confession and contrition, 
the rubarb of restitution and satisfaction;171 
The attribute of rhubarb as purging aid is both metonymical and figurative here in Milton’s 
passage, as it is in other Renaissance poets’ use of the word.172 This immediate and visible 
attribute—what it does and how it tastes—also makes this word available for creating religious 
tropes about repentance and mortification. However, pay attention to the way Milton uses the 
word’s figurative sense—the bitterness of the plant is associated with “restitution” and 
“satisfaction,” random concepts that are seemingly unexpected.  To understand the figurative 
sense of Milton’s use of “rhubarb,” readers should first understand how figurative language 
illuminates Milton’s resolution of the problem of mind-body dualism. In Milton Among the 
Philosophers, Stephen Fallon argues for Milton’s affirmation of monist philosophy against the 
rising authority of a mechanist world picture in the seventeenth century, and one of the most 
compelling pieces of evidence for Milton’s monism provided by Fallon is Raphael’s description 
of angels’ immaterial and material unity using the tropes of vegetables. Pointing at Hobbes and 
Henry More, two of the most prominent scholars and scientists of Milton’s time, Fallon tries to 
redirect previous Milton scholarship that “offers a chaotic list of sources and analogues for 
Milton’s materialism,” a list that includes ancient through contemporary authorities such as 
Gregory of Nyssa, Eusebius, the Zohar and cabbalist Robert Fluud, or Duns Scotus.173 Fallon 
                                                 
171 John Milton, Brief Notes Upon a Late Sermon, titl’d, The Fear of God and the King; Preached, and 
since Published, By Matthew Griffith, D.D., sig.A2r.  
172 For instance, in Shakespeare’s Macbeth: “what rhubarb, cyme, or what purgative drug,/ Would scour 
these English hence?” (V. 3. 55-56). Also, from now on I will use the standard spelling of the word, “rhubarb.” See: 
The Riverside Shakespeare, 2nd ed, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1997). 
173 On the notable discussions of the philosophical influences on Milton’s materialism, Fallon credits 
Marjorie Hope Nicolson for her early studies of Milton, Henry More, and Thomas Hobbes. For more on Nicolson’s 
influential works, see, “The Spirit World of Milton and More,” Studies in Philology 22 (1925): 433-52, “Milton and 
Hobbes,” Studies in Philology 23 (1926): 405-33, and “Milton and the Conjectura Cabbalistica,” Philological 
Quarterly 6 (1927): 1-18. On the influence of Gregory of Nyssa Fallon mentions William Hunter, and A. S. P. 
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notes Marjorie Hope Nicolson’s discussion of Henry More’s and Thomas Hobbes’ influence on 
the development of Milton’s ontology, though cautioning in the introduction to his book that 
Nicholson’s “articles linking Milton to Henry More and contrasting him with Hobbes offer only 
a half-truth” (4).  
Literal representation can be as opaque as figurative representation if the tenor of each 
metaphoric articulation becomes more and more obscure and personal. Milton’s shifting 
representation and articulation of the celestial and earthly world reveal the changes in the poet’s 
philosophical understanding. “As with Hobbes and Henry More, Milton’s conception of angels 
derives from his ontological assumptions” (141), writes Fallon, and we can construe that the 
philosophical context of Milton’s depiction of vegetables with soul and angels with body is the 
hybrid creation of such “assumptions,” informed by and reacting against the contemporary 
metaphysical assumptions of body and soul. Fallon’s argument contrasts with that of Nicholson, 
for Fallon insists that Milton never demonstrated the Cambridge Platonists’ dualist response to 
the threat of Hobbesian mechanism that circumscribes the power of free will.174 Milton was able 
to link material nourishment with spiritual growth; such a trope consistently appears throughout 
Milton’s various works, and the trope is self-explanatory: the nourishment of words will feed the 
readers’ soul. The power of free will is the power to grow—with virtuous intention, one will look 
to God and grow taller and higher. And as the humans can grow and change, so do the angels:  
                                                 
Woodhouse for examining the possible influences of Eusebius, the Stoics, and Robert Fluud. He also suggests John 
Rumrich’s Matter of Glory: A New Preface to “Paradise Lost,” which links Milton’s materialism with Duns Scotus. 
 
174 For further readings on the Cambridge Platonists, see: Rosalie L. Colie’s Light and Enlightenment: A 
Study of the Cambridge Platonists and the Dutch Arminians; Philosophy, Science, and Religion in England 1640-
1700 by Richard Kroll, Richard Ashcraft, and Perez Zagorin; A. C. Crombie, Augustine to Galileo: The History of 
Science A.D. 400-1650. Reason and the Imagination: Studies in the History of Ideas 1600-1800 edited by J. A. 
Mazzeo provides a broad spectrum of seminal works on science, idea, and the world view. Transformation and 
Tradition in the Science: Essays in Honor of I. Bernard Cohen edited by Everett Mendelsohn covers a span of 
several centuries and contains an excellent section on the history of early science in England. 
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Wonder not then, what God for you saw good 
If I refuse not, but convert, as you, 
To proper substance; time may come when men 
With angels may participate, and find 
No inconvenient diet, nor too light fare: 
And from these corporeal nutriments perhaps  
Your bodies nay at last turn all to spirit, 
Improved by tract of time, and winged ascend  
Ethereal as we, or may at choice 
Here or in Heav’nly paradises dwell (V. 491-500) 
Following Raphael’s speech on the “one first matter” to Adam, according to Fallon, the text 
above “makes explicit the monist basis of that materiality” (141). In the previous lines Raphael 
introduces “one first matter”: “one Almighty is, from whom/ All things proceed, and up to Him 
return,/ If not depraved from good, created all/ Such to perfection, one first matter all,/ Endued 
with various forms, various degrees/ Of substance, and in things that live, of life” (V. 469-74). 
There is one matter, which is also the first matter; the rest and later are “endued” with different 
forms, and the variation of this “one first matter” defines the physical reality of the matter. The 
OED offers various definitions and uses of the word “endue” including “to take in, ‘inwardly 
digest’” (II. 2. b), “to put on as a garment” (IV. 6. a), and “to be invested with power or quality” 
and “to be inherent in” (V. 9. b). The last definition also offers an example from Milton’s Sonnet 
7: “And inward ripenes doth much less appear,/ That som more timely-happy spirits indu'th.” No 
matter which definition best explains “one first matter all/ Endued with various forms,” there is 
an insight supported by Milton that the inward growth directly represents the outward growth, as 
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the matter is cloaked by the physical body, inward spiritual growth is literally veiled under the 
material body. But the spiritual growth is real and physical as well; the green leaf of the top of 
the plant is indeed the sign of the spiritual nearness to God, as much as ethereal angels’ being 
light and airy signifies their pure souls, making it possible for them to be near the higher 
existence. Inward purity will shape the outward appearance of the matter, as well as pure soul 
will compose and shape a body “more spirituous, and pure” enough to be lifted up and be “nearer 
to him,” explains Milton in Paradise Lost (V. 475-76).175   
According to Fallon, Raphael’s analogy between plant metabolism and the 
transformation of body into spirit in this text suggests the possibility of the “ontological 
continuity that he has just illustrated, that man can turn into angel” (141). The possibility is real 
and limitless though it has not yet happened, not been described yet. Furthermore, the possibility 
exists for both angels and men. Whether angel or human, they are all “one first matter,” thus 
containing the same substance and going through the same sublimation of their material 
substance: “Milton viewed angels and human souls as similar in substance; the tenuously 
corporeal angels of Paradise Lost resemble the tenuously corporeal souls of Christian Doctrine. 
Milton’s angels are not Aquinas’s disembodied spirits; their substance, like the mode of reason, 
differs from man’s ‘but in degree, of kind the same’” (Fallon 142).  That Milton often uses tropes 
of vegetables and fruits, perhaps most frequently among the gardening tropes in Paradise Lost, is 
not uncommon to remark; many scholars have discussed Milton’s use of vegetation metaphors—
as in the scenes when Adam and Eve discuss gardening and labor in Paradise in Paradise Lost as 
well as the tropes of farming and seasonal changes in Paradise Regained—in order to reveal the 
                                                 
175 “But more refined, more spirituous, and pure,/ As nearer to him placed or nearer tending/ Each in their 
several active spheres assigned,/ Till body up to spirit work, in bounds/ Proportioned to each kind” (V. 475-79). 
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religious undertones of Milton’s articulations of literature as the vehicle of religious 
transformation and the subsequent elevation of human kind.  
Karen L. Edwards, in Milton and the Natural World, provides numerous insightful 
examinations of Milton’s understanding of the new knowledge of the world fostered by the 
advent of science, and I also find her inclusion of Hooke intriguing: 
Hooke’s praise of “a new visible world” in the preface to Micrographia is often 
taken to herald the experimentalists’ belief that to see is to know, a belief that led 
ultimately to what David Michael Levin has called the “hegemony of vision.” But 
Hooke’s praise of optic lenses does not make an easy equation between seeing 
and knowing. He acknowledges that that which is seen must be interpreted. To 
see a structure does not allow direct access to knowing any more than reading 
words does, for the interpreting mind must represent what it sees. (80) 
Edwards follows her reading with a passage from Hooke’s Micrographia in which Hooke 
discloses that even though he wants to show the “true appearance” of various objects, he feels 
the need to provide an additional interpretive step to produce a “plain representation” of them.176 
But notice how the microscopic view makes it rather more challenging for Hooke to find that one 
“true appearance”: 
I never began to make any draught before by many examinations in several lights, 
and in several position to those lights, I had discover’d the true form. For it is 
exceeding difficult in some objects, to distinguish between a prominency and a 
                                                 
176 Hooke, The Preface, Micrographia. sig.F2v. The discrepancy between what one sees and what one 
represents—draws or describes--is inevitable regardless of how “plain” the representation can get: “[T]he Gravers 
have pretty well follow’d my directions and draughts; and that in making of them, I indeavoured (as far as I was 
able) first to discover the true appearance, and next to make a plain representation of it. This I mention the rather, 
because of these kind of Objects there is much more difficulty to discover the true shape, then of those visible to the 
naked eye, the same object seeming quite differeing, in one position to the Light, from what it really is, and may be 
discover’d in another.”  
116 
depression, between a shadow and a black stain, or a reflection and a whiteness in 
the colour. Besides, the transparency of most objects renders them yet much more 
difficult then if they were opacous.177 
As Edwards explains, it is hard to determine the extent to which Milton was influenced by the 
new knowledge of the world provided by experimental science. Even though Milton no longer 
had sight to read or see the microscopic details of a flea or a plant such as rhubarb, Milton’s 
“reformed mode of natural analogy,” as Edwards calls it, is worth examining here because my 
discussion of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century poets’ use of figurative language will ultimately 
reveal that the discoveries of scientific knowledge of the time advanced not just the abstract, 
objective, and empiricist understanding about the world, but also that these scientific discoveries 
promoted the legitimacy and expediency of turning poetic representation into day-to-day tropes 
about economic and social exchanges such as farming or gardening, and even more importantly, 
making tropes about religious enlightenment as real and literal as natural phenomena and 
conditions.  
Through his description of the purpose of the microscope, Hooke argues that the world 
will become better-known through the mechanical aid of the device; thus he strives to “promote 
the use of mechanical helps for the senses, both in surveying the already visible world and for the 
discovery of many others hitherto unknown, and to make us, with the great conqueror, to be 
affected that we have not yet overcome one world when there are so many others to be 
discovered, every considerable improvement of telescopes or microscopes producing new worlds 
and Terra-Incognitas to our view.”178 That blindness forced Milton to adapt virtually the process 
Hooke describes as a new, exciting direction available to the enlightenment is worth pointing out 
                                                 
177 Hooke, The Preface, Micrographia. sig.F2v. 
178 Hooke, sig. D2v. 
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here. Seeing, in both a material and immaterial sense, becomes real with Milton and Hooke. 
Seeing directly leads the observer to discovery and knowledge, thanks to the very basic tenet of 
delivering “terra-incognita” into “our view.” Seeing what was invisible, and not being concerned 
in what sense an object was invisible at that moment to the naked eye, was never Milton’s loss 
when he lost his vision; at least, that was Milton’s belief, and Paradise Lost is there to show his 
possession of spiritual vision, more even to prove his spiritual gain. Milton might have lost his 
capacity to see what was visible to his naked eye, but not to see what was visible to his inner or 
spiritual eye. Hooke almost believes that the microscope offers the similar kind of revelation, 
seeing what was invisible through the distortion of the visible. Seeing “terra incognita” or the 
darkness first—the obliteration of what is visible to the naked eye to get to the point of seeing 
again—before seeing “new worlds” is inevitable for both Hooke’s microscopic and Milton’s 
spiritual seeing.  
Milton’s tropes involving attributes of plants and animals perform a specific role of 
signification in his works; understanding how a plant grows into a tree or produces a fruit helps 
us understand Milton’s poetic and religious anticipation for the world that he desires to see in the 
future, presented in both Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained. Seeing is indeed the mind’s 
work for the blind poet. Milton’s faith and anticipation for religious reformation and poetic 
innovation should remind us of the labor required for a pious believer who seeks God’s truth. 
Anticipation is critical—it not only exhibits the degree of faith but also postulates time and place 
in the future tense. It is clear that Paradise Lost is envisioned by a poet who looks forward to 
seeing the Paradise to come; this wishful tone is in the experience of reading the text as if 
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different color hues are perceived by the degree of various shades.179 Through Paradise Lost 
Milton conveys the faithful believers’ aspiration for the Paradise to which they will someday 
return. The narrative about a heavenly place once promised but now lost always has a universal 
appeal, especially embodying the emblem of loss and promise of heaven altogether. Even though 
the tone of repentance and anguish continues throughout the text, Paradise Lost also leaves 
readers wondering what the future will be, inspiring them to look forward into the future, not 
look back into the past. The tense of Paradise Lost is in the past, but the readers are already 
looking into the future, aspiring to regain what has been lost. Paradise Lost teaches its readers 
how to anticipate in and wish for something that is invisible and absent in their present, physical 
realm; the physical eye can’t accomplish this learning task. 
Trivial things—such as a rhubarb—become significant in Milton’s works because the 
small, powerless objects become the symbol of growth and change that are immanent of greater 
aspirations. Additionally, time, as with Milton’s life-long political project, must take its course to 
make something small and insignificant into something life- and history-changing. Looking 
backward is an integral part of looking forward, as microscopic looking in and macroscopic 
looking out define each other. For instance, in Areopagitica (1644), Milton argues that a nation’s 
cultural sophistication is defined by its “subtle and sinewy” rhetoric: “a Nation not slow and dull, 
but of a quick, ingenious, and piercing spirit; acute to invent, suttle and sinewy to discours, not 
beneath the reach of any point the highest that human capacity can soar to.”180 Again, pay 
attention to the conceptual movement and direction of the adjectives that Milton carefully lists 
                                                 
179 The hope is felt, not read—I will explore this idea more fully later in my discussion of the Augustinian 
theory of illumination and intelligent order and the difference between and co-existence of wisdom (sapientia) and 
knowledge (scientia). 
180 John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech of Mr. John Milton, for the Liberty of Unlicens'd Printing, to the 
Parliament of England. The passage quoted comes from Complete Prose Works of John Milton, Vol. II 1643-1648, 
Ed. Ernest Sirluck, 551. 
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above—slow, low, and dull to fast, high, and sharp.181 Milton’s phrase “subtle and sinewy” 
reinforces the idea that the invisible but subtle, abstract ideas are a living part of bigger, sharp, 
and tangible voices that move the readers to take an action; again, writing—writing poetry, more 
specifically—in this sense must go somewhere higher and larger than its printed page; when the 
sentence ends, its idea should live on and continue to work outside the text. With or without the 
microscopic information of the structure of the world, with or without the articulation of how the 
world exists through the aid of science and mechanical advancements, poetic representation finds 
a way to represent the world through mirroring and projecting, beyond the limitations as well as 
the expectations of scale or detail. Understanding the metaphoric relationships that exist in nature 
might be more delightful and instructive than looking through a microscope to find out what the 
naked eyes cannot see. 
Seeing represents the faith beyond reason or belief for both Hooke and Milton. The 
unmoving will to focus and zoom in to find the light of enlightenment is undeniably paramount 
in the process of Milton’s looking forward to the regaining of Paradise and Hooke’s looking in to 
unveil “terra incognita.” Hooke makes an intriguing statement about opacity and transparency:  
“[T]he transparency of most objects renders them yet much more difficult then if they were 
opacous.”182  Milton uses the same word “opacous” in describing the nebulosity of the Earth, and 
Adam, in Book VIII of Paradise Lost, seems to be suspicious about the Ptolemaic idea of the sun 
revolving around the earth, asking Raphael about celestial orders and motions: 
 When I behold this goodly frame, this world 
 Of heav’n and Earth consisting, and compute  
                                                 
181 For Milton, it seems to me, it is immoral to take time and space if there were no change or anticipation 
of change to come. We will revisit the issue of time when I discuss how Adam and Eve disagree about their idea of 
how to spend time. The word “spend” here however is polarizing. 
182 Hooke, The Preface, Micrographia, sig. F2v. 
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 Their magnitudes, this Earth a spot, a grain,  
 An atom, with the firmament compared 
 And all her numbered stars, that seem to roll 
Spaces incomprehensible (for such 
Their distance argues and their swift return  
Diurnal) merely to officiate light 
Round this opacous Earth, this punctual spot 
One day and night, in all their vast survey 
Useless besides, reasoning I oft admire 
How nature wise and frugal could commit 
Such disproportions with superfluous hand (VIII. 15-27) 
Milton’s use of the word “officiate” is also noteworthy. The ambiguous micro- and macro-scopic 
implications of Milton’s and Hooke’s use of the word “opaque” reveal perhaps different but 
similar views of the way seeing aided their believing. Milton is obscured and veiled by the 
opaque sheen that prohibits him from seeing the Sun through his physical eye; he embodies the 
opaque body itself, the blinded, veiled orbit, the earth to be looked in, examined and tested, and 
protected and renewed by God, the sun. Note that the opacity here is not with God but covering 
over the object of examination; the opacity obscures the object’s—Milton’s--view of the sun, or 
God. And God is ubiquitous, but our certain corporeal circumstances make it difficult to see 
Him. Adam is both suspicious and inspired by the “opacous” sheen that creates distortions and 
disproportions and is part of “nature wise,” which is also created by God. In this sense, Milton 
implies the challenge he feels in seeing both physically and spiritually since the loss of his 
physical sight. This vexing irregularity and irrationality exhibited in nature is the proof of God’s 
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work and His existence, as the poet must confront and embrace the similar challenges of absent 
physical sight and a shielded view of the physical world. The poet not only embodies the blinded 
eyeball, but his blindness to the outside world also makes him compare himself to “the opacous 
Earth” after the Fall, as the poet calls the earth “this punctual spot” waiting to be found and 
saved by that warm benevolent force far away and above. When Milton compares the earth and 
himself to the “punctual spot,” it is clear that he faithfully anticipates the salvation and the return 
of Paradise; being punctual and remaining hopeful in the face of darkness requires a practice of 
patience and firm faith. The poet represents a persistent believer who patiently waits for the sun 
to shine through the poet’s obscured world and help him see beyond his own obstacles and 
ambiguities. That Adam wonders “how nature wise and frugal could commit such 
disproportions” suggests that the poet is suspicious of the Ptolemaic system, but more 
importantly, this insight signifies that the poet, like the night waiting for the daybreak, is so 
anxious to be found and shone upon by God’s warm light, soon and persistently, that he wonders 
why he doesn’t just circle around the sun, immediately and eternally, so that he can always be in 
the presence of such light. But this endless light without darkness will ruin all the grain and 
eventually burn up everything, including the poet. Seeing too much, all at once and permanently, 
has its fatal consequences, and the poet’s blindness allows his experience of being unveiled to be 
even more illuminating.  
When Hooke looks through the microscope at the fly’s wings, he is faced with multiple 
layers of transparent surfaces, which makes the process of looking through each and focusing 
upon a specific plane difficult. Hooke’s statement that “the transparency of most objects renders 
them yet much more difficult then if they were opacous” ironically echoes with Milton’s both 
frustration and admiration of the ambiguous ways Nature, God’s creation, works; abundance and 
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clarity often do not go well together. There are perhaps too many transparent layers, too much to 
see and understand at once, so that the abundance of the information available at the eyepiece of 
the microscope is perhaps not an ideal situation for a scientist after all. As Hooke says, opacity 
confronts him with challenges, but they are challenges that enable and anticipate solutions and 
rewards. Perhaps science, religion, and poetry all agree on the slowly realized but certainly 
existing value of opacity reigning over the immediate and easily visible value of transparency. 
Hooke is aware of the microscope’s potential danger to enhance the technological and 
mechanical abandonment of spiritual sight as he tirelessly tries to connect spirituality with the 
microscopic view of the world. In Milton’s description of “opacous Earth,” the poet is the one 
being looked at, being examined and signified by God, but Hooke’s objects cannot possess, or, 
more importantly, cannot unveil, the human qualities of anguish, anticipation, and aspiration. In 
his experiment, Hooke plays the part of the examiner who reigns over and looks at the minute 
things from the “opacous Earth.” Adam’s macroscopic view of looking out to the 
incomprehensible frame of the celestial world is juxtaposed with the blind poet’s microscopic 
view of the world that offers him a self-examining look into his imagined world in Paradise 
Lost, and this self-reflective, microscopic look into oneself concedes a self-expanding 
transformation that guarantees any kind of imperfection or hardship—even including the poet’s 
blindness—that is part of God’s design.183 Thus with Milton, opacity is not projected; it is not 
away from or outside the poet, but within. Therefore, the poet tries to understand and see the 
universe through the less-than-perfect, opaque lens within while the microscope rather tries to 
remove it (though the scientist does see the importance and necessity of opacity). 
                                                 
183 To state the obvious, but self-reflection is an integral part of understanding God; one must know himself 
first to know God. 
123 
Hooke’s desire to access and then interpret “terra incognita” signifies an empiricist quest 
for conquering, the sort of reductionist approach to obtaining new knowledge for which science 
has often been criticized. If Hooke wants to illuminate as much as possible through his 
mechanical device, Milton wants to reflect as much as he believes through his poetic device. 
Notice the fundamental fissure between Milton’s seeing rooted in imagination and Hooke’s 
seeing anchored to evidence. Milton’s approach to his articulation of the universe, whether 
influenced by the new scientific knowledge or not, still protects the domain of mystery and 
opacity. The zooming in, illuminating power of the microscope works against the very core of 
the mimetic process of poetry, which entails expansion through imitation. Even more, 
illumination is not about the light within oneself, but about giving light to something, 
someone.184 The word “illumination” always signifies the source of light outside itself, the light 
being thrown to something that makes something appear more than obvious. The microscopic 
illumination of the object might reveal some material interior of the object, but it cannot reveal 
the intellectual or spiritual presence within. The definitions of the word “illuminate” provided in 
the OED clearly reveal the transitive verb function of this word, taking one or two objects to 
complete its action. The act of illuminating always requires the one that illuminates the other. To 
put a light on something is to make something show, and it is indeed a passive revelation, or, to 
be exact, not a revelation at all. What Milton then tries to accomplish, by avoiding the empirical 
approach of uncovering mysteries by illuminating lights on them and zooming in, is a reflection 
upon his own doubts and uncertainties as he slowly but surely comes to a better understating of 
the mysteries he hasn’t seen through his physical eyes. This again supports why Milton imagines 
                                                 
184 According to OED, the word comes from the Latin participial stem of “illūmināre,” which means “to 
throw light on, light up, brighten, set in a clear light, make illustrious”; also it means “to baptize, to kindle, to paint 
or limn in colours” in medieval Latin. As transitive verb, “illuminate” signifies “to light up; give light to” (OED 
1.a). 
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“the mind through all her powers/ Irradiate” and desires to “there plant eyes” as he pleads for the 
spiritual eye in Book III of Paradise Lost; only the spiritual light that “shine[s] inward” can 
guide us to see the “things invisible to mortal sight” and to “purge and disperse” falsehood from 
truth (III. 51-52, 55).185 
The OED entry also offers a useful example of “illuminate” from Paradise Lost, 
including the lines from Book VII where Raphael describes God’s creation of light:  
  And God made two great Lights, great for thir use 
  To Man, the greater to have rule by Day, 
 The less by Night alterne: and made the Starrs, 
  And set them in the Firmament of Heav'n 
  To illuminate the Earth, and rule the Day  
 In thir vicissitude, and rule the Night, 
 And Light from Darkness to divide. (VII. 346-52) 
This is not a kind of light that penetrates and blinds, but by degree and gradation it creates its 
own significance. Darkness exists on the earth as the lack or disappearance of the day, the 
specific time and space that is called “night.” This is a light that gives and creates, even in its 
absence.186 The microscopic zeroing-in process involves a different kind of illumination, willed 
by a mechanistic claim that probably can more fittingly be paired with a Hobbesian mechanism 
that believes that the extension of the material machine is as far as the mind can and ever will be 
extended. In Paradise Lost, especially in the conversation between Adam and Raphael, Milton 
                                                 
185 This passage (III. 51-55) from Paradise Lost is one of the main inspirations for this dissertation. 
186 The example from Paradise Lost I included above appears in the first list of definitions of “illuminate” 
as a transitive verb in OED (1.a). Even though the sense of pervasiveness and exteriority—the light that shines upon 
and takes an object to shine its light on—is also inevitable, the sense of giving and regenerative light is more 
prevalent in those lines from Paradise Lost. The light shone through a microscope however delivers a different kind 
of illumination. 
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clearly eschews any metaphysical idea that suggests the limitation of free will—not just for 
human beings, but for any living thing, such as vegetables and angels. Any living thing has a 
potential to learn and grow—to “shine inward,” “irradiate,” “purge and disperse,” and to “see 
and tell/ Of things invisible to mortal sight” (III. 52-55).  
Adam in the above lines from Book VIII expresses his doubt of the efficiency of divine 
creation. He acknowledges the world containing both heaven and earth as a constructed, material 
existence when he calls it a “goodly frame” (VIII. 15).  When Adam tries to perceive the 
physical size and distance of the geocentric celestial sphere that God designed, he is trying to 
“compute their magnitudes” (16-17).  The earth is a physically small place compared to the 
incomprehensible size of other celestial entities, as is seen when we review the signifiers he uses 
to describe the earth: “this earth a spot,” “a grain,” “an atom with the firmament,” and “all her 
[earth’s] numbered stars” (17-19). Note how the verbs describing Adam’s action change to 
reveal different cognitive processes occurring in these lines; at first Adam “beholds” the frame of 
the world—he looks, observes, and then he perceives. This act of “beholding” is both active and 
passive for Adam; as he looks at/perceives/conceives the idea of what he is looking at, he 
imagines the object he is observing —the goodly frame, the stars, and even God—
simultaneously looking back at him, creating a concurrent reciprocal relationship between the 
object and the observer. The word “behold” also appears in Book IX of Paradise Lost: “How 
shall I behold the face/ Henceforth of God or Angel, earst with joy/ And rapture so oft beheld?” 
(IX. 1080-82). The OED suggests that “behold” here is used to signify an action involving 
human perception: “to hold or keep in view, to watch; to regard or contemplate with the eyes; to 
look upon, look at (implying active voluntary exercise of the faculty of vision)” (I. 7. a). On the 
other hand, the stars are “numbered” but they still “seem to roll spaces incomprehensible”—note 
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that the “spaces” that are “incomprehensible” signify both the atomist materialist world and the 
spiritual world, both worlds making it difficult for Adam to comprehend the divine "frame" of 
the world. It is a "goodly" frame, but impossible to be comprehended by human scales and 
perception. In his discussion of Hobbes and Milton, Fallon suspects that “simple diametrical 
opposition thus does not suffice as a description of the relationship between Milton and Hobbes” 
and argues that when most of Milton’s contemporaries supported incorporeal substance to fence 
off Hobbes’ mechanist materialism, “Milton’s opposition to him took another form, one that 
adopted an assumption shared by Hobbes and the new science: the materiality of all entities. It is 
against this common background that Milton’s opposition to Hobbes must be viewed, for the 
similarities make Milton’s ultimate repudiation of him more significant” (130).187 The certainty 
or lucidity of the material existence doesn’t signal the spiritual existence for Milton; however, 
the opacity of the material existence requires the need for spiritual abundance. The machine 
doesn’t run because it has been running; nor does it need an external force to get it running. It 
runs because of the inner will that initiated its movement. The body cannot move without its 
spirit, and the spirit has nothing to show or prove its moving, material existence. 
Adam’s description of the earth is redolent of Hooke’s microscopic view of his small 
objects, looking from a distance necessary for the observer and the lens to position and observe 
the target object. Ironically, though one be microscopic and the other macroscopic, both Hooke 
                                                 
187 Fallon argues that even though various critics try to explain Milton’s ambiguous view on science by 
pointing to “Milton’s Baconian enthusiasm in the ‘Third Prolusion’ and to the eager commendation of scientific 
endeavor in the ‘Seventh Prolusion’” and by contrasting those examples with Milton’s reticence toward astronomy 
in Paradise Lost and his criticism against showy but futile knowledge in Paradise Regained (135). Fallon explains 
that those opinions derive from the assumption that Milton disagrees with the new science “only because it is not 
congruent with the wisdom of the past” (135). On the other hand, Fallon suggests, Milton’s apathetic reaction to the 
new science, especially starting from the 1640s, is based on “rational and not merely nostalgic grounds” and that we 
should notice how “Milton did not wholeheartedly support a project that eagerly co-opted the metaphysics of 
Descartes,” as Milton “fundamentally opposed the separate existence of an aspiritual material universe, which was 
the laboratory of the new philosophy” (135).   
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and Milton show their concern and even obsession with the potential view that can be induced 
from looking in, for the movement is toward the object, not the vast structure that holds the 
content; in other words, when Adam says, “when I behold this goodly frame,” he has already 
moved onto questioning the content and function of the “goodly frame.” The adjective “goodly” 
could express the quality of good appearance and of well-proportioned as well as something that 
is “notable in respect of size, quantity, or number,” as the OED suggests, but what I would like to 
point out here is that the adjective “goodly” does focus on the frame of things, the appearance of 
things, or the exterior holding and assuming the interior. Adam indeed expounds that the frame 
of God’s creation, the world itself as it appears to him, looks good enough as far as appearance is 
concerned. Now, the real question is whether the good appearance of something means 
something is really good. Granted, this is the most basic and frequent question asked regarding 
appearance and reality, but my analysis of this particular passage shows Adam’s quandary about 
the discrepancies between what he sees—or what he doesn’t see—and the discrepancies between 
perception and truth.188  
How does a scientific observation conducted by humans, even with the mechanistic aid of 
scopes, observe, and even further, explain, what our sight cannot physically reach? The 
microscopic lenses can reach as far as they can, but what awaits after that? How do we believe 
                                                 
188 The OED definitions of the word “goodly” emphasize the outwardly, material appearance: “Of good or 
pleasing appearance; handsome, beautiful, good-looking; comely, fair” (1.a) or “notable in respect of size, quantity, 
or number; fairly large, sizeable” (5). The phrase “this goodly frame” appears in Shakespeare’s Hamlet (II. 2. 298). 
Hamlet compares his pretended appearance to the “goodly frame, the earth” where happy pedestrian life seems to 
obscure or forget the tragedies and disasters that occur day to day on the earth: “[W]herefore I know not—lost all 
my mirth, foregone all/ custom of exercises; and indeed it goes so heavily with/ my disposition, that this goodly 
frame, the earth,/ seems to me a sterile promontory; this almost excellent/ canopy, the air, look you, this brave 
o’erhanging/ firmament, this majestical roof fretted with golden fire,/ why, it appeareth nothing to me but a foul and 
pestilent/ congregation of vapors” (II. 2. 296-303). By comparing his “disposition” and “goodly frame” to “a sterile 
promontory” and “a foul and pestilent congregation of vapors,” Hamlet suggests the discrepancy between how he 
performs to appear to the world outside him and what really goes on inside his mind that he has to conceal from the 
world. I am quoting from the second edition of The Riverside Shakespeare. See: The Riverside Shakespeare, 2nd ed. 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1997). 
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and rely on the knowledge gained through observation to define or deter something? When 
Adam sees the world and “beholds this goodly frame,” he confesses “something yet of doubt 
remains” (VIII. 13). Why do the heavenly bodies circle around the earth at unimaginable speeds 
when it is more “superfluous” for the earth to move? Why did nature “wise and frugal” commit 
“such disproportions,” wonders Adam (VIII. 26-27). These are the similar suspicions Cavendish 
raised against Hooke’s description of microscopic details of minute bodies: a microscopic view 
might gain us more variety of seeing the world, but what do we do with all the information? For 
Cavendish, the abundance of information from observation threatens the logical representation 
and understanding of the world and thus too much information was proven unnecessary and 
unproductive for human perception and knowledge of the world. But for Milton the observation 
itself, combined with the theological “frame” of the world, creates a logical fissure in human 
perceptive understanding of the world. Why is there such an illogical mistake as stars rolling 
around the earth when it should be the other way? If there is indeed a fissure in divine logic, then 
how do we resolve it? The comely looking “frame,” after all, can contain “such disproportions.” 
It is equally significant to note how Milton circumscribes the material limitation as the earth’s 
significance while the rest of the heavenly construction expands and blurs physical boundaries—
geometrical and material quantification—that define their scale and magnitude. That the earth’s 
opacity blocks itself away from the warmth and light of the sun echoes with the 
“incomprehensible” size, distance, and speed of stars and “spaces” (VIII. 20). Note that Adam 
says he tried to “compute” the world’s “magnitudes” to understand the “useless” operation of the 
stars rolling around the earth. Fallon also points out that during Milton’s time with the advent of 
the new science the “materiality (which allowed for observation, quantification, and 
measurement) increasingly became a leading test of reality or existence. Proponents of active 
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incorporeal substance, by definition imperceptible, scrambled to provide empirical evidence of 
the activity of that substance” (134). Measuring units became more and more articulate and 
expressive in defining the materiality of both heavenly and earthly worlds. In Paradise Lost  
Adam wants to measure a qualitative entity using a quantitative and mathematical reckoning 
even though he simultaneously notes that it will be impossible to measure and understand 
“spaces incomprehensible” because the earth can only be measured by being compared to such 
physical and material entities as “a spot, grain,/ An atom with the firmament” (VIII. 17-8). 
Meanwhile, even though humans “numbered” stars and announced that they “seem to roll,” since 
the “spaces” the “goodly frame” holds together inside are incomprehensible, how far the stars 
“roll” and thus how “swift” the stars “roll” are impossible to be computed. The things 
comparable are the things comprehensible; the things with material weight and scale are the 
things that Adam can see as well as understand. In Adam’s doubtful inquiries, we spot the poet’s 
subtle articulation of how the conventional frame of the celestial world constrains and 
manipulates the human logic.  
Perhaps then it is more than human logic, perhaps something more like a poetic 
imagination that Milton suggests might help us understand such inconsistent and illogical design. 
The “incomprehensible” problem that cannot be solved by computing should naturally be dealt 
with through a means that is beyond logical and measurable material means. However, Milton’s 
monist animist materialism doesn’t just deny everything “material”—what Milton offers is the 
combination of the two opposites, not the complete denial or obliteration of the other. The 
illogical, inarticulate, and immaterial something is in and with the logical and measurable 
material means.  
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4.2 Augustine’s Visual Metaphor and Spiritual Seeing 
 That Milton’s attention to inner or spiritual vision appears related to Saint Augustine has 
been widely remarked, and at this point I would like to introduce Augustine into my discussion 
to supplement my earlier descriptions of Sidney’s “inward light” (indeed, Augustine’s writings 
would have been familiar to the superbly well-read Seidney, as well).  In “Vision: The Eye of the 
Body and the Eye of the Mind in Saint Augustine’s ‘De Trinitate’ and ‘Confessions,’” Margaret 
Miles examines Augustine’s use of visual metaphor and argues that “the metaphor of physical 
vision constitutes the leitmotiv throughout Augustine’s many accounts of spiritual vision” (126). 
Augustine compares an act of seeing to knowing, and, as Miles astutely points out, “it is a 
metaphor which enables Augustine to distinguish internal spiritual things more subtly and to 
describe them more easily” (126). Augustine’s metaphor of the “eyes of our hearts, with which 
God may be seen” (Sermons 88. 5) not only emphasizes the distance between the material and 
immaterial entity, but it also links the physical eye as a constituent part of the spiritual eye, and 
this congruency between a material and immaterial entity enables men to see “That which is” 
(Confessions 7.17. 23).189 To see the truth, one must feel the truth through one’s heart, Augustine 
suggests, so that physical vision is the vehicle that connects the concept with the observer or 
receiver of the sensation, just as metaphors work by acknowledging the distance between the 
image and the word. The distance between the object and the articulation point—the distance to 
the observer’s eye or the brain that receives the image and interprets the distance between the 
thing itself and the means to articulate or delineate it—also makes necessary the human effort to 
                                                 
189 Sermons on the New Testament 51-94, translated by Edmund Hill, 422 ; The Confessions of Saint 
Augustine, translated with an introduction and notes by E. B. Pusey, 152. Various translations of St. Augustine’s 
Confessions are available, including E. B. Pusey’s 1950 translation, which I use for my study. For different 
translations, see: Confessions of St. Augustine, translated by F. J. Sheed (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1943); also, 
Confessions, translated with an introduction and notes by Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991). 
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grasp the distance and cancel it, as Miles writes: “Augustine’s model of physical vision 
underlines and supports his description of the necessity of human effort, concentration, and 
training” (126). As I have argued earlier, this human effort is present in both the activities of 
Hooke’s observational science and Milton’s poetic rendering of the Paradise as it is imagined, 
but only the blind poet’s epistemological ambivalence suggests that the distance between the 
viewer and the object is paramount in every act of seeing and knowing—and, furthermore, 
believing.  
That “human effort, concentration, and training” to believe in something, even when that 
something is invisible to the physical eye, might be why Adam, in Paradise Lost, says “the 
sedentary earth/ That better might with far less compass move,/ Served by more noble than 
herself, attains/ Her end without least motion, and receives/ As attribute such a sumless journey 
brought/ Of incorporeal speed, her warmth and light” (VIII. 32-37). He thinks that the 
heliocentric system is less efficient—certainly it is not self-sufficient and not self-initiated for the 
earth—than a geocentric system.  Though the earth and its tenant, Adam, might be placed in the 
center of the universe to receive the warmth and light from the sun, this center is nothing but a 
passive object, the “sedentary” receiver as Milton describes it, sitting and resting, exercising no 
self-motivation or will to be the active participant in the process of distributing warmth and light 
for themselves. Indeed, the warmth and light come from the sun—and alternately, from God for 
Adam—and there must be a hierarchy—as one must be the source generating warmth and light 
to share and give them to the other, but Adam suggests a more active involvement and, most 
importantly, service that he can offer. This service I mention here is paramount in the process of 
believing, especially believing in something that is so powerful that seeing it is as blinding as not 
being able to see God in His physical presence though the human eye. Through Adam’s doubtful 
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speech about the geocentric system, we hear the blind poet’s reasoning that the service one must 
offer to receive the warmth and light is logical and just. Furthermore, this reasoning offers 
Milton the reassurance that the magnitude of the outcome of his service might be higher and 
bigger than those without hardships that might challenge or obstruct the sight of God. I cannot 
stress this point more; any believers who seek the light of God should feel as if they are trapped 
in the darkness so they feel, as Miles asserts, “the necessity of human effort, concentration, and 
training” (Miles 126), and therefore willingly reach out to find the light and warmth from God. 
By sitting, as Adam argues, one only receives but never participates. Thus Adam complains that 
this “sedentary” position for the earth and himself “commit[s] such disproportions with 
superfluous hand” (VIII. 26-27) that it proves wasteful of not only the potential warmth and light 
we can receive from God but also all the greater things “many nobler bodies to create” (VIII. 
28). To act upon our will to seek after God is not only logical because it is most efficient and 
rewarding for both the source of light and the one seeking the light, but also because the harder 
one desires and seeks out to see God, the brighter his glory will shine. 
And this glorious effulgence involves a kind of interior enlightenment that brightens a 
man from inside out, not illuminating by shining the light upon him. The light and warmth are 
born and radiate from a man’s interior to his exterior; here, the man’s interiority becomes a 
direct, physical reflection of God’s warmth and light. But how does a man reflect or embody the 
divine light? To be clear, how does a man metaphorically communicate the warmth and light the 
sun provides, which is compared to the warmth and light God embodies? Through “human 
effort, concentration, and training” a man worships God, overcoming worldly obstacles and 
challenges, and this training can give the believer the mind’s inner eye that allows him to 
perceive and communicate the divine light rather directly and immediately, through himself. 
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Exteriority then plays a very small part in embodying the divine light, as embodying the divine 
light involves the interiority of a man. Since he is not illuminated by the external source of light, 
he is self-sufficient through his interiority.  In Art and the Christian Intelligence in St. Augustine, 
Robert J. O’Connell, S.J., writes that it is “impatience” that leads one to occupy the outer, the 
physical things that mediate and communicate the inner knowledge:  
It is far from clear that Augustine ever explored this phenomenon on its own 
terms: too often, he treats it as a corollary drawn from his epistemological 
conception that sets up an antithetic relationship between the operations of sense 
and intellect. Sense, he tends to think, apprehends the visible, sensible symbol; 
only the mind can attain to vision of the invisible reality that is symbolized. The 
visible sun may furnish a symbolic image of the divine intelligible Sun; the 
audible word or visible gesture may function as an exterior sign conveying—more 
or less trustily—knowledge of some inner personal conception, intention, or 
attitude. (40) 
Anticipation and patience can be associated with the opposition of science and religion.  
According to Svedsen’s Milton and Science, "there could be no absolute issues between 
science and religion, though he [Milton] knew the appeal of that quarrel for others," and thus 
Milton was only remotely interested in the debates of cosmological theories (44). Svedsen 
suggests that Milton was aware of the rivaling ideas about the universe available to him, but for 
Milton the "conviction of man's moral responsibility in a theocentric universe outweighed 
everything else" (44). Svedsen points out that Milton’s description of the celestial system is 
rather “descriptive” than “technical” and thus reveals either “his ignorance of up-to-date 
astronomy or his disinclination to shift emphasis away from man” (45). That Milton knew less 
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about or paid little attention to some of the fashionable or controversial theories of the spheres 
kept him away from “committing his poem to controversy” (45).  Milton’s intention with 
Paradise Lost was to compose a world of harmony, “the correlation between physical and moral 
other, the true and final harmony of the spheres” (44). Thus, Milton deliberately puts his 
judgment about particular facts or ideas concerning the universe in abeyance so that he can focus 
solely on his poetic articulation.  
More importantly, Milton was aware of the conflicting ideas concerning the structure and 
operation of the universe, but he had a different agenda on his mind other than figuring out plain 
facts. Facts weren’t the most critical concern in his poetic works. Poetry for Milton remained 
poetically hermetic and self-sustained. Raphael’s comparison of the structure of the universe to a 
plant in Book 5 of Paradise Lost induces a logical question against the encyclopedic classical 
and medieval understanding of the universe—in that traditional view of the universe, the Great 
Chain of Being is static; Karen L. Edwards also argues in Milton and the Natural World that the 
depiction of Raphael’s belief shows Milton’s unconventional view of the structure of the 
universe as she writes: “[T]his dynamic scale of being has important consequences for Milton’s 
political and theological views” (Edwards 125).  This “dynamic” view of the structure of the 
universe reveals that Milton believed in a kinetic universe through which the souls could ascend 
if they worked hard to get closer to God—as plants will grow closer to the sun. She further 
examines Adam’s response to Raphael’s plant metaphor and the placement of scale in this 
“dynamic scale of being” in Book 5 of Paradise Lost: “The scale of nature set/ From center to 
circumference whereon / In contemplation of created things/ By steps we may ascend to God” 
(V. 509-12). Perhaps the obvious idea (that I myself struggled with for a long time) we should 
acknowledge here is that the scale being mentioned here is no longer a ladder. The movement is 
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not from the lower to higher, but from one horizon to the other, and in this sphere Adam 
imagines the scale is differentiated by the distance from the center. The fundamental concept of 
movement changes, no longer only about elevation but also about expansion. This is a sonic and 
symphonic growth, expanding horizontally and growing vertically--one can ascend to God as the 
plants can grow taller and closer to the sun. Furthermore, as Adam describes, there is a 
degradation between the scales, but where the center resides is unclear. Where do the steps 
ascend? Is it we who stand in the center and ascend toward the outside of the circumference? Or 
does God exist in the center and we ascend toward the center? And what are the implications of 
shifting the content of the center? What does the placement of our being and His being suggest 
about the celestial world and its mechanics, its operation? Does the kinetic scale of the universe 
then pose a threat to or buttress the conventional understanding of God’s position and our 
relation to God? But most importantly, how does this fit into the Platonic hierarchy of being or 
Augustinian order of being?  
It is still hard to see that Adam’s doubts and questions about God’s construction of the 
universe demonstrate Milton’s skepticism about experimental science. Svedsen observes:    
In Paradise Lost, Milton repeatedly moves from circumference to center, 
retracing through stock images the arcs of focus upon earth and man. And it is a 
two-way passage. Satan and Adam are centers from which radiate the flow of 
imagination, as when Adam and Eve contemplate the heavens and pray or Satan 
apostrophizes the sun after he has flung himself from its sphere to the top of 
Mount Niphates. No other poem is more explicit as to place; in Heaven, Hell, 
earth or chaos, the reader of Paradise Lost always sees things from a precise 
physical point of view and he always knows what it is. (45) 
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Svedsen’s emphasis on the idea of place is useful for my argument as well; assessing one’s place 
against the other’s—God’s—shifts the direction of our ascension. Knowing one’s own place or 
placement in relation to the higher or lower entities informs individuals of the difference, 
gradation, and depth between different matters because a single point of view that already 
assumes a perspective about the world can look up or down to find his or her significance in the 
universe. Therefore, though Milton doesn’t abandon the encyclopedic tradition of ascension and 
gradation, “the present exposition of the Miltonic universe works from circumference to center” 
(Svedsen 47). The nature Milton describes in Paradise Lost through Raphael’s analogy of the 
scale of being reveals the poet’s consent with the conventional Neoplatonic belief that 
differentiates living creatures by their movement. Svedsen explains that “Principles of order, 
gradation, and harmony are axiomatic in the encyclopedic view of natural science” (116) and 
thus that Milton’s treatment of things moving upward as professed through Raphael’s analogy of 
being shows “spiritual gradations are conveyed in the images of movement”(114). Indeed, to be 
near God is the ultimate goal at the end of this order. Milton uses the tropes of small and light 
things that possess more potential to be mobile, such as plants and insects, though these creatures 
are either rooted or sprung from the ground in Paradise Lost: 
 At once came forth whatever creeps the ground, 
 Insect or worm. Those waved their limber fans 
 For wings and smallest lineaments exact 
 In all the liveries decked of summer’s pride 
With spots of gold and purple, azure and green, 
These as a line their long dimension drew 
Streaking the ground with sinuous trace. Not all 
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Minims of nature: some of serpent kind  
Wondrous in length and corpulence involved 
Their snaky folds and added wings. (VII. 475-484) 
The gradation beginning with smallest and lowest is at work here. The insects come from the 
ground, and they flourish from and above the ground as the season changes. The insects are also 
powerful enough to leave marks on the ground, “streaking the ground with sinuous trace.”190 
Milton’s observation of insects and his use of their attributes postulate something larger and 
transformative to come, and his description of insects becomes more figurative as he focuses on 
what their attributes portend.   
Drawing upon Svedsen’s argument that Paradise Lost constantly moves back to the 
center “retracing through stock images” of earth and man (45), I also believe that Milton’s epic 
poem thus focuses on the movement of nostalgia, remembering the harmonious center that is 
now lost. However, I would further point out that the nostalgic movement in Paradise Lost is 
also a movement forward, not a movement backward—the movement trying to return to the 
center signifies the poet’s anticipation for God’s paradise to return. Perhaps this movement from 
“circumference to center” could suggest that man looks at the horizon but not at the sky above; it 
could also mean that God’s presence is radiating from the center, and man looks to the center 
where God is and moves toward Him. No matter how we try to interpret this movement, one 
thing is clear—the scales are still there, and so is the movement. It is only the direction that has 
changed. As the upward movement is now replaced by the horizontal movement, the potential 
for ascension is replaced by the potential of expansion, a tangential and imaginative movement 
rather than a scaling and logical one. Raphael’s dismissal of Adam’s doubts about the 
                                                 
190 This is also an example of modesty topos—Milton compares himself to an insect that leaves “subtle and 
sinewy” marks on the page. 
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heliocentric system doesn’t necessarily suggest Milton either contested or believed in one 
absolute cosmological theory. What Milton believes, however, is the power of anticipation and 
hope that induces movement and progression, whether it occurs vertically or horizontally.   
It is obvious, considering how much Milton produced as a political writer and how he 
anxiously delayed writing his epic poetry until later in the seventeenth century, that every 
symbolic gesture he makes with his words—specifically pointing at his colorful use of animal 
and plant analogies that frequently show up in his prose as well as poetry—should suggest the 
poet’s pronounced appetite for political and natural anatomy. That Milton knew the anatomies of 
a bee and an ant is appropriate to point out here. In her chapter “Rehabilitating the Political 
Animal,” Edwards discusses Milton’s use of insect tropes—a Royalist bee and a republican 
ant—and how Milton used animal tropes to re-appropriate “the ‘old’ natural history” into “an 
‘old’ political debate” (128).191 The attribute the poet understands and adds to the creatures in 
nature becomes the poetic value; it is not the truthful or factual value, but it is a poetic value that 
I am going to discuss further in this chapter. Poetic value, often quite distinct from the scientific 
value or literal value, provided a bridge to connect faith with epistemology, for, to Milton, a non-
literal observation of a natural phenomenon wasn’t entirely wrong, if it were seen through 
spiritual vision. And, though it seems almost too obvious to point out, in Milton’s case most 
things were seen through spiritual vision, especially as he increasingly lost his physical sight.  
How would a scientist like Hooke describe an ant or a bee if he could not see at all? 
Without his eyesight to look through his microscope, how would he produce his knowledge and 
believe in what he sees? And how does a poet, without his sight, draw the world out there 
beyond the reach of his sight, certainly enough to describe it with his words? How can Milton be 
                                                 
191 Karen Edwards, Milton and the Natural World.  
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certain enough to draw paradise that he has never seen through his eyes, but believe in it enough 
to write an epic poem containing twelve books about this place while under the scrutiny of 
political turmoil that could end not only his poetic but also political and religious career? 
Religious faith always demands a rehabilitation of scientific information. No 
phenomenon that nature reveals through a magnifying glass without any temperament of human 
anxiety and desire provides the satisfying or mortifying knowledge to inspire a man to believe in 
something so much he will endanger his own life and even the wellbeing of his community. 
Therefore, a spiritual man must believe nature does one thing to foreshadow or anticipate the 
other; and this analogy—and fallacy—works efficiently for both religion and poetry. The 
exactness in the truth provided through the scientist’s instrument is irrelevant and useless to a 
poet or a preacher unless such scientific fact can be reread and analyzed through a figurative 
lens. 192 It is indeed the writer at the end who has to make sense out of what he sees by 
describing it into words, as Hooke confesses, and the writer takes the role of both reader and 
writer, as he first observes what is in front of him before he writes about it. As much as a poet 
might interpret and reinterpret the information he observes from the world, his representation 
will also shape the way his readers learn the attribute that “a bee” is associated with the Royalists 
while “the parsimonious emmet” associated with the roundheads.193  Edwards describes this 
eminent fissure between the scientific knowledge and poetic reinterpretation of scientific 
knowledge as “the tension between the two epistemologies”: “[The tension] creates a complex 
representational problem for the Creation narrative in Paradise Lost” (128). Of course, the 
                                                 
192 In Chapter Seven “Rehabilitating the Political Animal,” Edwards refers to Catherine Wilson, who points 
out in her discussions of scientific observations of animal anatomy that microscopic information “was as 
impoverished in cultural terms as it was enriched in observational terms” (Wilson, The Invisible World, 212). 
193 Milton, Paradise Lost, Book VII, lines 484-89. “First Crept/ The parsimonious emmet, provident/ Of 
future, in small room large heart enclosed,/ Pattern of just equality perhaps/ Hearafter, joined in her popular tribes/ 
Of commonality.” 
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tension Edwards describes here is a kind of tension between political knowledge and scientific 
knowledge, but, going back once again to the point I made earlier about seeing and believing and 
the inscrutable role sight plays in the construction of personal and cultural epistemologies, this 
“tension between the two epistemologies” has existed since classical antiquity, involving the 
dualist figuration of material and immaterial realms as well as the dualist articulation of the 
world, as in Augustine’s ontology of spiritual and physical seeing. Fallon also describes the 
status of Milton’s ontologically-deprived evil while his material angels keep their ontological 
integrity as an “Augustinian ontology of evil” (169).194 
In Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye, Rudolph Arnheim writes 
that vision is not mere passive reception.  
The world of images does not simply imprint itself on a faithfully sensitive organ. 
Rather, in looking at an object, we reach out for it. With an invisible finger we 
move through the space around us, we go out to the distant places where things 
are found, touch them, catch them, scan their surfaces, trace their borders, explore 
their texture. It is eminently active occupation.195 
That seeing can immediately establish the tangible materiality of the object without touching it 
should recall my earlier argument that Milton’s blindness helps the poet to see what he believes 
without actually having seen what he believes in—the physical blindness is spiritual 
enlightenment from within, just as the immaterial is immediately material in monism. This is 
once again not an external light shed upon the poet, like the light coming through the 
                                                 
194 Stephen M. Fallon, Milton among Philosophers. 
195 Rudolph Arnheim, 43. In his influential work Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative 
Eye first published in 1954, Arnheim writes that human perception is immanently personal project and projection of 
personal partiality, intuition, and subjective articulation of personal preference. For this study, I am using the revised 
and expanded edition of 1974. 
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microscope, but the light that comes from within, that shines from inside and glows outside. This 
light is almost untraceable and immaterial, though it is perceived through the material eye and 
felt as a material sensation. The classical metaphor for seeing does emphasize the idea of 
distance, the material as well as conceptual difference between the word and idea. As Margaret 
Miles observes: “For classical people who originated the metaphor, sight was an accurate and 
fruitful metaphor for knowledge because they relied on the physics of vision, subscribed to by 
Plato and many others, that a ray of light, energized and projected by the mind toward an object, 
actually touches its object, thereby connecting viewer to the object” (127). Augustine writes in 
On The Trinity that “the nature of the intellectual mind is so formed as to see those things which, 
according to the disposition of the Creator, are subjoined to intelligible things in the natural 
order, in a sort of incorporeal light of its own kind, as the eye of the flesh sees the things that lie 
about it in his corporeal light, of which light it is made to be receptive and to which it is adapted” 
(XII. 15. 24).196  
Supposing that we use our bodily sensations to gain intelligence about the world, 
Augustine suggests that “the intellectual mind” occupies both the power of corporeal senses and 
incorporeal mind to sort through the “natural order” between man and God, and that man must 
use both physical and spiritual faculties to understand its relationship to God. Things that are 
readily visible to the corporeal eye are “subjoined to intelligible things in the natural order,” but 
one must use more than the corporeal eye to see and understand “intelligible things” that are 
higher in the natural order and “in a sort of incorporeal light of its own kind.” In Augustine’s 
hierarchical structure of our condition in relation to God, the human or corporeal reality exists at 
                                                 
196 De Trinitate or On the Trinity: Books 8-15, 101.  
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the low level and the creator at the top.197 Augustine’s epistemology locates man’s sensation at 
the bottom of the epistemological hierarchy, postulating that man can rise above his corporeal 
status by way of reasoning—using either wisdom (sapientia) or knowledge (scientia)—to the 
higher types of vision. Man, both corporeal and spiritual, possesses both body (rationes 
seminales) and soul (ratio hominis) and can perceive reality through both his senses and 
imagination, producing wisdom and knowledge. Wisdom (sapientia) represents the knowledge 
acquired through the superior reason, and the knowledge gained through the lower reason is 
called science or knowledge (scientia).  The unique ability to acquire and use sapientia or 
scientia sets man apart from other corporeal entities. Furthermore, epistemological knowledge 
exists to work antithetically against the hierarchy of being in Augustine’s theory of knowing. 
Man should be able to use more than his senses and apply imagination to achieve a spiritual 
understanding of reality, and even further, the intellectual level of eternal reasoning, equivalent 
to the eternal concepts in the mind of God. As Ronald Nash explains in The Light of Mind, 
sapientia and scientia differ in various respects since “science uses the method of investigation, 
but wisdom uses intuition” and “the end of scientia is action or accomplishment” (8). While 
scientia “enables man to harvest better crops, construct better buildings, or wage war more 
effectively,” the end of sapientia is contemplation. And even though, as Nash points out, “the 
                                                 
197   For more on the Platonic tradition in Augustinian theory of knowledge, see The Christian Philosophy 
of Saint Augustine by Etienne Gilson, and Ronald H. Nash’s The Light of Mind. Nash presents a simple yet useful 
diagram of Augustine’s theory of reason and knowledge and the relationship between them. The structure of reason 
and knowledge can be understood by two modes of understanding a being--ontology, “the downward way of 
becoming,” and epistemology, “the upward way of knowing.” In order to sustain or gain certain ontological status, 
one must go through the three different levels of reality: bodies (rationes seminales) in the bottom, souls (ratio 
hominis) in the middle, and God (rationes aeternae) on top. Epistemologically, man is equipped with senses 
(corporeal knowledge), but capable of using imagination (spiritual knowledge), and ultimately with practice and 
endeavor man should be able to achieve reason (intellection), which will lead him to the eternal knowledge of God, 
rationes aeternae. As Nash explains, Augustine’s structure of thought derives from the views of Plato and Plotinus 
about reality and how we perceive it. Such a “downward way of becoming” reflected a Platonic pattern of 
knowledge, while Augustine presents “his upward way of salvation” as the way to use knowledge and reason to 
“come closer to its ultimate goal, The One” (Nash 4-5). 
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preservation and sustaining of human life depends upon scientia,” it is sapientia that delivers 
man closer to the eternal knowledge of God: “Wisdom is superior in the sense that it is 
concerned with the acquisition of happiness and the ultimate goal of human existence” (8).  
Because I find something very congenial and important to my project in his description of 
philosophy, I return to Robert J. O’Connell: 
Philosophy, it has been said, begins in wonder. But all too often that wonder is 
interpreted as something verging on inquisitiveness: the spur of puzzlement that 
leads us to want to banish the darkness of ignorance or confusion, to inquire, to 
get to know and thus—apparently—eliminate the very wonder that gave inquiry 
birth. In other connections, our ignorance or confusion may be seen as touching 
on our thirst for satisfaction: we yearn to understand why we are unhappy, how 
we may attain to our restless heart’s desire. (167) 
This is the kind of light that requires the eye—or the mind—to work to see the truth. No 
“sedentary” and passive mind can find the truth because it takes patience and work to open the 
mind to see the truth. In Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, one of the pivotal works on 
Augustine, Etienne Gilson writes that “illumination is rightly considered such a distinctive 
feature of [Augstine’s] philosophy that we commonly call his theory of knowledge ‘the 
Augustinian doctrine of divine illumination’” (77). Gilson further points out that Augustine’s eye 
and mind metaphor clearly “came from the writings of the Platonists” and argues that Augustine 
was “satisfied with this philosophical doctrine only because it agrees with the teaching of 
Scripture.” More importantly, this metaphor assumes that 
the act whereby the mind knows truth is comparable to the act whereby the  
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eye sees the body: “menti hoc est intelligere, quod sensui videre.” Moreover, it 
assumes that as objects must be made visible by light before they can be 
perceived by the sight, so scientific truths must be made intelligible by a kind of 
light before they can be grasped by the mind. Finally, it assumes that as the sun is 
the source of the physical light which makes the sciences intelligible to the mind. 
Thus God is to our minds what the sun is to our sight; as the sun is the source of 
light, so God is the source of truth. (Gilson 77)  
Augustine further argues that “the corporeal eye, too, does not, therefore, distinguish white from 
black objects without a master, because it had already known there colors before it was created 
in this flesh” (On the Trinity XII. 15. 24). The incorporeal eye, the mind, receives and projects 
wisdom while awake or sleeping, while we use knowledge to weigh and organize the temporal 
objects and events: “If then, this is the correct distinction between wisdom and knowledge, that 
to wisdom belongs the intellectual cognition of eternal things, but to knowledge the reasonable 
cognition of temporal things, it is not difficult to decide which is to be preferred to or placed 
after which” (XII. 15. 25). Augustine developed his metaphor of seeing God through the eye of 
the mind from the classical account of physical sight as spiritual rays that “shine through the eyes 
and touch whatever we see” (IX.3.3). The tangible experience is even mutual and reciprocal—
vision is manipulated by the information already held in the brain as much as the object being 
seen is manipulating what gets imprinted in the human brain. “By the vehicle of the visual ray,” 
Miles explains, the classical theory of vision imagines the observer’s sight as a tangible beam 
that reaches and touches the object distant from the viewer: “the object is not only ‘touched’ by 
the viewer, but also the object is ‘printed’ on the soul of the viewer. The ray theory of vision 
specifically insisted on the connection and essential continuity of viewer and object in the act of 
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vision” (127). As Miles points out, Augustine made it clear that the vision “must be initiated by 
the viewer” because, for the sight to fully embody the function of knowing, the individual will 
from which the beams originate and are projected determines the luminosity of the sight. In other 
words, no sight can be born, exist, or do anything if the sight isn’t aimed at a desired object for 
the eye to see and understand; as Augustine writes: “[T]he sensation proceeds, not from that 
body which is seen, but from a living body that perceives” (On the Trinity XI.2.3). And where 
does that “desire” that finds an object to desire come from? Augustine insists that it precedes the 
act of reception: “[B]efore the vision arose, there already was a will which directed the sense to 
the body in order that it might be formed by seeing it” (XI.5.9).   
4.3 Milton, Poetry, and Vision 
It is not premature to say that the blind poet’s sight is already and always willing, even 
before he sees anything; the spiritual eye has been open and has sought to reach out to the world. 
This will to look out and perceive unseen is undoubtedly physically persistent and spiritually 
felt—the blind poet must have the will to see before he sees, and what he sees he sees through 
his mind’s eye, not the physical eye. In Book VIII of Paradise Lost, Adam describes what he 
remembers about his own creation, waking up and seeing “this happy light” which he knew how 
to name right away: “My tongue obeyed and readily could name/ Whate’er I saw. ‘Thou sun,’ 
said I” (VIII. 273). This “happy” sun is the first thing Adam calls out loud, by its name, and 
speaks to, in his recollection of his awakening. Adam starts asking questions to the creatures he 
sees, including the sun, about how he came to be what he is: “fair light,/ And thou enlightened 
earth, so fresh and gay,/ Ye hills and dales, ye rivers, woods, and plains,/ And ye that live and 
move, fair creatures, tell,/ Tell, if ye saw, how came I thus, how here?” (VIII. 273-77). 
Obviously, the sun is the source of awakening and enlightenment to Adam, the sun that reveals 
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and illuminates the world for Adam to see and learn as he gathers knowledge from observing and 
asking questions.  
Because seeing is directly linked to his intelligence, as is shown in Adam’s identifying 
and calling out names of objects, Adam will apparently learn nothing without the sun. Adam 
immediately sees the sun as teleologically both the observer and provider of knowledge for him. 
His first words, according to his description, were indeed “Thou sun”—he “obeyed” his tongue 
and called out what he “readily could name” (VIII. 272-73). After somehow learning and calling 
its name out loud, Adam then asks the sun questions about his creation, as if he assumes the sun 
has always been where he is and should know where Adam came from. An awareness of his 
surroundings and the first object that sparks an intellectual response informs Adam to identify 
the sun as “This happy light,” though the sun doesn’t answer back to him: “While thus I called 
and strayed I knew not whither/ From where I first drew air and first beheld/ This happy light, 
when answer none returned” (VIII. 283-85). In fact, the following lines demonstrate how Adam 
comes to consciousness surrounded by the light and warmth of the sun:  
  As new waked from soundest sleep 
  Soft on the flow’ry herb I found me laid 
  In balmy sweat, which with his beams the sun 
  Soon dried, and on the reeking moisture fed. 
  Straight toward heav’n my wond’ring eyes I turned, 
  And gazed a while the ample sky, till raised 
  By quick instinctive motion up I sprung, 
  As thitherward endeavoring, and upright 
  Stood on my feet; about me round I saw  
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  Hill, dale, and shady woods, and sunny plains, 
  And liquid lapse of murmuring streams. (VIII. 253-63)  
Clearly, something has awakened him from a deep sleep—it is unclear whether the sun is the 
very first thing that awakes Adam. Yet, let us not forget Adam remembers waking up in the sun 
light. More clearly, he remembers during the day light, and he sees everything that is around 
him, including the bright warming sun that “dried” his “balmy sweat” (255-56).  
Adam catches his breath as he awakes—he comes to life by breathing in. The life starts 
with the breath, then the knowledge of being alive settles in with his senses; and undoubtedly, 
Adam’s first sensory experience is seeing. Milton uses adjectives such as “happy” to describe 
Adam’s first sensory experience. Yet seeing doesn’t give any answers to Adam’s inquiry about 
his creation. The sun, if what Adam says is true, doesn’t give any answer back, yet he still calls 
the sun “happy light.” Simple as it may sound, he is happy in the sun; he is pensive in the shade. 
It is paramount to note here that Milton uses the word “pensive” to describe the first man’s first 
encounter with his own existence and the quandary of self-identification that inevitably follows. 
It is even more important, I would argue, that Adam is sitting down to think “on a green shady 
bank” (VIII. 286). Away from the sun, the thinking man finds shade to ponder how he came 
about, where or who he is.  
But why does he find a shaded area to think? More specifically, if the sun is the source of 
knowledge, then why does Adam move away from the direct sun light and find a shady spot to 
ponder his own creation? There are a few points I should discuss further here. First, Adam reacts 
to the brightness of the sun, but the sun itself fails to be the direct source of knowledge. The 
“happy light” does not ponder; the bright, “happy” sun light cannot be the full source of the light 
of enlightenment. The “happy light” shines and dries, doing what it does, contented. There is no 
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desiring for more. This “happy light” is a kind of self-sufficient, self-consumed light that shines 
while it burns--oblivious, simple, just doing its job. Under the shade, the mind is finally at work, 
full of thoughts, meditating and reflecting upon his creation until he falls asleep: “Pensive I sat 
me down; there gentle sleep/ First found me, and with soft oppression seized/ My drowsed sense, 
untroubled, though I thought/ I then was passing to my former state/ Insensible, and forthwith to 
dissolve” (VIII. 287-91). What leads Adam to the state of enlightenment seems to be far away 
from “the happy light” as Adam falls asleep and then feels as if he is “passing to” his “former 
state”(290). The “green shady bank profuse of flow’rs” subtly but surely awakens his pensive 
thoughts, leading him to “a gentle sleep” as if he were in a trance, his sensory systems 
overloaded with abundant smells and sights of flowers. Under the shade, sitting down, Adam 
now pensive—either “sorrowfully thoughtful; gloomy, sad, melancholy” or in a state associated 
with “thought, anxiety, or melancholy,” states the OED—finally calms down and falls into his 
own thoughts.198 He is now in a reflective, meditative state, instead of tirelessly looking outward 
and asking questions to “whate’er [he] saw” (273).  
Eve in Book IV asks a very simple question—why they “shut all eyes” at night, when 
moon and stars are still bright: “But wherefore all night long shine these, for whom/ This 
glorious sight, when sleep hath shut all eyes?” (IV. 657-58). However, Adam believes the night 
is when things are veiled for a good reason:  
 Lest total darkness should by night regain 
 Her old possession, and extinguish life 
                                                 
198 The first few examples for the definition and use of the word “pensive” in the OED show the word’s 
association to the heaviness of heart: “Pencyf, or hevy in herte” from Promptorium Parvulorum, c.1440, and “The 
heauy burthen of my pensiue breast” from Michael Drayton’s Legend Matilda in Poems, c.1605 (“pensive, adj.” A. 
1). The general use of the word as the implication of seriousness or being full of thought, meditative and reflective 
still suggest a kind of heaviness in the heart, though the word appears to be linked with the mental state.  
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 In nature and all things, which these soft fires 
 Not only enlighten, but with kindly heat 
  Of various influence foment and warm, 
  Temper or nourish, or in part shed down 
  Their stellar virtue on all kinds that grow 
  On earth, made hereby apter to receive 
  Perfection from the sun’s more potent ray. 
  These then, though unbeheld in deep of night, 
  Shine not in vain, nor think, though men were none, 
  That heav’n would want spectators, God want praise. (IV. 665-76) 
About light and darkness, Adam assumes that the visible light reigns over the lack of light, thus 
characterizing the darkness as the loss of light, though it is not useless since it has its proper, 
designated purpose to throw into further relief the light seen and make what God has created 
shine even brighter. Here Milton is applying Neoplatonic astrology that ranked creatures by their 
“stellar virtue” through which animals, plants, and minerals become more refined.  The sun is not 
for the meek. The coldness and darkness of the night is supposed to refine and temper the 
creatures, making them stronger and ready for the sun’s blazing light; and the stronger they are 
the more light they can take in and shine outward. The night is not a proper time for the creatures 
to show their beauties, but it is instead a time for them to gain “temper or nourish” so they will 
be strong enough to receive the sun’s blunt rays. Eve reveals a different understanding of the 
light, or more properly, about the darkness of the night, for she doesn’t see the night’s darkness 
as the loss of the sun’s light, but simply a different kind of light that shines differently while 
serving the same purpose.  
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Most importantly, Eve thinks they are not appreciating God’s creation fully enough by 
sleeping at night because she believes that those things that “all night long shine” are not only 
bright and visible in the darkness but also worthwhile to stay up and see. In contrast, Adam puts 
great emphasis on the urgency and authority of the sunlight over “total darkness” as he describes 
the night’s servile role as a transitional period to “temper” and make nature “apter to receive/ 
Perfection from the Sun’s more potent ray” (IV. 672-73). For Eve, darkness still informs and 
illuminates, but Adam sees darkness as a subordinated form of the sun’s light. But as I have 
pointed out earlier, Adam’s “happy light” is indeed a shallow light that is felt skin deep; the 
interaction between Adam and the sun’s light has only been immediately physical, as the sun 
dries the sweat and shines brightly on the things he saw yet gives him no answers. No knowledge 
is truly gained from the bright sunlight; it is when Adam moves to the shades and becomes 
“pensive” he sees more than “whate’er he saw” and begins to really comprehend who he is and 
how he came to be. The inward seeing begins when he is away from the blazing sun and sits 
down to think “on a green shady bank” (VIII. 286). Maybe Adam should pay attention to Eve’s 
doubts. The lack of blazing sun light might make him less “happy” at night, but Adam might 
gain more knowledge about himself and the world by being “pensive” under the shades, away 
from the sun. Still, that will perhaps only lead him to a more pensive state. God indeed wants his 
human creatures to be satisfied and “happy,” and it is for Satan to be in the state of wanting and 
being pensive. It is clear that the “happy light” that shines obliviously and blazingly is indeed an 
external light that shines on things, but the illumination and enlightenment of the mind occurs 
from within, more likely summoned in the darkness or the shaded areas where the sun’s light is 
not too bright to obstruct the mind’s eye.  
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Adam’s understanding of the sun as the immediate source of enlightenment is not only 
premature but also varies from Eve’s understanding of the light, for she sees the light as the 
image of God’s creation. The latter needs much more explanation—obviously the latter is a kind 
of reading that perceives metaphoric associations that delay a matter-to-matter, linear reading of 
“whate’er [one] saw” (VIII. 273). This is not the kind of light that provides us the sight that helps 
a man prove a hypothesis or theory but the kind that proves nothing but the need for faith. Thus 
the latter is begotten by the lack of light, the bright, happy light that perhaps blocks one from 
seeing the other side of light. Shade, Milton’s poem implies, is as vital as light, and Eve is 
intuitively tuned to this knowledge. As much as Adam is aware of the fact that the world and its 
organisms still breathe and function in the darkness when they are unseen, his understanding is 
indeed a rational one. To phrase it more plainly, Adam needs to make sense, for he is the one 
asking questions, trying to reason with what he observes and what Raphael states. Knowledge 
about his existence and his place is important to him. Thus, when Eve exhibits a rather simplified 
curiosity as she wonders why “all night long shine [starlight], for whom/ This glorious sight, 
when sleep hath shut all eyes,” Adam tries to reason with her by telling her that nothing is lost, 
but at night stars are preparing the creatures to become “apter to receive/ Perfection from the 
sun’s more potent ray” (IV. 672-73).  
This is a “happy” resolution that Adam can think of, to use the term Milton uses to 
describe the full, unapologetically lucid and determined light of the sun; even the stars and the 
moon that shine at night will eventually serve their ultimate purpose of completing their part in 
the sun’s mission, making their existence at night transitory and preparatory. But we also must 
pay attention to Milton’s choice of the word “happy.” Such an uncanny word for this particular 
occasion of denoting the sun’s illuminating qualities, it plainly screams bright, drying sunlight, 
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sight of lucidity. Yet the sound and meaning of this word spin out such a feeling of hollow bliss, 
ironically so much similar to the feeling of doubts and absence. The word “happy” sounds like 
an amplifying noise that obliterates what is around it, and when one is “happy,” there is nothing 
else; indeed, that is the point—one needs nothing anymore. The sound—and the idea—of this 
word instantly yield a complete eclipse of opacity or eradication of depth and darkness. This 
“happy light” is indeed a corporeal delight, a bodily sensation felt through physical senses, 
forming a knowledge about the world around Adam, but still not the light that comes from 
within, the divine light that brightens from within. Augustine writes in On the Trinity that if a 
man wishes for and pursues good things, not evil things, then he will eventually have them, and 
thus only he “who has all that he wills, and wills nothing wrongly” is a happy man (XIII.5.8). In 
other words, a man is not happy because he wills wrongly. If a man wills rightly, wills for the 
good things, as he is already good, he will have what he wills and he will be happy. Happiness 
only occurs in good things, and even though the process of getting happiness might be hard and 
torturous, it is only “transitory,” as Augustine explains: “For many have bravely directed their 
course through these transitory evils towards the good things that shall endure. They are certainly 
made happy by hope, even when they are in the midst of transitory evils, through which they 
arrive at the good things that shall not pass away” (XIII.7. 10). Wanting—if wanting something 
good—is not the reason of unhappiness but the integral starting point of happiness because it 
assures man a chance to be happy. And as Augustine anticipates and believes, the man will be 
happy. Even though he still desires, it is getting as well as wanting that makes the man happy.  
Here it might be useful to revisit Adam’s observation of his surroundings when he 
awakes in Book VIII, lines 253-63. Once he is under the shade, something different occurs. It is 
the shade that allows him to see things other than the shades. As Etienne Gilson explains: “The 
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intellectual mind which Augustine assigns to man as his own and which is, therefore, created, 
can be called a natural light, if we may be allowed to use a phrase which Augustine does not 
employ but which does no violence to his thought. The result of divine illumination is not, 
normally at least, a supernatural illumination; on the contrary, to be the receptive subject of 
divine illumination belongs by definition to the nature of the human intellect” (79). According to 
Adam’s explanation to Eve, the sun deserves its observers and receivers to witness and prove its 
luminosity, but the darkness of the night should remain subservient and obsequious to the sun. 
Even if the stars and the moon exist in the darkness, “these then though unbeheld in deep of 
night/ Shine not in vain” (IV. 674-75); if these lights during the night didn’t “temper or nourish, 
or in part shed down/ Their stellar virtue on all kinds that grow,” then the stars and the moon at 
night are being wasteful (IV. 670-71). It is because, as Adam further muses, the creatures created 
by God need to reflect and be praised as God’s great work; if not: “That Heav’n would want 
spectators, God want praise” (IV. 676). That is the “happy” and virtuous ending for “all kinds 
that grow.” In Adam’s rational world, the stars and the moon must exist for fulfilling their 
subservient role of supporting the sun, through which everything is illuminated by the “happy 
light.”   
Adam believes “the happy light” is almost equivalent to the divine light that generates 
and illuminates the beginning and the end of every creature. In Book 8, Adam describes the sun 
as the source of “the happy light” that enlightens and illuminates even though his need to move 
away from the sun to ponder should tell him otherwise. Unlike Eve, Adam can’t seem to 
envision the night’s darkness as another representation of “happy light.” Eve actually never 
doubts that the stars and the moon must be brightly shining and enjoyable to those who don’t 
sleep at night and are able to watch their glory: “But wherefore all night long shine these, for 
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whom/ This glorious sight, when sleep hath shut all eyes?” (IV. 657-58). Comparing Adam’s 
rationalization of the purpose of night to Eve’s more nuanced insights, we see that Adam must 
make sense of the stars and moon spending their energy in the darkness by imagining their 
complete, “happy” course as if they are part of the sun’s destiny, a rationalization necessary to 
provide a reason for any light existing in the darkness.199 According to Adam, the direct 
illumination, the happy light, is the source of knowledge, morality, and beauty. Without the 
direct illumination from the sun, Adam believes, there can be no happy light and hence no 
knowledge, morality, or beauty.  
The “happy light” may, however, undermine access to the very things Adam imagines it 
provides. In Art and the Christian Intelligence in St. Augustine, Robert J. O’Connell, S.J., writes:  
The philosophic task in any age is not a happy one: rigor of method, care for 
evidence must always keep us honest, prevent our aspirations from leading us into 
mere sentimental wish fulfillment. It must discipline the idealizations, chasten the 
constructions of our metaphysical imaginations so that they do not drift off into 
insubstantial fantasy. But the epistemological preoccupation, become 
imperialistic, can also hobble our advance, clip the wings of philosophic flight, 
prevent us from coming to know the very good our hearts most deeply yearn to 
know; it can, in the tones of a perverse kind of piety, interdict our recognizing the 
commanding beauty that, as moral beings, we must be ready to assent to. 
Philosophical thinking, then, to retain its vitality, to maintain itself in readiness to 
                                                 
199 Of course, here I am assuming this is Adam’s own rationalization of how and why the stars and moon 
show up at night. Though Milton might simply be borrowing from the Neoplatonic astrology to describe the idea of 
stellar virtue, and though he might indeed have doubts about the sun’s predominant virtue over the stars and the 
moon, it is worthwhile to closely examine how Adam believes this system must work. Obviously, Adam is uncertain 
that anything can be useful or good in the darkness—there can’t be any epistemological discovery in the darkness as 
there is no “happy light” and hence, very little ethical or aesthetic merit can be expected from the night. 
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respond to the riches of being, must consent to become a constant series of 
decisions, interlocking and mutually correcting—epistemological, ethical, and 
aesthetic. (169) 
It is important to point out that O’Connell thinks it is the philosophical inquiry that desires to 
have a “wing” in the first place, but the empirical, practical mindset discourages and obstructs 
the wings of philosophical inquiry from flying. Perhaps, though, one might argue that 
philosophers and artists alike let their thoughts fly away, until those thoughts are proven not 
merely at fault for being abstract, but also at fault in reality, like Icarus’s waxen wings. To have 
successfully gone to the sun without having the wings melt and falling into the sea is to end 
everything—that is the completion, the “happy” closure that might bring contentment but kills 
the desire to want, ponder, and create. The “happy light” suggests the finite contentment that 
erases the desire to be close to the sun, as it is inevitable that being in the darkness is what drives 
human beings to seek the light. While philosophy lingers on the possibility of lack, empirical 
science hangs on the certainty of completion. To write about happiness and to write about the 
sun, one must be away from them. But empirical science must zoom in and get closer to the 
object of desire, and this is how, as O’Connell points out in the preceding passage, the 
“epistemological preoccupation, become imperialistic, can also hobble our advance, clip the 
wings of philosophic flight, [and] prevent us from coming to know the very good our hearts most 
deeply yearn to know” (169). For Adam, everything has to be explained and reasoned, and as we 
see in Paradise Lost, Eve remains satisfied with the answers she receives from Adam; and most 
importantly, she doesn’t doubt why the stars and the moon shine at night, but she simply 
complains that she doesn’t get to enjoy their beauty at night because she has to be sleeping then.  
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 The difference between Adam’s and Eve’s thoughts on this issue is subtle but 
meaningful—Eve doesn’t think twice about why the stars and the moon are shining in the 
darkness, while Adam thinks they are shining at night solely to satisfy the sun’s purpose. 
Applying Augustine’s theory about the relationship between ontology and epistemology, Adam’s 
teleological reasoning for the lights’ existing in the darkness proves somewhat similar to the 
Augustinian theory of knowledge. The following passage provides Gilson’s precise and 
insightful analysis of Augustine’s metaphor, but most importantly, it resonates closely with my 
argument about the immanent, active light that comes from within as opposed to the passive light 
that shines upon and illuminates from outside: 
The comparison between God and an intelligible sun serves first of all to point out 
the difference between a thing which is intelligible of itself and a thing which 
must be made intelligible if it is ever to become so; the sun exists, it is bright, and 
it makes bright the objects it illuminates. There is a great difference, then, 
between something naturally visible, such as the light of the sun, and something 
visible only because of a borrowed light, such as the earth when illuminated by 
the sun. In the same way, we must distinguish between God considered in His 
own Being, the intelligibility of God which is independent of everything but itself, 
and the sciences which derive their intelligibility from that of God. Thus the 
comparison allows the truths perceived by the soul no more light of their own 
than that possessed by things when deprived of the sun which illuminates them. 
However, we must remember that this is only a comparison and that even so, it is 
the intelligibility of the sciences rather than their comprehension by the mind that 
is here traced to the divine light. (78) 
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Interestingly, in this passage Gilson describes the sun’s light as “the intelligibility of God” that is 
autonomous and self-sufficient and compares it to “a borrowed light” that is dependent upon the 
object to be illuminated. God is the light of the sun, too bright for humans to see, which is 
sapientia; though we cannot directly see the sun’s light, we can see what He illuminates, which 
with limited vision might produce only scientia. Sapientia, though hard to directly access or see 
with the corporeal eye, can be gradually achieved by practicing opening the mind’s eye. Unlike 
the physical eye, the mind’s eye doesn’t get blinded by the sun’s light but seeks illumination 
from it.  
I return to Augustine, who argues that “we ought rather to believe that the nature of the 
intellectual mind is so formed as to see those things which, according to the disposition of the 
creator, are subjoined to intelligible things in the natural order, in a sort of incorporeal light of its 
own kind, as the eye of the flesh sees the things that lie about it in this corporeal light, of which it 
is made to be receptive and to which it is adapted” (On the Trinity XII. 15. 24). It is important to 
point out that Augustine believes in the possibility for man to acquire higher knowledge and 
encourages us to “rather believe” in achieving intellectual vision through higher reasoning to 
attain knowledge of God. According to his passage, our soul already is the eye to perceive 
incorporeal light, as does our physical eye always see what’s out there in the corporeal world, 
under corporeal light. But unlike the physical eye, the soul’s eye—our “intellectual mind”—isn’t 
always open and readily seeing “the things that lie about it in this corporeal light.” For one thing, 
what the soul’s eye sees is not “the things that lie about it in this corporeal light.” Furthermore, in 
order to “see those things which, according to the disposition of the creator, are subjoined to 
intelligible things in the natural order, in a sort of incorporeal light of its own kind,” one must 
work hard to train the soul’s eye so that it will open to receive such incorporeal light and be able 
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to see it at the same time. And that training of the soul’s eye will require both scientia and 
sapientia, but most critically, sapientia. And, perhaps it is plausible that Eve, who appears more 
taciturn and less studious than Adam in the lines I previously examined, actually exhibits certain 
Christian-espoused attributes such as a childlike curiosity and playfulness of a trusting but 
intuitive person, who is more tuned to acquiring wisdom (sapientia) than knowledge (scientia).  
Seeing what the sun readily illuminates provides man knowledge here and now, but 
contemplating under the shade—even falling asleep—allows man to recall and remember. 
Adam’s thirst for knowledge provides him with what he desires through scientia, inquiring and 
learning while Eve exhibits a certain carelessness towards corporeal knowledge about the world 
and its order. She is more concerned with her inner self, inner happiness. Hence she often abides 
and accepts Adam’s knowledge (scientia) about things such as the solar system, but when it 
comes to her own work and self-efficiency, she has an idea of her own, and she is surely 
propelled by her own will: “Let us divide our labors, thou where choice/ Leads thee or where 
most needs, whether to wind/ The woodbine round this arbor or direct/ The clasping ivy where to 
climb, while I/ In yonder spring of roses intermixed/ With myrtle find what to redress till noon” 
(IX. 214-19). She understands what free will can do in gaining happiness, and according to 
Augustine, she who, innocent and good, wants something good and not evil, will find happiness: 
“If this be our condition this to dwell/ In narrow circuit straitened by a foe/ Subtle or violent, we 
not endued/ Single with like defence wherever met,/ How are we happy, still in fear of harm?” 
(IX. 322-26). What Eve suggests here is thought provoking and perplexing, as it clearly suggests 
that Eve thinks fear makes man unhappy. Or at least that the threat of fear makes one unhappy. 
But how does she know what fear is? Does she even know what fear is? Or, is she suggesting 
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that Adam, in the passage above, is the one who fears enough to “dwell/ In narrow circuit 
straitened by a foe”?  
Of course, some might readily argue that Eve’s curious and credulous mind made her 
wander off alone in Paradise and eventually led us to our fallen state. But the fault is not entirely 
on Eve; most would argue that it is on Satan—she was only curious, only wanting to achieve the 
eternal knowledge and get closer to God. For instance, in Paradise Lost Adam acquires 
knowledge (scientia) while he asks Raphael questions about the solar system as they walk 
together. His intelligence, besides the knowledge already implanted in him such as what he 
learns during his dream vision about his own creation, often comes from sources outside him, 
such as angelic knowledge coming directly from the angel’s mouth. Eve also learns; however, 
her intellectual approach is more self-reliant, self-reflective, and spontaneous. She likes to 
wander off and observe things alone, and when she has doubts or concerns, she might discuss it 
with Adam. And she listens to Adam and hears what he knows and learned from Raphael, though 
she contemplates on her own. Adam would have asked millions of questions before even looking 
at the fruit. So what does this mean? If Eve were the gullible one, and Satan indeed approached 
her knowing that she would be more susceptible to his plea, then weren’t we already determined 
to be fallen? Perhaps the question we should be asking is—why did Milton painstakingly depict 
Adam and Eve such as he did? Why does Eve appear to be more spontaneous, intuitive, and 
credulous in her thoughts? Milton’s point might be exactly that—Eve had to be the one. Satan 
had to go to Eve first.  
But there is more. There is Adam, who takes the fruit from Eve. Augustine’s theory of 
knowledge provides a clue as to how Milton generates his own understanding and answer to the 
question. Augustine’s theory of being—or Platonist Christian hierarchy of being—makes it 
160 
impossible for man to remain perfect and happy as God intended him to be.  Any act of acquiring 
knowledge is driven by free will; even if God has already given Adam and Eve certain 
knowledge about the world during their conception, they still want to know something about the 
solar system or why the stars shine at night. It is the persistent will that helps man climb up the 
hierarchy of being. And it is the free will that also leads man to fall. Peter A. Fiore, in Milton and 
Augustine, argues that “there is a remarkable consistency between this teaching of Augustine and 
Milton’s treatment of Adam and Eve before the Fall” (41). Fiore explains that “before the act of 
disobedience, there was a weakening of the will, a slipping or falling from perseverance, a failing 
to abide in that goodness in which there is no sin. And the actual fall into sin took place with the 
eating of the apple” (41). Furthermore, there was a series of events prior to the fall that led to 
weakening of the will and eventually to sin, for “it would have been better if Adam had been less 
curious about the forbidden tree and had talked less about it to Eve, so as not to influence her 
dreams, or if he had heeded his own advice when he hopelessly discouraged her from going out 
alone” (41). Fiore further concludes that this paradox between Augustine’s depiction of Adam 
and Eve’s god-like perfection and the inevitable existence of the free will that led them to 
consent to sin actually yields an opportunity for us to contemplate the subtle complexity of 
Christian doctrine. The Fall might have never happened without the free will, and it will be 
impossible to understand the depth and complexity of Christian doctrine without the Fall.  
In Soliloquies, Augustine describes reason as the contemplation of truth: “[T]he gaze of 
the soul is Reason (I. 6.13). It is reason that performs the mind’s “act of looking” (I. 6.13).200 
                                                 
200 Augustine further writes in Soliloquies that “very act of looking, even though the eyes be sound, cannot 
turn them toward the Light unless three things persist: Faith—by which the soul believes that, that toward which the 
gaze has been directed, is such that to gaze upon it will cause blessedness: Hope—by which, the eyes being rightly 
fixed, the soul expects this vision to follow: and Love—which is the soul’s longing to see and to enjoy it. […] And 
this intellectual vision is that which is in the soul a conjunction of the seer and the seen: as seeing with the eyes 
results from the conjunction of the sense of sight and the sensible object, either of which being lacking, nothing can 
be seen” (I. 6. 13). 
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And this soul’s eye doesn’t automatically offer the divine sight; it needs to seek and look to see 
the truth; as Ronald Nash observes, “the mere possession of eyes is not enough to guarantee 
sight, so too the mind must look if it is to see truth” (64).201 Through the active and diligent way 
of looking through the soul’s eye, man can acquire higher reason, and the “object of higher 
reason is the eternal world of the forms; its method is contemplation; its end is happiness; and its 
result is sapientia” (65).202 But the soul’s eye and man’s will can also err in the course of 
reaching for higher knowledge; thus in Satan’s speech to Eve in Book 9 of Paradise Lost we see 
Satan naming what Eve will acquire when she takes a bite into the forbidden fruit “wisdom,” 
indeed above “science”: 
  O sacred, wise, and wisdom-giving plant, 
 Mother of science, now I feel thy pow’r 
  Within me clear not only to discern 
  Things in their causes but to trace the ways 
  Of highest agents deemed however wise! (IX. 679-83) 
Here Satan, the author, employs all the right buzz phrases—“wisdom-giving plant,” “mother of 
science,” and “the ways of highest agents”—to inspire his cautious audience to commit to 
“venturing higher than my lot” (690). Even further, Milton compares Satan’s eloquence and 
delivery to ancient classical orators: “As when of old some orator renowned/ In Athens or free 
Rome, where eloquence/ Flourished, since mute, to some great cause addressed,/ Stood in 
himself collected” (IX. 670-73). Milton seals the lines that describe Satan’s rhetorical delivery 
                                                 
201 Nash, The Light of the Mind. 
202 Nash also notes: “Augustine distinguished between the ratio superior and ratio inferior, the higher and 
lower reasons. These two aspects of the same mind have different objects, methods, ends, and results. The object of 
the lower reason is the temporal world of particulars; its method is investigation; its end is action; and its result is 
scientia” (The Light of the Mind 65). 
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with a final stressed syllable to properly provide the contextual support that Satan actually 
believes in his "heroic" cause. As if emulating a speech spoken by a great hero, Satan stands still 
and “collected”; note also Milton clearly distinguishes “motion” from “tongue” and describes 
each as an integral and independent “part” of Satan’s speech: “while each part,/ Motion, each act 
won audience ere the tongue,/ Sometimes in highth began, as no delay/ Of preface brooking 
through his zeal of right” (IX. 673-76).  A slightly earlier passage challenges the reading of 
Satan’s heroic speech and suggests that Satan’s emulation of classical antiquity is false and 
insufficient, for it provides him with a model devoid of spiritual illumination. Even though the 
poet seems to hyperbolize Satan’s oratorical skills, he also describes Satan with the following 
accusatory words: “when now more bold/ Tempter, but with show of zeal and love/ To man, and 
indignation at his wrong,/ New part puts on, and as to passion moved,/ Fluctuates disturbed, yet 
comely and in act/ Raised, as of some great matter begin” (IX. 664-69). Milton’s iambic 
pentameter in the lines that describe Satan’s oratorical delivery provides dignity and distance 
without inserting too much decorum or conceit (lines 672-78), but some of those lines spoken by 
Satan are written in irregular meter rather than iambic pentameter (look, for example, at lines 
679-680). I argue that the iambic pentameter of the first two lines spoken by Satan is 
questionable because the same vowels of the first words of these two lines—“O” and “o” in 
“mother”—disturb the flow of iambic pentameter (679-80). Moreover, the speech not only 
contrasts with the poet’s reading of Satan’s outward display of oratorical greatness but also 
confirms a subtle fissure in Satan’s seemingly heroic speech. About Satan’s oratorical delivery 
Milton does say the following: “ere the tongue/ Sometimes in highth began” (674-75).  
Consistency is the key to the validity of measured lines, and if Satan aspired to attain the 
eloquence of Greek and Roman orators, shouldn’t he have consistently “in highth began”? 
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Indeed, Milton was known for his aversion to rhyme schemes, but poetic meter is a different 
issue, and his admiration of and adherence to the style of ancient Greek and Latin epic poetry 
ensures his belief in the poetic meter that was so important in the poetic tradition he emulated.203 
Let us then closely examine the first two lines of Satan’s speech to Eve in lines 679-80 by 
reading them out loud: “O sacred, wise, and wisdom-giving plant,/ Mother of science, now I feel 
thy power.” Most readers would see no metric irregularity in the first line, especially once being 
informed that this is Milton’s epic poem consisting blank verse with iambic pentameter and no 
rhyme schemes. Opening with a lowly and softly blowing sound of “O” without stress, most 
readers will read the line as perfect iambic pentameter. This speech by Satan commences with a 
single vowel/syllable that requires another syllable to immediately follow, hence creating 
amphibrach, “O sacred” (- / -), short syllables on both sides, and the following syllables thus fall 
into the pattern of iambic pentameter.  
However, Satan seems to be invoking something that is already inside him, and his later 
lines do claim that a piece of the “sacred, wise, and wisdom-giving plant” is indeed inside him: 
“now I feel thy power/ Within me clear” and “Look on me,/ Me who have touched and tasted, 
yet both live” (IX. 680-81, 687-88). If Satan did invoke something that is inside of him, then 
                                                 
203 I want to make sure that the readers are on the same page with me on this argument—as most Milton 
readers must know, Milton eschewed rhyme schemes and end rhymes. He found regular rhyme not only numbing 
but dumbing of the lively sound and beauty of English language. While abolishing rhyme, Milton remains quiet 
about poetic meter in his note on “the verse” added in the second printing, prefacing Paradise Lost in 1667: “The 
measure is English heroic verse without rime, as that of Homer in Greek, and of Virgil in Latin; rhyme being no 
necessary adjunct or true ornament of poem or good verse, in longer works especially, but the invention of a 
barbarous age, to set off wretched matter and lame meter; graced indeed since by the use of some famous modern 
poets, carried away by custom, but much to their own vexation, hindrance, and constraint to express many things 
otherwise, and for the most part worse than else they would have expressed them. [. . . ] as have long since our best 
English tragedies, as a thing itself, to all judicious ears, trivial and of no true musical delight; which consists only in 
apt numbers, fit quantity of syllables, and the sense variously drawn out from one verse into another, not in the 
jingling sound of like endings, a fault avoided by the learned ancients both in poetry and all good oratory.” Then he 
adds and concludes that this abjuration of meter should not be considered by the reader as “vulgar” but as “an 
example” to free ancient heroic poetry from “the troublesome and modern bondage of rhyming.” Milton does stick 
to iambic pentameter for his heroic epic poem—just no “jingling” rhymes. 
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how would he summon it? In a lofty tone, as if lifting up and breathing out something deeply 
lodged in himself, couldn’t Satan breathe those words—“O sacred, wise”—out with one 
extended “o” with a stress, followed by a trochee (“sacred”) or cretic (“sacred, wise” /- /)? This 
could also suggest a dactyl followed by iambic (“O sacred, wise” / / - /). According to Satan’s 
description of this “power within” him, shouldn’t such lofty power require a little more gravitas 
and time, thus perhaps extending the sound of “O” in the beginning of his invocation of such 
power? But most importantly, let us now examine the word “Mother” that begins the next line 
(IX. 680). According to Milton, Satan’s tongue “sometimes in highth began”—and the line that 
begins with “Mother” exhibits just that. It is clear that iambic pentameter is broken in the next 
line, as the word “mother” adds the stress on the first syllable (/ -). Even if one argues that 
“mother” can be read in iambic, there is still some irregularity in the syllables that follow the first 
syllable (“of science, now I feel thy power” -  / -  - / - / -/) , which makes this line impossible to 
be read in iambic pentameter.  
These lines are no aberration, for Satan’s measured lines are often inconsistent and ill-
measured. The ebb-and-flow of iambic pentameter is disturbed, and even worse, his lines 
“sometimes in highth began” and sometimes don’t. Milton’s delineation of Satan’s oratorical 
delivery as a whole therefore suggests a certain obliqueness—literally, something is off. This 
irregularity perhaps is most clearly presented in Milton’s careful arrangement of subtle 
denotations indicating disturbance and pretense. Satan shows “indignation,” he “new part puts 
on,” and “fluctuates disturbed” though he soon collects himself “comely” and “raised, as of some 
great matter begin.” Angered as well as amped by his previous failure in convincing Eve, Satan 
keeps manufacturing and fabricating a better speech by putting “new parts” on, until Eve will be 
moved to take a bite of the forbidden fruit. However, since Satan seems to demonstrate oratorical 
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sophistication inspired by classical antiquity, one must not make a hasty conclusion that Satan’s 
inconsistent meters suggests that Milton may have regarded classical poetics in a negative light. 
Clearly, Satan possesses intelligence and skills as other heavenly angels do, but he “fluctuates 
disturbed”—he moves obliquely, as he is motivated by a wrong cause, and for the worse, 
inspired by anger. It is more convincing that it is Milton’s intention to show Satan’s oblique 
motivation and reasoning in those lines that subtly shift from the normal iambic pentameter to 
unexpected and unrecognizable irregular meters.  
In addition, Satan insinuates this fruit will give Eve corporeal knowledge (scientia) and, 
most importantly, divine wisdom (sapientia): “Wisdom-giving plant, Mother of science” (679-
80). That both sapientia and scientia come from one plant is noteworthy, but it is paramount to 
pay attention to the subtle derivation of what is given and what is begotten. The plant, according 
to Satan’s speech, gives wisdom—“wisdom-giving plant”—when the plant is also the mother of 
science, who gives birth to science. The difference between “wisdom-giving” and giving birth to 
science is that there is anticipation and acknowledgement of a recipient; wisdom is given to 
someone or something, whereas science is the recipient itself. Wisdom, according to Satan’s 
speech, thus reigns above science as it is closer to the source of divine knowledge; wisdom 
resides within the plant and is still part of it, not a reproduction of it, even when it is given, 
whereas science is separated from the plant, no longer being the source of divine knowledge. 
Therefore, scientia is something that can be found and studied through observation and 
examination of the physical world, but to gain sapientia one must be near the origin of the divine 
intelligence from which wisdom can be given. Satan’s derivations of the two kinds of knowledge 
suggest a backdrop of Augustinian theory of knowledge, but the gradation between the two also 
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tempts Eve to want wisdom even more. Since the plant gives it, why shouldn’t she come and 
take what the plant does “give”?  
Of course this is a trap and a deception—it is not a giving plant, and anything the plant 
can give, one must will and labor to take. Satan surreptitiously leaves this part out, focusing on 
the appealing claims that wisdom is indeed good, that it won’t kill Eve but rather will give her 
more life with the power of divine vision, and that the plant is there to give what Eve or anyone 
would like to possess—divine knowledge. But why should she take sapientia from outside, 
through a sensory experience? Unless it is scientia she is looking for, shouldn’t sapientia be 
sought within oneself, by opening the mind’s eye? In A Treatise of Civil Power, Milton 
emphasizes the guidance of the Spirit within oneself, as opposed to scientia gained from analysis 
of external events:  
First it cannot be deni’d, being the main foundation of our protestant religion, that 
we of these ages, having no other divine rule or authoritie from without us 
warrantable to one another as a common ground but the holy scripture, and no 
other within us but the illumination of the Holy Spirit so interpreting that scripture 
as warrantable only to our selves and to such whose consciences we can so 
perswade, can have no other ground in matters of religion but only from the 
scriptures. And these being not possible to be understood without this divine 
illumination, which no man can know at all times to be in himself, much less to be 
at any time for certain in any other, it follows cleerly, that no man or body of men 
in these times can be the infallible judges or determiners in matters of religion to 
any other mens consciences but their own.204 
                                                 
204 John Milton, A Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes. The Prose of John Milton: Selected and 
Edited from the original Texts with Introductions, Notes, Translations, & Accounts of All of His Major Prose 
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Aside from the historical implications of passage above, Milton supports Augustine’s theory of 
knowledge and divine illumination and believes that the knowledge gained through looking at 
the world outside the self only reveals its scientific origin, which is distanced from the self, as 
opposed to the knowledge acquired through the way of looking inwardly, looking into the self, 
by contemplating, which helps one to reach sapientia. Surprisingly, or, perhaps not, even though 
intuitive, Eve, who seems to be more in tune with her inner knowledge, doesn’t see that she does 
have the divine light within her. Her mind’s eye is shutting down tightly, as she is tempted and 
persuaded by Satan.   
Milton’s meditations upon the limitations of physical sight, as well as its possible 
impairment of spiritual sight, involved far more than his own failing vision. Catherine Wilson’s 
The Invisible World: Early Modern Philosophy and the Invention of the Microscope offers a 
valuable study of the way the early modern period reacted to the emergence of modern science 
and how the extension of empirical sight enabled and disabled the spiritual and philosophical 
outlook to natural world:   
The orderliness of the cosmos in the medieval tradition, the rankings of 
angelology and the hierarchical system of enclosed spheres, might be supposed to 
have conveyed a certain smug security. But medieval philosophy was ambivalent 
toward the natural world and the value of the sense of vision. Curiositas was one 
of the sins most repellent to Augustine; the profound ocular aestheticism of the 
Confessions is the other face of the fear that visuality and spirituality are as 
mutually exclusive as gratified lust and salvation. Representatives of Christianity, 
a religion of self-examination stressing not the obedience to external law but the 
                                                 
Writings, 450. See also: The Works of John Milton, vol. 6, ed. Frank Allen Patterson (New York: Columbia UP, 
1932) 1-41. 
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purification of motive, argued that this task was sufficiently absorbing to leave no 
energy available for external applications of the questioning faculty, a view that 
persisted until physic-theology and popular science converted the knowledge of 
nature in an idle culture into a moral pastime far less dubious than the reading of 
novels. (22) 
As expected, seeing through the physical eye was trusted by neither medieval philosophy nor the 
Christian religion; furthermore, seeing too much and too closely through any sort of scientific 
machine using the physical eye meant the betrayal of the spiritual eye, and even worse, the 
squandering of the full potential of the divine light that should be actively engaged in the 
illumination of the mind. Christianity’s obsession with the inward vision necessarily found the 
physico-theological view of the emerging sciences as thwarting the necessary separation between 
the external, physical world and the spiritual world within, and Hooke’s microscopic view of the 
physical world does indeed blur the line between the two. Without sufficient inward 
contemplation, we have only knowledge observed through sensory experience, and though the 
empirical knowledge is important, one cannot gain sapientia through empirical knowledge. If 
Eve had been trained to see through spirituality, she would have noticed Satan’s “words replete 
with guile” (IX. 733). In a way, visuality offers more reason for Eve to be tempted—after all, she 
sees Satan alive and well after consuming the fruit. What she sees through her physical eye 
makes her incredulous of the knowledge she has gained from God via Adam while she becomes 
more credulous of what she sees with her eyes.  
Even though Eve has exhibited far more autonomy when tuning in to her intuitive 
reasoning and contemplative thoughts, she here shows how no human is truly prepared to fight 
against a tempter who tries to allure him or her with any means possible, including the possibility 
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of immortality. Notice how Eve’s speeches noticeably get shorter and shorter, as Satan’s 
speeches get not only longer but enticingly more elaborate and persuasive; while “she scarce had 
said, though brief,” Satan’s becoming “more bold,” as if the tempter sucked and took the inner 
strength out of the tempted (IX. 664). Satan begins his first persuasive speech in Book IX, line 
532, which goes on for seventeen lines (lines 532-548). Eve’s replying lines to Satan last for 
fourteen lines (553-66). Satan’s lines are consistently longer than ten or more lines, with an 
exception of the lines 626-30, where Satan replies briefly to Eve’s retorts. Satan’s speeches are 
consistently long and verbose, at the same time articulate and studded with notable rhetorical 
devices (IX. lines 568-612, 679-732) compared to Eve’s speeches that remain simple and short 
(lines 615-24, 647-54, 659-63).205 This pattern of Eve’s brief speech ends when she is fully 
persuaded and tempted, so she herself now delivers a long, elaborate speech that resonates with 
imagery and repeats content from Satan’s speech (lines 745-79); this is one of the two longest 
speeches spoken by Eve during the temptation scene, though this one is before eating the fruit. 
Almost tempted, “yet first/ pausing a while, thus to herself mused” (743-44), now Eve utters the 
lines that echo those of Satan’s: “This fruit divine,/ Fair to the eye, inviting to the taste,/ Of 
virtue to make wise: what hinders then/ To reach, and feed at once both body and mind?” (776-
79). Eve now “mused” (744), for she is not using her wisdom (sapientia) to reason with Satan’s 
argument, but with the material knowledge he just has gained through looking and hearing as 
“his words replete with guile/ Into her heart too easy entrance won” (733-34) and her sight is 
“Fixed on the fruit she gazed” (735). The verb “muse” is a peculiar word choice by the poet to 
                                                 
205 Ten lines, eight lines, and then five lines—as we can see, Eve’s lines are strikingly shorter than those of 
Satan. Of course, I am not at all arguing that the length determines the quality of the speech, but we must pay 
attention to how the poet contrasts Satan and Eve’s speeches in this way—the juxtaposition is peculiar. Satan 
delivers one of his most cunning and spectacularly subtle and surreptitious speeches at the moment of tempting Eve, 
while Eve’s speeches remain strikingly matter of fact and concise. Of course, ultimately Eve delivers a long, 
articulate speech that mirrors and builds upon Satan’s verbose and long speeches.  
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signal the subtle but certain shift in Eve’s mind, as the word could mean both contemplating and 
talking to oneself discontentedly. The most obvious and popular meaning of the word is “to be 
absorbed in thought” and “to meditate in silence” (OED 1. a) as an intransitive verb or “to 
ponder over, reflect upon; to contemplate” (1. c) as a transitive verb. As an intransitive verb, th 
word “muse” can also mean “to grumble, to complain, or to murmur discontentedly” (4. a). Since 
Milton clearly describes “his words replete with guile/ Into her heart too easy entrance won,” 
there is no doubt at this point that Eve is swayed. Eve “to herself mused”--something has ruffled 
her simple, contemplative mind, but it wasn’t just Satan’s speech alone, and she is musing “to 
herself” as if she grumbles and complains to herself. The peaceful solitude and quiet has been 
interrupted and is gone, and she now hears murmuring noises inside, grumbling and complaining 
because she is vexed by this quandary presented by the serpent and wonders why she can’t have 
the fruit after all.  
Her musing acts as an inner complaint and reasoning against her inner wisdom, but most 
importantly, it functions as a turning point where we witness Eve’s capability to use her 
intelligence to examine the situation through a louder and more vociferous discourse. This is 
especially significant because she hasn’t been vocal or aggressive enough to argue against Satan, 
as I have pointed out earlier. Her speeches get briefer and weaker, so that one almost wonders 
why she doesn’t fight harder as Satan gets more aggressive and persuasive in his argument. 
Something about Eve’s silence, I think, I should clarify and explain here. Her lack of outward 
speech should not be criticized or measured as lack of intelligence; surely, when comparing the 
conversations between Adam and Raphael and the ones between Eve and Satan, there are some 
obvious differences between them, such as, for instance, the length of Eve and Adam’s speech. 
As I pointed out earlier, while Satan’s speeches get longer and more elaborate, there is not much 
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written evidence that shows her vigorous intellectual contest against Satan; furthermore, since 
Adam consistently speaks in lengthy, articulate lines while conversing with Raphael, it is indeed 
difficult for the reader to ignore the striking difference between these constructions. For 
example, in Books 7 and 8 of Paradise Lost when Adam requests Raphael to explain how God 
created the world and how the celestial system works, Raphael answers Adam in a long, 
continuous discourse that lasts throughout Book 7, and then in Book 8 Raphael encourages 
Adam to “dream not of other worlds” and suggests “know what passes there; be lowly wise:/ 
Think only what concerns thee and thy being” (VIII. 173-74).  
However, in Book 8 we notice Adam gathering what he has learned from Raphael and 
using his intelligence to ask questions and voice his opinion outwardly to Raphael: 
 How fully hast thou satisfied me, pure 
  Intelligence of Heav’n, angel serene, 
  And freed from intricacies, taught to live, 
  The easiest way, nor with perplexing thoughts 
  To interrupt the sweet of life, from which 
  God hath bid dwell far off all anxious cares, 
  And not molest us, unless we ourselves 
  Seek them with wand’ring thoughts, and notions vain. 
  But apt the mind or fancy is to rove 
  Unchecked, and of her roving is no end. (VIII. 180-89) 
Adam here is clearly aware of how the mind might wander/wonder, even though he begins his 
question with a polite affirmation of Raphael’s answers. However, what is perplexing here is that 
though Adam says that God has prepared and wants Adam to follow the “easiest way” (VIII. 
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183), he is already locked into philosophical inquiries that are anything but simple or easy. Adam 
is a complex thinker, and his insights and inquiries in Book 8 lines 180-216 (also lines 250-559, 
a long, continuous speech describing his recollection of being created by God) show plenty of 
evidence that Adam is able to assay Raphael’s speech and develop his own argument against 
Raphael. But Adam also quickly yields; though he thinks “apt the mind or fancy is to rove/ 
unchecked, and of her roving is no end,” he believes such “roving” has its end  
 Till warned, or by experience taught, she learn, 
  That not to know at large of things remote 
  From use, obscure and subtle, but to know 
  That which before us lies daily life, 
  Is the prime wisdom; what is more, is fume, 
  Or emptiness, or fond impertinence, 
  And renders us in things that most concern 
  Unpracticed, unprepared, and still to seek. (VIII. 190-97) 
I am suspicious of, or at least interested in, how readily Adam puts the progression of his 
thoughts in abeyance and accepts Raphael’s suggestion: “Therefore from his high pitch let us 
descend/ A lower flight, and speak of things at hand/ Useful, whence haply mention may arise/ 
Of something not unseasonable to ask/ By sufferance, and thy wonted favor deigned” (VIII. 198-
202). Figuratively speaking, here we see Adam’s reasoning coming down to earth, back to 
“things at hand” and the practical questions that are “not unseasonable to ask” that could give 
him “useful” answers. Adam here, I would argue, makes a mistake of linking “the easiest way” 
with “a lower flight”—his mind is already deep in the way of an informed, educated mind, 
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voicing insights from a fully functioning intelligent mind operated by scientia, and it is hard to 
say that the cause of his immediate withdrawal to “the easiest way” is inner wisdom and faith.     
Rather, it seems to me that he is using deductive reasoning to eliminate what is the least 
practical and least reasonable to believe. More importantly, “the easiest way” could signify 
gracefulness and the easy execution of writing, as one of the OED definitions of the adjective 
“easy” demonstrates: “of written compositions: Showing no trace of effort; smooth, flowing” of 
a writer or thinker (A. I. 4. b); it could also imply a kind of nautical trope, as in something “not 
hard pressed: not hurried, gentle; said of motion, a breeze, a fire, etc” (A. I. 5. a). Adam, in 
Paradise Lost, refers to sapientia when he says, “to know/ That which before us lies in daily life,/ 
Is the prime wisdom” (VIII. 192-94), but it is hard to say that Adam’s reasoning comes from “the 
prime wisdom” offered in “daily life” as so far most of his intelligent decisions have been 
influenced by Raphael. Adam clearly thinks the more “apt the mind,” the more likely it will 
“rove” (VIII. 188), which supports my suspicion that Adam follows Raphael’s lead and hasn’t 
truly wiped out his doubts and questions; “the easiest way” to Adam is still less challenging, “a 
lower flight” (VIII. 199). Adam describes “what is more [than the prime wisdom] is fume,/ Or 
emptiness” (194-94). Yet we should pay attention to the way Adam gains knowledge about the 
world; though he says what one could gain outside the natural knowledge is “fume” or 
“emptiness,” most of Adam’s knowledge comes from an articulate source, an interactive, 
Socratic discussion with Raphael. Adam knows about “the easiest way,” but he doesn’t practice 
it. And if “the easiest way” is what God intended us to live, then this course of action must be 
intuitively in us. When dealing with that inner wisdom, an internal contemplative dialogue 
between reason and self should take precedence over an external exchange of knowledge. The 
one that actually takes knowledge in “the easiest way,” without any trace of effort or eagerness 
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to learn, is Eve. After all, “the easiest way” must be able to simplify “perplexing thoughts” to 
render them less perplexing, and most importantly, “the easiest way” will require less words to 
articulate either perplexing or “sweet” ideas. Thus Eve’s musings show her inner wisdom, albeit 
wisdom that is tainted by Satan. 
Looking at lines 739-44 from Book 8 carefully, one should notice that her musing is 
further heightened by her sensory experience: “Meanwhile the hour of noon drew on, and waked/ 
An eager appetite, raised by the smell/ So savory of that fruit, which with desire,/ Solicited her 
longing eye; yet first/ Pausing a while, thus to herself she mused” (739-44). And Milton’s 
brilliance is that he hasn’t forgotten that she is a human being, who after all does get hungry and 
senses her hunger. That her musing coincides with her heightened sensory experience isn’t a 
coincidence. Whether it is silent or murmured to herself, the grumbling speech she makes in the 
next thirty-five lines (745-79) must have been echoing inside her head. These lines reveal her 
reasoning as unsettled and confused, fluctuating between why she should or shouldn’t follow 
Satan’s suggestion. By the time she “muse[s],” she is already convincing herself 
 For good unknown, sure is not had, or had 
  And yet unknown, is as not had at all. 
  In plain then, what forbids he but to know, 
  Forbids us good, forbids us to be wise? 
  Such prohibitions bind not. But if death  
  Bind us with after-bands, what profits then  
  Our inward freedom? In the day we eat 
  Of this fair fruit, our doom is, we shall die. 
  How dies the serpent? He hath eat’n and lives, 
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  And knows, and speaks, and reasons, and discerns, 
  Irrational till then. For us alone  
  Was death invented? (IX. 756-67). 
For the worse, her musing has already been tempered by the inevitable corporeal reality—it is 
about lunch time and she feels “an eager appetite” as her body’s sensory system nags her to 
smell the fruit, see the fruit, and eat the fruit: “An eager appetite, raised by the smell/ So savory 
of that fruit, which with desire,/ Solicited her longing eye” (IX. 740-43). Now her body 
“raise[s]” her desire for the fruit and thoughts of eating the fruit. In the above lines spoken by 
Eve, Milton juxtaposes the two words “knowing” and “had” to demonstrate how Eve confuses 
two different kinds of knowledge, one inspired from the divine light, the spiritual knowledge and 
wisdom, or sapientia, and the other obtained through corporeal experience and learned 
examination, the external knowledge and worldly information, or scientia. Eve seems to equate 
nescience with immateriality: “unknown” is “not had” and “had and yet unknown” is “not had at 
all” (756-57). If never “had,” it is never known; for Eve, lack of knowledge signifies both 
material and immaterial scarcity.206 This is a very subtle and slippery argument; Eve here could 
mean that if she does not know something at this point, then she has never had that knowledge. 
The first condition, “for good unknown, sure is not had,” could imply having as obtaining the 
knowledge through physical experience, at which point knowledge becomes a material 
possession, like knowledge being transported from the fruit to the mind of a person just by 
consuming the fruit; yet the second condition—“had and yet unknown, is as not had at all”—is 
                                                 
206 In addition, this passage about Eve demonstrates Milton’s monism or animist materialism. As Fallon 
observes in Milton among the Philosophers, Milton’s monism involves the idea that a single material substance 
which is "animate, self-active, and free" can compose everything in the universe: “But where Hobbes assimilated 
mind to matter and explained mental events mechanically, Milton assimilated matter to current notions of mind and 
moved toward the position that all corporeal substance is animate, self-active, and free” (81). 
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much more opaque and defies analysis. Once again, it is hard to tell whether the word “had” 
signifies either the physical consumption of the fruit that yields the knowledge of “good,” or the 
spiritual possession of the knowledge of “good” that Eve should have already “had” intuitively. 
If the first is the case, then what kind of knowledge is Eve acquiring? Sapientia? Or scientia? If 
the latter is true, then obviously taking the fruit from the tree and eating it signifies she has lost 
her own divine light and didn’t work hard to regain its strength to fight against the temptation. 
The lines 756-57 could simply mean that if one never had experienced “good” then he or she will 
never know what “good” is. Yet I would argue the peculiar mentioning of knowing and having in 
Eve’s crucial musing suggests a strong platonic and Augustinian backdrop. Then the line “had 
and yet unknown, is as not had at all” questions the possibility of inner light that could exist 
before the physical or experimental knowledge. If that is the case, Eve denies all her intuitive 
knowledge and wisdom that set her apart from Adam and made her a more autonomous thinker 
than Adam. Depending on how we read those lines, one can argue that Eve turns immaterial, 
spiritual sapientia into something interchangeable with material and physical scientia that can be 
possessed, or that she challenges the possibility of spiritual knowledge by saying that knowledge 
is something tangible, something that can be observed and possessed, so that without scientia 
there can’t be sapientia “at all.” Eve no longer believes that the invisible, immaterial “good” can 
be apprehended through finding and reigniting the inner divine illumination. 
Satan’s words become more powerful, the poem seems to indicate, because they are 
accompanied by visuality, and the above lines reveal how what Eve sees takes over and dims the 
illuminating light that is Eve’s spirituality, eclipsing and disabling her wisdom to reason and 
fight against Satan’s temptation. By this point, Eve is fully occupied by what she sees in front of 
her, as sapientia loses its place and strength to keep illuminating the inner wisdom that she 
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desperately needs—and, by extension in Milton’s theology, all humans need—ever more to fight 
against Satan’s temptation.  
Wilson argues that Augustine’s and the general medieval theology’s theory of divine 
illumination rather proves the Platonic Christian fear of the empiricist doubting of the realness of 
spirituality, and that, as she asserts in the passage I cite above, “the profound ocular aestheticism 
of the Confessions is the other face of the fear that visuality and spirituality are as mutually 
exclusive as gratified lust and salvation.” When physical seeing began to offer sights as real and 
detailed as the microscopic or telescopic views of things previously unseen or invisible before 
those devices’ inventions, seeing began to be more real than knowing—at least the rationalist 
philosophers and theologians began both to predict and to fear the implications of such 
challenges as empirical discoveries piled up and science advanced. As Wilson describes above, 
visuality is the misleading, unwarranted portent that blurs the spiritual communication with and 
affirmation of God attained through the mind’s eye, without seeing God through the corporeal 
eye. In that sense, visuality offers more reason for Eve to be tempted. What she sees through her 
physical eye makes her incredulous of what she knows already as she becomes more credulous 
of what she sees with her eyes. Hence, Satan’s cunning timely words tempt her, “Look on me,/ 
Me who have touched and tasted, yet both live,/ And life more perfect have attained than fate/ 
Meant me, by vent’ring higher than my lot” (IX. 687-90). Pay close attention to the display of 
visual signs Satan lays in front of Eve, encouraging her to trust what she sees in front of her. As I 
have already discussed above, this abundance and assurance of immortality through physical 
seeing undermines the idea of God and wisdom gained through patient self-examination and self-
illumination. Satan cleverly asks—“Look on me” (687). If individuals could “touch” and “taste” 
immortality as a physical existence, not as an abstract idea, wouldn’t they at least begin to 
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compare the sight of God they see and the vision of God they know and wonder if perhaps they 
should believe what they see through their eyes instead of what they envision? Whether or not 
Eve was already fallen at this point of Satan’s persuasion is not the point of my argument here, 
for regardless of whether or not she was, we can agree on one thing—Satan is certainly banking 
on empirical evidence to convince Eve. Indeed, Milton’s subtle and thorough construction of 
Satan’s argument gives Satan one of the most vexing and ominous questions directly challenging 
the ontology of religious faith:  
 The Gods are first, and that advantage use  
  On our belief, that all from them proceeds;  
  I question it, for this fair Earth I see,  
  Warmed by the sun, producing every kind,  
  Them nothing; if they all things, who enclosed 
  Knowledge of good and evil in this Tree, 
  That whoso eats thereof, forthwith attains 
  Wisdom without their leave? And wherein lies 
  Th’offense, that man should thus attain to know? 
  What can your knowledge hurt him, or this Tree 
  Impact against his will if all be his?” (IX. 718-28)  
Satan here says he is not even sure why he must believe, or even worse, why anyone must fear 
something that they never know exists since they don’t see its existence in the things all around 
them. Subtly polarizing and distorting the singularity and omnipresence of God, Satan uses the 
plural “gods” and in a confessional tone proclaims his failure to see God in everything around 
him.  
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The argument Satan makes here is that if God is omnipresent and omnipotent, he should 
have been able to see Him readily, physically, everywhere in the physical world. But this is 
exactly why, as Wilson asserts, “medieval philosophy was ambivalent toward the natural world 
and the value of the sense of vision”—spirituality is devalued as it is materialized. However, this 
is not to say that Milton paints his God without spirituality, diminishing the abstract idea of God, 
to profess his monist faith. The idea of God’s being held in the mind’s eye and the faith in the 
possibility that God can be seen through the physical eye confirm the co-existence of spirit and 
body, but Satan’s speech cleverly describes his Augustinian “curiositas” as a wise and observant 
way of understanding God while simultaneously debunking the very fact that God created what 
he sees. All these points about Satan’s speech should lead us to one understanding about Satan—
he has a bad spiritual sight, he is a bad reader of God. Or, at least, he is a proponent of ruining 
spiritual sight by confusing spiritual seeing with the ready and easy visuality that he argues 
should reveal God’s presence without the painstaking process of self-examination and 
contemplation. Eve, however, has a good spiritual eye; unfortunately she is not using it, and 
Satan happens to get her before she even fully opens it. Thus, the wrong sight—the physical 
sight—captures her mind, and her mind’s eye is occupied by the sight of “curiositas”: “his words 
replete with guile/ Into her heart too easy entrance won:/ Fixed on the fruit she gazed, which to 
behold/ Yet rung of his persuasive words, impregned/ With reason, to her seeming, and with 
truth” (IX. 737-38). The gaze is fixed onto the thing visible—not with the spiritual eye, but with 
the corporeal eye. This passage, I would argue, exhibits the very reason for medieval 
philosophy’s ambivalence towards visuality; physical sight possesses the ability to blind and 
obstruct spiritual sight. Thus, Satan’s speech here perhaps suggests the poet’s gratitude, for the 
loss of his physical sight accords with Christianity’s fear—at least following the medieval 
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tradition—that the abundance of physical seeing could ruin one’s spiritual seeing. Even further, I 
might argue that here we see the expressions of concern from a poet who espouses the kind of 
patient, self-contemplative “inward” seeing that his poetry champions.  
 
5 CHAPTER 5: Inward Vision in Milton’s Samson Agonistes and Paradise Regained 
Instead of being told through the creator’s point of view, Book VIII of Paradise Lost 
presents the story of Adam’s creation recollected by Adam, the created. According to his 
memory, Adam says that after “new waked from soundest sleep,” he began to muse about what 
he sees “about [him] round”: “Hill, dale, and shady woods, and sunny plains,/ And liquid lapse 
of murmuring stream” (262-63). Adam does not know or cannot recall who he is or where he 
comes from: “But who I was, or where, or from what cause,/ Knew not; to speak I tried, and 
forthwith spake” (VIII. 270-71). Then, all of a sudden, he is able to call the sun by its name: “My 
tongue obeyed and readily could name/ Whate’er I saw. ‘Thou sun,’ said I, fair light” (VIII. 272-
73). Notably, after his “tongue obeyed and readily could name/ Whate’er [he] saw” (272-73), 
Adam is able to identify the things he sees “round” him and speak to them. Adam cannot say the 
names of what was “round” him at first, but once he was able to “name/ Whate’er [he] saw”—
the sun—he begins to talk to everything he sees around him: “Ye hills and dales, ye rivers, 
woods, and plains,/ And ye that live and move, fair creatures, tell,/ Tell, if ye saw, how came I 
thus, how here?/ Not of myself; by some great Maker then,/ In goodness and in power pre-
eminent” (275-79). Seeing the sun and its “fair light,” Adam calls its name out loud, making his 
first attempt at communication. Light leads Adam to awareness of himself and his surroundings. 
Closely looking at Adam’s encounter with light, I will attest that light described by Adam in 
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lines 260-290 in Book VIII signifies more than the illuminating physical light. Light leads to 
seeing, seeing begets communication, and finally communication results in narratives.  
Light revealed to Adam reveals what Adam sees, for light gives definition to the things 
Adam sees. How Adam wakes up and sees himself and the world further demonstrates how 
seeing portends the light in an intellectual or psychological sense of the word; opening one’s 
physical eye to the world illuminates and defines—or redefines—the meaning of self and the 
other. That Adam recollects seeing the light for the first time when telling the story of his 
creation is critical for our understanding of Milton’s insights on seeing as spiritual enlightenment 
in Paradise Lost. Adam’s recollection of seeing the world around him reveals the most basic yet 
the most comprehensive goal of seeing—telling. Seeing what is around him leads to a realization 
of the existence of “some great Maker” (278). This seeing prompts a narrative, and in this way 
seeing fulfills its greater potential—psychological enunciation of self and documentation of 
spiritual enlightenment. For example, in The Confessions of Saint Augustine, Augustine writes  
Let now the numerous variety of things furnish me some example. I behold the 
day-break, I foreshow, that the sun, is about to rise. What I behold, is present; 
what I foresignify, to come; not the sun, which already is; but the sun-rising, 
which is not yet. And yet did I not in my mind imagine the sun-rising itself (as 
now while I speak of it), I could not foretell it. But neither is that day-break which 
I discern in the sky, the sun-rising, although it goes before it; nor that imagination 
of my mind; which two are seen now present, that the other which is to be may be 
foretold. Future things then are not yet: and if they be not yet, they are not: and if 
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they are not, they cannot be seen; yet foretold they may be from things present, 
which are already, and are seen. (XI. 18. 24.)207 
Augustine’s reaction to “the day break” reveals that what one “behold[s]” now, which is 
“present,” isn’t all that telling is about; as his narrative above shows, while bending the horizon 
of time, telling comes to its existence. What one can “foresignify” is something “to come,” 
which the spiritual, immaterial eye can see beyond what is there or already there, like “the sun 
which already is,” even though “they cannot be seen.” Augustine interprets—foresignifies—the 
rise of the sun from seeing the day break.  
In Book VIII of Paradise Lost, after recognizing and identifying that what he sees is the 
light, Adam also foresignifies the presence of the sun, which is more interesting especially 
because Adam is able to identify and call out the name of the sun even though he has just seen 
the light. Yet something in Adam, something almost immanent, urges him to utter the words, 
“thou sun”: “tongue obeyed and readily could name/ Whate’er [he] saw” (VIII. 272-73). Looking 
at both Adam’s and Augustine’s reactions to the visible world, I notice that spiritual seeing needs 
a kind of visual stimulus to initiate a negotiation between the physical sight and the envisioned 
sight inside the mind. The visual element is immanent in the spiritual vision. Furthermore, that 
Adam is able to signify the sun “this happy light” (VIII. 285) supports that the sensory 
experience of seeing provides a vital aid in not only gaining but also articulating the material 
                                                 
207 The Confessions of Saint Augustine, translated with an introduction and notes by E. B. Pusey, 291. 
Various translations of St. Augustine’s Confessions do show variations, especially with the word “foresignify” in the 
passage I presented above. For instance, while Pusey says “What I behold, is present; what I foresignify, to come,” 
Chadwick’s 1991 version uses the word “forecasting” instead of “foresignify”: “What I am looking at is present, 
what I am forecasting is future” (Chadwick 234). F. J Sheed’s 1943 translation says the following: “What I am 
looking at is present, what I foretell is future” (Sheed 275). Although the differences between “foretell,” “forecast,” 
and “foresignify” might be small, I can’t ignore how “foretell” and “forecast” somehow flatten the sense of poetic—
verbal—incantation that comes through the word “foresignify.” Although some studies suggest Chadwick’s 
translation as more current and authoritative, I am partial to Pusey’s 1950 translation, so I am going to refer to 
Pusey’s 1950 translation throughout my study.  
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knowledge about the visible world as this knowledge adds to the content of Adam’s telling. But 
there is still one question: is “happy” what he sees, through his eyes? Where did the idea of 
modification come from, and where did the modifier come from? But then, where did this urge to 
say—“tongue obeyed and readily could name/ Whate’er [he] saw” (VIII. 272-73)—“thou sun” 
come from, after seeing and identifying light as the sun? Without knowing that the light he sees 
is the sun or is coming from the sun, Adam can “foresignify” the first visible object that he sees 
as his consciousness moves out of darkness to the light. Augustine has seen and known about the 
sun-rising, but Adam has just woken up from a sleep—at least this is what he recalls. Adam’s 
“foresignifying”—if we borrow Augustine’s term—is both more advanced and more nascent 
than what Augustine implies because it is never revealed how Adam gained his incipient 
knowledge about the “happy” sun after his very first awakening. Yet most importantly, both 
Augustine’s and Adam’s use of foresignification reveals that what they end up describing 
extends well beyond the material magnitude or quality of what one sees—signifying beforehand, 
simultaneously, or subsequently requires a prophetic sight. This differs greatly from “scientific” 
seeing, devoted to objective reproduction, and produces an entirely different sort of narrative or 
model concerning the material features of one’s surroundings.  
Clearly, in Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained, and Samson Agonistes, Milton underlines 
the potential for prophetic sight as the only kind of seeing that results in meaningful story, 
signifying and recording something beyond the physical eye’s ability to see. Seeing becomes 
knowing, and knowing propels telling. And telling is the most instrumental element of 
continuing and confirming faith. Sight is the tool needed for the construction of text, and the 
instrumentality of telling gets further developed and examined in Samson Agonistes, where the 
lack of sight—opting out from the abundance of seeing—helps Samson recollect his faith 
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through dark times. It is also equally intriguing that while optical devices were understood to be 
advancing and correcting human vision, as the microscope can allow observers to see the most 
subtle and small object invisible to the naked eye, Milton offers criticism against optic devices 
mirroring that in The Blazing World, where Cavendish points out the inorganic, clumsy, and 
perfunctory aspect of optical devices. It is even more noteworthy, perhaps, to point out the 
obvious; that the poet with his own diminishing eye sight makes a point about how optical 
devices rather magnify irregularities and unveil more imperfections of our own natural condition 
than our own natural sight, which can be full of imperfection. Both for the scientists and the 
poets, the goal is to present what they see. In that sense, optical devices and poetry assume a very 
similar objective—revealing and presenting what one sees. “By the help of Microscopes,” Robert 
Hooke argues in Micrographia, “there is nothing so small, as to escape inquiry; hence there is a 
new visible world discovered to the understanding.” The visible world definitely expanded, 
microscopically or macroscopically, as the scientific inventions and knowledge advanced, but 
the physical views of the world that became available through the optic aids still demanded 
vigorous acts of inward reasoning.  
As the quantitative increase in distance and scope of the world became visible with the 
advent of new science, it inspired a change in the conceptual view of the world. This increasing 
availability and accessibility of the physical world could not completely disprove the spiritual 
presence of the qualitative world, and such uncertainty towards constantly growing awareness of 
terra incognita foreshadowed the change in conventional perception of both the celestial and 
corporeal structure of the world, which furthermore influenced the philosophical view of the 
world. Various Renaissance poets and thinkers attest to the prosthetic instrumentality of optic 
devices such as the microscope and telescope that rather refract and diminish the human spirit 
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rather than enhance it; they were far more invested in poetry that explores intellectual subtlety 
and human imagination and hubris as an instrument of sight—surely, Milton and the other poets 
I discuss here not only recognize but also self-consciously caution that the continuity and 
diffraction between the mechanically-enhanced and natural sight may alter the attribute of 
sapientia in poetry. In Milton’s later poems such as Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes, 
the greater landscape or smallest detail that mechanically enhanced seeing can provide doesn’t 
portend either the moral or aesthetic quality of the narrative it tries to produce unless the sight is 
reckoned by the spiritual sight and told through the sight that is spiritually enhanced. Milton 
displays the mechanically enhanced sights as not only optical illusions but moral and spiritual 
deprivation, comparing the optic devices to the prosthetic eyes that only spiritually indigent 
creatures like Satan vaunt about owning and using. 
In “Augustine on Evolution, Time, and Memory,” John Caiazza examines Augustine’s 
interpretation of the Book of Genesis and detailed commentaries on “the time bound nature of 
physical and biological processes in relation to God’s creative action” (116).  Skeptics have 
argued the inconsistency of God’s creating light the first day and the sun and the moon on the 
third day, but as Caiazza points out, for those who wrote the script, it was more important to 
focus on “the [light’s] metaphoric role as the basis for understanding the universe, that is, as the 
sign and effect of God’s rationality” (117). The light unveils and teaches, through “sign and 
effect,” God’s work by performing the “metaphoric role” of making the signs visible and 
illuminating their meanings; light, then, ultimately is for reckoning God’s work, hence the 
“effect of God’s rationality.” How Milton presents Adam’s waking up, becoming aware of his 
surroundings, and seeing light reflects the process of reckoning “the sign and effect of God’s 
rationality” as the process eventually leads Adam to an action, when he “readily could name,” 
186 
that signifies the onset of his intelligence. That signification—the language being yielded or 
begotten by seeing light—of Adam’s coming to the realm of language demonstrates exactly the 
“light’s metaphoric role” Caiazza describes; the light as a metaphor should carry its observer to 
insightful illumination. Even though Adam says “who I was, or where, or from what cause, knew 
not,” Adam is able to name “whate’er [he] saw” right where he was illuminated by “whate’er 
[he] saw,” which reveals the metaphorical role of light as spiritual awakening and guidance. The 
light awakens something in Adam, and he “obey[s]”:“to speak I tried, and forthwith spake,/ My 
tongue obeyed and readily could name/ Whate’er I saw. Thou sun, said I, fair light” (VIII. 271-
73). Adam sees light, light illuminates and activates his mind, and Adam’s tongue “obey[s]” 
what his mind triggers him to “forthwith sp[e]ake.” Adam’s first encounter with light 
demonstrates how the “light’s metaphoric role” delivers “the sign and effect of God’s 
rationality” (Caizza 117).  
Adam’s description of the nearness and urgency of ubiquitous light further reveals the 
paradoxical nature of the “sign and effect of God’s rationality.” As a metaphorical sign, light 
suggests the inward and meditative illumination, but its material sign exists externally and comes 
to Adam from outside as he sees the world around him made visible by light; and to make the 
light’s illuminating effect complete and rational, Adam articulates what he sees through another 
form of materialized sign, the “name” of the “fair light” (VIII. 272-73).208 What was external is 
internalized, rationalized, and came back to its external state again. The sign of God’s rationality 
is farther away from Adam while the effect of God’s rationality occurs near Adam; more than 
                                                 
208 Moreover, as Adam makes clear, the light he refers to is “thou sun,” which is more than ubiquitous and 
almost pervasive; thus, the event foreshadows a possibility of Adam’s lack of insightful understanding at the point 
of seeing the light. I examine this point further where I compare seeing under the sun’s rather straight, intrusive light 
as non-poetic light, as opposed to seeing in the shade, and argue that opting out from the abundance of light is 
equivalent to seeing through the un-aided, natural eye, which will make us rely more on sapientia, while 
mechanically-enhanced seeing will rely more on an artificial, material aid of worldly knowledge that promotes 
physical enhancement and increase over spiritual depth. 
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near, it occurs in his mind. The mind’s interiority manifests the external sign into a proximate 
significance, proximate enough to embody our mind’s interiority and compact enough to fit and 
be articulated in these lines. What makes the external and material sign become internal and 
immaterial? What makes the physically immobile sign conceptually mobile? What Adam’s 
tongue obeys is sapientia, “the sign and effect of God’s rationality,” the immanent authority of 
spiritual interiority. And that spiritual interiority shapes the way one sees, turning the external 
and material sign into internal and immaterial significance—spiritual seeing directly influences 
the moral and aesthetic authority of telling. In this chapter, divided into three sections, I will 
examine Milton’s poems and discuss how spiritual and poetic seeing generates a more persuasive 
narrative and epistemological authority than mechanically enhanced seeing that promotes servile 
and insular narrative. Regardless of his physical blindness, Milton exhibited an aesthetic and 
moral vigor in his narrative that suggests that spiritual seeing affirms one’s poetic insight and 
religious faith, while mechanically enhanced observation or scientific examination often points 
to the kind of seeing that only works to analyze and disprove. 
5.1 Seeing as Expansion, Seeing as Examination 
The scene of Satan’s temptation of Eve reveals why logical reasoning can fail to defend 
and sustain against Satan’s manipulation of both the sensory system and human logic. Scientia, 
as opposed to sapientia, ascribes to the artificial and instrumental aspect of knowledge; this 
learned knowledge often challenges the inner knowledge attempting to create suspicion about, 
conceptualize, or even fabricate its antecedents. Seeing accompanied only by scientia is bound to 
perceive and suspect any unexplained prohibition supplementing ideology and class—why can’t 
Eve have the fruit, obtain knowledge, and live forever too? Scientia hinges upon using the sight 
to question and inspect, and as scientific knowledge increasingly became the key to 
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understanding the natural world, the mechanical enhancement of human sight signaled an 
inefficacy of the realm of religion and folk worship and thus the improbability of seeing the 
invisible world or of any scholastic examination of spirituality versus physicality. Sapientia 
became even more spiritual, too unreal, unless the spiritual world can be defined and measured 
in the same terms as the natural world. Catherine Wilson writes: 
Consider again the suggestion that the objectivity of science is a consequence of 
the perspective adopted by the mathematizing atomist who escapes both the 
inconsequentiality and discursiveness of the superficial performances of idle 
virtuosi and the illusions of subjectivity. And note first that the reductionist 
accounts of human perception and the elimination of sympathies and antipathies 
and other evident projections of the human psyche into nature were not the 
necessary accompaniments of atomism or mechanism. For Descartes, Galileo, and 
Boyle, mechanism and corpuscularianism were paired with sensory reductionism, 
the denial of real qualities. But Gassendi, Charleton, and for a time Thomas 
Hobbes, equally celebrated as moderns in their day, believed in visual species that 
they construed materially as icons, films, or idola, “decortications or sloughs,” 
which, emitted from the object, flew through the air like snakeskins carrying “an 
exact resemblance of all Lineaments and colours,” as Charleton described them, 
entered into the eye and mind, and so made us see. (Wilson 20)  
Wilson further points out that even seeing itself as sense perception became the target of 
Cartesian reductionism: “The doctrine that qualities are simply the effects of corpuscular 
arrangement was an additional hypothesis, in which the knowledge that the eye was somewhat 
like an optical device, a camera obscura that projected a picture on the back of the eye, had to be 
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forgotten. The new view was that the eye was responding to a pattern, as Descartes knew, of 
pressures” (20). Descartes believes that sight is “the most noble and universal” of human senses 
and that “there is no doubt that the inventions which serve to improve its power are the most 
useful which can exist” (from Dioptrique, qtd. in Wilson 20-21).209 Yet this kind of classification 
of seeing as the mechanical means that serves merely our sensory perception implies that “seeing 
is essentially servile” (Wilson 21).  
Under the aid of optical technology and scientific knowledge, seeing, as a sensory 
experience becomes even more servile as the distance necessary for conceptualizing and 
imagining what could be seen but hasn’t been seen gets diminished. If sensory experience only 
informs one’s physical condition and controls how one conducts his or her life, then the 
knowledge one possesses about the physical world becomes suspect of being tenuous and false. 
Perhaps these scientists do the work of philosophy, disarranging and unnaturalizing by 
questioning and analyzing, not relying on the given nature of things. Unfortunately, as I will 
argue, trying to reinforce the atomic reality of our existence cannot allow a room for “the 
illusions of subjectivity” and “human perception”; once the optic inventions try to prove the 
material reality of our existence by improving our seeing, seeing indeed becomes “essentially 
servile.” Atomic reality will eventually encourage, as Wilson asserts above, “the elimination of 
                                                 
209 In his short treatise published in 1637 titled Dioptrique or Optics, René Descartes presents his purely 
mechanical optical theory, which argues that our visual experience should match the physical objects we see: 
“Hence you will have no reason to conclude that there is no need to suppose that something material passes from 
objects t our eyes to make us see colours and light, or even that there is something in the objects which resembles 
the ideas or sensations that we have of them. In just the same way, when a blind man feels the bodies, nothing has to 
issue from the bodies and pass along his stick to his hand; and the resistance or movement of the bodies, which is the 
sole cause of the sensations he has of them, is nothing like the ideas he forms of them. By this means, your mind 
will be delivered from all those little images flitting through the air, called ‘intentional forms,’ which so exercise the 
imagination of the philosophers” (Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings 58-59). Furthermore, looking out to 
the stars and the moon or looking at the microscopic details of our body or the “little images flitting through the air,” 
as Descartes describes them, appears to deflect introspection and take away from the Christian ideal of self-
examination. 
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sympathies and antipathies” and the evacuation of spiritual reality; once sensory experience is 
deemed unstable, then natural seeing without any artificial aid becomes not only suspect but also 
subservient to mechanically enhanced seeing. Mechanism and corpuscularianism, or sensory 
reductionism, can’t fully explain how the material experience can induce something immaterial. 
As with Hobbes and Gassendi, yet more material constructions are needed to signal and point at 
the immaterial, such as “icons, films, or idola, ‘decortications or sloughs’” (Wilson 20).  Hooke 
argues that “every considerable improvement of Telescopes or Microscopes [produces] new 
worlds and terra incognita’s to our view” because he believes these scopic devices will not only 
expand the scope of visuality but also increase and improve the detail and quality of visuality. 
Even further, “by the help of Microscopes,” Hooke argues in The Preface to Micrographia, 
“there is nothing so small, as to escape inquiry; hence there is a new visible world discovered to 
the understanding” (sig. A2v). However, a microscopic view simply provides one of many 
additional perspectives, as Wilson argues: 
 And this is indeed a conclusion one might derive from leafing through the 
 Micrographia. We are told there, because we could not otherwise guess it, that  
what we are seeing are bits and fragments of familiar substances—moss, mold, 
and vermin—presented under an unfamiliar aspect. Mold looks like a lunar forest, 
a flea looks like a crustacean, and so on. We might as well be seeing new 
landscapes and new forms of life; only their labels identify them. And from this 
one might then infer that the microscope can give us no information—or at least 
no direct information—about our macroscopic world and its objects, except 
information of the general form “this is how it looks under the microscope.” 
(Wilson 244) 
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If “there is a new visible world discovered,” as Hooke says, and the purpose of scientific 
instruments such as the microscope is to enhance the human sight and make the visible more 
clear and perceivable to the physical eye so that the visible becomes more than just visible, then 
shouldn’t these instruments make “a new visible world” understandable to the mind as well? And 
by saying “understandable,” I mean to reveal and teach the viewer new knowledge about this 
“new world”?  Yet, the instrument cannot show more than a material texture under “an 
unfamiliar aspect,” that is, under the microscope; as Wilson says above, “what we are seeing are 
bits and fragments of familiar substances—moss, mold, and vermin—presented under an 
unfamiliar aspect.” Can a microscope inform viewers that the presented images—often little 
more than textures—they see through a microscope are more than just a texture, that they are 
indeed “mold” or “a flea” even though they might look like “a lunar forest” or “a crustacean”? 
How do viewers identify what they see through a microscope after all? Most observers, when 
presented with “a new world” in front of them, respond with a consistent and similar process of 
recognition and assimilation—“that looks like so and so”—to make the unfamiliar familiar as 
they remember aspects of the old familiar world and compare them to this new world in front of 
them. In Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life, Steven Shapin 
and Simon Schaffer suggest that Hooke envisions his scientific instruments as serving both 
instructive and editorial duties upon human senses and, furthermore, to inform human reasoning: 
“Scientific instruments therefore imposed both a correction and a discipline upon the senses. In 
this respect the discipline enforced by devices such as the microscope and the air-pump was 
analogous to the discipline imposed upon the senses by reason. The senses alone were 
inadequate to constitute proper knowledge, but the senses disciplined were far more fit to the 
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task” (37).210 Shapin and Schaffer further note: “Things would be seen that were previously 
invisible: the rings of Saturn, the mosaic structure of the fly’s eye, spots on the sun. And other 
things, essentially invisible, would be given visual manifestations: the pressure of the air, 
aqueous and terrestrial effluvia” (37). However, even though what was “previously invisible” 
can become visible through the scientific instruments, the microscopic view remains as another 
example of “visual manifestations” still to be figured out and identified by the human mind. The 
unreliability of the human senses, combined with the realization of the artificiality of the 
machines, perhaps lead us to ponder the following question: how can human beings with the 
infirmities of human senses recognize or identify good from evil, or Satan in the disguise of a 
serpent, when they can’t even see well enough through their natural eyes?  
In his very brief mention of the microscope in Paradise Regained Milton in his restrained 
voice presents his objection to such a claim that one can expand and increase the quality of 
human sight with a mechanical instrument. Brief and rather ambiguous, Satan’s mentioning of a 
microscope still deserves a detailed analysis. In his gaudy descriptions of the site of political 
power, which he uses to tempt Christ, Satan reveals that power stretches as far as one can see, 
and in his case, he can see quite far: 
there the Capitol thou seest 
Above the rest lifting his stately head  
                                                 
210 Shapin and Schaffer argue that “the power of new scientific instruments, the microscope and telescope 
as well as the air-pump, resided in their capacity to enhance perception and to constitute new perceptual objects” in 
Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (36). Indeed, even though “a crustacean” 
might not be the view of a new world, one must take this into consideration—seen through a natural eye, a flea 
would appear as a speck, nothing like a crustacean. Shapin and Simon further point out: “The experimental 
philosophy, empiricist and inductivist, depended upon the generation of matters of fact that were objects of 
perceptual experience. Unassisted senses were limited in their ability to discern and to constitute such perceptual 
objects. Boyle himself reckoned ‘that the Informations of Sense assisted and highlighted by Instruments are usually 
preferable to those of Sense alone’” (36). As Shapin and Simon point out, Hooke believed that “scientific 
instruments enlarged the senses” and thus opened up a new, wider and more detailed view of the world that a natural 
eye cannot see: “In Hooke’s view, the task was one of remedying the ‘infirmities’ of the human senses” (36). 
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On the Tarpeian rock, her citadel 
Impregnable, and there Mount Palatine 
 The imperial palace, compass huge, and high 
 The structure, skill of noblest architects, 
 With gilded battlements, conspicuous far,  
Turrets and terraces, and glittering spires. 
Many a fair edifice besides, more like  
Houses of gods (so well I have disposed  
My airy microscope) thou may’st behold  
Outside and inside both, pillars and roofs 
Carved work, the hand of famed artificers 
In cedar, marble, ivory or gold. (IV. 47-60) 
Satan here says that he has “disposed” his “airy microscope” because “the imperial palace” 
seems to be so much “more like/ houses of gods”; in other words, “the imperial palace” 
possesses such characteristics of divinity—“houses of gods”—with “many a fair edifice” and 
“pillars and roofs/Carved work, the hand of famed artificers/ In cedar, marble, ivory or gold.” 
This is an unusual use of the trope of the microscope, especially because the idea of a 
microscope’s being “airy” doesn’t quite make sense right away. The word “airy,” just as with 
Milton’s use of the word “happy” in Paradise Lost that I discussed previously, seems too 
conspicuous within its context. OED offers various definitions and uses of the word “airy,” the 
most obvious of which describes a state of being “in the air” or “of or belonging to the air, esp. 
as distinguished from the earth, water, etc.; living or located in the air” or “located high in the 
air, lofty” or being “exalted” and “celestial” (OED, I. 1. and 2.). When interpreted with this 
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intended meaning, “airy microscope” could simply mean looking into something from above, up 
in the air, up in the sky, so that Satan is bragging about his panoramic, eagle’s eye view upon the 
imperial palace. However, the word also has some other significant connotations, such as “being 
the nature of air,” either exhibiting the “consistency or appearance” of air to mean an “airlike” or 
“immaterial” condition of something or being “composed of air” to signify “soft” or a “spongy” 
state (OED. II. 5. a-b). The connotation that I am most interested in discussing here, however, is 
one that is depreciative, which represents a condition that is “intangible” or “insubstantial” or 
“slight”; it further could refer to a person’s “empty character” or judgment to mean something 
“superficial, shallow” and even further, “speculative, conjectural” (OED. II. 6. a-c).  
There can be many explanations why Satan mentions this new scientific instrument to 
make his point about the great details of the interior and exterior decor of the imperial palace. 
One of the immediate and obvious explanations that come to mind is to bolster and hyperbolize 
the exquisite details of these palaces to influence and persuade Christ. Satan “disposed” his “airy 
microscope” because every small detail of these imperial palaces is so meticulously constructed 
that they are even more apparent when magnified. Descriptions like “Turrets and terraces, and 
glittering spires” and “pillars and roofs/Carved work” further suggest height, implying the bird’s-
eye view or a wide open perspective from high above. And if Satan were indeed looking down to 
these palaces, the details must look small—thus the need for “microscope” to magnify the small 
details. However, considering the size of objects that can go underneath the magnifying glass, 
why would Satan want to use a microscope to look at something “conspicuous far”? Satan makes 
a point that he flies so high and is located somewhere up high enough that he has to look at the 
details of these “huge” palaces through a microscope. By signifying the magnitude of these 
imperial palaces and their political and economic power—“the Capitol thou seest/ Above the rest 
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lifting his stately head / On the Tarpeian rock, her citadel/ Impregnable, and there Mount 
Palatine/ The imperial palace, compass huge”—Satan further implies his own “impregnable” 
power that supposedly resides “above the rest lifting his stately head” (IV.48-50). He is after all 
as powerful as how much he can see. As I pointed out earlier, implication of the height is the key 
here. His self-positioning above all the rest of a miniscule world reveals Satan’s thirst for vanity 
and self-aggrandizement, and his birds-eye view descriptions of the imperial palaces might 
indeed demonstrate that Satan does possess the power of such towering and immense sight, but it 
also reveals that his power is only as powerful as where he positions himself to be. And let us not 
forget, he has “disposed [his] airy microscope” (IV. 56-57). The magnificent details of the 
imperial palaces that Satan is able to see and describe, without the airy microscope or any 
mechanical aid, demonstrate the material beauty and political power of the edifices themselves, 
but they offer not much to prove Satan’s power, not even his seeing power, except for the fact 
that he can fly high.   
In fact, one must wonder about the following: a microscope is used to see objects that 
appear too small for the naked eye, so why doesn’t Satan use a telescope to see palaces that are 
remote and larger than himself, instead of a microscope? In fact, Satan does mention “telescope” 
a few lines before he mentions his “airy microscope” in Book 4, line 56-57 of Paradise 
Regained. While he has “disposed” his microscope because the details of the palaces were so 
“well” constructed that they were “conspicuous far,” he still finds the telescope necessary to use 
in lines 40-42: 
On each side an imperial city stood,  
With towers and temples proudly elevate 
On seven small hills, with palaces adorned, 
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Porches and theatres, baths, aqueducts, 
Statues and trophies, and triumphal arcs,  
Gardens and groves presented to his eyes, 
Above the heighth of mountains interposed. 
By what strange parallax or optic skill 
Of vision multiplied through air, or glass 
Of telescope, were curious to inquire: 
And now the Tempter thus his silence broke. (IV. 33-43) 
Notice how Satan’s picturesque description of what he calls “long but in breadth not wide” (IV. 
27) in the lines above contrasts with the specific and illustrated depiction of the city in lines 44-
59, presented earlier. The description of the imperial city above provides pastoral scenery, open 
and idyllic, that is also synchronized by monuments and landmarks. Lines 35-38 demonstrate a 
sense of balance between nature and man-made artificial edifice, rhythmically listed: “On seven 
small hills, with palaces adorned,/ Porches and theatres, baths, aqueducts,/ Statues and trophies, 
and triumphal arcs.” On the contrary, in lines 44-59 where Satan describes the “outside and 
inside both” (58), the proper names and specific names of things and places dominate his 
description: “On the Tarpeian rock, her citadel/ Impregnable, and there Mount Palatine/ The 
imperial palace, compass huge” (49-51), “Turrets and terraces, and glittering spires./ Many a fair 
edifice besides, more like/ Houses of gods” (54-56), or “Outside and inside both, pillars and 
roofs/ Carved work, the hand of famed artificers/ In cedar, marble, ivory or gold” (58-60). The 
broad patterns of the pastoral landscape are marked by the elements of human civilization to 
create boundaries and definitions for Satan to want to see more—something more than a 
continuous pattern of green pasture or stream of water or mountains. Satan cleverly mentions the 
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telescope for seeing “long but in breadth not wide” (27), but when speaking of minute details he 
knows he is supposed to use a microscope.  
No matter how high Satan flies, however, the cities are not getting small enough to fit 
under the microscope. How can one fit “Turrets and terraces, and glittering spires” underneath 
the magnifying glass? Satan’s statement is full of inconsistencies. When he says “I have 
disposed/ My airy microscope,” he still admits that he needs some kind of optical instrument to 
look at smaller details inside the palace—yet he is not even near the palace. Nothing that he 
describes in the first 60 lines or so in Book 4 is small enough to be under a microscope. He has 
removed himself so far away by flying high above the city that he will need a telescope to see the 
details of the palace. To top it all off, he speaks of the wrong instrument to do so. The fact that 
Satan thinks of a microscope in a situation where he is looking at things “huge” enough to be 
“conspicuous far” exemplifies his voracious appetite for self-aggrandizement and magnification 
of his power. The higher and farther he is from the objects he wants to see, the more power from 
his panoramic view he can get. So why does Satan use a microscope instead of telescope to look 
at things “conspicuous far,” and what does it say about Satan’s sight?  Magnifying small details 
is not the main goal for him because he is concerned with bigger things; he doesn’t want to be in 
the position of the lower and smaller—he still wants to be above “the rest,” high up to be able to 
possess all the views. This is why a telescope won’t do—Satan can’t accept the fact that he is the 
smaller component of the universe that needs to look up and zoom in to realize that there is a 
wider and bigger universe out there.  
Nonetheless, the  telescope is being mentioned in line 42 as the “optic skill” that Satan 
would occupy to obtain the sight “curious to inquire” (42-32), even though somehow Satan 
switches from telescope to microscope—obviously a wrong switch—while looking at the remote 
198 
site of the imperial palace. Satan’s arrogance and ambition make him contradict himself. He 
wants to show off how much he can see, so he says he sees something so remote that it will take 
a telescope to satiate his curiosity; however, he won’t admit his need for a telescope because he 
wants to exaggerate the magnitude of his height and size. Thus he quickly switches to “an airy 
microscope,” as if all the remote details of the city he sees from the sky are so small that he can 
fit them under his special optic device. It is noteworthy that Satan mentions the two optic 
instruments in close proximity to each other—lines 42 and 57—albeit the telescope appears in 
the lines where Satan muses to himself while the microscope appears in his speech to Christ. 
First of all, these instruments are both optic devices designed to enhance the limited sight, the 
human sight, which suggests that Satan’s sight is limited, just like that of humans. On the other 
hand, this could also mean Satan’s own thirst for material power restrains his ability to see. 
Furthermore, Satan’s topographical musings point to the attributes of a verse genre characterized 
by the description of a particular landscape; the prospect poem uses a common motif in poetry 
and hymnody, often viewed from a height. Prospects often portray a distant, heavenly site that 
displays the common aesthetic attributes such as pastoral and sublime imagery. Since 
topographical poetry often indirectly contemplates cultural or social issues or addresses a 
political issue concerning the fashioning of an English national identity, poets used the poetic 
descriptions of the landscape as a poetic vehicle to express political or social concerns as well as 
to blend and seek compromise between extremes. These poetic descriptions present peaceful and 
paradisal scenery, distant enough from the observer that the observer can obtain the aerial view, 
yet close enough to be seen and described by the observer. Both devices, telescope and 
microscope, require not only the observer but also the object to be on a certain plane or space for 
the observation to occur, which in turn strictly limits one’s perspective. Seeing through the 
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natural eye, on the other hand, might not provide sights as accurate or fixed as those provided 
through the optical instruments, but it does provide multiple perspectives. Thus Satan probably 
can only see “long, but in breadth not wide,” for telescopes and microscopes do not have the 
optic ability to show a wide scope of things. By examining these perplexing descriptions of 
Satan’s use of optic instruments, we see that Satan contradicts himself in order to inflate his 
account of his power and to persuade Christ. Because Satan wants to prove to Christ that he can 
be as high and far from any earthly existence as he is above “the heighth of mountains 
interposed” (39), he has to vaunt the distance—height—that enables him to obtain certain sight 
of the city, and the telescope signifies the distance and remoteness; however, because he doesn’t 
want to perceive himself smaller than the world, he has to gain more height and be on top of the 
imperial city so that he can look down on it and use the “microscope” as if the city and its 
content are too small for him.  
This brings me back to Milton’s own blindness—actually, more about the idea of lacking 
one of the most significant human senses and how this lack of physical sight could enhance the 
power of the spiritual sight. What Satan lacks, I would like to argue, Christ has in bounty. 
Though Satan might be able to see multitudinous things, his perspectives are limited. He might 
be able to see things through a panoramic view, flying above, but he cannot see the interiors that 
are small or hidden unless the details are made visible by human endeavor or divine operation. 
Thus, reading the “airy microscope” as something “intangible” or “insubstantial” or “slight” or 
even “superficial, shallow” and even further, “speculative, conjectural” (OED. II. 6. a-c) makes 
more sense, especially when this earthly mechanical device is paired with Satan in the poem.211 I 
                                                 
211 This pairing, I would argue, further reveals Milton’s skeptical view of the newly created scientific 
instruments and their advances that thwart a human perspective that is less intrusive and manipulative. For example, 
in New Science, New World, Denise Albanese examines Milton’s suspicion towards the newly developed optical 
instruments and suggests that Milton might indicate that such “optic skill” is “the Devil’s work” after all (129).  
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would argue that lack of good sight for Satan is also demonstrated in his lack of knowing which 
instrument he should use for the different objects. Even the new science employing the optical 
instruments of Galileo is unable to help Satan distinguish or trace the spatial depth or difference. 
That he is able only to describe a nebulous and unreliable view of paradisal prospect 
foreshadows Satan’s dismal fate that he will always remain remote and exiled from Paradise. 
However, as I will discuss later, Satan does not admit he is responsible for his own future as he 
covets earthly power with his physical sight. Without prophetic insight, he cannot see the sign or 
the indicator that he will fail to tempt Christ. The only thing he relies on is his own experience, 
and the past experience of winning over Eve gives him the reason to believe he can win again. 
Thus Satan is perplexed by his continuous failure in tempting Christ; as shown in Book 4 of 
Paradise Regained, Satan is “perplexed and troubled at his bad success/ The Tempter stood, nor 
had what to reply,/ Discovered in his fraud, thrown from his hope,/ So oft, and the persuasive 
rhetoric/ That sleeked his tongue, and won so much on Eve,/ So little here, nay lost” (IV. 1-6). 
Most importantly, Milton also points to Satan’s weakness, for Satan is “self-deceived and rash” 
(IV. 7-8).  
In Paradise Lost Satan looks at the right object using the right glass—a telescope for 
stars—while positioned correctly, looking up at the stars that are far “above all hills,” but in 
Paradise Regained Satan’s actions around the instruments indicate his tenuous knowledge of the 
instruments and his negligence about their use: “By what strange parallax or optic skill,/ Of 
telescope, were curious to inquire” (IV. 40-42). Perhaps it is because he is “self-deceived and 
rash” and that Satan is too anxious to pass up the opportunity to use the help from any apparatus 
to enhance his sight and further to secure his chance of persuading Christ. Furthermore, as if 
Satan became too anxious to trust that Galileo’s glass would be enough, he says he has a 
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microscope in hand, which he later disposes anyway (lines 40-42 and 56-57). Maura Brady, in 
“Galileo in Action: The ‘Telescope’ in Paradise Lost,” aptly describes the applied, additional, or 
added artificial aspect of Satan’s use of optic devices as his “prosthetic” sight, a term I find 
especially appropriate and will borrow for my discussion.212 Satan’s sight is limited because he 
can only see through his physical eye as most humans do with their non-spiritual sight, which 
proves why Satan desperately wants to have an access to these artificial devices. However, 
Milton makes it very clear that there is no ex machina that can help one possess spiritual sight if 
one is only aware of physical sight. The vision that one gains from a “prosthetic” apparatus 
cannot readily supply knowledge as comprehensive as the organic sight can. Too small or too 
big, the images from microscope or telescope are partial to a bigger entity—they are pieces that 
must be joined together to make sense and even to be used to create a hypothesis. Not to 
mention, there is always the machine in between the observer’s eye and the object. The 
mechanically enhanced sight, Brady insists, is obstructive compared to our regular human vision 
because it is external, an additional application from outside to enhance what ends up being most 
internal, vision. Satan with his attempt to qualify his limited earthly vision by using the 
mechanically enhanced vision therefore confirms that his vision only possesses “the very 
mechanisms of vision for the human observer,” what Brady describes “would obstruct the view 
of a celestial being.”213   
The vision that Christ possesses is a prophetic vision, not a prosthetic vision.  To Satan 
who tries to tempt Christ with a prospect of imperial grandeurs, Christ replies: 
 Nor doth this grandeur and majestic show 
                                                 
212 Maura Brady, “Galileo in Action: The ‘Telescope’ in Paradise Lost,” Milton Studies 44 (2005), 148. 
Brady describes: “When read as prosthetic to the observer’s body, the ‘glass of Galileo’ approaches angelic sight by 
augmenting fallible human vision” (148).  
213 Ibid. 
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 Of luxury, though called magnificence, 
 More than of arms before, allure mine eye, 
 Much less my mind; though thou shouldst add to tell  
Their sumptuous gluttonies, and gorgeous feasts 
On citron tables or Atlantic stone; 
(For I have also heard, perhaps have read) 
Their wives of Sertia, Cales, and Falerne, 
Chios and Crete, and how they quaff in gold, 
Crystal and myrrhine cups embossed with gems 
And studs of pearl, to me shouldst tell 
Who thirst and hunger still. (IV. 110-21) 
Christ finds Satan’s evidence for his argument not only erroneous but also unmoving. All the 
physical luxury Satan describes is uninspiring to Christ because even though the physical 
“grandeur and majestic show/ Of luxury” does “allure [his] eye,” the material “magnificence” 
merely appeals to his physical eye but “much less [his] mind” (IV. 110-11, 112, 113). The 
“magnificence” refers to material exaltation and lavishness, which does not impress Christ’s 
spiritual eye, though he admits that his physical eye does notice the magnitude of the empire’s 
material greatness. Christ’s response is surprisingly honest and humble; notice how he candidly 
informs Satan that he knows about the earthly subjects: “for I have also heard, perhaps have 
read”—especially when compared to Satan’s over-confidence and pertinacious attitude toward 
his constant failure to convince Christ. What Christ knows from hearing and reading, like the 
knowledge gained from external sources constructed by others, moves “much less [his] mind.” 
Satan remembers his victory against Eve and believes he can trick Christ as well, making him 
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“perplexed and troubled” at his failure (IV. 1). If Satan had possessed a prophetic vision, he 
would have known that he cannot tempt Christ; even though Satan’s “prosthetic vision” still 
provides nebulous vision, his lack of spiritual vision makes it impossible for him to turn his eyes 
onto himself. The prosthetic vision provided through optic devices not only fails to enhance 
natural vision, but it can also obfuscate our chance to achieve prophetic vision on our own.  
Satan’s ambivalent and erratic delineations of the imperial city in Paradise Regained 
suggest that Satan values power to possess a variety of different sights over the validity or 
accuracy of the sight (IV. 40-60).  Perhaps Milton suggests that, whether with or without the help 
of optic devices, Satan is doomed, banned from the site of Paradise that he covets and longs for 
through his eyes. No matter what instrument Satan possesses, not only is the Paradise still far 
away from him, but the optic technology is also questionable; thus he cannot obtain a good 
physical view of Paradise. The telescope’s technological imperfection was well-known during 
Milton’s time, partly explaining the moral and epistemological paucity associated with Galileo’s 
instrument in Milton’s writing. More importantly, the blurry and ambiguous sights in Paradise 
Lost and Paradise Regained are often hyperbolized and espoused by Satan, foreshadowing his 
earthly and selfish desire to possess abundance of sight, even if faulty. In his anxious mind Satan 
thinks that even though the distance is “long” he can still take it all in because it is “in breadth 
not wide” (IV. 27). Again, this clearly demonstrates what is inside and outside of Satan; inside is 
the abundance of corporeal desire and anguish but the absence of spiritual insight; thus there is 
always a paradise outside of him where he cannot be physically while there is no paradise inside 
of him, which completely alienates him from paradise physically and spiritually. Desperate, 
Satan attempts to use any power, any machine, or any apparatus to be near Paradise, but until he 
can possess the inner spiritual light, he remains blind to the true sight of Paradise. Satan’s 
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description of the heavenly view of the imperial city’s prospect reveals Milton’s criticism of 
human artifice and the tenuous and artificial truths that it provides, which exemplify the lost and 
abandoned site of Satan’s mind. Satan is physically distant from and absent in Paradise; thus he 
is always in need of external devices to connect himself to the site; however, Satan’s mind longs 
for paradise too, though it is absent of any ability to host or to train any inner light that can lead 
him to the inner Paradise. Satan embodies physical and spiritual mayhem.  
Milton’s view of the new scientific discovery and its impact on morality and 
epistemology is closely linked to his co-existing Augustinian and monist materialist beliefs. 
Considering all the concepts of moral and epistemological accuracy, certainty, and empirical 
probability, we see that Milton’s poetry demonstrates moral and epistemological accuracy by 
being certain in his religious beliefs but not entirely in empirical probability. Satan’s moral and 
epistemological inaccuracy is revealed by his uncertainty—his reliance to the optic devices and 
what they might show, which reveals Satan’s lack of confidence in using his own physical sight 
alone. He does not trust his own sight, even when the blind poet exhibits incredible certainty in 
his insight. Satan’s sight is bound to his own greedy desire to see everything at once, and Satan 
has no time to ponder or contemplate what he sees. His wanting to see more obviates him from 
obtaining moral and epistemological clarity, resulting in epistemological darkness and moral 
anguish. Again, with his scarce inner knowledge, Satan fails to achieve the knowledge of the 
other, what is outside of him, such as God or goodness, whose moral and epistemological order 
doesn’t skip time. Satan’s ambiguous seeing method shows that he readily sees vast earthly 
establishments but fails to comprehend God conceptually. Therefore, lines 40-60 demonstrate a 
permutation of sights, stretched out through deduction or focused through magnification, yet 
always induced by Satan’s own anxiety to override Christ and persuade him.  
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5.2 Seeing as Anticipating, Seeing as Believing 
Milton’s belief concerning physical and spiritual sight is rather simple. One’s bad 
physical sight might not hinder one’s spiritual sight, but one’s bad spiritual sight will obstruct 
one’s physical sight. For instance, in Sonnet 22, Milton writes that even though he is unable to 
see the world through his physical eyes, he still imagines how the world perceives him. Unable 
to look outside of himself, his vision is more than inward bound—it is turned so inwardly that it 
deceives, that it does not show the abundance of his spiritual sight to “outward view,” to the eyes 
that seek only material sights to prove; he is protected in his own darkness, which blinds the 
“outward view” by the others, who would look for “blemish or spot” but wouldn’t see it. 
Cyriack, this three years’ day these eyes, though clear  
To outward view, of blemish or of spot, 
Bereft of light their seeing have forgot, 
Nor to their idle orbs doth sight appear 
Of sun or moon or star throughout the year, 
Or man or woman. Yet I argue not 
Against Heaven’s hand or will, nor bate a jot 
Of heart or hope, but still bear up and steer 
Right onward. What supports me dost thou ask? (Sonnet 22, 1-9) 
“The conscience,” the poet says to his friend, is “what supports [him]” (line 10). This conscience 
drives and leads the poet straight into the storm; instead of retreating from the storm, he says he 
will “still bear up and steer/ Right onward” (8). An outward distortion, the loss of physical sight, 
induces an inward disruption and internal grafting of the mind, but through contemplative and 
faithful reasoning, the poet finds himself in a shielded orb that is his faith and imagination, 
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sailing and not lost, with a firm sense of direction as he will “bear up and steer/ Right onward.” 
Even though his eyes appear “clear/ To outward view,” the poet knows his blind eyes are full of 
blemishes and opacities as they are “bereft of light” (3). Only the poet knows “thir seeing have 
forgot” as he is looking out and experiencing the darkness—“bereft of light”—from inside out. 
The poet not only identifies his eyes being “idle orbs,” but the “idle orbs” are what his blind eyes 
can physically see—close your eyes and describe what appears before your eyes. In Sonnet 22 
the description of the poet’s sight is so intricately developed as he begins to describe his anguish, 
doubt, acceptance, and hope; the poet moves back to his inner self, articulating his emotional 
thoughts—he will “argue not” and “nor bate a jot/ Of heart or hope” (7-8). When the poet says 
he will “still bear up and steer/ Right onward,” the readers are led back to the sight of amplified 
action or demonstration, that is, exteriority, again. The exteriority and interiority of this image is 
paramount to understand how the poet defines his blindness. Physical sight only recognizes his 
eyes being “idle,” being unable to see; therefore, nothing occurs in the world of a blind person, 
as the blind eye balls embody “idle orbs” (4).  
Milton’s Sonnet 22 demonstrates how the abundance of spiritual sight triumphs over the 
physical blindness by juxtaposing the subtle but fundamental difference between what the poet 
sees and what he imagines—the differences that constitute exteriority and interiority of the poet 
and how the world might perceive his blindness, while readers are led by his imagination that 
envisions how he appears to the outside world. The poet’s thoughts remain protected from “the 
world’s vain masque,” for while they move from inside to outside of the poet, what the poet sees, 
despite his being blind, is not bound or limited by the physical dimensions, but rather, his 
blindness allows the poet to move freely between the sights imagined and seen. This oscillation 
between inside and outside also helps the poet articulate the necessary distance and separation 
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between the inner and outer world that the blind poet must maintain in order for his inner spirit to 
remain pure and strong against the worldly infirmities and temptations. The poet is thrown into 
such harsh, unfortunate storms, and the waves of criticism regarding Milton’s failed reformation 
effort rise from “side to side” (line 12), which signifies another external movement that is seen 
and occurs in the world distant from the poet. The poet believes it is “Heaven’s hand or will” that 
creates the storm, and he, through his conscience, decides to “bear up and steer/ Right onward” 
(7 and 8-9). Paired with human elements that control, guide, and intend, this divine authority 
tests the poet’s unbreakable faith and devotion that the poet attests for his future poetic and 
religious career.  The poet’s blindness yields an internal source of spiritual strength in Sonnet 22, 
which Milton describes as “[his] noble task”; reading Milton’s poems inspires the readers to 
wonder how the poet fulfills this “noble task” through his poetic works once he became blind: 
readers come to realize the lack of physical sight does not hinder his spiritual journey as he is 
“content though blind,” protected from “the world’s vain masque” (Sonnet 22, lines 13-14). His 
works are even more focused on the sight of the invisible world and the subject of a “noble task” 
against the worldly temptation in the works I will examine later. In Paradise Lost, Paradise 
Regained, and Samson Agonistes Milton clearly shows that his sight deficiency is only physically 
bound, and so is the limitation of it.  
That which could be seen and understood through the spiritual sight has fewer limitations 
physically and spiritually because of the support of his “conscience” (Sonnet 22, line 10). For the 
poet who does not have physical sight, “Bereft of light” and “idle” signify neither limitations nor 
impassiveness; his blindness yields a chance for the poet to become more productive, to open up 
the spiritual eye and subscribe to spiritual sight. His conscience leads the poet to “still bear up 
and steer/ Right onward”; the poet promises that he will never give up, that he will never let 
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himself dwindle. The word “steer” typically signifies an action to “guide a vessel by means of a 
rudder or the like” or “to guide a vessel in a certain direction; to sail or row towards a specified 
place” (OED, 2. a. and c.). Yet the word “steer” is nuanced with mechanical conduct and 
operation that guides “something that is in motion”; according to OED it also signifies an action 
“to guide (a chariot, a horse, cattle, etc.),” “to guide (a plough),” or “to guide the course of (a 
vehicle, a bicycle, a balloon, etc.) by mechanical means; to guide (a floating object) by taking 
advantage of a current” (OED, 3. a, b, & c). Besides the machines and vehicles being mentioned 
above, there is one more possibility for the kind of vehicle that Milton might “steer” to “right 
onward”—to steer and write onward with his pen. The nautical conceit as a metaphor for writing 
becomes even more convincing when the line is read out loud. The pairing of the words “bear” 
and “steer” is peculiar, as there is initially a sense of less movement while the latter suggests the 
application of force to lead and move.214 The word “bear” clearly implies forces being held in, as 
it signifies thrusting down or holding against the external forces or weights; yet the word “steer” 
expresses a sense of external projection of inner desire or will. Reading the line out loud, one 
should notice there is a timely line break, which makes the reader pause, just before “Right 
onward.” This purposeful line break further yields a fresh start for the next phrase “Right 
onward” at the beginning of the new line. Clearly, this is the blind poet’s declaration that he will 
still keep writing and continue his poetic and religious journey despite of the loss of his physical 
sight. “The conscience,” then, could represent a kind of spiritual arbiter, or even the watchful eye 
of the conscientious and contemplative mind (sonnet 22, line 10). Note that this conscientious 
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mind of the poet is aware of how “all Europe talks from side to side” (12) about “[his] noble 
task” that is “overplied/ In liberty’s defense” and has ended in vain (10-11). Though the poet is 
dejected by “the world’s vain masque” (13), the sonnet’s last line also suggests a sign of hope 
and even gratitude that shows how the poet overcomes self-criticism and self-doubt by realizing 
that the physical blindness has shielded him from “the world’s vain masque” and the severity of 
its worldly judgment that could have made him even more self-conscious had he still had his 
sight—“content though blind” (14). Sonnet 22 shows how spiritual seeing takes self-governance 
and practice because a conscientious poet is not only challenged by the external criticism, but he 
competes against his own self-criticism. The poem is a reminder and promise to the poet himself 
and his friend Cyriack that the poet must use self-restraint and self-determination—and not 
“overpl[y]” his “conscience” this time (10)—to abide and still “bear up and steer/ Right onward” 
(8-9). The need for spiritual seeing fuels the poetic imagination in Sonnet 22 because the sonnet 
focuses on the sight of a distant, unpredictable future that is invisible to the physical senses. 
Simply put, the lack of physical sight enhances the poet’s spiritual sight while an abundance of 
physical sight creates “the world’s vain masque” and more opacity to the poet. This bitter but 
worthy lesson is immanent in spiritual seeing and furthermore necessary to poetic imagination 
because self-criticism and self-awareness are the very core of poetic inspiration. 
With his persistence and mechanically enhanced gears, Satan in Paradise Regained sets 
out to see Christ with his own eyes, ironically, and prove him wrong. Satan tells Christ that he 
has never ceased his eye’s searching for Christ since he first knew about Christ’s birth: “[O]f thy 
birth at length/ Announced by Gabriel with the first I knew,/ And of the angelic song in 
Bethlehem field,/ On thy birth-night, that sung thee Saviour born./ From that time seldom have I 
ceased to eye” (IV. 503-507). And Satan makes certain that he will tempt Christ; he tries with 
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every earthly resource, yet nothing works: “Since neither wealth, nor honour, arms nor arts,/ 
Kingdom nor empire pleases thee, nor aught/ By me proposed in life contemplative,/ Or active, 
tended on by glory, or fame,/ What dost thou in this world?” (IV.368-72). However, the 
following speech by Christ to Satan in Paradise Regained not only reveals why Satan’s attempts 
fail but also reinforces Milton’s treatment of the theme of spiritual vision. Here, Milton links the 
inner contemplative vision of Christ with the superior power of spiritual knowledge that reigns 
over the external corporeal vision of Satan and his vast material knowledge: 
 Think not but that I know these things, or think 
 I know them not; not therefore am I short  
 Of knowing what I ought: he who receives  
Light from above, from the fountain of light, 
No other doctrine needs, though granted true; 
But these are false, or little else but dreams, 
Conjectures, fancies, built on nothing firm.  
The first and wisest of them all professed  
To know this only, that he nothing knew; (IV. 286-94) 
I have two points to make here. First, Christ is clearly uninterested in “these things,” the material 
things that are subject to know or be known. Second, Christ prefers “light from above” over 
“knowing what I ought,” which further suggests Christ espouses spiritual understanding over 
more empirical exploration. Knowledge, especially here circumscribed by the object “what I 
ought,” signifies the kind of conventional knowledge Christ avoids—after all, knowledge that 
one “ought” to know can be despotic, antagonizing insightful and spiritual thinking; to Christ 
conventional knowledge signifies “conjectures, fancies, built on nothing firm” (IV. 292). The 
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kind of knowing Christ calls out as “false” above is aligned with scholarly, orthodox knowledge, 
and thus the subjects of such “knowing” are often superficial and worldly “things,” pronouncing 
“what [one] ought” to know. Christ even points out that “doctrines” are unnecessary “though 
granted true” (IV. 290). Again, the word “granted” there signals artificial authority of the 
doctrines. It should become clear not just that Satan’s resources are only worldly “things,” but 
that they also signify a shallow materiality of “things” that possess no epistemological or moral 
worth to Christ. Christ’s acute insight reveals the capriciousness and artificiality of conventional 
knowledge; for Christ, there aren’t even specific or proper modifiers to describe this kind of 
knowledge—thus, “these things.” 
Furthermore, Christ’s criticism of conventional knowledge above also subverts the 
concepts conventionally associated with spiritual knowledge or poetic inspiration, as he calls the 
orthodox knowledge “false, or little else but dreams,/ Conjectures, fancies, built on nothing firm” 
(291-92). His analysis of “these things” and his argument against material knowledge echo with 
Sidney’s argument for poetry, which emphasizes inward vision and abundant truths separated 
from mere arrangements of matter. In the lines above, we see Milton comparing Satan’s 
abundance of earthly knowledge to “nothing firm.” Here, Milton’s accomplishment is closely 
related to Sidney’s, for Milton actually inverts the attack against poetry, reversing the common 
comparison of poetry to the source of fictional imagination and moral corruption by describing 
conventional “knowledge” as “fancies” and “dreams” (IV. 290). Against the poetry haters’ 
criticism of poetry’s supposed emotional, unsound, and immoral influence, Milton argues for the 
sinuousness and heterogeniousness of poetic sentiment: “The first and wisest of them all 
professed/ To know this only, that he nothing knew” (293-94). Sapientia begins with self-
awareness and intuitive insight, just as poetic uncertainty admits and professes the idea that 
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“nothing [is] firm” and embodies the very truth it tries to reflect and instruct. Sidney’s argument 
for poetic imagination’s supple capability to mimic but also to inspire nature should also remind 
us of Milton’s argument for “subtle and sinewy” rhetoric that is more sustainable than the 
rhetoric of excess and certainty.  It is through the rhetoric of excess and the prosthetic sight that 
Satan tempts the human race and attempts to humiliate Christ. Man-made knowledge practices 
more confinement and intolerance against other men, and the conditional and capricious 
foundations of the fact-driven knowledge or knowledge generated by scientific observations 
prove its lack of firmness. Milton suggests this hypocrisy through his “subtle and sinewy” poetic 
language, the kind of narrative that unveils one thing by obscuring the other.215 Christ’s use of 
“firm” here doesn’t refer to physical firmness, but abstract idea of firmness, in such way that 
“subtle and sinewy” suggests the strength and firmness of poetic imagination that abides the 
shifting conventions and worldly forces. Scientia, after all, is built upon “these things” that can 
be altered, if proven untrue by the conventions. This conventional knowledge can’t be true until 
it is proven to be true by a certain school of thought or group of scholars. The poetic imagination 
is closely linked with the spiritual eye, and, in describing the invisible reality, Milton clearly 
expresses his contempt for the abundance of earthly sight that leads only to more confusion and 
obstruction of spiritual seeing. Satan’s inability to see outside himself and his ambition suggests 
his lack of spiritual insight, which clearly leads to shallow “conjectures” that what he sees 
through his physical eye is worthy enough to move Christ. Satan, as we saw, even incorporates 
technological help, which proves to be only a prosthetic but not a prophetic aid; what Satan 
needs even to be able to understand and communicate with Christ is not a material aid, but a 
spiritual one.  
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After several vain attempts, Satan is “now/ Quite at a loss, for all his darts were spent” 
(IV. 3666). It is interesting that Christ compares the material abundance—“wealth,” “honour,” 
“arms,” “arts,” “kingdom” or “empire”—offered by Satan to “dreams,” “fancies,” and “nothing 
firm” (IV. 366-72). That Satan is completely unable to see why Christ cannot be tempted 
suggests that true blindness for Milton involves a spiritual, not a physical, lack. Physical 
blindness merely veils what spiritual sight can both recover and even improve with insights that 
physical sight can’t capture. Inner blindness means the loss of spiritual sight, a greater loss than 
physical blindness; obviously for Milton, one can repair and restore the outer, material loss, but 
the loss of inner sight results in ineffable calamity; thus, Satan is inevitably outside of paradise, 
seeing paradise as an always distant place but also always in hell, spiritually deprived of God’s 
love. Spiritual blindness suggests the occlusion of epistemological clarity and moral sense; even 
though Satan might be able to see a wider and fuller content in the world, nothing he sees 
through his physical eye helps him understand why he is wrong and why he cannot win over 
Christ. This is also why Satan fails to grasp that scientific aids are only material aids that connect 
one material reality to another and that a physical, prosthetic instrument cannot be transformed 
into a spiritual, prophetic aid that might unveil the spiritual reality through the physical one. 
Satan’s failure should also make us wonder—is anyone lacking spiritual insight damned, for 
instance?  The Reformation theologians argued that the individual could come to an 
understanding of God through study of scripture. Satan is an extreme case that nevertheless 
illustrates a deceptive pattern of thought Milton viewed as very tempting to all humans—that our 
physical sight must tell the truth. This is why Milton stresses the importance of reading the 
scripture right, through the spiritual eye, instead of the physical eye. Especially from the 
Enlightenment onward, humans have been increasingly prone to ignore the spiritual and revel in 
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the material; a sole reliance on material vision like Satan’s presents for Milton an impossibility 
of even comprehending the existence of a spiritual realm, as, again, is seen in Satan’s puzzlement 
over his failure to tempt Christ. Even at the start of Paradise Lost, Satan is presented as a 
materialist. His response to being cast out of heaven isn’t a metaphysical one typified by remorse 
or the hope of absolution; instead his response is to rise from his armies from the dark and plan 
revenge through his massive forces. Milton depicts Satan being more active than being 
introspective so that his defeat was a military rather than moral one. 
Milton, as a Puritan, might be expected to have a literal style of biblical exegesis, but, in 
keeping with my insistence that spiritual vision was more important to Milton than the more 
linear ordering of knowledge typified by material vision, Milton clearly espouses a far more 
flexible style of reading of scripture.216 Interestingly, Milton’s divergence from contemporary 
Protestant norms cuts both ways, for his reading style sought not just one true meaning but 
enabled multiple interpretations of individual lines or passages. An example is Milton’s reading 
of Psalm 2:7: “I will declare the decree: the Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my Son; this day 
have I begotten thee.” As Hugh MacCallum points out in Milton and the Sons of God: The 
Divine Image in Milton’s Epic Poetry, “Milton departs from Protestant exegesis by welcoming 
the literal sense of the passage from Psalm 2:7 and endorsing its subordinationist implications” 
(82). In other words, although Protestant orthodoxy demanded a figurative reading here to make 
Jesus co-eternal with the Father, Milton did not feel compelled to narrow his reading to a certain 
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dogmatically endorsed meaning. Michael Bauman explores the same issue in “Milton’s 
Theological Vocabulary and the Nicene Anathemas,” pointing out that “Milton does not accept 
the Nicene notion that the son was ‘begotten not made.’ For him, the terms are frequently 
interchangeable” (77).217  Perhaps it is exactly that—“the terms are frequently 
interchangeable”—that troubled the poetry haters. Milton’s inclination for “interchangeable” 
terms coincides with his campaign for “subtle and sinewy” use of language that signals the 
element of deviation immanent in poetry and certainly in Milton’s poetry, which is vital for 
poetic imagination but a threat to the stability of morality and conventions. Nonetheless, 
Milton’s use of poetic language reveals how he supports the idea of seeing as anticipating and 
portending. 
The distinction between literal and non-literal reading of the Bible is tied to my 
discussion of Milton’s spiritual vision versus Satan’s material vision because they represent 
antithetical modes of processing reality. As Peter Harrison asserts in The Bible, Protestantism 
and the Rise of Natural Science: 
The Protestant insistence on the literal sense of canonical texts had far-reaching, if 
unintended, consequences. As we have seen, the allegorical reading of scripture 
proceeded from a particular attitude to the world of things. The allegorical 
methods of interpretation pioneered by Philo and Origen were premised upon the 
notion that the things in the phenomenal world referred to by words in canonical 
texts actually represented, through resemblance, other things. To insist now that 
texts be read literally was to cut short a potentially endless chain of references in 
which words referred to things, and things in turn referred to other things. A 
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literal reading of the scripture was one in which the previously open-ended 
process of deriving a series of references from a single word was terminated once 
a word had performed its basic task of referring to a thing. (114)218 
One process, as with Sidney, enables “many Cyruses,” the other only one.  
Satan’s spiritual blindness, as opposed to Christ’s indifference to the material world, 
signals Milton’s treatment of blindness as not just a mere poetic conceit for Milton but a real and 
always-present private concern. This argument can be further developed through a discussion of 
Samson’s physical blindness and spiritual awakening in Samson Agonistes and the comparability 
between Christ and Samson as prophetic figures. While Manoa expresses his grief over 
Samson’s loss of his sight and imprisonment, he still believes that Samson’s loss must serve a 
greater purpose in God’s plan for Samson:  
And I persuade me God had not permitted 
His strength again to grow up with his hair 
Garrisoned round about him like a camp 
Of faithful soldiery, were not his purpose 
To use him further yet in some great service, 
Not to sit idle with so great a gift 
Useless, and thence ridiculous about him. 
And since his strength with eyesight was not lost, 
God will restore him eyesight to his strength. (Lines 1495-1503). 
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From Manoa’s faithful and prophetic lament in Samson Agonistes, we can infer how Milton 
treats physical blindness as a spiritual challenge to overcome, not a mere physical disability. 
Manoa says his son is “not to sit idle with so great gift” and still believes that Samson’s true 
strength is not completely usurped because “his strength with eyesight was not lost” (line 1502). 
Subtly, Milton juxtaposes Samson’s eyesight with Samson’s “great gift,” for Samson’s infallible 
gift is an inner strength, although it could easily be interpreted as a physical, visible strength. 
Samson’s great strength “was not lost” because Samson’s physical strength comes from inside; it 
is God’s “great gift” after all. Even when Samson’s faith is challenged, Milton shows, Samson 
cannot obliterate what is begotten from God’s love and given to Samson as a gift. Further, notice 
that Manoa believes being “idle with so great a gift” is “useless” for Samson. Not using his gift 
is wasteful, and God will not let “such a great gift” go idle. Manoa’s prophecy reveals that no 
matter what physical or spiritual agony Samson is chained to, Samson is destined to recover his 
spiritual strength, which will compensate for the rest of his physical loss. Thus the “gift” remains 
in Samson as a spiritual entity—faith—rather than a material strength such as physical strength.  
When Manoa insists Samson’s lost eyesight will be restored, Milton doesn’t mean the 
literal, physical strength; faith will restore not only the physical sight but also the spiritual sight 
that is being usurped, as much as Milton hopes the faith will carry him on even after his cause 
failed. It is the figurative strength that does the literal work of restoration and further might even 
be able to transform the permanently damaged physical into the state of spiritual, as when it 
“restore[s] him eyesight to his strength” (1503). Note that Milton suggests that the restoration of 
Samson’s eyesight goes further than mere material restoration but rather up “to his strength.” 
The last few lines of the semichorus toward the end of Samson Agonistes reveal that Manoa’s 
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prophecy indeed came true and the restoration of Samson’s eyesight entails something greater 
than the restoration of physical eyesight, “inward eyes illuminated”: 
 But he though blind of sight, 
 Despised and thought extinguished quite, 
 With inward eyes illuminated, 
His fiery virtue roused 
From under ashes into sudden flame, 
And as an evening dragon came, 
Assailant on the perched roosts, 
And nests in order ranged 
Of tame villatic fowl; but as an eagle  
His cloudless thunder bolted on their heads. (lines 1687-96)  
Thus, Manoa’s prophecy tells that as long as Samson can overcome his doubt and sorrow, he will 
gather his spiritual strength again. Samson will be able to exert the necessary strength even to 
restore or replace his lost physical asset of eyesight, so that the loss of eyesight is not the worst 
that can happen to Samson—it is the loss of “so great a gift” that would be fatal. If we accept 
that Samson’s strength is not a mere physical gift, Manoa foresees that Samson’s restoration of 
his spiritual sight will lead not just to a recovery but improvement of material limitation through 
spiritual restoration. 
 That spiritual sight can be gained from a material loss of Samson’s eyesight should 
suggest that Samson’s physical loss is necessary for the restoration of both his physical and 
spiritual strength. This should also demonstrate Milton’s simultaneous use of both literal and 
figurative language, regardless of his Protestant religious belief. Without the figurative 
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interpretation and signification, faith loses one of its most effective narrative tools—prophecy. 
And I will argue that religion made more sense for Milton when prophetic aid performs as a 
facilitator of knowing and learning because his use of faith proves that faith is internal, both in 
literal and figurative sense, even when one experiences faith being visible. Harrison points out 
the role of the advent of scientific reasoning and rhetoric in the slow abdication of metaphorical 
representations:  
[A]s an inevitable consequence of this way of reading texts nature would lose its 
meaning, and the vacuum created by this loss of intelligibility was gradually to be 
occupied by alternative accounts of the significance of natural things—those 
explanations which we regard as scientific. In the new scheme of things, objects 
were related mathematically, mechanically, causally, or ordered and classified 
according to categories other than those of resemblance. (114)  
Prophetic sight is deeply connected to what Harrison calls “intelligibility” above, which in the 
context of poetry can refer to Sidney’s concept of poetry’s imagination and its capability to not 
only mimic but also inspire nature. Rather, it is through prosthetic sight that Satan attempts to 
extend and improve the quality of his seeing; as I have discussed in other chapters, in the preface 
to Micrographia Hooke argues for the necessity of the external and mechanical instrument to 
discover the microscopic world. In order to understand and describe “a new visible world,” 
Hooke seems to argue that a new way of seeing has to be invented; however, “a new visible 
world” is still represented through the old method of singling out one small aspect of the bigger 
landscape portraiture.  
The optically enhanced vision evoked the philosophical problems of disproportioned 
representation of physical reality that was co-produced by the machine and the “operations of the 
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sense, the memory, and reason” (The Preface).219 Again, scientifically aided vision cannot 
surpass its prosthetic material reality, unable to circumvent the stigma that it can improve merely 
the physical sight, and remains as an artificial instrument attached to and controlled by the body. 
Hooke wanted to perfect and standardize the unstable expressions and appearances gathered 
from human sensory perceptions by “adding of artificial Organs to the natural” (The Preface).220 
There is a clear similarity between Augustine’s spiritual eye, Harrison’s “intelligibility,” and 
what Hooke calls “the natural”—they are identified or tested by what exists outside of them, 
what lacks their organic and internal attributes. They represent the inner, spiritual instrument of 
seeing that requires inner knowledge and spiritual willingness to see the physical world through 
self-knowledge and spiritual contemplation before the material communication with the physical 
world takes place. What Harrison calls “alternative accounts of the significance of natural 
things” or the sight enhanced by “adding of artificial organs to the natural” indicate a physical 
reality that remains subordinate to the soul; more importantly, for Augustine, whether prosthetic 
or prophetic, physical or spiritual, seeing can “never take place without the soul.” Augustine 
observes: 
Hence, the parent, as it were, of that vision, that is, of the form which arises in the 
sense of one who sees, is the form of the body from which it arises. But yet the 
latter is not a true parent, and consequently the former is not a true offspring. For 
the vision is not completely begotten by the form of the body alone, since 
something else is applied to the body in order that it may be formed by it, namely, 
the sense of the one who sees. […] For that body which is seen is not at all 
spiritual. On the other hand the vision, which takes place in the sense, is indeed 
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mingled with something spiritual, because it cannot take place without the soul. 
But the whole is not so, since that which is formed is a sense of the body. (On the 
Trinity XI.5.9) 
Spiritual seeing not only makes the invisible objects visible to the mind’s eye, but it makes both 
the visible and invisible world far more perceivable and conceivable to the mind; prosthetic 
vision doesn’t improve or impact physical vision much, and for the worse, it could rather 
interfere with spiritual vision or even obstruct prophetic vision. After all, as Hooke is clearly 
aware, the images seen through the “artificial organs” can easily provide erroneous information, 
misleading and misinforming “the natural” as much as the natural, physical vision can do the 
same alone because there is no guarantee that the machine or the physical vision will not err; 
thus he suggests the scientist rely more on the hypothetical stability of his artificial instrument 
and less on the tenuous human imagination and sensory experience. 
 
5.3 Seeing as Reflection, Seeing as Protection 
The optical instruments are as susceptible as human imagination and sensory experience 
to not only alter or obfuscate physical reality but even challenge moral and epistemological 
values. Margaret Miles also points out how the natural world can only be seen and understood 
more accurately by seeing through the mind’s eye, “the accurate ‘seeing’ of the visible objects” 
which “involves the exercise of spiritual vision” (Miles 139).221 Here, we can also relate Miles’ 
assertion of the need for seeing and perceiving the nature accurately to Maura Brady’s assertion 
that Satan’s lack of accurate vision not only reveals his lack of epistemological and moral clarity 
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but also the implications of “spotty” vision provided by Galileo’s intellectual and mechanical 
achievement.222 After all, the machine cannot reveal the nature alone, without human 
manipulation; as Brady argues, “[T]he dangers associated with Galileo’s instruments in Paradise 
Lost are moral as well as epistemological, that stargazing might tempt a viewer to aspire to 
godhead.”223 Milton makes it obvious that there is an interruption and obstruction of the 
astronomer’s solid and clear view of the moon in Paradise Lost:  
He scarce had ceased when the superior fiend 
Was moving toward the shore; his ponderous shield 
Ethereal tempter, massy, large and round, 
Behind him cast; the broad circumference 
Hung on his shoulders like the moon, whose orb 
Through optic glass the Tuscan artist views 
At evening from the top of Fesole, 
Or in Valdarno, to descry new Lands, 
Rivers or mountains in her spotty Globe. (I. 283-91) 
When Milton refers to Galileo’s instrument in Paradise Lost, Brady insists, “the astronomer’s 
activities are highlighted in ways that recall the historical Galileo’s methodological, rhetorical, 
and pedagogical labors with the instrument, and suggest that these labors may interfere with or 
distort vision” (139). 
Brady further points out that these lines also reveal how the astronomer—the observer or 
the gazer—“actively participates in the production of vision” (140). The astronomer’s vision of 
the moon is not purely inductive, after all; as the “purposive infinitive ‘to descry’ suggests,” 
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Brady argues, even before the astronomer looks at the moon, he might already have an idea of 
what he is about to observe. He is already informed and manipulated by the features of the moon 
that “the Tuscan artist” has already viewed through “optic glass.”224 In addition, the negative 
connotation of the periphrasis “Tuscan artist” suggests Galileo’s endeavor and invention as a 
skilled artistry, underlining the ongoing argument against poetry makers that poetry and poetic 
imagination encourage idle life and even ignore the lack of morality because a poet doesn’t do 
anything practical, unlike a soldier who fights in a war.225 Most importantly, by applying the 
word “artist” to Galileo, “Milton links the work of the scientist with that of the poet, emphasizing 
the importance of the imagination—of expectation, hypothesis, and the inductive leap—in 
scientific endeavor” (Brady 140). This could easily be Milton’s refutation to Hooke’s claim for 
“artificial organs” improving “the natural.”226 Human imagination and sensory experience, even 
with the ample possibility of being erroneous and instable, are still as innately involved with 
scientific observation and prosthetic seeing. According to Milton, both poet and scientist need 
artistry to convert what they see into what they believe. Such transformative artistry cannot occur 
without the spiritual sight, sapientia, the kind of seeing that takes place and sustains its power 
because of faith. Even the scientists must believe in a kind of closure to their search and 
experimentation. Such artistry’s moral purpose or aesthetic merit is proven by its ability to hide 
the trace of transformation as much as possible, to make the artistry and the will as invisible as 
possible. To further Brady’s point, Milton in Paradise Lost methodically analyzes the new 
science’s moral and epistemological inconsistency by comparing the optical instrument—“her 
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spotty globe”—to poetic imagination (I. 291). That poetry sustains its moral and epistemological 
clarity by constantly reminding itself of its imaginative foundation makes it a more morally and 
epistemologically suitable vehicle to convey truth.  
I would also like to reintroduce the aspect of the prospect poem clearly suggested in both 
Satan’s description of “an imperial city” in Paradise Regained and the “artist” who, standing at 
“the top of Fesole,” views “new lands” through “the optic glass” in the lines above from 
Paradise Lost. Scientists are associated with Satan, who uses seeing as an agency of controlling 
knowledge; Satan’s prosthetic gaze through the optical instruments suggests that he is an 
embodiment of the empirical gaze that associates knowing by seeing and describing what it sees 
obsessively. To those who associate seeing with agency, the quality of what they see becomes 
less critical; instead, how far one can see becomes paramount to an empirical gazer. A morally 
questionable and epistemologically confused gazer cannot see truth no matter what “artificial 
organs” he occupies to enhance his bad vision.227 As Augustine writes, “the vision, which takes 
place in the sense, is indeed mingled with something spiritual, because it cannot take place 
without the soul.”228 
This also brings us to question the moral and spiritual maturity of the observer and what 
kind of gazer Satan, Samson, Eve, Adam, or even Christ represents in Milton’s poetry I have 
examined so far. Do some of Milton’s characters possess a spiritually, morally, and ethically 
mature gaze and use their vision to gain spiritual growth, rather than material access and gain? 
And, if they rather exhibit the lack of a spiritually and morally mature gaze, what does Milton 
say about such lack? And finally but most importantly, what does Milton suggest about the new 
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science’s way of seeing and representing the world as opposed to poetry’s mimetic ability?  
Satan’s obsession with how far he can see reveals that he associates seeing with agency, as much 
as Eve becomes susceptible to Satan’s temptation when she ignores the inner knowledge she 
already has from her spiritual vision. Samson’s loss proves that even a man blessed with a divine 
physical strength can easily lose control of and abuse his physical strength to satiate his earthly 
desires. However, Samson’s avoidance of Dalila after losing his sight reveals Milton’s rather 
complicated treatment of physical sight—physical sight is as tenuous as spiritual sight will allow. 
At his weakest mental stage, therefore, Samson cannot bear Dalila even to get near him; he 
specifically orders Dalila, who just wants to “approach at least, touch [his] hand,” to stay away: 
“Not for thy life, lest fierce remembrance wake/ My sudden rage to tear thee joint by joint./ At 
distance I forgive thee, go with that” (Samson Agonistes, lines 951, 952-54). Just because 
Samson cannot see physically doesn’t mean he cannot see spiritually.229 Furthermore, Samson’s 
reaction to Dalila’s request reveals how a blind man’s searching hands can observe more 
thoroughly and subtly than the eyes while also highlighting the capability of poetic conceit, 
which connects two distant, most unlikely things--what can’t be seen by hands and what can’t be 
touched by eyes. Poetic metaphors can connect two distant things, physical and spiritual, earthly 
and godly, and haptic and visual. Now, relying more on his spiritual and moral sight, Samson in 
turn feels more intensely about his moral and spiritual lack. When his spiritual sight is unstable, 
he cannot even control his physical senses, thus ordering Dalila to keep her “distance” (954). 
Perhaps also supporting the theory that physical sight is the seed of our earthly desire, Milton 
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subtly points out the undeniable power of physical sight that manipulates human body and mind. 
And this material desire manifested in physical seeing is why no one is safe from becoming a 
morally tenuous, spiritually impervious observer.  
In addition, one can also argue that it is because of our weakness that we need such   
“artificial organs” as an “optic glass” to enhance our limited natural vision. In Milton and the 
Natural World, Edwards points out that scientists like Robert Boyle and Thomas Browne tried to 
defend science by explaining that the knowledge gained from natural science can protect human 
kind from “the consequences of seduction” (Edwards 39). As Edwards describes, Boyle suggests 
that if Eve had used the scientific reasoning and experimented with “the serpent’s claims, she 
would not only have avoided the Fall; she would have discovered in the created world further 
evidence of the Creator’s glory, power, and wisdom” (39). However, Edwards effectively locates 
the weakness in Boyle’s argument, pointing out the fact that God has already endowed Eve with 
solid knowledge, even before the advent of new science, and all she needed to do to avoid the 
Fall was look inside and find her spiritual light. Edwards observes: 
Yet Eve knows enough. Had she properly valued her own experience of the 
natural world, she would not have been led astray by the marvelous talking 
serpent. But she accepts his interpretation of God’s other book for her own, a 
form of intellectual laziness with the most serious consequences. Speaking of our 
individual responsibility to work out the meaning of God’s Word for ourselves, 
Milton declares in De Doctrina Christiana: “God offers all his rewards not to 
those who are thoughtless and credulous, but to those who labor constantly and 
seek tirelessly after truth.”230 
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Edwards’ observations are particularly useful in my own analysis. For instance, the bounty of 
visual information Adam remembers observing when he wakes up can’t give him much spiritual 
knowledge about the invisible world without his contemplating on it; Adam signifies the sun as 
the “happy light” and ignores some of the critical observations and insights that inform him 
about the sun’s bright light otherwise. Adam falls short of fully engaging his intuitive, inner 
knowledge as he gains more education from and relies on Raphael’s knowledge, and soon Adam 
begins to sound like Raphael, depending on scientia, consciously correcting his own insights and 
wisdom. Contrary to criticism narrowly targeting Eve’s yielding to Satan’s temptation, her 
ability to figure forth and foresignify is striking compared to Adam’s dependence on Raphael, 
albeit she does become a victim of Satan’s temptation because she begins to rely on her physical 
senses, especially what she sees and hears, the latter most likely to be tainted by Satan’s 
manipulation. However, that should only prove the importance of sapientia. Without the 
individual’s faith and willpower to seek the truth, no scientific observation or instrument can 
help one not only to find the truth but also to protect the truth. The new science might argue for 
greater material knowledge’s being more beneficial than a lack of material knowledge; however, 
without spiritual and moral soundness, there is no guarantee that one can protect and preserve 
what he or she already knows. That the “optic glass” conveniently envelopes and removes the 
spiritual labor of finding what to look at before determining a method of seeing creates a certain 
breed of lazy observers; a gazer who is not aware of the power of his or her own gaze is as 
dangerous as an empiricist gazer because one could easily yield one’s right to see spiritually to 
seeing far and wide through “optical glass” and be satisfied with how much appears visible. 
Considering Milton’s own lack of physical vision, his treatment of Satan’s, Eve’s, and 
Samson’s lack of spiritual vision reveals his faith in an individual’s ability to gain spiritual vision 
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even when physical vision is taken away. Yet Milton shows very little faith in the possibility of 
revelation or restoration of spiritual vision through scientific seeing. The observer at the other 
end of the optic instrument always represents a spotty sign of doubt and opacity in Milton’s 
poems that I have been discussing. Even though Milton eschewed the idea of monarchy, he still 
believed in the efficacy of hierarchy, like many of his seventeenth-century contemporaries. It is 
the orthodoxy of Platonic hierarchy that buttressed the tradition of implementing spiritual over 
physical knowledge, thus teaching that mature vision must be founded on the system of 
hierarchy. One could also blame hierarchy as a tool for compensating for a failure to gain moral 
vision, but for Milton hierarchy is a far more moral and spiritual agent to access mature vision 
than the “optic glass.” When one looks through a microscope with a goal to achieve, not only 
does the instrument become an extension of mechanical power, but the observer’s act of seeing 
through the instrument also provides a steadfast control and power over his subject, which the 
observer might have never thought possible through his natural eye. The symbolic extension of 
both power and peril that the “optic glass” represents for Milton echoes the glorified empiricist 
signage of expansion and control enabled by seeing as wide and far as one can from above. With 
the optical instrument or any kind of “artificial organs” trying to improve “the natural,” how is 
any artist safe from becoming an empirical gazer? Perhaps I should revise my previous statement 
and suggest that a morally questionable and epistemologically confused gazer is afraid to see—
instead of “cannot see”—truth. No “artificial organs” can enhance one’s bad, confused, and 
immature spiritual vision.  
The connection between the lack of spiritual vision and the fear to use spiritual vision 
raises the question of awareness, especially with Samson. Samson seems aware of the difference 
between inward and empirical—literal—sight. For Samson, the power of empirical or literal 
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sight, which is closer to phenomenological perception than the inner vision or insight, is too 
visceral, too real to be felt; it wounds him when he is touched, as he exclaims to Dalilah he might 
hurt her if she touches him. Samson’s reaction to Dalilah reveals how much he is wounded, for 
the two reflect each other like a mirror image. This should give us a good clue that Dalilah, so 
full of visual glory, is the site to be afraid of and to avoid. Samson’s reaction to Dalilah’s request 
to touch him after he has lost his sight unveils a significant change in Samson’s ability to see; 
when his physical sight is gone, his spiritual sight doesn’t go away. The physical wound from the 
loss of his sight becomes a new, gaping wound for his spiritual sight to illuminate; and now the 
physical sight gone, Samson sees only through his spiritual eye. The loss of physical sight 
intensifies his other sensory faculties. But aside from such speculation, one can clearly see that 
Samson’s reaction to Dalilah’s request to touch his hand shows both anguish and fear. Even if 
Samson denies her request to touch him just because he despises her, why does her touch matter 
so much to Samson, especially after his fall? Perhaps Samson is afraid that he can feel—
interpret—Dalilah’s touch. Dalilah’s touch embodies a metaphorical sign that provides more 
than literal touching; neither does it inflict any physical sensation yet. It might seem that I am 
making a dull point here, but we must pay attention to the fact that the mimetic representations of 
sensory experiences are being compared to Samson’s spiritual inner sight, and his inner sight 
reads and interprets symbolic representations, far different from literal seeing or empirical 
looking. Note how Dalilah hasn’t even touched him yet—she only asks him if she could “touch 
[his] hand”--though Samson’s dramatic reaction suggests that he is being threatened by the idea 
of—or the vision of, more likely—her touching (Samson Agonistes 951). Obviously to Samson, 
her touch is symbolic; even without his physical sight, Samson can interpret what her “touch” 
means; thus, upon hearing her request to “touch” him, Samson is already reacting against what 
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the word augurs. He hears the word, and he interprets what he hears. This is not too far from 
reading a text and interpreting its meaning; as a matter of fact, for Samson, I would like to argue, 
the hearing of Dalilah saying the word “touch” brings him the image of her touching, which 
becomes a text that Samson reads and interprets. Hearing becomes a sight, and the sight 
functions like a tactile experience when the sound or the noise heard becomes a signification; the 
sound becomes a text to be interpreted, which further proves touching and hearing not only 
tactile but also textual. Samson’s reaction to Dalilah exhibits how haptic experience can become 
even more visual once it becomes textual, which further demonstrates not only a politics of gaze 
and touch but also the transformative power of poetry that Sidney argues for in The Defence of 
Poesy. 
The definitive epistemological discipline of the spiritual vision over physical sight comes 
from biblical tradition. Consider specifically the following significant verses from the Bible: “the 
light of the body is the eye” (Matthew 6:22) or “For God doth know that in the day ye eat 
thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil” 
(Genesis 3:5).231 Much Judaeo-Christian philosophy strives to substantiate the concept of 
hierarchy and separation between the body and soul.  The eye is the material and symbolic organ 
that embodies a vehicle that delivers the physical light into the body and spiritual light into the 
soul. The physical organ of the eye enables both seeing physically and seeing spiritually. One 
sees the material world, from which God’s beauty and truth enter into spiritual knowledge. The 
physical light distributed in the body through the eye stands for the spiritual light of a see-er that 
reflects the spiritual maturity of the see-er. Therefore, the lack of willpower, self-governance, or 
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spiritual insight can be revealed through the vision the eye sees; the eye that sees the bad vision 
might signify the augur of bad faith. 
Therefore, the bad spiritual sight—the failure to see spiritually—comes after the bad 
spiritual vision—the inability to see spiritually. In other words, any abeyance in seeing 
spiritually should explain the human awkwardness in front of the enigma of spiritual sight, when 
dealing with anything sublime or divine. Gazing at any material object becomes more than mere 
material communication between the observer and observed, but this interaction presents a 
special spiritual challenge in the fallen world where everything we see doesn’t reflect God’s 
beauty and truth. In Paradise Lost, even before the fall, Eve could have avoided gazing at the 
fruit, but she places her eye on the fruit and “Fixed on the fruit she gazed” (IX. 735).232 
Willpower governs the gazing body; whether Satan looking at Eve or Eve looking at the fruit, the 
gaze plainly signals what it desires. This is why the spiritual maturity of the gazer becomes 
paramount. The inner light should shine over and push out the dark shades of material 
temptations. And the need for spiritual strength becomes even more urgent when the moral, 
ethical, or epistemological clarity of the gazer is at risk. I would argue that the faith of the gazer 
controls the fate of the gaze, the culmination of the act of gazing/looking.  
Surely, once blind, Milton’s Samson is even more aware of the two faculties of seeing in 
Samson Agonistes—the irony is that he is even more aware of others’ gazes once he has lost his 
own: “Now blind, disheartened, shamed, dishonoured, quelled,/ To what can I be useful, wherein 
serve/ My nation, and the work from Heanv’n imposed,/ But to sit idle on the household hearth,/ 
A burdenous drone; to visitants a gaze,/ Or a pitied object” (563-68). Milton’s sonnet 19 delivers 
a more optimistic outlook on being blind, but in both Samson’s speech above and Milton’s 
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sonnet 19 “When I consider how my light is spent,” the reader gets the sense that the blind 
speaker is struggling with the notion that the blind person cannot do anything. The despair for 
now, in present, always seems so dark and daunting that it blocks the person’s capacity to grasp 
that much ability remains, albeit it seems as if such ability has also disappeared along with the 
physical sight. In sonnet 19 Milton’s tone begins with bitterness and despondency, yet the poet 
quickly recovers the tone of dedication and purpose, proving that the physical hardship makes 
him more aware of “that one Talent which is death to hide” (3). Importantly, the loss of sight 
doesn’t stop him or make him “hide” his “talent”; rather, the poet argues he is even more 
dedicated to fulfill his “talent” as he sees his “soul more bent” to make his talent work. That 
“bent” is crucial, implying an exterior force that reshapes the poet’s will, literally bending it 
toward his “Maker.”  
  Also in Samson Agonistes, about 100 lines after Samson’s woeful speech upon his 
blindness, Milton reveals through the voice of the Chorus that the inability to see the world 
forces one to look inwardly, to find the strength within, to “feel within/ Some source of 
consolation from above/ Secret refreshings, that repair his strength,/ And fainting spirits uphold” 
(663-66). At this point of the play, Samson is still in the agony, “all helpless with th’ irreparable 
loss/ Of sight, reserved alive to be repeated/ The subject of their cruelty, or scorn” (644-46); he is 
neither convinced nor able to see his fall as “secret refreshings” as the Chrous tries to tell him 
(665). There is something to be said about the difference between what the Chorus tells the 
audience and what Samson says in Samson Agonistes. The revelation of “secret refreshings” 
arrives to Samson much later in the play, though such insight has already been pre-announced by 
the Chorus. To whom is the Chorus really speaking, then? In “Reading Samson Agonistes,” Joan 
S. Bennett points out that “we are not to look at this play—it was ‘never intended’ for the stage; 
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rather, we are to listen for the language of the spirit complicating the words spoken by all the 
characters, words such as ‘strength’, ‘dark’, ‘light’, ‘blindness’, ‘vision’, ‘prison’, ‘liberty’, 
‘choice’, ‘promise’, ‘reason’, ‘fool’, ‘random’, ‘chance’, ‘necessity’, ‘love’, ‘law’, ‘deliverance’”  
(Bennett 222).233 Bennett further argues that it is the experience of reading Samson Agonistes 
that will inspire the readers to believe in and act on the right cause: “[W]e should expect, then, 
that by entering into Samson’s experience we will emerge strengthened in mind and spirit to 
meet such suffering directly in its full and complicated force in our world and in ourselves” 
(221).  Milton presents a different kind of tragedy through Samson Agonistes where the words do 
more than present a mere reflection or imitation of the world—here we are reminded of Sidney’s 
“many Cyruses,” where words possess genuine constitutive power—and provide a persistent, 
singular inspiration to raise Samson to a greater act and give the readers a hope for the new 
“secret refreshings” (Samson Agonistes 665) if they still believe in the cause of the Reformation. 
The words in Bennett’s list above occur throughout the work in a careful pattern showing how 
one moves from darkness to light—again, closely examine not only the meanings of the words 
but also the order in which they are mentioned. Falling from the blessed state of his physical 
strength into the lack of strength, sight, and hope, and then slowly climbing back up to the vision 
and light, Samson falls and rises showing us how his physical blindness is necessary for his 
spiritual awakening. What we see consistently throughout Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained, 
and Samson Agonistes is that losing the spiritual sight is surprisingly easy—but once lost, the 
consequences are catastrophic, for it is not easy to restore. In Samson Agonistes, even Samson, 
who was “[God’s] nursling once and choice delight,/ His destined from the womb,/ Promised by 
Heavenly message twice descending” (633-35), has to lose his sight and strength first to begin to 
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use his spiritual sight. We must not forget however that the spiritual sight can be restored and 
thus differs significantly from the physical sight, which once lost is much more difficult if not 
impossible to restore. 
 
5.4 Seeing as Telling, Seeing as Foresignifying 
Let us consider the visual imagery of the winged eye, the emblem of the insatiable 
Renaissance “QUID TUM” (“what is next?”) intelligence thirsty for the abundance of 
knowledge. If Hooke looked further into the small objects that could be seen through the natural 
eye, one could say the sixteenth-century British geographer Richard Hakluyt looked farther to 
the horizon to see what could be seen through the natural eye. Both, certainly, provide useful 
models of an outward gaze eager to digest, quantify, and map man’s material surroundings, and 
Hakluyt’s dispassionate delivery provided a model to invoke even greater claims if objectivity. 
Promoting overseas expansion and the colonization of North America, Hakluyt published 
travelogues such as The principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the 
English Nation that became the most authoritative texts to inform the early English voyages to 
North America. Hakluyt’s flat tone and remote voice throughout his writing certainly yields the 
portrait of a rational, objective author and eye-witness who can be trusted for both the purpose of 
commerce and religion—his language is precise and his information effective in covering as 
many facts as possible, without losing the focus from his subject—as he describes the objects to 
be seen, examined, and recorded for the empire to use in colonization. Stephen H. Clark explains 
why Hakluyt’s writing style became the most emulated writing style for historical, empirical, and 
most importantly, imperial narrative in Travel Writing and Empire: Postcolonial Theory in 
Transit: 
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A reading in the language of surveying is thus a point on a standard scale (or 
ladder) which correlates a selected object with a given fixed datum; the method is 
essentially that adumbrated by Hakluyt. In this kind of reading meaning is as 
monologic as it is possible to be. Plurality and ambiguity are utterly excluded, for 
only one point can occupy that place at that time—or rather, that place and that 
time within that formal system. The unknown is produced by extrapolation from 
the known, but the known itself is ultimately an arbitrary datum. Like any 
mathematical language, the geometry of surveying is self-defining and self-
sufficient and this property contributes to its appearance of unquestionable 
rightness when, as a language, it is used to describe the world. (110-111)234 
Advanced optical devices and means of transportation allowed the Renaissance scholars to see 
further, and being able to see more seemed to have become paramount to such prolific political 
and cultural periods as the Renaissance. There is so much to be seen and recorded, it seems as if 
Hakluyt had to constantly record what he saw, not what he felt—of course this is also why 
empirical writing represents itself to be more factual and reliable. Hakluyt’s writing, for 
example, is far more objective and dry than Hooke’s writing in Micrographia. Hakluyt is so 
trapped in the moment of describing and recording, he forgets to see what is really there—all his 
narratives are devoted to objective reproduction, page by page expanding the domain of his sight. 
Producing an entirely descriptive narrative depicting his surroundings, Hakluyt seems to be 
surrounded and lost in an unknown forest, in the middle of “a new visible world.”  
The attempt at dispassionate, objective prose, however, highlights even further the 
materialist bent of Hakluyt’s voracious eye. Describing is intended as a means of conquest and 
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control, just as we have seen in Milton’s depiction of Satan; yet lacking poetic imagination or 
inner sight, the narrative remains flat and one-dimensional. Instead of working on his own 
redemption and salvation, Satan still cannot see why he is expelled out of Heaven. In Paradise 
Lost, completely obscured by “darkness visible” (I. 63), resentful and sorrowful Satan exhibits 
perhaps the most easy, typical behavior expected out of a confused and angry child who is 
unable to see why he is being punished. Unfortunately, Satan remains that way eternally, and he 
is always surrounded by Hell “on all sides round” and can’t seem to get away from “darkness 
visible.” Satan’s affinity to quantity and consumption unfortunately doesn’t help him see through 
his situation but forces him to see only his situation. To see outside and beyond that “darkness 
visible,” Satan will have to look inward, forget what others have but not forget the individual 
beauty and significance God gives to each one of his creation. Yet Satan proves to have no 
capability to look inward; he is too obsessed with what he sees outside himself to see what he 
could possess spiritually—his sight is driven by the conquering spirit of “quid tum,” and there is 
no way to remedy the inner spiritual impairment that makes him look only at what he does not 
have, what is outside him.  
The spiritual sight works to focus on what is the innermost and significant knowledge, 
whereas Satan’s earthly sight spins and expands out of control, and as John Leonard points out in 
“Language and Knowledge in Paradise Lost,” “Satan uses the plural to allege divine 
malevolence” (Leonard 140).235 In contrast, as Diane McColley writes in “Milton and the 
Sexes,” “what seems to matter most to [Milton] is the eachness of each being” (McColley 
185).236 Just as for Hakluyt, number and quantity signify power to Satan, but neither power nor 
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material abundance means anything to Milton because what he cares about is as small or 
immaterial as “eachness of each being.” For Milton, God is for each one of us, and that singular 
focus of God makes each one of us so rich and satisfied that we won’t need any additional 
external devices to expand our world or conquer the other. To be unable to call God with a 
singular case or name indeed reveals Satan’s lack of ethical, moral, and spiritual maturity; that 
inability suggests that Satan lacks the inner knowledge or spiritual sight necessary to accept that 
he is wrong to challenge God who is the only God. As I described earlier, in Book 8 of Paradise 
Lost Adam tells the story of his creation and remembers how he acknowledged the “happy light” 
even when he didn’t even know who he was. Even without knowing who he is, then, Adam is 
still able to recognize the inner light. Satan, on the other hand, throughout both Paradise Lost 
and Paradise Regained, deliberately tries to remain silent about God’s singular existence and the 
significance of his singularity. This un-mentioning of God’s singular existence is a rhetorical 
ploy not only to confuse Eve with vague rhetoric that pluralizes and undermines God’s authority 
but also to convince himself of his cause—if God were not just one omnipotent entity and Satan 
were up against several gods, then Satan might have a better chance to win the battle against the 
multiple gods. Satan’s rhetorical creativity comes through his great ability to deceive, which also 
includes self-deception. This logic proves, moreover, that Satan is indeed aware and scared of 
God’s one, singular entity—plural gods signify fragmentation and denudation of one powerful 
entity. In addition, how Satan gravitates toward scientific devices such as the telescope and 
microscope in Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained to gain more access and control over 
physical knowledge reveals Milton’s uncertainty and suspicion toward using such external 
agencies to enhance one’s sight when, instead, sight can improve internally if each one of us is 
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willing to realize the spiritual sight that is already in us. John Leonard suggests in “Language and 
Knowledge in Paradise Lost” that “Adam asserts his will by setting limits to it” while Satan is 
“tactlessly blunt”(138). Leonard’s argument coincides with McColley’s point about humility that 
springs from knowing and respecting the “eachness of being” that is prevalent in Milton’s 
understanding of love and individuality (185).237 The criticism against Eve’s departure from her 
husband to be alone emphasizes the very fact that she disobeys Adam because of her 
individuality—but it is because of that individuality, her “eachness of being” as I would argue 
along with McColley, that Eve also gets her own education, albeit her course is far more 
condensed and difficult. This education is a life-long lesson to each human being, as we learn to 
properly use and celebrate our freedom to choose and be responsible for the choices we make. 
McColley says that Milton “was radical in his insistence on women’s spiritual completeness, 
responsibility, and fitness for ‘all rational delight’” (185). I ask a familiar question—why would 
God create us so weak that we inevitably fall? Perhaps God respects us more than we do since he 
gave us the liberty to be ourselves, celebrate, respect and develop “eachness of each being” 
through the freedom to learn and fall and learn again.  
Milton’s “darkness visible” can be read both ways after all. For Satan it means the doom 
inescapable, but perhaps Milton suggests something more than inescapable darkness all around 
him—after all, Adam and Eve fall, too. As we see from Satan’s reaction compared to Adam and 
Eve’s, “darkness visible” is not an absolute condition of doom, for what is visible can also be 
invisible if it is veiled, and darkness must be there to show the light where it should shine. 
Satan’s reaction to “darkness visible” reveals that he might prefer darkness invisible, which truly 
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represents the eternal doom, without growth or change.238 Darkness unveils the light, so darkness 
must be present, be “visible” to make things seeable, a point that resonates deeply with the 
poetry of Finch that I will examine in the next chapter. The unveiling of “darkness,” the negation 
of light and darkness, is the life-long lesson and development of one’s spiritual light. The light’s 
obliteration of darkness—making darkness visible by making it invisible—articulates the need 
and function of “darkness visible.” By negating the physical eye, the spiritual eye matures, and 
the fruit of this generative and creative negation is, not just for Milton but for all the readers of 
Milton’s work, an inner eye that is capable of seeing “darkness visible.” It’s the poetic mind that 
finds the light looming within and beyond darkness, not the eye that measures and examines 
what is visible now, here. This way Satan will never be past darkness; he will not only be stuck 
in permanently static and consistent “darkness” but also always outside of the realm of “visible.”  
In Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England, Barbara J. Shapiro points 
out that the logic and rhetoric of seventeenth-century England became the persuasive means of 
“enlarging and expanding similarities” to ground the new facts and experiences that became 
available through the advent of new science. The used-to-be hierarchy between rhetoric that 
formed popular discourse and the learned communication dominated by logic and dialectic began 
to deteriorate, and the relationship between them started shifting: “Amplification and 
ornamentation were skills taught by rhetoric and employed by poets as well as writers aspiring to 
eloquence. These practices were so deeply ingrained that they were not employed as mere 
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illustration, but had become part of Renaissance proof and argumentation” (229).239 As Shapiro 
notes, persuasive rhetoric dominated every mode of communication and learning: 
We have seen that seventeenth-century philosophers, scientists, and historians 
were attempting to reconstruct knowledge by grounding it on fact and experience. 
This realm of the ‘probable’ rather than the logically certain was traditionally the 
realm of rhetoric. By the seventeenth century, however, rhetoric appeared to be 
too emotional, too personally biased, too ready to accept common opinion, and 
too amplified, verbose, and poetic for their purposes. Practitioners of the new 
fact-oriented learning became restive with the standard models of writing and 
thinking.240  
Rhetoric aims to win the argument, as its goal is not truth, but being persuasive based on 
probability. Certainty here takes more than factual or experimental proof—certainty is exactly 
why Satan puts identifying God’s singularity in abeyance. Certainty assumes epistemological 
darkness and requires one to plunge blindly into the unknowable while probability always hinges 
on the middle ground. With probability, chances are, Satan will feel trapped in the darkness that 
makes everything invisible. Satan cannot embrace probability because he must use seeing as an 
agency of controlling knowledge. To those who associate seeing with agency, the quality of what 
they see becomes less critical while how far they can see becomes paramount to such an 
empirical gaze.241  
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241 As Augustine writes, “the vision, which takes place in the sense, is indeed mingled with something 
spiritual, because it cannot take place without the soul.” 
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In The Empty Garden: The Subject of Late Milton, Ashraf H. A. Rushdy suggests that 
Adam’s “first glimmers of consciousness” and Augustine’s dialogue with the world in the Book 
of Meditation exhibit a similar pattern of learning to understand God properly.242 According to 
Rushdy, this pattern of learning requires inner contemplation, through which one can transcend 
the corporeal knowledge perceived from the physical world into spiritual knowledge: “To see 
through the earthly and carnal to the heavenly and spiritual, to treat the material of vice in such a 
way that it is made the stuff of virtue, to meditate on the world in order to ascend to heaven: 
these are the options available to the faithful being in the duress of temptation.”243 Rushdy 
further argues that through “an act of meditation,” Christ in Paradise Regained is able to “see 
through the earthly and carnal” and distinguish Satan and his earthly temptations from the 
“heavenly and spiritual” (264). Christ through meditation achieves “the intellect filled with the 
Spirit” that enables him to “enigmatically address an intellect devoid of spiritual apprehension in 
order to address a different audience at a different level of understanding—the spiritual readers” 
(264). Then, meditation yields a spiritual battle ground, or engenders spiritual tensions that allow 
the mind to perceive the difference between earthly and heavenly. Even though one can perceive 
the spiritual world through meditation, the difficulty of seeing the heavenly through the earthly 
ensues from the worldly knowledge observed through the physical eye, which often intercepts 
observation into the spiritual realm. Without the persistent and cautious contemplative effort to 
sustain the mind’s eye that sees the spiritual world, the physical eye often tricks us into 
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243 Rushdy 264. This is true at all times, I would insist. Rushdy’s heavy reliance on Jung doesn’t alter the 
applicability of his observations to my own study. 
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becoming a bad reader of the spiritual world who forgets “the use of the eye beyond sense and 
reason, the most ethereal of the capacities unique to the human soul” (263).244  
Darkness gives the time needed for light to take its form. Milton did not write visible 
darkness—he wrote “darkness visible” because the illumination is the most important thing one 
must anticipate, and he is certain that it is coming, that things will be visible. Augustine sees 
what is there—“what I behold, is present”—but what he sees through his physical sight also fuels 
his imagination and suggests that the antecedent of something “visible” is indeed “darkness.”  
The idea of something becoming “visible” gives time and space the meaning that makes the dark 
present more bearable, and suggests the sort of fertility and fecundity of darkness that I will 
explore in the works of Finch in the next chapter. Poetic authorship, though it may seem odd at 
first to the reader, surprisingly relies on a certain level of blind trust and faith that the intended 
meaning will not get completely lost in the intervening space between the author and reader. 
Furthermore, the realm of poetry or certainty doesn’t remain static, but constantly intersects with 
the realm of probability. Human imagination and sensory experience, with the possibility of 
being erroneous, are responsible for both scientific observation and prosthetic seeing. Seeing 
becomes knowing, and knowing propels telling. Telling is hardly objective; there is no seeing 
that doesn’t involve self. If it is possible that the mechanically-enhanced sight is responsible for 
magnifying the blemish on “her spotty globe,” then it is also possible to erase or unsee that spot 
by the spiritually-guided eye.245 Telling, whether for the scientist or the poet, is the artistry that 
converts what one sees into what one believes. Indeed, telling is the most internal yet 
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communicative instrument of celebrating and confirming one’s belief. However, seeing that 
doesn’t “foresignify,” to borrow Augustine’s term, or lead to what Sidney calls “figuring forth,” 
is pointless and hollow to the artistry of poetry. This is why poets who are especially committed 
to using the poetic imagination to understand and represent the world must defend the artistry 
that requires the illumination of the spiritual eye, the spiritual light that is able to see that there is 
the light that becomes even more imminent and ubiquitous in the darkness. 
6 CHAPTER 6: “No Fierce Light Disturbs, Whilst It Reveals”: Illuminating Darkness in 
the Poetry of Finch 
That the World may ne'er invade, 
Through such Windings and such Shade, 
My unshaken Liberty. 
 
No Intruders thither come! 
Who visit, but to be from home; 
None who their vain Moments pass, 
Only studious of their Glass, 
News, that charm to listning Ears; 
That false Alarm to Hopes and Fears; 
That common Theme for every Fop, 
From the Statesman to the Shop, 
In those Coverts ne'er be spread, 
Of who's Deceas'd, or who's to Wed, 
Be no Tidings thither brought, 
But Silent, as a Midnight Thought, 
Where the World may ne'er invade, 
Be those Windings, and that Shade: 246 
 
The darkness of the night signifies an intimate and private source of poetic imagination in 
Anne Finch’s poetry—Finch sees the night’s lone and enigmatic presence as equally ubiquitous 
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and intense as the bright daylight. The night’s quiet and subdued state heightens the poet’s 
sensitivity to the subtleties of nature, whose never-ceasing mutability becomes more magnified 
and dramatized by the stillness of the night than by the radiance of the daylight. The night’s 
unwavering darkness doesn’t signify obscurity and destruction in Finch’s poetry; rather, she 
describes the inexorable night’s darkness as a personified solitary poetic genius—a 
representation of mysterious aptitude, bottled in the pensive and ingenious intellectual abyss of 
an inspired poet who anticipates unleashing a greater insight. While the night’s darkness 
embodies the dynamic and enthusiastic “inward light” that fuels the poet’s creativity, Finch’s 
polarizing depiction of light as both the excessive and homogenizing institutional force of 
uniformity and the night’s antecedent necessary for yielding the darkness challenges the 
traditional and deterring notion of darkness as the deficient state of light. Finch’s poems also 
reveal how the poet’s imagination becomes more engaged and productive in a delicate but 
refined mental state intensified by the opposite psychological states—for instance, in “The 
Consolation,” the poet’s depressed and subdued mood is compared to the delirium and 
colorfulness of nature and the grandeur of mythical figures who never seem to fall but rise: “See, 
Phoebus breaking from the willing skies,/ See, how the soaring Lark, does with him rise” (lines 
1-2). What rises does fall, and to Finch, this duality and mutability in nature signifies the promise 
of rebirth and regrowth:  
Glorious, and high, but shall they ever bee, 
Glorious, and high, and fixt where now we see? 
No, both must fall, nor can their stations keep, 
She to the Earth, and he below the Deep, 
At night both fall, but the swift hand of time 
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Renews the morning, and again they climb, 
Then lett no cloudy change, create my sorrow, 
I'll think 'tis night, and I may rise to-morrow.247  
Finch sees the night’s darkness as a liminal doorway to poetic daybreak—darkness is as 
significant as light for her poetic imagination to become active. Fittingly, “The Consolation,” a 
poem about night being the poet’s consolation, opens with an invocation of Phoebus, the Greek 
god whose chariot pulled the sun, and the lark, the popular mythological and literary symbol of 
daybreak.248 The night is closely represented with the possibility of the fall in the poem, but the 
fall also generates and propels the creation. 
This chapter will examine Finch’s enthusiasm and affinity for night and her esoteric and 
unconventional poetic decision to magnify the night’s darkness as the source of poetic creativity 
and psychological solace. While she praises the lack of light as an indication of advanced artistic 
and individual independence, she also suggests that the topos of light as the ubiquitous symbol of 
knowledge and life reinforces the homogenous cultural institutionalization of dualistic values 
such as light and dark or good and evil. By highlighting and reassessing the estranged values of 
the things usurped of light, Finch debunks the ego-ocular-verbocentrism of the hegemonic social 
and class structures that concenters and hyperbolizes the more apparent and pronounced.249 
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249 In the introduction to Modernity and Hegemony of Vision, David Michael Levin discusses how vision is 
one of the predominant modes of perception, and the culture of vision dominates the discourses of knowledge in 
Western culture: “Can it be demonstrated, beginning with the ancient Greeks, our Western culture has been 
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reality? If so, many more questions follow. Can it be argued that, in the period we call ‘modernity’ (the period 
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Finch’s casting the light away to preserve her creative relationship with the night further reveals 
her acute awareness of her marginalized subjectivity as a female poet, a subjectivity that inspires 
her poetic imagination; she also doubts and challenges the gospel of scientific objectivity, 
championing instead poetic individualism and subjectivity. Thus, she belongs to a continuing 
tradition of female writers including Cavendish who were skeptical of the modern scientific 
project and struggled to preserve their female subjectivity. Female writers of the English 
Renaissance, as they are constantly aware of their political and social limitations, express a 
similar anxiety and criticism against the advent of science. Cavendish, through her struggles with 
The Royal Society, illustrates the precarious position of the “woman of science” in seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century England; Finch, who followed a generation later, also found herself 
exiled to the margin of scientific knowledge. Women writers of seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century England such as Cavendish and Finch wrote about their experiences of being outsiders 
from the patriarchal production of knowledge and power; they share the distinction of offering 
alternate modes of discovering truth and, in their works, provide an interrogation of at least some 
aspects of the foundational doctrines of modern mechanistic philosophy that brought about what 
Susan Bordo has defined as “Masculinization of Thought.”250 I am far from presenting these 
poets as representing the entire discourse against the fashioning of modern science in the 
seventeenth century, but they are intellectually related to one another in presenting important 
critiques and alternate modes of knowing the universe that lost out to science and were neglected 
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or misunderstood to the point of outright hostility over the next centuries.251 And only recently 
have the complaints of these seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century skeptics regained a 
foothold in philosophical inquiries into the foundational beliefs of science, for contemporary 
theorists routinely decry the totalizing claims of science as both improbable and inherently 
dangerous in the social arrangements that they hail forth in modern civilizations.252 In Science, 
Reading, and Renaissance Literature: the Art of Making Knowledge, 1580-1670, Elizabeth 
Spiller also considers the entire experimental paradigm something that by definition attempts to 
hide its subjective and man-made nature, as “Experimentation depends on creating artificial 
situations for the purpose of discovering universal scientific laws” (7).253 Spiller further argues 
that these scientific experiments were not about scientific discoveries but about empirical 
reinforcements that support the pre-existing social and cultural hierarchy of patriarchal 
hegemony: “From most premodern philosophical and historical perspectives, this goal represents 
an epistemological paradox, yet by the end of the seventeenth century claims for the power of 
experiments are becoming widely accepted along with new assumptions about the existence of 
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universal scientific laws that they point to.”254 At the start of the following century, Finch’s 
exploration of a subjective, mutable self under the influence of the passions provides an 
especially cogent critique of the masculine, self-aware figure of the scientist then coming into 
prominence.   
Furthermore, Finch’s consistent representation of the human psyche as the source of 
mutability shows the poet’s own potential to grow and excel while she challenges the patriarchal 
tools of a process of knowledge production that oversimplifies women merely as intellectually 
servile and socially marginalized. The poet’s pensive and sometimes inactive, sedentary mood 
prevailing in Finch’s poetry is merely external and deceiving. The poet’s affinity for quiet 
solitude signifies not only her desire for social independence and personal solidarity but more 
importantly her intellectual independence. This is also why the sense of mutability and 
individualism governs Finch’s sense of time and space in her poetry—over and over Finch points 
out that mutability and heterogeneity tower over stability and regularity as her poetic inspiration 
comes from ambivalence and opaqueness. Finch wants to retreat from the hegemony of 
regularized, masculine time and space. Solitude might be the only way she can confront and 
delay the traditional sense of time. Therefore, she must use the space of solitude—the shaded 
areas and the poetry itself—to delegate the expected flow of time. She retreats from the punctual 
time, seeking out the night’s darkness that always antagonizes the daylight. Such an eccentric 
and capricious denial of the socially and ideologically accepted use of time and space provides 
the psychological dynamic and unease useful for informing the poet’s creative imagination.  
Even though Finch seems to advocate a choice between the two opposites by praising the night’s 
enigma and solitude over the daylight’s expressive refulgence, her literary virtues often seem to 
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rise from a synthesis of the two opposites, a kind of intimate fantasy fusing the two opposites. 
Articulated through her intensely strained emotional voice, the visions of mysterious and solemn 
night, or winding roads shaded by trees, represent a maverick gesture and convey the intrepid 
outlook of the poet. The amalgamation of all aspects of reality, either effulgent in the light or 
variegated in the shade, produce a more accomplished and compelling representation of reality. 
Finch’s argument for the underappreciated or usurped themes such as darkness and melancholy 
might come across as one-sided, but her awareness of divergent aspects of reality suggests 
otherwise. Finch’s argument for the heterogeneous view of darkness cannot succeed without 
admitting the necessity of light. The element of ambivalence and heterogeneity was prized in 
poetic production during the English Renaissance and seen as the basis of the poetic imagination; 
the poetic imagination, as Sidney argued and many others subsequently affirmed, requires 
opposites—metaphors analyze and merge dissimilarities to generate the sharpness and subtlety 
of meaning a poet desires to articulate without succumbing to the conventional shelving of 
hierarchy between two things. Finch’s romantic view of psychological clamor and emotional 
intensity as the source of poetic inspiration further points to the seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century’s neoclassical attempt to join fancy and judgment to explain wit. In an effort to define 
poetic inspiration or imagination, many critics debated the proper definition of the term “wit” in 
the ever-changing critical effort to locate and describe the imaginative source of poetry. Hobbes 
argued that fancy minus judgment or reason could not constitute wit; fancy and judgment should 
work together to accomplish wit, and Finch’s attempt to marry the effects of sensory perceptions 
and reason in her poetic creations echoes the idea that wit embodies both intellectual judgment 
and artistic imagination. 
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6.1 Poetry’s Promise of Mutability and Finch’s Use of Mutability 
 The tropes involving the human body and its sensory operation often reveal the 
metaphoric association between the writing body and the body of a written composition. In 
Finch’s “The Spleen,” the association between touch and figurative language extends to the 
poet’s figuration of her own malady as un-touchable, ungraspable. The spleen, the malady itself,  
is a metaphor for the poetic predicament that the poet faces and has to overcome—and the poet 
might have chosen the most fascinating and challenging subject to test and show off her poetic 
skills. Her triumph over this task will be a poetic achievement, one that deserves hyperbole. 
Finch believes poetry can capture and clothe the spleen, this protean beast that does not “remain 
in one continued shape.” As the poet reveals in “The Spleen,” the taming of the malady signifies 
being able to capture the private and subjectively experienced symptoms into words, 
transforming the internal into external. This is poetic metaphor’s singular capacity—joining two 
opposites, even unlikely ones. As Finch describes the spleen, she turns her own, mostly ocular 
private sensory observations into her poetry’s public realm where the reader experiences both 
ocular and tactile effects. The protean form is captured in the poem. Even though it might change 
its form afresh every time it is read, the fact that Finch’s poetic imagination delivers the 
figuration of the spleen remains unchangeable.  
Furthermore, in Finch’s nocturnal poems, the poet’s rejection of light is often associated 
with her deliberate denial of the conventional production of ocular epistemology; as I have 
argued before, seeing is closely linked with telling, yet the eyes that saw and hands that wrote 
belonged to those writers who thrived on the speaking ego of the male author. The poet’s 
dismissal of the day light reveals her attempt to evade the obligation of performing the exchange 
of social and ideological values of the hegemonic system, but such specific affinity towards 
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nocturnal images further signifies her desire to obstruct and delay the practice of ego-ocular-
verbocentrism by producing the images of the other: the narrator often suspected of possessing a 
rather eccentric, feminine, and fragmented ego strained by melancholy, the night’s darkness 
devoid of worldly significance, and the conscious censoring of  the “lines intend for publick 
view.”255 By magnifying the unconventional properties of the night, the spleen, and feminine 
subjectivity, Finch negates the ocular verbocentrism that generates the ideological narratives of 
patriarchal hegemony. Sensory perception and emotional experience govern Finch’s poetic 
imagery and her attempt to restore the internal values that lost out to the social and ideological 
values that carry significance in the external world.  
The poet in Finch’s poetry, represented as a lone, romantic figure possessing a singular, 
anti-social, and eccentric genius, often appears to remove herself from the external pressures of 
social conventions as well as poetic tradition. Nevertheless, her poems often demonstrate her 
awareness of the ruling poetic conventions of the day as she points to the conundrum poetic 
conventions pose to the genuine and personal articulation of intimate thought. Even through her 
association with the peculiar themes of nocturnal imagery and melancholy, Finch has been 
historicized, linked and associated with certain poetic traditions. Wordsworth once described 
Finch as one of the very few exceptions since Milton whose poetry “contain[s] a single new 
image of external nature.”256 However, Charles Hinnant cautions that Wordsworth’s famous 
claim on Finch’s poetry only provides “the archaeological nature of [Wordsworth’s] enterprise, 
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which revived interest in Finch’s poetry only by constructing a kind of historical mythology in 
which the poems become recognizable from the vantage point of their Romanticism” (Hinnant 
27). Hence, to Wordsworth, Finch’s poetry represented “an early, buried version of that 
Romanticism” (27). Many critics followed Wordsworth’s “historicizing approach to Finch’s 
poetry,” a project that only undermined Finch’s works as unfinished, still-in-progress, 
“adumbrations—shadows that looked forward to the fulfillment to come” with the full flowering 
of Romanticism (27). Hinnant suggests that it was Reuben Brower who first offered a counter 
criticism against Wordsworth’s historicizing of Finch. By recognizing Finch’s difference and 
“distance from the Romantics,” Hinnant describes, Brower “locates these so-called nature poems 
early in Finch’s career and thus grounds them in a seventeenth-century tradition of metaphysical 
poetry” (Hinnant 27). If the development of a poetic movement reflects a linear historical 
progression, Brower’s reading of Finch places her at the mature end of a seventeenth-century 
movement when Wordsworth lines her up at the incubating start of an eighteenth-century 
movement.  
In addition, part of Finch’s poetic inspiration often comes from the idyllic solitude found 
in a pastoral landscape. Finch combines the peaceful pastoral life with the night’s silent solitude 
and creates an ideal setting for her own private development of poetic imagination and 
intellectual discernment. Finch also invokes classical muses such as “Phoebus breaking from the 
willing skies” and “the soaring Lark” for inspiration, only to reject such external conventions in 
favor of her own emotion and imagination. Finch demonstrated an increasing awareness of the 
poetic traditions of her own period as well as those governing older verse. Her work’s affinity 
with the metaphysical tradition is evident in poems such as “The Petition for an Absolute 
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Retreat,” which represents the distanced perspective of the speaker through the image of the 
telescope, an emblem common to much religious poetry of the seventeenth century.  
Yet Finch’s poetic creativity is more intensely connected to—or comes from, to be more 
specific—her corporeal body. The corporeal body reminds the poet of the distance between 
celestial perfection and corporeal inadequacy, and the poetic metaphor is the poet’s tool to move 
upward. The desire to get closer to the celestial perfection—to ascend from small to great or 
partial truth to complete truth—governs the motion of the poetic imagination. Indeed, Finch’s 
poetic metaphors are meaningful and succinct as they indicate upward motion. Yet Finch’s 
poems openly discuss her physical malady affecting her mind, and instead of trying to veil the 
symptom, she explores and exploits the symptoms—the symptoms become the subject of her 
creation, not the obstacle for her creation. Tuned to the reveries of unnoticed and obscure 
subtleties, Finch delves into the abyss of a contemplative melancholic mind. This perhaps 
contradicts the upward propelled motion of poetic imagination. How do the cynical and 
unbalanced characteristics of the spleen or the lack of light embody the ascending motion to 
ontological perfection and undisturbed truth?  
Finch’s representation of the malady shows the poet’s profound grasp of the polarizing 
effects of the spleen, and it is Finch’s poetic ambition to confront and join the conflicting 
opposites together. Finch’s poetry shows that the ascension to truth by poetic imagination can 
also happen on a rather unconventional, meandering journey, by travelling “thro’ those Windings 
and that shade.”257 Finch’s winding and shaded path will reveal the poet and her reader things 
that could have been absent or hidden had she taken the hierarchical path to truth. In this sense, 
Finch resolves the moral dilemma caused by her polarizing formal and thematic subjectivities 
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found in her poetry. She understands that her subjectivity is polarizing to her poetic ambition. 
The spleen is both mobilizing and immobilizing; she embodies the spleen. The spleen inspires 
and discourages the poet, and even though the poet might dread its conflicting effect on the body 
and mind, she finds the spleen’s derailing impact on both body and mind forceful and sensational 
enough to stir her poetic imagination. The happy life without depression, the bright light without 
the shadow, in other words, results in a torpor of the poetic imagination. Notice the 
transformation she traces out in “The Spleen”: 
 I feel thy Force, whilst I against thee rail; 
 I feel my Verse decay, and my crampt Numbers fail. 
 Thro’ thy black Jaundice I all Objects See  
As Dark and Terrible as Thee, 
My Lines decry’d, and my Employment thought 
An useless Folly, or presumptuous Fault: 
Whilst in the Muses’ Paths I Stray, 
Whilst in their groves, and by their Secret Springs 
My hand delights to trace unusual things, 
And deviates from the known and common way.258 
The poet clearly suffers from the malady that blurs her poetic creativity: “my verse decay, and 
my cramped numbers fail.” Like a nebulous fog, her body moves too slowly, but her mind 
changes too constantly. However, in the midst of hazy “paths [she strays],” the poet also 
encounters something “unusual” and tangible as her “hand delights to trace unusual things,/ And 
deviates from the known and common way.” Being lost in the spleen’s “dark and terrible” forest 
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proves to be an inspiring experience; the poet who initially felt herself losing her creativity in the 
battle against the malady somehow finds poetic inspiration and strength in the state of “dark and 
terrible.”  Finch isn’t the first poet who tackled the subject of melancholy—though her approach 
is startlingly genuine, intimate, and emotional, as opposed to the grieving elegy tradition from 
the previous century or the poems about pensive solitude and melancholy popularized by 
Milton’s Il Penseroso. 
It is also paramount to notice that the overall temperament and mood of “The Spleen” 
echo with the mysterious, unruffled, self-sufficient coolness of the night that eschews the light’s 
“vulgar croud,/ [its] slaves, more clamorous and loud.” To Finch, darkness is enigmatic, 
romantic, and singularly creative while the day light is “vulgar,” “loud,” just like the slavish 
majority that blindly follow the obvious—indeed, they become the “slaves” of the malady by 
choice: 
Whilst in the light, and vulgar Croud, 
Thy Slaves, more clamorous and loud, 
By Laughters unprovok'd, thy Influence too confess. 
In the Imperious Wife thou Vapours art, 
Which from o'erheated Passions rise 
In Clouds to the attractive Brain, 
Until descending thence again, 
Thro' the o'er-cast, and show'ring Eyes, 
Upon her Husband's soften'd Heart, 
He the disputed Point must yield, 
Something resign of the contested Field; 
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Til Lordly Man, born to Imperial Sway, 
Compounds for Peace, to make that Right away, 
And Woman, arm'd with Spleen, do's servilely Obey.259 
Finch points out how the symptoms of the malady are easily misinterpreted and glorified by the 
popular majority. Regardless of the real symptoms of melancholy, which Finch vividly describes 
in her poems, the melancholic temperament, as articulated in such expressions as “the aromatic 
pain”—from which Pope borrowed his famous “die of a rose in an aromatic pain”—became 
romanticized and mimicked by many, as exhibiting these symptoms became the sign of cultural 
refinement and malaise prescribed for the higher class. Finch’s description of the spleen as “the 
vapours” that exist “in the imperious wife” derides the appearance—“new are thy motions, and 
thy dress”—of the malady that became fashionable among women who perform a state of 
physical weakness and mental frailty as the sign of femininity and servility. 
Though this might not seem plausible, the hyperbolic descriptions of the spleen might be 
the most fitting rhetorical choice for Finch to create the vivid impression of how the spleen 
attacks and usurps her mental and physical condition. The symptoms Finch illustrates show 
nothing but tedium, yet it is challenging and unpredictable— “thou Proteus to abused 
mankind”—and the ominous yet mysterious appearance of the malady seduces the ordinary 
people, so that showing the symptoms of the spleen becomes fashionable: “New are thy motions, 
and thy dress.” Finch portrays the spleen through the hyperbole of “unusual things” where the 
“muses’ paths [the poet] stray,” through which the poet also “deviates from the known and 
common way.” The spleen therefore becomes a metaphor for her poetic vision—the sublime 
“force” of “the airy phantoms” might also be the “dark and terrible,” but Finch does not deny the 
                                                 
259 Finch, “The Spleen. A Pindaric Poem,” lines 50-63. 
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spleen’s mystical power over mankind; rather, as the poem reveals, she is fond of its association 
with terifying and unorthodox unpredictability and mutability. Though she opens “The Spleen” 
with the question, “What art thou, Spleen, which ev’ry thing dost ape?” one can argue after a 
careful reading of the poem that Finch realizes what could “ape” the poet is the lack of 
melancholy. The nonfigurative, the ever-changing attributes of the disease challenge the poet to 
become more alert and perceptive. As the poem progresses, Finch’s use of figurative language 
slowly unveils that the spleen does deserve the hyperbole and the “perplexing form” (line 5). 
Further, the poet’s struggle against the melancholy is not just an internal and personal one; it is 
also a source of her professional ambition and distress. Although her poetic works were 
published anonymously, “The Spleen” clearly demonstrates how the poet feels her “verse decay, 
and [her] cramped numbers fail” because of the poet’s private anguish and anxiety from the 
malady.260 The complaint is both private and public; her complaints against the spleen constitute 
the poem, but the poem can also be seen as the triumphant song of the spleen—a Pindaric ode to 
the spleen. Finch chooses one of the most outward and hyperbolic modes of poetry to express her 
anguish over the most intimate and inward clash between her personal and professional space. In 
this sense, the poet’s brave and unconventional poetic decision also deserves as much hyperbole 
as the malady itself. 
 Because the conflict between her personal and professional life creates “the contested 
field,” Finch articulates her debilitating inner, psychological war through the images of solitude, 
darkness, and melancholy.261 In doing so, Finch further suggests that the creative space of a poet 
should be isolated and protected from any external forces threatening the poet’s intellectual 
                                                 
260 We must pay attention to how the phrase “cramped numbers fail” expresses her anxiety and poetic 
ambition at the same time. It’s not that she doesn’t have enough to say—the “numbers fail” because her ideas have 
to be “cramped” in the limited time and space, the conventional frame of poetry.  
261 Finch, “The Spleen. A Pindaric Poem,” line 60.  
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integrity and creative solitude; poetry-making requires diligent study and contemplative solitude, 
but sometimes it also involves skillful negotiations with the outside world. For instance, the main 
subject of Milton’s Sonnet 8 is Pindar, and the poem reveals that he is about to be assailed and 
thrown out from his home. The old poet who occupies his old home is about to be evacuated 
from his home; Milton represents Pindar as the emblem of deteriorating past poetic tradition by 
describing the moment where the poet is threatened and pushed out of his establishment by the 
militant, external forces. Milton’s Sonnet 8 embodies, both figuratively and literally, the creative 
nook that holds and protects Pindar inside.262 Poetry provides a sanctuary for a poet who is in 
political exile, but even under the shield of poetry the poet is being threatened by the external 
forces.263 Thus, in Sonnet 8 Milton pleads that his life should be spared just as the house of 
Pindarus was spared from being destroyed when the army of Alexander the Great sacked Thebes: 
“These defenceless dores may sease,/ If ever deed of honour did thee please,/ Guard them, and 
him within protect from harms” (lines 2-4). The house being occupied by a poet signifies a 
poetic space being occupied by a poet. Here, one can argue that a poet’s creative inner space 
isn’t always protected but often ends up being unlocked and bombarded by external forces as 
much as a poet fabricates the world people read and remember. However, as Sidney argues in 
The Defence of Poesie, a poet can imitate and create many versions of truth and even enhance the 
original; Milton argues that his pen will prevail through any political pressures--the poet holds 
the power not only to record history but also manipulate it: “He can requite thee, for he knows 
the charms/ That call Fame on such gentle acts as these,/ And he can spred thy Name o're Lands 
                                                 
262 As the lines progress close to the end of the sonnet, Milton makes certain that the words of the poet are 
indeed what lasts after the ruin and transcends the truth: “The house of Pindarus, when Temple and Towre/ Went to 
the ground: and the repeated air/ Of sad Electra's Poet had the power/ To save th' Athenian Walls from ruine bare” 
(lines 11-14). 
263 After losing his political battle against the Royalists, Milton experienced his poetic and political career 
being threatened—“these defenseless doors may seize/ If deed of honor did thee ever please,/ Guard them, and him 
within protect from harms” (lines 2-4). 
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and Seas,/ What ever clime the Suns bright circle warms” (lines 5-8). The space of poetry is 
forgiving and affirming—it is personal and public, egotistic and didactic.264  
When it comes to Finch, a female poet writing in the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
century, the poet’s personal space is her poetic space; her personal space and poetic space are 
one, walled away from the outside. Most often, a female poet during this time period cannot 
build enough physical and mental distance between her domestic and social or personal and 
public domain; thus, the two will collapse or coincide. In Handmaid to Divinity: Natural 
Philosophy, Poetry, and Gender in Seventeenth-Century England, Desiree Hellegers writes: 
“While the symptoms of the spleen or hysteria confirm the ‘femininity’ and delicacy of the upper 
class woman, they also undermine her claim to intellectual quality and justify her confinement to 
and subordination within the private space of the home” (148).265 The opening question of 
Finch’s poem, “What are thou SPLEEN which ev’rything dost ape?” expresses the poet’s 
“central concern with the flexibility of the discourse of the spleen and with the semiotics of 
disease” because the public discussion of her malady could render her vulnerable and again, 
feminine to the society.266 At first, “the contested field” seems to suggest that her domestic and 
social space becomes too “crowd[ed]” with the malady. Too many occupants populate her 
already clouded mind.  The battle between her malady and her verses keeps getting more intense 
as the contested field remains over-crowded, and the conflict becomes more acutely poetic; 
hence she feels “[her] verse decay, and [her] cramped numbers fail.” However, according to 
Finch’s description of the malady, we can induce that melancholy isn’t entirely the source of her 
                                                 
264 It might be useful to quote what Maurice Kelley says about poetic language in This Great Argument 
again. To protect his private poetic space from external ideologies, a poet “seeks to figure forth precept in a 
concrete, speaking picture, to present ethical teaching in a form that is both attractive and stimulating; in short, to 
teach by the feigned image of poetry” (98). 
265 Desiree Hellegers, Handmaid to Divinity: Natural Philosophy, Poetry, and Gender in Seventeenth-
Century England, 148. 
266 Hellegers 149. 
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physical and mental debilitation but rather a source of sublimity and magnificence for the 
poet.267 In fact, as she feels more anxious to write poetry and as her mind is more occupied by 
the melancholy, she feels something that “delights” with “[her] hand while she “trace[s] unusual 
things.” What kind of experience can offer the poet such delightful experience with her hand, 
tracing “unusual things” while under the spell of the spleen? Where do the readers see the 
unusual things she traces “whilst in the muses’ paths [she] stray[s]”?  Is it plausible to argue that 
her crowded, “contested field,” turns out to be a more generative and active field of poetic 
inspiration?  
In “Melancholy in Anne Finch and Elizabeth Carter,” John F. Sena points out that even 
though “melancholy was the bête noire of some Englishmen, the malady was looked upon with 
pride and deference by many. If melancholy caused physical infirmity and psychological 
distress, it was also associated with genius and artistic creativity” (115).268 In addition, Hellegers 
points out that “the public form of the Pindaric also seems to be a particularly appropriate 
medium for treating a phenomenon that was viewed, from the late seventeenth century onward, 
                                                 
267 In The Poetics of Melancholy in Early Modern England, Douglas Trevor points out that sometimes the 
depressed moods are preferred by those who sought spiritual ascendance rather than elevation of moods. Neo-
Platonist belief stated that the upward motions of a purified and purged soul requires the downward motion of 
emotional sorrows and suffering, or, as Trevor asserts, “poets need to suffer in order to create verse that will 
‘quenche’ their thirst”(36). Sadness marks the moralistic mourner while purifying the religious sufferer, and Trevor 
argues that Spenser’s sadness in The Shepheardes Calender “substantiates one’s moral and religious virtue,” serving 
as “a tool by which to prod his readers into supporting his career as a poet. The very ubiquity of sad figures in 
Spenser’s verse testifies to his worldly aspirations, with poetry functioning both as the vehicle for his ambitions and 
the cure for his episodic misery” (36). The distinction between Neoplatonic sadness and Galenic melancholy is 
similar, Trevor asserts, to the differences between “announcing oneself as irremediably sick and coveting and 
marketing pity. Spenser eagerly participates in the latter, but shies away from the former” (36). Anne Ferry, in The 
“Inward” Language, writes, “The actual word expression, commonly used by Wyatt and other writers throughout 
this period for the utterance of what is in the heart, describes the relationship here of outward signs to inward states. 
In either a literal or a figurative reading, expression defines outward signs, like tears, as the emission of what is in 
the heart; to utter also meant to emit or exhale” (69). Poetry provides a useful tool for poets to immerse themselves 
in narcissistic grief, but poetry also treats—purges—the affliction through the poetry’s innate outward motion of 
expressing one’s inner thoughts.  
 
268 John F. Sena. “Melancholy in Anne Finch and Elizabeth Carter: The Ambivalence of an Idea.” 
Yearbook of English Studies 1 (1971): 108-19.  
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as peculiarly English.”269 During the sixteenth century, Renaissance scholars and writers 
perceived that the melancholic artist possessed an aura of artistic superiority, and even today 
artists tend to link creativity with suffering, solitary confinement and pensive melancholy. To 
many seventeenth and eighteenth-century English upper class aristocrats, the spleen signifies a 
privileged sickness “associated specifically with the upper classes and with a sedentary life of 
luxury. In this respect, as John Mullan among others has emphasized, the spleen marked not 
simply affliction but also privilege.”270 Associating the malady with more refined and “superior 
mental endowments” wasn’t entirely without medical foundation either. Physicians also believed 
that the spleen was caused by “physiological factors similar to those responsible for intelligence 
and wit.” Those with more sensitive and refined spirits were more susceptible to the melancholy. 
Great heroes and talented people throughout history were often described as those touched by 
this malady, and the spleen had become a rather fashionable disease for poets and thinkers alike 
in the eighteenth century. In “From Delusion to Illumination: A Larger Structure of L’Allegro-Il 
Penseroso,” David M. Miller argues that the pleasures only melancholy can provide can never be 
fully appreciated without knowing the pleasures from mirth: “The delights of L’Allegro are real 
and valued, but like the glories of Greece they cannot stand against the ecstasy of Christian 
contemplation. Partial truth is inferior to complete truth. It is Il Penseroso who represents the 
proper Christian pattern” (37).271 Miller incorporates a taxonomy borrowed from Lawrence 
                                                 
269 Hellegers, Handmaid to Divinity, 147. 
270 Ibid. In addition, John Mullan discusses how the medical symptoms of the spleen, or melancholy, 
became standard markers of creativity and authorship after the eighteenth century’s celebration of “feelings”—
sympathy and sensibility--and argues that such an image of the melancholic writer was not unusual, in Sentiment 
and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century. According to Mullan, philosophers like David 
Hume and novelist Samuel Richardson exhibited “various dispositions to melancholy, hypochondria, or ‘spleen’” 
(17). 
271 Miller suggests that many of Milton’s poems show the poet’s affinity toward melancholy and that 
Milton seems to be in favor of pensive solitude rather than “thoughtless excess” of mirth and social life: “In Il 
Penseroso thoughtless excess must be controlled least man abdicate the responsibilities of his amphibious nature.” 
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Babb’s discussion of Il Penseroso in “The Background of Il Penseroso” that posits two distinct 
kinds of melancholy—black and gold—and associates the latter with a more divine and artistic 
portent for poets: “Golden melancholy was the concern, not of physicians, but of poets. And its 
products were not despondency amid madness, but the highest of man’s artistic achievements.” 
Milton also refers to the black melancholy as “loathed” while golden melancholy remains 
“divinest” (33).272 Finch’s melancholy embodies both gold and dark; it not only comes to her as 
a dark and untraceable “monstrous vision” that surreptitiously usurps her at night, but the poet 
also associates the melancholy’s numbing hallucinatory effect with enlightening, divine golden 
melancholy.273  
In “The Spleen,” Finch’s description of golden melancholy deviates from Milton’s 
association with poetic inspiration and the malady, however, as Finch shows a clear aversion 
toward the malady’s debilitating effect—“the jonquil o’ercomes the feeble brain” (40). Finch’s 
critical tone against “men of thoughts refined” who are “fool[s], to imitate the wits” (64) and the 
“coquette, whom ev’ry fool admires” (99) suggests that she is against the popularization of the 
malady—she might be complaining that the malady becomes too accessible and common, losing 
its novel and distant existence.274 Hellegers also points out the fashionable artistic attribute of 
melancholy fail to include the certain members of society: “For the male writer, at least, displays 
                                                 
Miller suggests that Milton perceives both extremes culpable even though he finds the second is “morally superior to 
the first” (33). 
 
272 Referring to Milton’s L’Allegro and Il Penseroso, Miller points out that Milton describes melancholy as 
“loathed Melancholy,/ Of Cerberus and blackest midnight born/ In Stygian Cave forlorn” in the beginning of 
L’Allegro (lines 1-3); also as “But, hail, thou Goddess, sage and holy,/ Hail divinest Melancholy,/ Whose Saintly 
visage is too bright/ To hit the Sense of human sight” in Il Penseroso (lines 11-14). See: David M. Miller, “From 
Delusion to Illumination: A Larger Structure of L’Allegro-Il Penseroso.” Also, Lawrence Babb, “The Background 
of Il Penseroso.” 
273 Finch, “The Spleen,” line 20. 
274 It will indeed make gold popular, ironically making it more valuable to the common public, but in 
return, what is valuable to “the world” is no longer “golden” to Finch.   
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of splenetic symptomatology became a means of affirming or enhancing social, political, and 
intellectual authority. The discourse of the spleen, Finch implies, legitimates ‘scientifically’ the 
claims of upper-class men to power and privilege.”275 It is not the spleen’s capricious and 
ominous visits the poet eschews; she abhors the patriarchal force behind the medical science and 
society’s identification of the malady as a feminine symptom of weakness and vulnerability. As 
Miller suggests, Milton’s “twin” poems of duality—melancholy and happiness, day and night, 
solitary and social person—envisage delivering the “complete truth.”276 Finch values the artistic 
depth and complexity she can draw from the symptoms of the spleen greater than the pain and 
malady caused by the illness. The oscillating but persistent fore- and overshadowing of the 
spleen’s physical and mental symptoms render the duality tenuous and capricious. It can easily 
sway the “vulgar crowd,” who servilely follow its “dynamic charm”; unlike the “vulgar croud,/ 
thy Slaves, more clamorous and loud,” the poet isn’t deluded by the spleen’s dynamic charm: 
“New are thy Motions, and thy Dress.”  
Furthermore, the contemporary fascination with the malady deserves Finch’s unfavorable 
tone because she believes that those who idolize and imitate the creative spirit of melancholy do 
not possess the poetic and creative capacity that she herself possesses. While the “vulgar crowd” 
chase and idolize the malady, the malady sought and chose the poet—in other words, she had no 
choice but to receive the malady and surrender. In the beginning of the poem, she does appear to 
be passive and powerless when the dark symptoms of melancholy take over her at night. With 
the spleen, everything seems to be out of balance, out of proportion: “From Harmony no help is 
had; Musik but soothes thee, if too sweetly sad,/ And if too light, but turns thee gayly mad.”277 It 
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276 As Miller writes in “From Delusion to Illumination: A Larger Structure of L’Allegro-Il Penseroso”:  
“Partial truth is inferior to complete truth” (37).  
277 Finch, “The Spleen.” Lines 135-37. 
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is hard to achieve “harmony” with the spleen because an element of magnification and 
manipulation—mutability—generates the enigmatic power of the malady. Yet Finch’s 
representation of her malady evolves from a self-effacing and self-deprecating articulation to an 
active and vivid description of the illness propelling the manic genius poet. Though she petitions 
against the spleen, she finds the malady enigmatic and its effect on the mind tangible: “secret, the 
mysterious ways,/ by which [it] dost surprise, and prey upon the mind” (144-45).  Even when she 
finds the malady gloomy and unfair, she describes the perturbed and jaundiced state of affliction 
with self-contradictory and oxymoronic expressions such as “fantastic harms” or “the dire effects 
of thy more pow’rful charms” (112, 115). The exaggerated contrast—the imagined distance—
between the spleen’s dark and yellow or destructive and creative capacity proves that the 
melancholy’s power is actual and functioning, controlling the poet’s creative process whether 
she desires it or not. Without the dark shadowing of melancholy, there is neither depth nor 
definition to keep things sharp and intense: “Through thy black jaundice I all objects see,/ As 
dark and terrible as thee,/ My lines decried, and my employment thought/ An useless folly, or 
presumptuous fault.” The melancholy, whether it represents creative inspiration or demonic 
malady hindering artistic creativity, influences the sharpness of the artist’s work. 
Yet vision of darkness doesn’t automatically mean impeding poetic creativity. Although 
the poet says the melancholy is shapeless and formless, her description of the spleen as “black 
jaundice” presents the melancholy in both black and gold colors. Unlike the articulation of 
melancholy as either golden or black in temperament, Finch’s depiction of melancholy in “The 
Spleen” combines the two characteristics and creates a more believable and accurate picture of 
the malady—it can’t be defined as one or the other, and when the malady is both creative and 
destructive the poet seems to be most confused but greatly inspired. This complicated yet murky 
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state of melancholy leads her to “the Muses’ paths” where “in their groves, and by their secret 
springs” she comes across the tangible delights while “trac[ing] unsual things.” In the midst of 
melancholy’s dark cloud, Finch employs various sensory perceptions to keep a keen sense of 
herself and her capacity to write poetry—the first twenty-five lines of “The Spleen” involve 
ocular experience. From lines 26 to 43 she focuses on describing how she experiences her 
malady through the sense of smell. Quite fittingly, the third sensory experience she employs is 
touch, which she closely aligns with ocular experience to demonstrate how colors are being 
manipulated into moods, to express her heightened state of feeling melancholy. The description 
of her hands tracing unusual things is a trope for both writing and envisioning, and her ocular 
experience coincides with tactile experience. Compared to her earlier descriptions of the 
melancholy creeping into her bed as she passively lies there, she is more active and her 
experience is more tactile when “[her] hand delights.” In the beginning of the poem Finch’s 
description of the spleen provides a rather elusive picture of melancholy; constantly shifting 
between the extremity of moods, being resolutely sad or intensely happy, the poet describes the 
spleen “Proteus to abus’d Mankind,/ Who never yet thy real Cause cou’d find,/ Or fix thee to 
remain in one continued Shape/ Still varying thy perplexing Form” (lines 2-4). In the beginning 
of the poem Finch perceives the spleen lacking a tangible or real body, thus a Protean but hollow 
form. The hyperbolic attention the spleen receives from the poem—“the son of Bacchus pleads 
[its] pow’r” and “Retained thy pris’ner, thy acknowledged slave,/ And sunk beneath thy chain to 
a lamented grave”—gives this elusive and distant temperament a more concrete identity (94, 
149-50). And this tangible identity of the poet’s malady also redefines the poet; after all, the 
sickness initiates internal struggle and germinates the poetic mind, and prepares the poet’s 
professional career. Without the poetic urgency that encourages the poet to oblige “the Spleen,” 
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the poem loses its personal significance that distinguishes itself apart from any other poems 
professing the romantic view of melancholy.  
The poet’s sensory experience of the malady is mostly ocular in the beginning of her 
poem, but when she begins to describe her writing process, the details of her splenetic experience 
interfering with her writing experience becomes more tactile. Here in “the Muses’ paths” the 
poet actually feels something tangible, but imagines her poem gaining more tangible flesh. 
Although the poem begins with the description of the spleen as protean and intangible, the spleen 
slowly takes a concrete form; the once “monstrous vision,” impossible to trace or grasp, has been 
captured and written down.  As the poet “trace[s] unusual things” and “[her] hand delights,” the 
blurry sight of the spleen becomes less abstract and intangible, though the poet still preserves the 
malady’s mysterious entity as opaque and clandestine. Finch compares the malady to the motion 
of the sea—the waves rise and fall; affliction and change are essential part of artistic begetting—
“Now a Dead Sea thou’lt represent,/ A calm of stupid discontent,/ Then, dashing on the rocks 
wilt rage into a storm” (6-8). The rising and crashing motion of the sea wave echoes with Finch’s 
own experience with the malady’s unpredictable and violent visits.  Clearly, writing about the 
spleen gives the poet a sense of purpose and control over the malady even though she laments 
the difficulty of pinning down—“fix thee to remain in one continued shape”—this protean 
affliction inside herself; however, she knows where she can encounter and confront this protean 
form: inside the frame of poetry, in “those windings and that shade,” as she writes in “The 
Petition for an Absolute Retreat.” This attempt is ambitious and heroic, and Finch’s poetic 
aspiration becomes more forcible and acute as the malady’s deterrence over her artistic creativity 
becomes more controlling and consuming of her body. The deterrence generates more 
encouragement, not discouragement of the poet’s artistic creativity.  
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Finch’s description of the melancholy does not veil the malady’s debilitating effect; 
rather, her poem begins with the description of how the spleen spreads and takes over the poet’s 
body like a slow, surreptitious, nightmarish dream: “On sleep intruding dost thy shadows 
spread,/ The gloomy Terrours round the silent Bed,/ And croud with boading Dreams the 
Melancholy Head.” She complains that the spleen’s unpredictability and covertness keep the 
poet “trembling sometimes” in “a panic fear” (9-10). Eleanor M. Sickels’ The Gloomy Egoist 
also examines the different seasonal and weather themes involving the expression of melancholy. 
Sickels argues that there is a large group of poets whose poems show “the continuing and 
increasing love for pensive autumn and barren or stormy winter” and that “the moods 
represented are roughly analogous to those of evening and night” (Sickels 267). Most poets 
desire the scholarly pensiveness and nocturnal solitude associated with melancholy: “The poet’s 
love for evening was partly conditioned by the fact that only then was [the poet] released from 
labor and free to indulge his delight in solitary rambles” (270). In Finch’s “The Spleen,” when 
the malady visits the poet during the solitary quietness of evening, the poet’s reaction seems to 
illustrate a desirable disposition of malady.278 
Finch’s ominous description of the malady slowly turns into ornate renderings of the 
spleen’s power in elevated tropes and hyperbolic tones. When under the attack of spleen, she is 
both active and passive; she is not only being consumed and controlled by the illness but also 
inspired and mobilized. Thus the night becomes the time of change and transformation. The 
poet’s description of her “day” life—her social and public life as a wife, which is also her 
domestic life—at first seems to create inflexible exteriority that circumscribes the poet’s creative 
                                                 
278 In The Poetics of Melancholy in Early Modern England, Douglas Trevor writes: “The dreamy optimism 
of ‘Il Penseroso,’ which disregards sickness as a potential consequence of late-night, solitary studying, is an 
indication of the rather remarkable disposition that Milton uncovers in himself in the face of Galenic warnings” 
(160). 
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motions. But this friction and congestion between the poet’s various inner and outer identities 
further suggests that what populates the poet’s “congested field” is not outside the poet but rather 
inside. The melancholic interiority of the poet expands and congregates, which makes the poet 
feel restricted and crowded inside.279 In the night when she is secluded and isolated by darkness, 
she finally finds her inner poetic self that gets tucked away and ignored during the day’s social 
and public time. Finch’s affinity toward the inner, private world becomes more apparent in other 
poems; for example, in “A Nocturnal Reverie” she eschews the obvious, intrusive, and loud 
public world that seems to undermine and impede her poetic career.  
6.2 Female Subjectivity and the Lack of Light 
The subtitle above precisely represents the close and inseparable relationship between the 
two topics; very few female thinkers or poets, or female subjects in general, before and during 
Finch’s time period, perhaps with an exception of Queen Elizabeth, had been the illuminating 
subject of literary or scholarly discussion. Finch’s assertion of a subjective, mutable self under 
the influence of the spleen further provides a persuasive critique of the masculine, self-aware 
authority figure that governs the production of knowledge—the male figure of the poet, the 
scientist, or even the husband. Finch will need to be presented as part of continuum of a longer 
tradition extending even before Cavendish of female writers recognizing that science was a 
social project organizing intellectual endeavors in a way that privileged male participation and 
superiority. 
Although Finch clearly suspects the social dangers of science on account of its 
relentlessly gendered nature, she chooses a less self-aggrandizing method than Cavendish’s 
                                                 
279 This “congested field” also echoes Finch’s complaint that the “cramped numbers fail.” There is indeed 
the frame that holds poetry, where its lines are numbered. This is again why writing an epic poem becomes not only 
a poetic but also a spiritual accomplishment.  
269 
direct and expressive criticism to voice her concerns. The autobiographical nature of Finch’s 
observations of her own physical malady makes her work one of the most compelling critiques 
imaginable of the possible existence of an objective consciousness able, in the manner of Bacon, 
to purposefully remove one’s subjectivity from one’s own experience of the world; unlike 
Cavendish, Finch is uncomfortable with representing herself in the linear narrative of Cartesian 
ego that controls and dominates the terrain through measuring and mapping her control—here it 
would be her authorial terrain. Finch is suspicious of both empiricism and rationalism—she is 
suspicious of the enterprise of knowledge production. As Hellegers points out, Finch’s “The 
Spleen” presents the poet’s criticism against the “medical narratives that naturalize and 
legitimize the privileged position of a masculine elite atop the hierarchies of gender, class, and 
race.”280 Yet the ideological practice of science overrides and usurps the social and political 
critique of the dominant masculine view of the female body written by women; the tradition of 
western metaphysics reiterates feminine attributes as naturally inferior to those of men and, 
Finch’s “‘The Spleen’ recognizes that late seventeenth-century medical narratives simply 
reconstruct existing conceptions of feminine instability evident in the works of male poets from 
Sidney onward under the aegis of a new narrative authority.”281 Contesting the “existing 
conceptions of feminine instability,” Finch’s works such as “The Petition for an Absolute 
Retreat,” “The Consolation,” “A Nocturnal Reverie,” and “The Spleen” focus on reevaluating 
the heterogeneous irregularities found in the immaterial realm of human psyche and emotions. In 
these poems, the poet asserts that the social and public activities of the day belong to “the Fair, 
the Gay, the Vain” and further suggests that the peculiarities of introverted social outcasts should 
be left alone to enjoy “more extensive Joy,/ When all Heaven shall be survey’d/ From those 
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Windings and that Shade.”282 These eccentricities must perform under the veil of normality and 
abide by the scrutiny of pedestrian happiness during the bright day light. However, in the 
darkness of the night, when socially and publically obliging forces are subdued and discouraged, 
the oddities feel secure enough to express their true identity. The night’s darkness takes over the 
vociferous and triumphant daylight that once antagonized and cornered the oddities to the shaded 
areas; unlike daylight, the darkness of night does not forcefully magnify and expose these 
unconventional subjects to the visible world. Finch signifies the brilliance of the daylight as the 
external, obvious, and inevitable attributes of forceful hegemony—too much light will end up 
marginalizing the sight, and too much certainty will obliterate the chance of new discovery.  
Finch often represents the appropriate, dominant sense of time as an antagonizing male 
figure, and the poet employs her poetic construction to challenge and decenter the linearly 
projecting time that is necessary to create the fictive “I.” Linear time reinforces the existence of 
the Cartesian ego by assuring its consistent placement and reappearance in the flow of time and 
history. In such linear fashion, time plays a threatening, arbitrary role that ignores and forgets 
lives outside its linear pattern. Finch’s playful protest against linear time renders pointless the 
speaking “I” of Cartesian thought and even further challenges the Platonic hierarchy of low and 
great, dark and light, body and spirit, or corporeal and celestial world. For instance, in “The 
Spleen,” the speaker’s physical malady distorts the recollected ordering of sensory experience, 
disabling time’s orderly linearity and the sense of a superseding Cartesian ego. When the 
speaking center shifts, the reliability of the narrator and narrative becomes suspect. In “The 
Spleen,” the depressed mind is being controlled by the depressed body; the mind’s clock must 
oblige the body’s, albeit the body can’t keep up with the passage of time due to the melancholy 
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that often sustains and wallows in one memorable—or perplexing—moment in time. The 
Platonic preference of mind over body is put in abeyance by the poet’s protest against the unity 
of time. By employing madness to question the ideological center of “I,” Finch’s poetry suggests 
a possible escape from the rituals of patriarchy and human reproduction that construct the subject 
as a willing participant in the putatively male realm of sexual politics and scientific knowledge. 
Freed of linear time, Finch’s text plays with the normative pattern of classical rational 
thought and validates experiences normally viewed as inappropriate when seeking “truth”: 
vision, dream, and fantasy. Finch’s affinity towards temporality undercuts the notion of 
continuous rational objectivity as well as the empiricist outlook of the universe that scientific 
experimentation presupposes, one which views the possibility of reducing material events to 
abstract models that can be labeled as truth. Such a practice, however, required a belief that 
individuals could exist outside of the obvious events they are observing under the lurid light of 
mechanical devices and make objective measurements and descriptions; viewed in this light, 
Finch also represents an articulate spokesperson for a persistent strain of anti-mechanist thought 
in England. Finch’s refusal to publish under her own name demonstrates her self-effacing 
censorship against her own poetic career. Then it becomes clear why the poet desires to find a 
place to keep her poetry live and hidden at the same time, away from the expected, regular 
surveillance of dominant ideology, apart from the socially-constructed narratives of time that 
summon the routine performances of social and class ideology that hinder Finch’s poetic 
pursuits. For Finch time is punctual and objective; it is unforgiving and controlling—time is 
patriarchal and male. The tropes of sensory impressions in “The Spleen” and “A Nocturnal 
Reverie” reveal how Finch anxiously attempts to manipulate time in order to preserve her poetic 
exile and refuge against time’s clockwork.  
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In Finch’s "A Nocturnal Reverie," the indicators of the flow of time such as conjunctions 
and prepositions appear punctually and persistently in the beginning of every third or fourth line, 
as if to prove that the poet’s anxiety over time becomes more intensified as the time passes. The 
frequent reminder of time and place—“In such a night”—throughout the poem reveals the poet’s 
attempt to hold time in abeyance: “In such a night, when every louder wind/ Is to its distant 
cavern safe confined;/ And only gentle Zephyr fans his wings,/ And lonely Philomel, still 
waking, sings;/ Or from some tree, famed for the owl’s delight,/ She, hollowing clear, directs the 
wand’rer right:”(lines 1-6). The poet’s struggle against time’s greed and selfishness is 
inevitable—even though the poet “Joys in th’inferiour World and thinks it like her Own” and 
desires to “abroad remain,/ Till Morning breaks” (lines 46-8), time is indifferent to the poet’s 
wishes and will not stop, and with its growth will summon the day break:  
When the loosed horse now, as his pasture leads, 
Comes slowly grazing through th’ adjoining meads, 
Whose stealing pace, and lengthened shade we fear, 
Till torn-up forage in his teeth we hear: 
When nibbling sheep at large pursue their food, 
And unmolested kine rechew the cud; 
When curlews cry beneath the village walls, 
And to her straggling brood the partridge calls; 
Their shortlived jubilee the creatures keep, 
Which but endures, whilst tyrant man does sleep; 
When a sedate content the spirit feels, 
And no fierce light disturbs, whilst it reveals; 
But silent musings urge the mind to seek 
Something, too high for syllables to speak; 
Till the free soul to a composedness charmed, 
Finding the elements of rage disarmed, 
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O’er all below a solemn quiet grown, 
Joys in th’ inferior world, and thinks it like her own: 
In such a night let me abroad remain, 
Till morning breaks, and all’s confused again; 
Our cares, our toils, our clamors are renewed, 
Or pleasures, seldom reached, again pursued.283 
The entire poem is only fifty lines long, but I wanted to cite this admittedly large portion of the 
poem to make it immediately clear to the readers how the lines are initiated by the anticipation of 
time. Note the progression of adverbial elements: “When,” “Till,” and “In such a night.” The 
flow of time is against the poet’s hope for a longer period of creativity—she wants to remain “in 
such a night” “when a sedate Content the Spirit feels” (39), but “morning breaks, and all’s 
confused again” (48). By constructing twenty-five heroic couplets recording the obscure yet 
fantastic charms and virtues of a night, Finch creates a unique figure of night suspended by the 
sinuous flow of sensory impressions. “In such a night,” all the senses are heightened and 
celebrated. Hues and shapes of nature are “seen” (10); the mythic creatures—Zephyrs and 
Philomel—are heard (4 and 5); “[t]hro’ temp’rate Air” the night wanes down the “repelling” 
odours (22). Night’s solidarity generates clarity and authority that the day’s hectic and clamorous 
dominance over the world prevents—only through night does the poet find her identity: “in 
the’inferious World and thinks it like her Own” (46).   
Night provides an intimate refuge for the poet where her sensory perceptions are 
enlightened by the night’s calm and sublime energy: “no fierce Light disturbs, whilst it reveals;/ 
But silent Musings urge the Mind to seek/ Something, too high for Syllables to speak” (40-1). 
The stereotypical representation of night as the time of inactive darkness is subverted by Finch’s 
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prompt and persistent invocation of night’s capacity to queue up and orchestrate such 
overwhelming sensory experiences. “In such a Night,” as Finch repeatedly points out, the night’s 
profound and sublime control over sustained time triumphs over the day’s brilliant but shallow 
expressions of busily moving and fleeting time: “All’s confus’d again:/ Our Cares, our Toils, our 
Clamour are renew’d” (48-9). The trope of “night” in “A Nocturnal Reverie” represents the sign 
of serenity and protective sanctuary for the poet. As a metaphor—it could be metonymy—of 
sustained time and space filled with nature’s poetry, “night” supplies poetic energy to the poet 
who clearly eschews the day’s obvious servile commitment to the flow of time. Time gets more 
transparent and comprehensible during the day as the daylight’s transparency obliges people to 
be more social and rational. At night, time loses such advantage and faces a much harder task; 
the world becomes clandestine and unpredictable. In “A Nocturnal Reverie,” night’s display of 
obscure yet fantastic and singular happenings provides a more generative and productive time for 
the poet. In addition, this is a particular night distinguished from all the other nights—“In such a 
night” signifies one specific night, a specific incident—and this specific time is expanded and 
extended as it is remembered and reiterated by the poet.   
But what is "Something, too high for syllables to speak" after all? Various scholars point 
to the idea of "the sublime,” and though the idea originated from classical Latin thought, it was 
still a less-known idea during her life time; thus it is fitting for a female poet like Finch who 
strives to challenge the male-dominated poetic tradition to find her poetic inspiration from the 
nocturnal carnival of sensory impressions that occur in “shaded” places. This is how Finch 
removes herself from the recurring assembly of old poetic tradition. She also criticizes the 
overused and exhausted expressions of Renaissance poetic conventions and claims her poetic 
novelty over the conventional poetry by demonstrating her ability to capture the daydream of 
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something obscure and dark—night as the sublime. The image of “sedate” darkness is yet 
awakened and brightened by the magnificent sights of nature’s unbelievable festivity at night, 
which are also juxtaposed with the piercing brilliance of the morning light. However, it is the 
night that the poet longs for, as she dreams to retreat from the mundane, repetitive day-to-day 
conventions of patriarchal society and the reiteration of classical poetic traditions that never fail 
to intrude into poetic space.284 This burning sun will find the speaker in Finch’s poetry and burn 
her poetic inspirations, a trope that is not distinct to Finch. Sidney’s Sonnet 1 from Astrophil and 
Stella employs the metaphor of old poetic conventions as the burning sun: “I sought fit words to 
paint the blackest face of woe,/ Studying inventions fine, her wits to entertain;/ Oft turning 
others' leaves, to see if thence would flow/ Some fresh and fruitful showers upon my sunburnt 
brain” (lines 5-8). Just as Sidney complains about being sunburnt by the unavoidable ray of the 
Petrarchan poetic conventions that influenced and fashioned sixteenth-century English poetry, 
Finch in the early eighteenth century also faces a similar conflict. Tradition is unavoidable as it is 
punctual and recurring like the day, but as the day returns so does the night, and every new 
generation of poets struggles to find a place to hide away from or negotiate with that burning 
sun, “Tyrant-Man” (38). Since “Tyrant-Man do’s sleep” during the night and the burning sun of 
poetic tradition stops shining at night, Finch celebrates night time. 
In addition to recording the night’s sensory impressions, Finch seems to commemorate 
the night’s reverie by giving it a more concrete form. The intricate and consistent grammatical 
and prosodic structure of “A Nocturnal Reverie” proves the poet’s seriousness in celebrating the 
night’s sublime energy versus the “lengthen’d Shade” the day “fear[s]” (31). Though the 
happenings during the night seem less organized, a close reading of the first few lines will show 
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that there is a certain schedule marked by a repetition of time indicating refrains and the same 
sensory impressions—hearing, sight, and smell. As I mentioned earlier, the sentences are 
punctuated by closed couplets, with iambic pentameter. The poem’s twenty-five heroic couplets 
frequently open with time-indicating words that signify when and where the poet longs to exist, 
instead of when and where the poet actually exists. Thus, in reality, the poet exists in the 
punctuality of numbers and recurring words—ending in masculine rhyme—rather than the time 
of night where all the fantastic festivities of sensory explosions and anthropomorphic 
occurrences that she imagines occur. Poetry is, furthermore, both a trap and escape—Finch is 
trapped inside the grammatical and prosodic structure of heroic couplets while the heroic 
couplets carry the poet closer to her desired, imagined place, when and where she longs to be. 
Then we can read the entire poem as an extended/expanded adjective that modifies “such a 
night.” Since the object of this extended adjective is outside the poet, the poet’s reverie must 
continue until the object comes “before our/her eyes,” until the adjective and the object exist as 
one without the difference or distance between the two.285 Making a noun dress up and act like 
an adjective is what poetic metaphors can do—whether it is the night or the spleen, these nouns 
represent more than an object but a condition or state that suggests a specific action. Finch’s use 
of these nouns suggests such specific choice that they simultaneously become connotations of 
condition and action.  
In addition, nouns such as “the spleen” and “the night” in Finch’s poems signify much 
more than depression or the lack of light; they prefigure a noun-to-verb conversion. As the topos 
of spleen and night signifies beyond the absence of cheerfulness and light, its metaphorical 
dimensions extend out to mean actions that anticipate and emulate the attributes of melancholy, 
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darkness and solitude. In “The Petition for an Absolute Retreat,” Finch decides to stray away 
from the clear and obvious path to find “a sweet, but absolute Retreat,/ Mongst Paths so lost, and 
Trees so high.” It is Finch’s own decision to curb the social and cultural conventions under the 
bright light to advocate the nocturnal life of a lonely artist. She negates the day light and social 
life to gain nocturnal freedom and professional solitude working as poet; she vociferously 
eschews empty ideological conventions while she praises the necessity of an inward and pensive 
mind that works to challenge and shift hegemonic practices of values devoid of personal and 
individual desires. Some might argue that Finch’s poetic creativity feeds on antithetical 
negotiations between opposites such as night and day or darkness and light, yet in Finch’s poetry 
both sides appear necessary to generate poetic creativity. To conclude this chapter and my 
somewhat experimental discussion of Finch’s poetic imagination as a movement toward 
synthesis, not antithesis, ascension rather than declension, or unification rather than 
fragmentation, I would like to compare Finch’s use of the topos of solitude and shade with 
Milton’s use of the topos of light and darkness to suggest that solitude and independence 
constitute the interiority of a poet.  
Although both Milton and Finch show their anxiety working under certain disadvantaged 
circumstances, the presiding poetic tradition propels Milton’s poetic ambition while poetic 
conventions or professional ambitions are secondary to Finch’s private desire to write.286 
Emotion and spirituality guide her eccentric, female, and poetic subjectivity. It is intriguing that 
both Finch and Milton write about female characters seeking solitude and independence to 
                                                 
286 Not only was Milton writing his epic poem late in his poetic career, but he also had to emulate the 
monumental poetic achievement of Virgil, who arrived many centuries before his time. Time seems to be 
antagonistic to both poets. However, Finch tries to obstruct time’s social regularity and ideological authority by 
retreating from the visible and communal passage of time. By negating conventional time, Finch can shut out the 
external noises of doubt and anxiety about her malady and subjectivity. 
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personify the lonely practice of maintaining the spiritual light. After all, the poet personifies a 
metaphor for light—the poetic imagination can illuminate the spiritual and intellectual darkness 
devoid of insight and faith. To climb and achieve the greatness of Virgil, the poet must turn to 
his or her public and professional ambition, but to sustain in the poetic spirit, the poet must, as 
Milton writes, turn to “the mind through all her powers/ Irradiate, there plant eyes, all mist from 
thence/ Purge and disperse, that I may see and tell/ Of things invisible to mortal sight” (PL III. 
51-55). Even in the physical darkness, Milton turns to “the mind” and “there plant[s] eyes”—the 
blind poet illuminates a world devoid of imperfection and mortality through the mind’s eye.  
Time alone is paramount; both the poet in Finch’s “The Petition for an Absolute Retreat” and 
Eve in Milton’s Paradise Lost express how they desire solitude to be able to work independently 
and efficiently. In Book IX, Eve suggests to Adam: 
   Thou therefore now advise 
  Or hear what to my mind first thoughts present; 
 Let us divide our labour, thou where choice 
 Leads thee, or where most needs, whether to wind 
 The woodbine round this arbour, or direct  
 The clasping ivy where to climb, while I 
 In yonder spring of roses intermixed 
 With myrtle, find what to redress till noon: 
For while so near each other thus all day 
Our task we choose, what wonder if so near 
Looks intervene and smiles, or object new 
Casual discourse draw on, which intermits 
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Our day’s work brought to little, though begun 
Early, and th’hour of supper comes unearned. (IX. 212-19) 
For the first time in Paradise Lost, Eve initiates the conversation with Adam, and to introduce 
her argument, Eve tells Adam the system of their labor isn’t efficient. Nature grows faster than 
Adam and Eve, and Eve thinks they might benefit greatly from diving the labor: “Adam, well 
may we labor still to dress/ This garden, still to tend plant, herb and flow’r,/ Our pleasant task 
enjoined, but till more hands/ Aid us, the work under our labor grows,/ Luxurious by restraint” 
(IX. 205-209). Calmly but succinctly, Eve points out to Adam that they are not working well 
together, and that they would work better if they divided the tasks and worked alone. Adam 
suggests that God didn’t intend the time Adam and Eve spent together solely for working: “For 
not to irksome toil, but to delight/ He made us, and delight to reason joined” (242-43). They 
spend time together in socializing and courting as well: “Yet not so strictly hath our Lord 
imposed/ Labor, as to debar us when we need/ Refreshment, whether food, or talk between, food 
of the mind, or this sweet intercourse/ Of looks and smiles” (235-39). Adam dismisses Eve’s 
suggestion that their current work routine might not be sufficient; instead he speculates that Eve 
might need some time away from the work load and that she might also be tired from the “talk 
between” and perhaps needs some alone time: “[B]ut if much converse perhaps/ Thee satiate, to 
short absence I could yield./ For solitude sometimes is best society,/ And short retirement urges 
sweet return” (247-50). Despite Adam’s persuasion, she prefers to spend the time differently 
from the way Adam does—Eve introduces the concept of individual time. By addressing her 
need to be alone to do what she likes to do, Eve tries to inform Adam that her time does define 
her sense of self, whether she is going to spend her time doing productive work or simply 
walking in the garden. Just as Eve argues that she needs her time alone to do her own preferred 
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work, Finch also pleads for the similar kind of freedom and alienation from social ties that take 
away from her independent experience of time. This is a new way of negating time, especially by 
using poetry, to deny and stall any obsequious movement toward the epistemology of time. As I 
pointed out earlier, this is Finch’s special way to antagonize the regularized and domesticated 
sense of time through her poetry.287 The time Eve shares with Adam, in other words, is a social 
time, which in some ways, doesn’t help Eve understand her sole existence, besides the one 
defined by being Adam’s mate. For Finch, the time spent pondering and meandering alone in 
nature signifies the time spent being productive; for Milton, Eve’s independent use of time 
means an opening for potential mutability, a kind of paradigm shift not only in the ontology of 
time but also the ontology of his verse, for this shift in defining and using time as a private and 
productive space in Paradise foregrounds a philosophical and structural reason for Satan’s 
temptation to take place in Paradise, where the Fall hasn’t occurred. However, my point is not 
about the moral argument that she becomes greedy of work and time or how Eve’s desire for 
independence leads humanity to the scene of temptation; I am describing something else.  
What Eve really wants becomes clear when we read Finch’s argument for solitude and 
retreat; perhaps Milton couldn’t say it for Eve, but what Eve really seeks is an experience of 
being alone, time spent by and for herself, time and existence completely reserved for herself—
                                                 
287 Imagine any casual conversation regarding time: “what time is it?” “It is four O’clock” (this often 
signifies it is time for one to do something, like go, leave, eat, sleep, etc.). This simple question about what time 
(more specifically, it asks “what time is now”) directly addresses the issue of identifying time. Whether we are 
addressing the concept of kairos or chronos, human beings ultimately identify and understand time by actions; hence 
the verbal tense: “I did” and “I will do.” But this further signifies that we also try to understand time by 
materializing it into a space—a passage, line, or an interval—occupied by actions that produce comprehensible, 
identifiable objects as the evidence of time: “things I did” and “things I will do.” For instance, wrinkles indicate the 
age—they not only signify that the time has passed, but also embody their being by their doing. Wrinkles signify 
(their doing) the passage of time (their being). Human beings rely on nature to figure out the passage of time, and it 
is natural that nature’s passage of time always leaves the fruits of its labor that make its existence comprehensible to 
us (i.e. vegetation tales, topos of seasonal changes). 
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“an absolute retreat” as Finch petitions. In addition, we must not miss the fact that Adam’s way 
of experiencing and identifying time signifies a fundamentally different habit—Adam is hardly 
alone in Eden. In Book VIII Adam remembers how he came to his existence; soon after he “new 
waked from soundest sleep,” Adam begins to acknowledge his surroundings. However, while 
naming all the animals in Eden, Adam feels a “sudden apprehension” (354). God promises Adam 
all the creatures in Eden belong to him, but he is still wanting more: “but in these/ I found not 
what methought I wanted still” (354-55). Adam defines this certain lack as the lack of “who 
partakes” (364) and tells God, who listens to his complaints: “In solitude/ What happiness, who 
can enjoy alone,/ Or all enjoying, what contentment find?” (364-66). In Paradise Lost, Adam’s 
time is social and communal. With very few exceptions, Adam is always seen paired with 
someone--conversing with Raphael or God, or working and conversing with Eve. Adam says he 
doesn’t want Eve to have any other experience with time except for the time spent together. The 
point I am trying to make here is not about Adam’s perception of time, but rather that the 
concept of time spent alone is alien to Adam, which is, ironically, the only way the creator would 
occupy his time. Thus God says the following to Adam: “A nice and subtle happiness I see/ Thou 
to thyself proposes, in the choice/ Of thy associates, Adam, and wilt taste/ No pleasure, though in 
pleasure, solitary./ What think’st thou then of me, and this my state,/ Seem I to thee sufficiently 
possessed/ Of happiness, or not?” (399-405). Happiness for God, of course, is uninterruptible 
and, most importantly, incomprehensible to Adam or human beings: “The highth and depth of 
thy eternal ways/ All human thoughts come short, supreme of things,/ Thou in thyself art perfect, 
and in thee/ Is no deficience found” (413-16). Because God is complete within himself, Adam 
argues, “No need that thou/ Shouldst propagate, already infinite,/ And through all numbers 
absolute, though one” (419-21). Adam argues that God will never experience loneliness or 
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incompleteness because he is absolute and ubiquitous by himself alone, but that is not Adam’s 
case.  
In addition, it is paramount to emphasize that the lone time is associated with the 
creator’s time. This is why Eve’s suggestion of abandoning social time signals a beginning of 
something ominous—if God occupies the self-contained, independent solitary time, what does 
Eve’s desire for working and being alone foretell? Or, is it because the tragic fall is inevitable 
and also necessary for the new beginning if the character desires for greatness and aspired to 
ascend closer to God or truth or celestial perfection? Eve’s desire to test and embrace this novel 
concept of time reflects what God says about his appreciation of solitude. Many scholars have 
argued Eve’s separation from Adam foreshadows the ominous seed of trouble in Eden because 
Eve’s solitude made it more possible for Satan to succeed his plan.288 However, one should 
notice a simple fact—Satan can tempt Eve when he is with her, physically in the same place at 
the same time, conversing with her. The Fall happens when Eve shares her time, not when she is 
alone. Even when Eve wakes up from a dream and tells Adam about the troublesome dream she 
had where she was tempted to eat the fruit from the Tree of Knowledge, she wasn’t alone—in 
her dream she was visited by one “with gentle voice” and when she wakes up Adam is right 
beside her. Roughly put, social time yields nothing but trouble, as God simply said: “in the 
                                                 
288 For instance, Maurice Kelley in This Great Argument suggests that Milton’s depiction of Adam reveals 
“that his fall is a foregone and inevitable conclusion"(149), and E. M. W. Tillyard believes that Adam and Eve are 
practically fallen before the actual temptation takes place in Studies in Milton (London, 1951). For an earlier essay 
exploring this topic presenting the similar type of criticism suggesting the fall is an inevitable reflection on human 
being’s weakness and imperfection, see A. E. Barker, "Structural Pattern in Paradise Lost,” Philological Quarterly, 
28 (1949). However, Diane McColley argues for the necessity for Eve’s freedom and her ability to make choice in 
“Free Will and Obedience in the Separation Scene of Paradise Lost.” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900. 12.1 
(Winter 1972): 103-120. She acknowledges that some might perceive the separation scene in Book IX of Paradise 
Lost presents Eve and Adam are “originally flawed and their failure was inevitable, and thus blaming their Maker 
for sin and woe, a notion Milton consistently repudiates in both poetry and prose. Rather, the scene portrays 
potentially sufficient beings in the process of healthful growth, facing difficulties and learning the meaning of 
obedience to God's behests and imitation of God's ways” (103). 
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choice/ Of thy associates, Adam, and wilt taste/ No pleasure, though in pleasure, solitary” (VIII. 
400-402). Yet the solitary time gives much more pleasure to the creator. Since Eve’s solitude 
was interrupted, Finch demands “an absolute retreat” where she can control or manipulate time 
and “taste” the “pleasure” from solitude, the pleasure of being able to create something of her 
own. 
Adam is also concerned with creating something of his own—he argues to God that 
procreation and multiplication of his kind will result in betterment of his kind, “by conversion 
with his like to help” (VIII. 418). Adam believes that earthly and flawed mortals can ascend 
closer to the celestial truth through reproduction—through the union of two souls in love, as 
based on the idea of the Platonic ladder of love—and multiplication of self: “But man by number 
is to manifest/ His single imperfection, and beget/ Like of his like, his image multiplied,/ In unity 
defective, which requires/ Collateral love, and dearest amity” (VIII. 422-26). On the contrary, 
Eve in Paradise Lost and Finch’s poetic persona exhibit a rather spiritual and artistic bent for 
extending and improving their own existence than Adam’s biological one. Adam pursues 
biological mimesis while Eve and Finch desire poetic mimesis. As I have argued in the previous 
chapter on Paradise Lost, Eve’s rhetorical command significantly improves and blossoms as she 
takes some time alone, away from Adam. Her arguments against Satan’s pernicious speech 
reveal spiritual depth and insight that she does not readily exhibit when she converses with 
Adam. The solitude gives her time to think and a sort of shade to illuminate her mind. Without 
Eve’s independent and unconventional spirit, Paradise Lost will not work—the poem will not 
exist. Had she not gone into the woods alone and fallen into the temptation, God’s paradise 
would have never been lost. And this loss is ever more essential and foundational for the 
existence of art. 
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However, as Adam says, we do not conceive how God creates, and corporeal creations 
cannot occur without mutability. Milton’s epic poem needs a fall with an epic magnitude. The 
routine of antithesis and synthesis sustains and propels the corporeal realm. Both Eve and 
Finch’s poetic persona know where they need to be to experience the joy of a complete solitude 
and retreat—thus they both end up in the shaded woods. Finch exclaims about a chance to be 
alone in the beginning of “The Petition for an Absolute Retreat”: “Give me yet, before I dye,/ A 
sweet, but absolute Retreat,/ ’Mongst paths so lost, and trees so high,/ That the world may ne’er 
invade,/ Through such Windings and such shade,/My unshaken liberty.” Then she further 
describes how her private time is being lost by participating in the pedestrian chores of daily 
social life. She eschews those with “listning ears” who let their time be usurped by the 
expectations of social and ideological conventions: “None who their vain Moments pass,/ Only 
studious of their Glass,/ News, that charm to listning Ears;/ That false Alarm to Hopes and Fears; 
That common Theme for every Fop,/ From the statesman to the shop,/ In those Coverts ne’er be 
spread,/ Of who’s Deceas’d, or who’s to Wed.” Finch declares that a private space 
undomesticated and untouched by the values of the outside world will result in a pure, true form 
of art. The “cleanliness” of true art will separate itself from the fake—the artist doesn’t have to 
forcefully lay out the differences other than simply making art that remains true to the artist’s 
convictions and desires, free of the “intruders” from the external world: “Courteous Fate! afford 
me there/ A Table spread without my care,/ With what the neighb’ring Fields impart,/ Whose 
Cleanliness be all it’s Art.”289 In a single description of a common house object such as a table, 
Finch succinctly condenses the two distinctively opposite images of a woman occupying her 
working space; Finch’s description of “a table spread without care” challenges the common 
                                                 
289 Finch, “The Petition for an Absolute Retreat.” Lines 22-25. 
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reactions from the reader who would more likely imagine a women’s naturalized, expected 
working place where she cooks and irons rather than the image of a woman sitting at her table 
working tirelessly on her poetry.290 The domestic image of women’s cooking space dissolves 
into Finch’s idealized creative space where the hard working poet sits at her messy table with all 
her works spread out “without [her] care.” Finch carries on with the comparison between writing 
and cooking to develop her argument for the aesthetic and moral wholesomeness of “plain, 
unstudied” (28) art “unshaken” (7) by affected styles and established conventions. Finch 
compares the cleanliness of pure art to the least cultivated or manipulated—in a sense, as pure as 
it is, raw—food:  
When, of old, the Calf was drest, 
(Tho’ to make an Angel’s feast) 
In the plain, unstudied Sauce 
Nor Treufle, nor Morilla was; 
Nor cou’d the mighty Patriarch’s Board 
One far-fetch’d Ortolane afford.  
Courteous Fate, then give me there 
Only plain, and wholesome Fare.  
Fruits indeed (wou’d Heaven bestow) 
All, that did in Eden grow, 
All, but the Forbidden Tree, 
                                                 
290 Imagine—the image of a messy table with the scratched-out or ink-stained papers spread out 
everywhere in a room is exactly what we are accustomed to envision when we think of a writer’s creative space. 
More importantly, this space is often associated with men. The ideology of women’s neatness often traps her in a 
place where the anticipation for domestic labor is inevitable. It is expected that a poet’s working table should be 
spread out, “without [the poet’s] care,” because the poet—a male figure—should only focus on doing the work of 
creation, and not the trivial work of cleaning. Only many centuries later, the conventional image of writing has 
become gender neutral.  
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Wou’d be coveted by me. 291 
Notice also how Finch chooses “the calf,” the young of the domestic cattle, to “make an angel’s 
feast” and that she uses only “the plain, unstudied sauce” to dress the meat. No elaborate or “far-
fetched” (31) ingredients and flavors will do—the poet wants to make something fresh and good 
inside and out by keeping the beginning ingredients untainted by worldly affectations. A feast 
good enough to feed angels must begin with fundamentally good and pure ingredients, and a 
good poem should begin with a good foundation as well; a good thought bears a good fruit, 
“unstudied” and “unshaken” by the pressures or power of the external world, Finch argues, as it 
is planted in the mind illuminated and nourished by the spiritual light. Neoplatonist overtones 
permeate this passage as the poet seeks for the marriage of spiritual and physical solace and 
purity to produce poetry “Whose Cleanliness be all it’s Art.” The poet stresses the importance of 
the pure ingredients for “an Angel’s feast” even though she also implies there could be nothing 
as clean or good as angels—hence the parenthesis around the concessive clause “(Tho’ to make 
an Angel’s Feast).”292 The poet argues that one must use “unstudied” ingredients to create “only 
plain, and wholesome Fare” for angels and that she would prefer uncooked, fresh raw food for 
this “wholesome fare”: “fruits indeed (wou’d Heaven bestow)/ All, that did in Eden grow,/ All, 
but the Forbidden Tree” would be “coveted” by herself. The innate purity is immanent in a true 
work of art, and the poet wants to feed her readers an honest work of art. 
If spiritual renewal and purification, in Milton’s words a kind of metaphysical 
renaissance “plant[ed]” in the mind to “purge and disperse,” can only occur through the poet’s 
                                                 
291 Finch, “The Petition for an Absolute Retreat.” Lines 26-37. 
292 Also note that the line “When, of old, the Calf was drest” can signify both the young animal and the 
muscle part of an old cow. The latter undoubtedly shows the new comes from the old, and the pure and brilliant can 
come from the dark and earthly. Finch sets off the “old” from “the calf” with commas and by placing “old” before 
“the calf.” Finch’s arrangement of the nouns by chronological occurrence—old came first, then the calf, and then the 
calf was dressed--also shows the artificiality of syntax and time construction in a sentence.  
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creative meandering in solitude, Eve’s desire to be alone and meander in the garden is essential 
for the desired fruition of pure and wholesome art. Most importantly, acknowledging one’s 
desire for solitude as an indication for artistic ambition supports the idea that Finch and Eve’s 
wandering in solitude generates a mature artistic fruition and enlightenment of the mind, in 
contrast to the popular condemnation of Eve’s behavior leading us to the unfortunate Fall. 
According to Finch’s assertion for the innate purity that determines the merit of one’s work, both 
abstract and corporeal “cleanliness” in poetry can only come to exist through a private practice 
and routine of being a poet. A clean and serene spiritual state cannot be achieved through an 
over-night “absolute retreat” away from any contamination or pressure from the external world. 
“Retreat” must become a habit, a practice, and this practice should become the poet’s life. This is 
Finch’s conviction for her poetic career; the space of “absolute retreat” must be domesticated—
naturalized—into a poet’s creative space. The “windings” and the “shade,” the private and 
hidden space where the poet can do her work without any interference or restrictions from the 
outside world, signifies a kind of pure “heaven” where she creates for spiritual nourishment.  
Milton, however, is not in dire need of solitude or darkness; he is usurped of physical 
light, surrounded by darkness and solitude. Milton begins Book III of Paradise Lost with what is 
known as “the invocation to light,” which lasts for the next fifty-four lines. While praising God 
as the eternal source of both spiritual and physical light, Milton also bares is soul, expressing 
how his blindness pushes him into an utter isolation from the world: “But cloud instead, and 
ever-during dark/ Surrounds me, from the cheerful ways of men/ Cut off, and for the book of 
knowledge fair/ Presented with a universal blank/ Of Nature’s works to me expunged and razed,/ 
And wisdom at one entrance quite shut out” (III.45-50). “Since God is light,” Milton says, God is 
in a sense unapproachable just as the brightness of a light makes approach physically blinding: 
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“Since God is light,/ And never but in unapproached light/ Dwelt from eternity, dwelt then in 
thee,/ Bright effluence of bright essence increate” (3-6). Milton’s comparison of God as 
“unapproached light” also alludes to the blind poet’s bewildered emotions toward the loss of his 
physical sight, as he cannot escape from the feelings of abandonment and isolation from God. 
Once again, “unapproached light” represents a light not only too bright to be seen but also 
signifies a light unseen. God who obliterated the poet’s sight is the same God who is being 
compared to light; yet the poet confesses that he still cannot comprehend—approach—God. 
Milton feels isolated from God as he is isolated from physical light. However, even though the 
overall tone of these lines might show polarizing emotions toward God and his blindness, Milton 
still believes physical blindness will encourage him to find the inward light that will illuminate 
the spirit and overcome the lack of physical sight. Rather than spending his time lamenting over 
the loss of his physical sight, Milton exclaims that he must turn to “So much rather thou celestial 
light/ Shine inward, and the mind through all her powers/ Irradiate, there plant eyes, all mist 
from thence/ Purge and disperse, that I may see and tell/ Of things invisible to mortal sight” (PL 
III. 51-55).293 After all, it consoles Milton that the darkness he endured would be replaced by a 
greater spiritual light to come; even though he is blinded from the physical world, the poet can 
rely on the spiritual light that “shine[s] inward.” Pushed away from the world visible to mortal 
sight, the poet must “plant” his eyes where the mind has endured self-criticism and self-doubt; 
the poet believes that the light visible to one’s mortal sight cannot “irradiate” the mind the way 
the spiritual light can “shine inward” and “purge and disperse.” If he can open his spiritual eye 
                                                 
293 Although I have already quoted these lines earlier, I can’t stress the significance of lines 51-55 from 
Book 3 of Paradise Lost enough. They became the guiding light throughout my dissertation and especially helped 
developing my discussion of the importance of the inward light for poetic imagination.  
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and look inside him, he may see the “celestial light”; he “may see and tell/ Of things invisible to 
mortal sight.”  
Shades are as important as lights in artistic representations, and Finch’s ardent assertion 
of the importance of shade, solitude, or melancholy in her poetry always amounts to an argument 
vouching for the most fundamental element of poetic imagination—mutability. In Finch’s “The 
Consolation” the poet finds solace in the circle of rise and fall and internalizes the physical law 
governing mutability by mimicking the routine of mutability in the form of poetry. 
See, Phoebus breaking from the willing skies,  
See, how the soaring Lark, does with him rise, 
And through the air, is such a journy borne 
As if she never thought of a return. 
Now, to his noon, behold him proudly goe, 
And look with scorn, on all that's great below. 
A Monark he, and ruler of the day, 
A fav'rite She, that in his beams does play. 
Glorious, and high, but shall they ever bee, 
Glorious, and high, and fixt where now we see? 
No, both must fall, nor can their stations keep, 
She to the Earth, and he below the Deep, 
At night both fall, but the swift hand of time 
Renews the morning, and again they climb, 
Then lett no cloudy change, create my sorrow, 
I'll think 'tis night, and I may rise to-morrow. 
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The images of mythical creatures and their magnificent ascension toward celestial perfection 
occupy the first ten lines until the concept of “Glorious, and high” reaches its highest point of 
escalation and exaltation of Phoebus and the Lark accomplished by the two lines opening with 
the repeated words, “Glorious, and high” (10). The “high,” brilliantly accented by the rising 
intonation preceding the question mark that concludes line ten, is depressed by a following turn 
that swiftly sinks into the sound of resolute decline—“No, both must fall” (11). Any poet who 
desires to “climb” the ladder of poetic greatness must endure the agonizing feeling of being 
defeated. Yet the routine of falling and rising continues as long as the poet cannot stop seeking, 
as Sidney writes in the beginning of his sonnet sequence Astrophil and Stella, “fit words to paint 
the blackest face of woe” while “Studying inventions fine” and “Oft turning others' leaves, to see 
if thence would flow/ Some fresh and fruitful showers.”294 Finch debunks ocular-verbocentric 
ideology and its perpetuation of the reduction of the topos of falling, darkness, or melancholy 
into the image of absence and deficiency. Finch emphasizes that the fall must occur—so can 
“again they climb,” as the ascendant spirit must begin somewhere to propel the poet to move 
forward and, as Finch’s earlier contemporary Milton insisted, “steer/ right onward.” 295 
 
7 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
Large projects inevitably feel incomplete to those undertaking them, and mine is no 
different. Much of my method has been exploratory and suggestive rather than definitive, an 
                                                 
294 Sir Philip Sidney, Astrophil and Stella, Sonnet 1, lines 5, 6, and 7-8. 
295 John Milton, Sonnet 22, lines 8-9. This sonnet provides another significant and guiding theme of my 
dissertation, which I have discussed in the previous chapters. I thought it would be appropriate to end my last 
chapter (aside from the conclusion) of my dissertation with the image of motioning up and moving forward, 
especially after my plunging into and navigating through the vast sea of the dissertating abyss. 
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honest reproduction of my own intellectual bent; therefore, many works that I had intended to 
include always seemed to remain just outside the scope of my study. Clearly, in the future I hope 
to expand my examination of the topos of light and inner vision to produce a more 
comprehensive analysis of the authors in question, as well as incorporate a wider array of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers who share the same intellectual concerns I have 
traced out in the preceding pages. A clear summary here in my conclusion of what I have 
accomplished so far should help create a more solid foundation for such future endeavors.   
As I have demonstrated, Sidney’s conception of figurative language and the poetic 
imagination provides a very useful foundation for an exploration of “inward light” represented in 
the works of Cavendish, Milton, and Finch. I have connected these figures in my study for a 
variety of reasons. For example, as I stated at the outset, Cavendish, Milton, and Finch all appear 
aligned in their insistence that accumulated sensory data gathered through scientific devices do 
not get one closer to “truth.” Because all three lived through the inception and early triumph of 
modern, experimental science, their varying yet consistent antagonism to the new science 
definitely provides a useful window through which to observe what they did consider a valid 
means of locating truth. In my study, Sidney’s reliance on “inward light” represents an alternate 
source of truth, one championed by all three of the later poets in my study (even Finch, whose 
inversion of light to darkness doesn’t diminish the interior, introspective nature of the truths she 
envisioned her poetry as uncovering). Sidney’s phrase opened up several important lines of 
investigation. For starters, the commonplace of light—or its lack—is ubiquitous in literary 
descriptions of truth, and, more importantly, serves to impart a sense of certain and absolute 
clarity to metaphoric representations combining light and truth.  Furthermore, Sidney’s argument 
for inner vision and spiritual energy, the “inward light,” suggests that uncovering truth requires a 
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turning inward. Truth can be misrepresented to the physical eye, but most importantly, truth can 
seldom be measured in a dimension capable of going under the actual scrutiny of instruments 
like the microscope. Inward vision or “inward light,” for the subjects in my study, suggested a 
spiritual authority distinct from corporeal reality, one that surpasses material temporality.  
In the dichotomy of “looking out” and “looking in” that I proposed, Sidney’s works made 
him an appropriate exemplar of the latter. The “inward light” that he advocates in The Defence of 
Poesy clearly announced the power of the individual imagination to grasp or produce truth in a 
process that renders the material world subordinate to the spiritual vision of the poet. Although 
literally looking in—through the microscope—Robert Hooke occupied the opposing pole of my 
dichotomy, for his influential work championed and popularized reliance upon physical sight and 
truth constructed from observable physical minutia. I have argued in this dissertation that 
Hooke’s microscopic seeing—and thus the reductionism inherent in modern science—
undermines the autonomy of spiritual sight, which Sidney considers sacred to the poetic 
imagination and describes as an “inward light each mind hath in itself.” As I showed, these two 
modes of knowledge-production work in opposing directions. Sidney argued for the primacy of 
universals and “fore-conceits” that preceded individual representations of truth through 
metaphoric and figural representation, whereas Hooke and other scientists envisioned more and 
more accurate representations of truth built from accumulated physical and sensory details. In 
Hooke’s experiments, light is the external source to reveal and magnify the small, and he claims 
that his book Micrographia illuminates the great and spiritual in the worldly and low. Regardless 
of the spiritual cast of Hooke’s stated goals, however, light always remained for him an external, 
mechanical force, whereas the light materialized in poetry—“inward light”—is a spiritual and 
intellectual source to illuminate the small, the hidden, or even the intangible.  
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Cavendish, the subject of my second chapter, wrote extensively about the “new” science 
and is important because she immediately perceived in Hooke’s works what she considered to be 
the damagingly materialist impetus of the new scientific method. The contrast between 
Cavendish and Hooke proceeds from my discussion of Sidney and Hooke in that it pits the same 
two ways of seeing and knowing the world against one another. As I stated in chapter two,  
Cavendish believed the contemplative mind could uncover legitimate and large truths from very 
limited or even singular sensory impressions; in contrast, Hooke sought truth through the 
repetition of careful observation, hypotheses, and testing. Cavendish argues that Hooke’s 
microscopic view defines the world by subordination, or worse, atomistic misrepresentation, and 
in a series of scathing and belittling narratives attempted to undermine faith in the veracity of the 
prosthetic sight of the new scientific instruments. Unlike Sidney, Cavendish stands out as an 
especially forthright and practical critic and poet because her matter-of-fact, self-reflective 
criticism of Hooke’s Micrographia makes the conflict between the scientific and the poetic 
search for truth more discernable and the agitated position of poetry—and poets—in the advent 
of new science more actual and urgent. Cavendish further predicts and details how the 
microscopic or atomistic view of the world will not only challenge the realm of poetic mutability 
and imagination but also subcategorize marginalized subjectivities.296 
 Milton, the subject of chapters three and four, wrote consistently about seeing both 
physically and spiritually. As I argued, poetic seeing for Milton induces the irradiating light; it 
enlightens him intellectually and spiritually while exposing him to a spiritual radiation that 
“purges and disperses” corporeal sights, but leaves him with the sight of “things invisible to 
                                                 
296 For example, in The Blazing World, a remarkably early work of science-fiction, Cavendish chooses a 
young woman, a conventionally marginalized subject, as a heroine of her story, who leaves her contemporary world 
to discover a utopian new world in another star, where she becomes the emperor of this new world that she governs 
using her own free will and reasoning.  
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mortal sight.”297 Thus in my analysis he is positioned squarely in line with Sidney, and I 
introduced Augustine as an additional foundation for my examination of Milton’s spiritual sight. 
Though the poet is unable to see outwardly, he does not need to look elsewhere anymore;  Milton 
insists in Paradise Lost that the “celestial light” will “shine inward,” illuminating and escalating 
his “mind through all her powers” (III. 51-52). Once one becomes aware of the importance of 
inward and spiritual sight in Milton’s work, one understands that they comprise a theme that 
Milton returned to repeatedly and consistently in his major works. 
Although most literary representations of light as truth materialize the spiritual authority 
of truth in a form of illumination and transcendence, my discussion of Finch showed how she 
sees the lack of physical light as a gateway to access poetic dawn—the poet becomes most 
independent and fruitful in exploring her poetic imagination and composing her poetry when she 
is away from both the physical and symbolic presence of the abundant and pervasive light. Finch 
compares the day light to the homogenous ideology that is everywhere—the ubiquitous day light 
undermines things devoid of conventional uniformity and normality. As I argued, her affinity for 
darkness is an esoteric and singular gesture breaking away from homogenous Western poetic 
conventions, one that even, I believe, undermines the verbo-ocular-ego centric values of the 
hegemonic social and class structures she attempted to escape in her quest for the less visual and 
less obvious. Finch emphasizes the role of shade as much as light in her poetic representations 
and encourages readers to rely on inward vision and intuition. Also, Finch’s explorations of 
melancholy and the lack of light in her poetry signal the most essential element of poetic 
imagination—mutability. The poet finds solace in the never-resting routine of rising and falling 
and advocates the physical law governing mutability in her poems, so that the topos of darkness 
                                                 
297 Milton, Book III, Paradise Lost, lines 54-55. 
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and the nocturnal motif recur and replace the conventional image of light. Above all, Finch 
reassures the readers that truth can be found in less obvious, less likely places if we do not lose 
the “inward light.” Thus, I end my dissertation with Finch’s suggestion that enlightenment can 
occur in the absence of light, hoping that when this extended academic exercise is over, I will 
find additional thoughts to illuminate under the guidance of my own “inward light.”  
I have, of course, uncovered multiple corollary projects I would like to pursue. For 
example, no discussion of these authors can avoid the obvious fact that they are split into two 
gendered pairs. As my tentative incorporation of gender in the preceding chapters shows, I am 
obviously interested in how the regulation of gender shaped the creation and reception of works 
by these authors. The burgeoning interest in the intersection of gender studies and science 
continues to create new materials that can profitably be imported into literary studies, 
particularly in the examination of the works of Cavendish. Furthermore, Milton’s Eve, it must 
have been obvious, emerged for me a figure of particular interest, for—her conventional role as a 
villain notwithstanding—she appears to possess a flexibility of mind and wisdom lacking in 
Adam, another division breaking upon the lines of gender.  
Of all the subjects of my study, however, I definitely wound up with a special affinity for 
and admiration of Finch. I hope to investigate further Finch’s exploration of various sensory 
experiences through her unconventional use of poetic imagery. I am repeatedly struck by the way 
she internalizes the lack of sound—quietness—and the lack of light—darkness—to create an 
esoteric aesthetic combining subjectivity and poetic ambition. The marriage between subjectivity 
and poetic identity Finch portrays in her poems disrupts the conventional motif of ego-centric 
and commanding authorship, for she does not hide her psychological downfalls and social 
unease. Finch’s open and revealing portrayals of her uneven, unconventional inner demons help 
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her create a unique poetic identity independent from the dominant image of the male author. The 
suspense and horror engendered by her psychological, inner monstrosity does not discourage the 
poet but rather inspires her to be even more engaged in her inner unknown dark abyss. Finch 
develops her own romantic aestheticism that embraces darkness and the sublime over the 
conventional sense of the beautiful, far preceding Edmund Burke’s exploration of the sublime in 
A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, published 
almost half a century later in 1757. Burke’s idea of the sublime focuses on external stimuli and 
the effect of astonishment on the readers, but Finch’s internalization of darkness, fear, and the 
sublime reveals the poet’s own psychological confrontation and awakening inside her mind 
rather than the emotional reaction being roused in the readers, which sets her apart from 
nineteenth-century romanticism.298 Indeed, Finch was ambivalent about the reading public, and 
Finch wrote in her poem “The Introduction” that she does not intend her lines “for publick view” 
(line 1) because she is afraid that her work might receive “so many censures” (2) and the 
conventional critics, clearly implied as male, “all might say, they’re by a woman writ” (8).299  
The idea of growth through inner psychological chaos does require “inward light.” In 
Book IV of Paradise Lost, Milton shows through the description of Satan’s inner hell that the 
thought of hell is as horrific as being in hell: “Horror and doubt distract/ His troubled thoughts, 
and from the bottom stir/ The Hell within him, for within him Hell/ He brings, and round about 
                                                 
298 In “Essay Supplementary to the Preface of 1815” to a collected volume of his poems, Wordsworth 
exaggerates and misrepresents Finch’s descriptions of and emotional reactions toward nature as the nascent sign of 
the nineteenth-century Romanticism. 
299 Finch is aware of the unfortunate fact that the conventional readers and critics who are male will say: 
“Alas! a woman that attempts the pen,/ Such an intruder on the rights of men,/ Such a presumptuous creature, is 
esteemed,/ The fault can by no virtue be redeemed” (9-12). And she also acutely points out how those critics 
condemn women who want to think and create things for--and by--themselves: “They tell us we mistake our sex and 
way;/ Good breeding, fashion, dancing, dressing, play/ Are the accomplishments we should desire;/ To write, or 
read, or think, or to inquire/ Would cloud our beauty, and exhaust our time,/ And interrupt the conquests of our 
prime” (lines 13-18). 
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him, nor from Hell/ One step no more than from himself can fly/ By change of place” (IV. 18-
23). Satan laments that he carries hell within himself, that “Which way I fly is Hell; myself am 
Hell” (IV. 75). There is no “inward light” for Satan, nor does he even try to “look in [his] heart” 
before he confines himself in hell. However, Finch is able to “look in [her] heart and write,” 
confronting her inner darkness to inspire her poetry.300 In Sonnet 5 of Astrophil and Stella, 
Sidney asserts: “It is most true, that eyes are form’d to serve/ The inward light; and that the 
heavenly part/ Ought to be king, from whose rules who do swerve,/ Rebels to Nature, strive for 
their own smart” (lines 1-4). This “inward light” clearly proved extremely illuminating for 
Sidney, Cavendish, Milton, and Finch.  
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